Title

Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Emotions

Author(s)

Myrna Gabbe, University of DaytonFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2016

Publication Source

Apeiron

Abstract

This article explores the nature of Aristotelian emotions and the body-soul metaphysics required to undergird them. The point of departure is an oft-cited argument that appeals to our experience of fear and anger to show the inseparability of the soul. My claim is that this argument is commonly misunderstood: that the intended target is not a separable soul, but an embodied soul.

Reinterpreted, we find that Aristotle is driven by an interest to integrate the sentient body with the intellect. And while, on this interpretation, the argument does not support a functionalist reading of Aristotle on the soul, it does suggest that Aristotle shares key intuitions with embodied cognition theorists and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, in particular, who demonstrates the dependence of reason on the body.

Inclusive pages

33–56

ISBN/ISSN

0003-6390

Document Version

Published Version

Comments

This document is provided for download in compliance with the publisher's policy on self-archiving. Permission documentation is on file.

Copyright

Copyright © 2016, Walter de Gruyter

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter

Volume

49

Issue

1

Peer Reviewed

yes

Keywords

pathê (or affections); logoi enuloi; body; functionalism; embodied cognition

eCommons Citation

Gabbe, Myrna, "Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Emotions" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 96.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/96