Philosophy Faculty Publications

Title

Intentions, Rights and Wrongs: A Critique of Fried

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1984

Publication Source

Philosophy Research Archives

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Fried’s thesis that a wrong must be intended by the violator in order for a person’s negative rights to be violated. With Fried’s requirement these rights become in a sense derivative from wrongs. This makes the relation between one’s negative rights and one’s moral integrity, upon which Fried wants to base rights, indirect and inappropriately weak. If rights are based on one’s status as a freely choosing, rational, moral personality, then whether one’s rights are violated should be determined by inspecting one’s own loss of integrity or function, not by examining the assailant’s intentions.

Inclusive pages

239-247

ISBN/ISSN

0164-0771

Comments

Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher

Philosophy Research Archives

Volume

10

Peer Reviewed

yes