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Toward A Deweyan Theory of Ethical and Aesthetic Performing Arts Practice

By

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Manuscript Summary: This paper formulates a Deweyan theory of performing arts practice that relies for its support on two main things: 1) the unity Dewey ascribed to all intelligent practices (including artistic practice) and 2) the observation that many aspects of the work of performing artists of Dewey’s time include features (“dramatic rehearsal,” action, interaction and habit-development) that are part of Dewey’s characterization of the moral life. This does not deny the deep import that Dewey ascribed to aesthetic experience (both in art and in life) but it does suggest that we might use his theory of ethical practice in conjunction with his theory of art as experience in order to create a more robust and unified Deweyan theory of what the performing artist does.

Biographical Note: Aili Bresnahan is a philosophy professor and former dancer and lawyer who specializes in aesthetics and American Pragmatism. She received her law degree from Georgetown University Law Center (Washington, DC) and her PhD in Philosophy from Temple University (Philadelphia, PA), where she completed her dissertation, Dance as Art: A Studio-Based Account under the guidance of Joseph Margolis.

Key Words: John Dewey, performing arts, pragmatism, ethics, aesthetics, dramatic rehearsal, moral imagination
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I. Introduction

In John Dewey’s philosophy, there is a significant unity and interconnection between all human activities that involve intelligence and control, whether such activities are ethical, scientific, educational or artistic. This means that to some degree, for Dewey, all human endeavors are unified by the human self and one area of activity can bear fruit in another. The focus of this article is to make an observation about performing arts practice that is supported by Dewey’s theory of ethical practice, a form of activity that is so integrated, situated, qualitative and aesthetic that the traditional post-Kantian dualism between art and morality (also perpetuated by Nietzsche) disappears in the unity of the self. 1 At the same time it also overcomes the Cartesian dualism between mind and body. 2

Dewey’s description of how we conduct our moral lives and develop our ethical capacities has many similarities with what performing artists often do in the context of making and performing art. Garry Hagberg and Michael Szekely have delivered papers at American Society for Aesthetics meetings that highlight jazz as an example of Dewey’s ethics at work. My project in this paper plays out differently from theirs because my aim is broader than understanding how jazz or any particular art might be ethical; I seek instead an expanded and unified Deweyan theory of artistic practice and experience that extends to the performing arts. I call it “Deweyan” not because I think Dewey’s philosophy can be mined to reveal this specific theory but because it is an extension of his views that furthers his thinking and does not contradict his stated views on art and on ethics in any way. Further, I think it is a theory that is not too unlike one Dewey might have had if he knew more about how performing arts such as
dance, theatre and music are practiced and performed from the point of view of the practitioner rather than the appreciator.

There is no evidence to show that Dewey thought deeply about what it is that performing artists do. Indeed, in a lecture delivered to the Washington Dance Association Dewey declared himself to be “not competent to give a talk upon dance as an art” due to his lack of familiarity with dance. He thus discusses only its history, in a meandering discussion in which he declares dance to be “the source of all the arts” due to “its connection with music, song, pantomime and at least some form of plastic art in the scenic decorations” and then acknowledges that dance is now considered to be a fine art, to be experienced as such, when it wasn’t before. There is no discussing of dancing or of choreographing or performing dances at all.

Dewey primarily treats art as experience, rather than ethical practice, but this does not mean that he would not have been amenable to the idea that performing arts practice shares much in common with the practice of ethics. He would likely have agreed that both the activities of art and of ethics are unified in the human self and that the same experiential qualities found in the ethical and artistic realms are also present in everyday experience – in heightened form in the case of art and aiming specifically towards the good and the wise in ethics. In developing this theory of performing arts practice along Deweyan ethical as well as aesthetic lines my intention is merely to add to, and not to replace, Dewey’s theory of artistic practice as characterized by aesthetic experiential quality. Dewey’s ethics are used here only to flesh out and unify that account so that it can account for certain features of performing arts practice that are otherwise unaccounted for. My suggestion is not that doing this will provide a sufficient account of everything involved in performing arts practice but that infusing Dewey’s aesthetic theory of artistic practice with his ethical theory will show Dewey to have application not just for
explaining the experience of making and “doing” art but for explaining how the performing arts involve problem solving and interaction with others in furtherance of not just an experience but a kind of communal good as well.

So why isolate the performing arts in this way? Why not include the visual arts as well? Here my goal is merely to highlight a paradigmatically interactive and social category of art. Keeping a performance of dance, music or theatre in mind makes it easier to see how art can be live and interactive, although this is not to say that painting and sculpture (especially performance pieces) cannot also be interactive and social. This essay’s attention to the performing arts is merely a methodological attempt to focus the discussion on paradigm cases, particularly since the social/interactive thesis requires more development in the case of the plastic arts than the space considerations of one article will allow.

In a typical performance of music, dance or theatre there is a relationship between performer(s) and audience in which direct eye contact can be made; the same air is breathed, most sounds made are heard by all, and at least some qualitative thoughts and emotions are shared. The relationship between performers on the stage, and between performers and audience, typically takes place in a communal atmosphere. The performers share their work, an audience responds, and everyone present can experience the reactions to the work and the responses of the others in the performing space. For the duration of a performance there is giving, receiving, sharing and work performed by all the participants in the experience.

There is, then, a sense in which the performing arts are social; the participants are engaged in the kind of activity Dewey believes human beings are engaged in all the time, interacting with the world and fashioning a life and a character out of this interaction. Since we have the ability to think, imagine, reflect and direct our actions, for Dewey this means that we
can and should strive to live in dynamic harmony with one another. Living well (leading a good life) thus requires “work,” which for Dewey means that it requires dedicated attention to the growth and development of both our selves and of our social communities. If we don’t see this morality as an “art” and as “concrete work” then we have just isolated a moral ideal that becomes impotent through lack of use. As we learn what happened in this situation and what happened in that we make better and better decisions. We develop good habits and dispositions against a background knowledge culled from a qualitative sensitivity toward and connection with others and our activities and our selves are unified in moral action.

When Dewey mentions the performing arts he tends to speak of them in anthropological, biological or psychological terms (tribal communal practices, for example, or a person’s seeking confirmation of internal rhythms). Dewey speaks wistfully of the way that dancing and pantomime once flourished in religious rites and celebrations, music and song used to be “intimate parts of the rites and ceremonies in which the meaning of group life were consummated” and athletic sports and drama “celebrated and enforced traditions of race and group, instructing the people, commemorating glories, and strengthening their civic pride”. It also seems that all “art,” for Dewey, is a form of craftsmanship (following what he says is the view of the Ancient Greeks) and that the “fine arts” are distinguishable from these only in terms of historical practices that developed in certain ways under particular conditions and ideals.

Perhaps Dewey would have recognized that the performing arts involve a hybrid unification of poēsis and praxis (using these terms as Richard Shusterman does, in which poēsis means a process of doing, undergoing or making an aesthetic object and praxis means rational, practical action). Indeed, in Art as Experience Dewey notes that “[s]ince artistic refers
primarily to the act of production and ‘esthetic’ to that of perception and enjoyment, the absence of a term designating the two processes taken together is unfortunate.”

If Dewey had been trained as a performing artist in dance, theatre or music he might have noticed that working as a performing artist does do something similar to what the moral agent does in being often deliberative, imaginative, active, interactive and character developing in a way that unifies the experiential and qualitative with the practical and active. Such unification of seemingly opposing dualistic forces (overcoming what he says is Plato’s legacy) is typical for Dewey. *Art as Experience,* for example, repeats the conclusions of his early psychological paper on *The Reflex Arc Theory* that decried the common notion of the reflex arc as one that viewed sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses as “separate and complete entities in themselves” (erroneously) instead of “as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole,” making a circuit rather than an arc and an organic unity rather than a reflex. In *Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten Account* David Sudnow provides an additional perspective on what is wrong with the traditional conception of the reflex arc theory. In short, Sudnow claims that evidence of how jazz musicians acquire the skills needed to play complicated “jazz sentences” contradicts the empiricist idea that skills are formed from associations of experiences or from a linear sequence of neural connections (the old idea of “the reflex arc”).

Dewey says in *Art as Experience* that the “action” of the artist, or the scientific inquirer, or the teacher, or the lawyer, or the doctor, is not separate from the experience of his or her art but is “emotionally and imaginatively dyed” with a “heightened consciousness.” Performing arts practice (*as a practice of art*) thus shares certain functions with what Dewey conceives to be the practice of ethics and other practices but it is not identical to them; it may be, for example,
that performing arts practice has higher qualitative value and lower practical value. The point here is that performing arts practice does have practical value for Dewey.

II. Other Attempts to Derive A Deweyan Theory of Artistic Practice that Could be Extended to the Performing Arts

Most philosophers of art who write about the connection between Dewey and art (such as Shusterman, Donald Kuspit and Van Meter Ames) focus on what Dewey says is art’s ability to provide a unified, heightened and consummatory experience. A few (Shusterman, Philip Jackson and Tom Leddy) also mention Dewey’s theory of art as an ongoing process of practice or as lived experience, the part of his aesthetic theory with particularly close ties to his ethical theory. David Granger, R. Keith Sawyer, Michael Mitias and Stephen Fesmire have theories that attempt to show how Dewey’s theories of imagination and expression might pertain to artistic improvisation. None of these theories, however, highlight how all of the imaginative, active, interactive and social elements involved in Dewey’s ethics can also be found in the performing arts. Shusterman’s book, Performing Live, despite a title that suggests an aim similar to mine, speaks primarily about the “live” or “somatic” nature of experiencing art (in terms of the art of living well) and does not address the practical aspects of the action and interaction involved in making and performing it. Shusterman does mention a few times in the book that Dewey recognized art’s “social function” and “process” but then Shusterman places far more emphasis on what he says is the “embodied experience” of art as a way, perhaps, of ushering in the “pragmatist aesthetics” of experience that he has coined “somaesthetics.”

In his book, Pragmatist Aesthetics, Shusterman argues that one can either take what he says is Dewey’s position that art “is surely aesthetic experience” or adopt a historicist theory that defines art as a social or cultural practice. This approach deepens the post-Kantian dualism between aesthetics and ethics that Dewey seeks to avoid. Although Dewey acknowledges that
there is no “direct moral effect and intent to art” he does point out that there is an important way in which art “exercises its humane function” via “the collective civilization that is the context in which works of art are produced and employed.”

A fuller and more unified Deweyan approach, I suggest, is one that would allow the situated socio-cultural and historic practice in which the self and his or her art develops to add to the account of that same self’s capacity to engage in a heightened aesthetic experience.

One way to “update” this theory in light of contemporary views of the self might be to use Joseph Margolis’ work on how the artistic performance and activity of an encultured self is not reducible to brain functions that operate mechanically (and without a concept of “purpose” or final cause). If one wanted to use current research in psychology and/or in neuroscience one might do so, carefully, as long as one kept in mind that Dewey has both Darwinian naturalist and Hegelian tendencies and that such an analysis should not inadvertently follow the naturalist line without careful consideration of how to justify this move in terms of Deweyan interpretation.

Mark Johnson, for example, is one philosopher who incorporates neuroscience into a Deweyan analysis and I refer the reader to his work for more on this.

The idea that for Dewey the conjunction of socio-cultural practice and history is what operates in the self along with the agent’s aesthetic experiential capacity is supported by two primary considerations: 1) For Dewey aesthetic experience is the qualitative aspect of all intelligent practices (including the historical, cultural and ethical), and 2) in fact, Dewey himself suggests that he would agree that history and culture affect both experience and practice. He says, for example, that “[t]he most elaborate philosophic or scientific inquiry and the most ambitious industrial or political enterprise has, when its different ingredients constitute an integral experience, esthetic quality.”
Experience of a child learning to cry for a purpose (“because the relation between doing and undergoing is perceived”) rather than merely as a “blind” expression. “There is now art in incipiency,” Dewey declares. “An activity that was ‘natural’—spontaneous and unintended—is transformed because it is undertaken as a means to a consciously entertained consequence. Such transformation marks every deed of art.” This is what Margolis would call “enculturation” (the learning of historical and social practices) at work.

There is room, then, for Dewey’s theory of art to grow and develop along paths other than the experiential one Shusterman has blazed. An account of performing arts practice enriched by Dewey’s ethics simply emphasizes the unity Dewey embraces between all intelligent activities of the self. Let us focus, now, on this unity in greater detail.

III. The Unity of Artistic and Ethical Action

As mentioned earlier, Dewey does not separate the moral person from his or her artistic, scientific, educational or political life. One’s life is one life; as complex as that life may be. A human being exists in the world in an interactive, progressive and continuous way. All aspects of her experience interact, overlap and fuse together into one self that includes and applies any background knowledge accumulated so far to each one of her activities. This means that for Dewey a meeting or conversation with another person would not involve separate functions of seeing the person, listening to her words, thinking about her and shaking her hand. Instead, all of these things are integrated in one unified experience that one might remember as “meeting Jill.” The whole self is fully absorbed and aware of the experience (this is where the qualitative, aesthetic aspect comes in) and there is a full, realized unity between the self and what it does.

Dewey refers, for example, to “the various ways in which the self interacts with the world” as having a “unitary connection” and to “the fact that all distinctions which analysis can
introduce into the psychological factor are but different aspects and phases of a continuous, though varied, interaction of self and environment . . . ”30 What this means is that for Dewey there are no separate categories or compartments in our selves or in our psyches, that divide our “ethical” abilities and capacities from our “aesthetic” ones. “There are no intrinsic psychological divisions between the intellectual and the sensory aspects; the emotional and ideational; the imaginative and the practical phases of human nature.”31 A person in nature is a live, interacting organism, body and spirit are joined to form one, unified self where that is interacting with “an environment that is human as well as physical, that includes the materials of tradition and institutions as well as local surroundings.”32 Additional support for this view may be found in one of Dewey’s earlier works, the lecture on the logic of ethics that he gave at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1895. Here Dewey says that intellectual, aesthetic and moral value interact and develop within a unity of experience during the development of self, with the aesthetic leading the way and the intellectual following.33

This means that for Dewey artistic action cannot help but be influenced by ethical action and vice-versa. When the self is developed through ethical action (as when a child learns to respect others) this is the same self who might then interact with other performers onstage and with the audience, bring all his capacities, developed in artistic, ethical and other activities, to bear on the experience.

Dewey says that art might affect ethics in the following way. He says:

Cooperation and sympathy are fostered by the activities of art. Some of these activities are spontaneous, but most of them serve some definite social end and are frequently organized for the definite purpose of increasing the unity and sympathy of the group. The hunting dance or the war dance represents, in dramatic form, all the processes of the hunt or fight, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this takes place purely for dramatic purposes.34
Here Dewey has referenced dance (and drama) but for Dewey communal singing provides a similar “uniting force” and “a unity of rhythm” that fosters good will and cooperation.  

Here, then, the aims of ethics, and of art, are continuous. Let us turn now to Dewey’s account of the moral agent.

IV. The Parallels Between Dewey’s Ethics and What Performing Artists Do

For Dewey, imagination, deliberation and reflection are necessary parts of moral action since what is right and wrong is clear only in the context of particular situations. This process of what Dewey calls “dramatic rehearsal” includes five steps:

(i) a felt difficulty;
(ii) its location and definition;
(iii) suggestion of possible solutions;
(iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; [and]
(v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection...

Dramatic rehearsal also involves the imagination necessary to predict what will happen as a result of a particular action.

Musical composers have attested to the fact that thinking (the deliberation and imagination stage) is often the hardest part of what they do. After a visit to the Middle East, India and Ceylon in the early 1960s, for example, Duke Ellington remarked, when working on some music with Eastern rhythms, “The most work I have done so far is to think, and this is the most important part. Once you make up your mind, you just put it on paper.” Ellington also dismissed the Kantian idea that improvisation is about “free play of the imagination.” “Anyone who plays anything worth hearing,” Ellington said, “knows what he’s going to play, no matter whether he prepares a day ahead or a beat ahead. It has to be with intent.”
Ballet dancer and choreographer, George Balanchine, also used his imagination and forethought in his artistic practice of planning the movements to be used in a dance performance. As he explained:

So you sit and think, how do you make the movement go with the musical line and not with the accents within a bar? If in the music there is a strong accent, the dance doesn’t have to have one. You look, the music is in three-quarter time, but in the notes that could be six eight. And in turn, six eight isn’t simply six even parts: the accent can fall on the even note or on the odd one. You have to keep all this in your mind.41

Similar difficulties arise when a choreographer plans the casting of a dance. A short cavalier (a male role), for both aesthetic and ethical reasons, usually requires a shorter ballerina. Mismatched sizes may not look right, aesthetically, and if a ballerina is taller (and the cavalier’s arms shorter) it makes it hard for the cavalier to avoid being hit by her rotating knee when he holds her waist in an assisted pirouette. Avoiding this sort of injury is ethical, even if it does not cause (if the dancers are truly professional) a perceivable negative aesthetic effect. Here is one case, then, where a performance is modified to accommodate ethical, and not merely, aesthetic, considerations.

In theatre there are also notorious instances of performers behaving ethically, or boorishly, when it comes to their relations to the other performers on stage. “Upstaging” one’s fellow players, for example, is something a performer might do to force his or her fellow actor to have to place their back to the audience when responding to the dialogue spoken by someone behind him (on the higher back level of most stages). This harms the directorial intent, and the intelligibility of the play to the audience, and thus affects the aesthetic response as well. An example of good ethical behavior in theatre would be when an actor assists another performer who has dropped his or her lines (by accident, one can presume) or who misses an entrance, exit.
or other cue by quick-thinking and improvised “covering” (by filling in dialogue or performing another action) so that the aesthetic integrity of the play is continuous.

After planning and executing similar ethical actions a number of times Dewey’s moral agent begins to acquire the habits necessary to react to similar situations in ways that produce comparably good results. Dewey calls this development “conscientiousness,” which he characterizes as the “ability to judge the significance of what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing what we do, not by means of direct cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering those impulses and habits which experience has shown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial in perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.”

Here a person has become a skilled moral practitioner with the ability to both judge and navigate her interactions with other people, thereby creating new meaning and values for her life; it is then that “our judgments are reasonable.”

Once imagination, deliberation and rehearsal have taken place whether in ethics or in the performing arts, it is important to emphasize that for Dewey one must do – one must act. Action, for Dewey, is whatever a person does with deliberation, thought, planning, direction and purpose. Moral action is performed on the basis of an evaluative moral judgment and the result of such action is practical moral knowledge. “What a man does,” Dewey declares, “is what his real judgment of the good is.” Dewey eschews the idea that our actions are the result of a hedonistic desire for pleasure (once again, a position that counters any idea that his aesthetics is about the sensual heightening and consummating of experience). In Dewey’s ethical world, pleasure can be a physical stimulus but it cannot be a motive operating upon us through an
abstract ideal.\textsuperscript{45} Instead we have a motivation that constitutes what it means to have an “interest” in something that is not limited to morality. Dewey says that an interest is:

an any concrete case of the union of the self in action with an object and end …[He explains that] children form the interest of a parent; painting or music is the interest of an artist; the concern of a judge is the equable settling of legal disputes; healing the sick is the interest of a physician. An interest is, in short, the dominant direction of activity, and in this activity desire is united with an object to be furthered in a decisive choice.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus achieving one’s goals and furthering one’s interests are combined in organized action that at the highest level is self-directed (in accordance with our acquired habits) and in this sense at least there is no distinction in kind between moral, professional and artistic action.\textsuperscript{47}

It is overcoming obstacles and conflicts in the course of organized action that causes us to develop our theory and our character. Once this development takes place we have a skill or mode of conduct that is not limited to the moral realm.\textsuperscript{48} In terms of self-development, then, there is nothing to exclude what the performing artist does from Dewey’s realm of intelligent and qualitative action.

So, one might ask, where are the points of discontinuity – how is the practice of morality and performing arts practice different? Can a performance of dance, theatre or music do everything that morality can do? And can it be immoral? The biggest difference between being a moral agent and an artist, for Dewey and for others, is undoubtedly in the purposes for which each activity is undertaken. I have suggested in the examples provided above that artists often employ a certain amount of communal understanding and harmony, understood as a moral good, in order to do and make and perform “art” that is good in the sense of “working” as a cohesive unit. But what about those situations in which they do not perform as communal, good-seeking aesthetic and ethical agents but as an individualistic diva, as in the case of the opera star who tramples on her cast on the way to center stage and holds her note so long that the next
component of the song is rushed or unable to take place at all? Might not there be a performance of art in which self-seeking motives and practices yield something that is aesthetically and artistically valuable? The answer is yes. The fact that there is often interaction, community awareness, deliberation, dramatic rehearsal and all the other features of Dewey’s ethical action in performing arts practice does not change the fact that there are some performances that are valued for their aesthetic and artistic qualities and features in cases where the social interactions are unharmonious or even positively unethical. There is a wide and varied literature on when and how artistic appreciation and experience is limited or harmed by negative, objectionable, offensive and other types of unethical content and purposes and whether art should be “free” from such considerations or responsive to them. Artists will also differ as to when and how they choose to let moral and ethical considerations change or affect their aesthetic and artistic choices in making and performing art. In certain cases the entire purpose of dance, or play or musical piece may be to transgress established social and moral norms in ways that Dewey would undoubtedly have found to be counter to his goals for a harmonious, inclusive and democratic society. My point here has only been to show that there is performing arts activity that is good in the interactive, social, communal sense that is part of what comprises Dewey’s society of moral agents. And that when it is we can understand this as an activity of the artist’s unified self, a self who is also a moral agent and person in the world.

V. Conclusion

One can speculate that if Dewey had written a book on performing arts practice (entitled The Art of Making, Doing and Performing Art, for example as a supplement to Art as Experience) that it might have followed the thinking that guided his work on ethics in terms of intelligent direction of the activities of the artists for the common good of all of the participants,
including the audience, of the performance as a whole. He did not, perhaps, because he found
the heightened level of the qualitative and aesthetic in art to be its most salient feature since this
was the primary mode in which Dewey interacted with art. Aesthetic qualitative experience,
however, is not limited to the arts for Dewey. Indeed, in his early lectures Dewey made the
aesthetic the primary stimulus for the development of ethics, logic and science. Nor is
deliberative, imaginative and self-developing intelligent action limited to ethics. Some
performing artists, some of the time, in their creative and experiential practice, do integrate the
qualitative, the practical and the ethical in what Dewey might call the mind-body activity of a
unified self. A truly Deweyan theory of art, then, is one that cannot (on pain of the dualisms he
sought so strenuously to avoid) be regulated to aesthetic experience alone. Further, we can
extend Dewey’s ethics to the active, practical, integrative and social aspects of the performing
arts without losing any of his rich understanding of the aesthetic experience of art. We can also
do so without losing the artistic freedom that performing artists hold dear.

1 Here the term “performing arts” refers primarily of dance, music and theatre, but does not refer only to the Western
“fine arts” that might fit within this category. Instead, both the performing arts that appear on a stage and the
performing arts that are part of the communal life of Western and non-Western cultures are included as well and that
may take place in such diverse locations as a field, a shack, a place of religious worship, a juke joint or a backyard.
2 Thanks goes to Casey Haskins for making this observation.
3 Dewey, “The Philosophy of the Arts,” 357. Thanks goes to Alex Robins for bringing this lecture to my attention.
4 Ibid., 357-359.
6 Thanks goes to Erum Naqvi for pointing out that there are parallels in the visual arts too, especially on a Deweyan
analysis.
For space reasons I have not chosen to extend Dewey’s theory of art into the realm of politics but for a work on Dewey’s theory of the function of art as social communication see Mattern, “John Dewey, Art and Public Life,” 54-75.


Dewey, Art as Experience, 5 and 6.

See, e.g., Dewey, Art as Experience, 236-237.


Dewey, Art as Experience, 48.


See Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten Account, particularly the foreword.

Dewey, Art as Experience, 273.


See Shusterman, Performing Live, ix-xii. See also 15, where Shusterman says that “Dewey celebrated aesthetic experience [emphasis supplied], making it the very center of his philosophy of art …”)

Support for this view can be found in Dewey’s essay, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism.” See also Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics, 34-61.

Dewey, Art as Experience, 360.
24 See Margolis, *The Cultural Space of the Arts and the Infelicities of Reductionism*.

25 See, for example, Johnson’s books, *Moral Imagination, The Meaning of the Body* and (with G. Lakoff), *Philosophy in the Flesh*.


27 Ibid., 65. See also chapter 14, where Dewey explains the close relationship between art and civilization.


31 Ibid., 258.

32 Ibid., 256.


35 Ibid., 46. See also Dewey, *Art and Experience*, 84.


40 Ibid., 273, quoting Duke Ellington.

41 Volkov, *Balanchine’s Tchaikovsky: Interviews with George Balanchine*, 139-140.


44 Dewey, *Lectures on the Logic of Ethics*, §244.
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