Philosophy Faculty Publications

Title

The Grammatical Background of Kant's General Logic

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-2008

Publication Source

Kantian Review

Abstract

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant conceives of general logic as a set of universal and necessary rules for the possibility of thought, or as a set of minimal necessary conditions for ascribing rationality to an agent (exemplified by the principle of non-contradiction). Such a conception, of course, contrasts with contemporary notions of formal, mathematical or symbolic logic.

Yet, in so far as Kant seeks to identify those conditions that must hold for the possibility of thought in general, such conditions must hold a fortiori for any specific model of thought, including axiomatic treatments of logic and standard natural deduction models of first-order predicate logic. Kant's general logic seeks to isolate those conditions by thinking through – or better, reflecting on – those conditions that themselves make thought possible.

Inclusive pages

116-140

ISBN/ISSN

1369-4154

Comments

Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Volume

13

Issue

1