Philosophy Faculty Publications

Title

Naturalism and the Surreptitious Embrace of Necessity

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2011

Publication Source

Metaphilosophy

Abstract

In this article, two philosophical positions that structure distinct approaches in the history of metaphysics and epistemology are briefly characterized and contrasted. While one view, “naturalism,” rejects an a priori commitment to necessity, the other view, “transcendentalism,” insists on that commitment. It is shown that at the level of the fundamentals of thought, judgment, and reason, the dispute dissolves, and the naturalists' employment of “necessity for all practical purposes” is at best only nominally distinct from the transcendentalists' use of the same concept.

Inclusive pages

17-32

ISBN/ISSN

0026-1068

Comments

Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher

John Wiley & Sons

Volume

42

Issue

1-2

Peer Reviewed

yes

Keywords

a priori, principle of noncontradiction, naturalism, Kant, philosophy of logic