Philosophy Faculty Publications

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2009

Publication Source

Philosophy of Science

Abstract

James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfiesWoodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible.

Inclusive pages

821-837

ISBN/ISSN

0031-8248

Document Version

Published Version

Comments

The document available for download is provided here in compliance with publisher policies on self-archiving. Any content used from this article must be attributed properly. Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher

Philosophy of Science Association

Volume

76

Issue

5

Peer Reviewed

yes

Link to published version

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