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Concerned Philosophers for Peace

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# CONCERNED PHILOSOPHERS FOR PEACE NEWSLETTER

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## We Try To Craft A Pieceful World, But the Tool We Use is Violence

**Duane Cady**  
Hamline College

In November [1998] the UN passed a resolution declaring the first decade of the new millennium a decade of nonviolence for the children of the world. In March [1999] NATO violated its own charter to open an offensive war against Yugoslavia. We aspire to nonviolence but our actions reveal our true values: In Violence We Trust.

It's hard to figure out why we are so committed to violence given its track record after WW II. The results have been mixed at best; often violence has made bad situations worse. The Kosovo situation fits this pattern.

In one of his more famous aphorisms Nietzsche says, "If the only tool you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail." Watching a small child with a hammer makes the point obvious. Recognizing the broader implications may give us insight into our continuing to rely on violence to address bad situations.



I think the main reason we continue to design, create, stockpile, deploy, use, clean up after and replace ever more ingenious means of violence is that we don't know what else to do. But we are Americans, after all, and we have to do something. We can't just sit by and let grave injustice flourish and we're not about to admit that we have no idea what might actually help the situation.

The only tool we have is violence. Of course we would use it. Taking up violence satisfies our need to do something to counter violence, invasion, injustice. Violence can satisfy an urge for revenge and occasionally it can set a temporary negative peace in place, at least for as long as we're willing to remain an occupying force. But negative peace wrought through violence is at best a begrudging concession of a beaten, resentful and humiliated enemy.

Genuine peace involves willful participation, cooperation and community. These are created not by violence but by care, trust, respect and equality. Genuine peace is complex, fragile, and develops slowly; violence is simplistic, insistent and quick. Powerlessness, frustration, impatience and injustice all tempt us to achieve the ever-elusive quick fix. We Americans simply can't resist the temptation even though we know better when we reflect on the legacy of violence.

As soon as we are seduced to violence in yet another bad situation where violence is only likely to make things worse, we in fact reinforce the illusion that violence can fix injustice and we reinforce the destructive cycle.

Our problem is that we have only a hammer. Virtually all of the effort and resources we put to preparing ourselves for dealing with bad situations are focused on the means of violence. If we were to take seriously the UN resolution to open the millennium devoting our effort and resources to create a decade of nonviolence for the children of the world, then perhaps we would have more effective tools available to us in 2010 when we face bad situations.

Until we build the tools for a truly new world order we will be stuck with the legacy of the failed violent world order.

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Ed. Note. This editorial originally appeared in the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* (April 11, 1999). It is reprinted with the permission of the author, who also posted this editorial on the CPP list server on April 19, 1999). Dates in brackets were added to the original.

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## 1998 CPP Presidential Address

### What Is To Be Done? A Concerned Philosopher's Dilemma

Beth J. Singer

Professor Emeritus, City University of New York, Brooklyn College

The subtitle of this paper was to read, simply, "a philosopher's dilemma," but in looking over my philosophical library and thinking about the philosophers I know, I realized that not everyone in the field shares the concerns of those who belong to this organization. As a concerned philosopher, I take one of my primary responsibilities to be the promotion of peace and justice in whatever ways I can. However, I have been repeatedly frustrated in my efforts to fulfill this responsibility. Hence the paper's title.

Some of this frustration is that of an ordinary citizen. For instance most letters to federal, state, and local legislators, even those relating to pressing social issues, receive perfunctory or noncommittal replies. Recently, the Governor of my state, George Pataki, vetoed a number of items in the 1998-99 state budget that would have provided increased funding for public higher education, including money for 300 new faculty members. Citizens who wish to comment on the Governor's actions can communicate with him by e-mail, and on this issue I did so, identifying myself as a long-time faculty member and department chairperson in the City University of New York. (The senior colleges of the University are funded by the state.) In the letter, I urged him to enter into new discussions with the members of the legislature and restore as much as possible of the funding he had vetoed. Among other things, I pointed out that because of earlier budgetary restrictions and retirement initiatives as much as half of the undergraduate teaching in the City University colleges is now done by part-time faculty who are not available either for student advisement or for service on departmental or college committees. I quote the Governor's reply in full:

From: Gov. Pataki  
Subject: Re: Budget for Education  
To: Beth J. Singer

Thank-you for your e-mail. Your correspondence is being routed to the appropriate staff.

Governor Pataki

But of course I am a professional philosopher as well as a citizen. For many years now I have been writing and lecturing primarily about human rights, conflict resolution, and the democratic process. My work has been quite widely published, some of it even in Russia and China. For this, I receive congratulations and expressions of admiration, and sometimes requests for copies of my papers from other philosophers. But you will not be surprised to learn that I have so far failed to have any impact on public policy.



Not that I haven't tried. Some of you may remember that, the year before the signing of the Dayton Accords, I gave a paper at a Concerned Philosophers meeting in which I dealt with the then escalating conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Entitled "Nationalism and Dehostilization" and based on a proposal that originated in Sarajevo, the paper outlined a peace-making process in which the citizenry at large and the organizations of civil society, initially with the participation of a small group representing the United Nations, would participate in reconstructing their own society on a multicultural basis.<sup>1</sup> A major aim of the proposal was to prevent the nationalist leaders from usurping power. Shortly thereafter, I was invited to present a longer version of the paper at a conference on the United Nations. Despite high praise from one of the commentators, a distinguished U.N. official who had been with that organization from its founding, nothing further came of it.<sup>2</sup>

However, I was invited to read the same paper in several cities in Poland, where there was and still is great concern about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. To my surprise, my presentation (which had been publicized in advance) did receive some attention outside academia. Arriving at the hall in Lublin where I was scheduled to talk (a municipal facility, not on campus), I was met by a representative of the local radio station. With the help of an interpreter, she spent over half an hour interviewing me about what I was going to propose. A few days later, I was again interviewed on the same subject, this time for television, in the city of Wroclaw. The interviewer was a faculty member from the University of Wroclaw where I had lectured. As far as I know there was no response to either interview, and I wonder if my being a philosopher rather than a political figure had anything to do with the way what I said was received. In any case, the Dayton Accords were directly contrary to what was recommended in the paper and to the proposal on which it was based.

Of course philosophers are not confined to writing, and we can become involved in political organizations dedicated to peace and justice and human rights. Some of those to which I belong are local, including the Long Island Progressive Coalition (LIPC), a group that attempts to influence public policy and public institutions. Others, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have grown very large and occasionally influence the policies of governments to some extent. A newer organization is the National Labor Committee, which I learned about at a Human Rights Day program arranged by faculty members at Brooklyn College.<sup>3</sup> The Committee supports worker and human rights and initiates actions against corporations that are guilty of gross exploitation of workers, especially women and children. An example is the "Peoples

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<sup>1</sup> From the very beginning of the war, there had been calls for a political rather than a military solution, and one that would preserve the multi-ethnic community. A center for this effort was Radio Zid, run by law professor Zdravko Grebo. Working with him and other antinationalist community leaders, an organization called the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly issued what they called a "Last Chance Appeal from Sarajevo." It is this on which my proposal was based.

<sup>2</sup> "The United Nations at Fifty," Hofstra University, March 1995. The commentator was the late Erskine Childers.

<sup>3</sup> The City University faculty are represented by a union, the Professional Staff Congress.



Right to Know" campaign designed to expose the exploitation of workers by contractors for the Wal-Mart stores. LIPC, mentioned above, has been conducting demonstrations in support of this campaign.<sup>4</sup>

To return to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, you may not be aware that there are many small organizations all over the U.S. that do work connected with the Balkan countries.<sup>5</sup> One of these is Conflict Resolution Catalysts, founded in 1987 and based in Vermont. Knowing me and my concerns, the Board of Directors of this group invited me to serve on the Advisory Board. CRC, as it is called, has run programs in several community centers and neighborhoods in Bosnia, employing "facilitators" trained to work with children and adults whose lives have been disrupted by the conflict. In a letter to the Executive Director, the Coordinator of a community center in Ilidza wrote, "CRC is giving a chance to the ordinary people which are the bases of any state. They have the possibility to assemble in a safe place to feel secure."<sup>6</sup> Surely helping with this is a way of being effective. However, maintaining those safe places, paying the local facilitators, and housing and feeding volunteers from the U.S. is costly. As foundation grants have expired and not been renewed, it has become difficult for CRC to continue its work and one center after another has had to close. The role of the Advisory Board, which originally served as a sounding board for the Board of Directors on questions of policy, is now primarily to help with fund-raising.

With all its limitations, I certainly think that this kind of activism is important and worth while, but what sort of contribution can I make as a philosopher? The main role of most philosophers is as teachers, and I believe that in our teaching we have an opportunity to influence students in important ways and thereby have an impact on society. By "influence" I do not mean persuade or propagandize. As I once overheard a student say about one of my classes, "We're not supposed to learn what to think; we're supposed to learn how to think."<sup>7</sup> The basic task, which I take to be central to every course in philosophy, is to teach students to think analytically and critically. They should learn to recognize and to raise philosophic questions and issues, to formulate positions and test their soundness, and in the process learn to argue -- and refute arguments -- in a logically acceptable manner. But to stimulate serious thought, the topics in connection with which we teach this should be significant ones with important implications.

Within the limits allowed by the curricula of our institutions, we must consider what to teach and choose teaching materials. As I tell my students when I describe the wide, and still growing, diversity of philosophic subdisciplines and "philosophies of," any subject matter can be treated philosophically. But some disciplines are more heavily concerned than others with issues that have moral, social, and political import, and the content of the curriculum is therefore important.

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<sup>4</sup> Leaflets about the campaign were distributed at the meeting.

<sup>5</sup> A directory of these was produced by the Balkan War Resource Group with assistance from the American Friends Service Committee.

<sup>6</sup> Vesna Bogdanovic, letter to Gary Shapiro, 20 March 1997.

<sup>7</sup> The statement was made in response to an objection voiced by another student to the hierarchical society proposed by Socrates in Plato's *Republic*.



Some of you are fortunate enough to be at institutions that offer Peace and Justice programs. Fairfield University, for instance, offers a minor in Studies in Faith, Peace, and Justice. The most comprehensive such program that I know of is at Villanova University, where students can choose to concentrate or minor in peace and justice studies and, if they wish, link this work to their majors. While they are all related to the standard disciplines, most of the courses are quite different from those with which I have had experience. The basic course, "Introduction to Peace and Justice," exemplifies a philosophic treatment of fundamental problems and also encourages students to devise ways of handling them. The description reads:

This course introduces issues of peace and justice by examining the definitions and understandings of the concepts of peace, justice, racism, sexism, and classism. You are encouraged to critically reflect on the systematic nature of justice and injustice, and learn to create strategies and techniques for effective social change.

This is an important departure from conventional college offerings. Sexism is now treated in the increasingly common courses in feminist philosophy, but while there is a growing body of philosophical writings on racism, I wonder how often the subject is dealt with in philosophy courses or, for that matter, in the rest of the typical curriculum. Brooklyn College has a racially and ethnically diverse student body of between 14,000 and 15,000 students. Its Philosophy Department offers one course, Ethics and Society, whose description includes "Discussion of such topics as racism and sexism, economic justice, civil disobedience, capital punishment, environmental pollution, nuclear power and weaponry, abortion, euthanasia, freedom of information, the right to privacy." Neither these nor comparable topics are specified as part of any other philosophy courses. The College's Africana Studies program deals primarily with history and culture, including a literature course cross-listed with American Studies called "Reading Race." It offers one course entitled "The Struggle for Liberation," and one other on "Inequality in Southern Africa." Elsewhere in the Undergraduate Bulletin, I could find the topic of race in the description of only one course, "Racial and Ethnic Politics in Urban America," offered by the Political Science Department. Regarding classism, the Sociology Department offers a course entitled "Social Class," with the term "class" appearing in the description of another Sociology course, "Contemporary American Society," and "stratification" in that of "The Inner City."

I would think that intensive philosophic treatment of classism, such as that in the Villanova course, would induce students who might otherwise identify themselves and, indeed, most people as middle class and think the issue of no moment, not only to question this, but also to try to understand the concept of social class, its presuppositions, and its implications. Like all the other topics covered in the course, this one can be a vehicle for instruction in philosophic thinking and for showing the relevance of philosophy to life.

Another significant feature of Villanova's course is the importance given to strategies and techniques for effective social change. Lest it be suggested that these are practical rather than academic considerations, or that they fall outside the sphere of philosophy, the whole history of philosophy belies this. Looking at the recent period, we can cite the American philosophers, George Herbert Mead and John Dewey. Mead insisted that we



can and often should change both ourselves and society, and that we can do so only through dialogue with one another. This, in turn, he points out, presupposes reflection, communication with ourselves.<sup>8</sup> Of course, reflective dialogue of the kind Mead advocates is precisely what we are (or should be) fostering in our teaching.

Dewey argued strongly for the use of democratic means for bringing about social change. Especially important in relation to peace and justice is his thesis that democracy is the best means of resolving conflicts:

The problem...is precisely how conflicting claims are to be settled in the interest of the widest possible contribution to the interests of--or at least of the great majority. The method of democracy--insofar as it is that of organized intelligence--is to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately.<sup>9</sup>

We do not have to accept this without questioning it. Students can be encouraged to ask not only whether bringing conflicts out into the open is helpful or harmful, but also what it means to define the method of democracy as that of "organized intelligence." Dewey does not repudiate the principle of majority rule, but he finds it inadequate. The democratic method to which he appeals is a process of joint inquiry and cooperative problem-solving. But, he maintains, this process must be engaged in by an informed, educated public of a sort that he holds we have yet to see. The development of such a public should be our major concern, and is what peace and justice programs in particular are designed to facilitate.

Electives in the Villanova program delve more deeply into the topics introduced in the basic courses. They include courses on human rights, education, applied ethics, and those dealing explicitly with issues of war and peace. A philosophy course, "The Ethics of War," conceived and taught by a member of this organization, ranges over topics from just war theory and nuclear deterrence to genocide and terrorism, and from guerilla war to nonviolent resistance, conscientious objection, and pacifism, all food for philosophic thought.<sup>10</sup>

However, most institutions do not offer programs or courses on peace and justice. (I have never even had a chance to teach a course on human rights, the subject of almost all my recent work.) If philosophers cannot teach in or institute such programs, we must ask how we can work for some of the same ends. I believe I have already suggested the basic answer: Just as every subject-matter is in some way open to philosophic treatment, it seems to me that every course in philosophy provides opportunities to introduce issues that are relevant to our central concern. The pertinence of ethics and social and

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<sup>8</sup> George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Charles W. Morris, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp.308, 309, 386. See also, John Dewey, "Democracy is Radical," *Common Sense*, no.6 (January, 1937), *The Later Works*, Volume 11 (1991), p. 297.

<sup>9</sup> John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935), *The Later Works*, Volume 11, p.56.

<sup>10</sup> The Ethics of War, Philosophy 2401-001, Dr. Joseph Betz.



political philosophy is obvious, and we all know that metaphysical questions such as that of freedom versus determinism do not have to be treated in a purely technical manner. Is aesthetics an exception? Doesn't much poetry and drama deal with social issues? What makes this treatment artistic? The same question can be asked regarding dance or painting or sculpture with "social significance. And of course philosophy of education provides us with a rich field: Dewey may be the first to come to mind, but there are others whose work is equally pertinent. For instance, Abraham Edel's book, *Interpreting Education*, contains a thought-provoking section on "Bases of Normative Judgment," with a chapter on "Politicized Schools and the Ideal of Impartiality."<sup>11</sup>

Writing assignments can be as important as readings. In my "Core" course in philosophy, combining what I had been teaching about argumentation with our reading of Mill's *On Liberty*, I assigned an essay in which students had to make believe they were Mill and consider a student government proposal to invite a Neo-Nazi to speak on campus. After presenting what they believed would be Mill's position and the main arguments they thought he would give, they had to give at least one argument for the opposite position and then refute it as they thought Mill would have.

But philosophers are still writers as well as teachers. Neither has to exclude the other, and beyond this, they can be combined. We can try to use both works of our own and those of other concerned philosophers, either as texts or as supplementary readings for students to draw upon in writing their own papers. (Laura Kaplan's book on the family is on one of my reading lists.) Hopefully, the volumes that grow out of the meetings of Concerned Philosophers for Peace will be used in these ways and students will learn from them.

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<sup>11</sup> Abraham Edel, *Interpreting Education: Science, Ideology, and Value*, Volume 3 (New Brunswick, NJ and Oxford, U.K.: Transaction Books, 1985).

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## **Mothering and Peace: Learning in Tandem -- Reply to Sally Scholz**

**Laura Duhan Kaplan**

UNC Charlotte

Sally Scholz's thoughtful reply to Joseph Kunkel's essay "Bridging Genders on War and Peace" (Kunkel, 1998) started me thinking about why I see a connection between mothering and positive peace. I find that I am hopeful where Scholz is cynical.

Scholz argues against the mother-child relation as a model for peaceful relationships partly on the grounds that the relationship is often unequal and conflicted. She is also suspicious about making an icon of the mother-child relationship because doing so



falsely assumes that the title "mother" carries with it a list of essential gendered characteristics (Scholz, 1998).

Perhaps my optimism comes from the fact that I frame the issue quite differently. For me the issue is not about using the mother-child relationship as a "model," i.e., about whether a person should approach political adversaries as she or he would a child. Further, I do not focus on the power differential in the parent-child relationship because I believe a child's needs exert tremendous power over caregivers, often teaching caregivers a whole new approach to life. For me, the important question is, "What can a person learn in the process of caring for children that could motivate them to work for positive peace in the public sphere?" This question is the same one Sara Ruddick addresses in her excellent work *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace* (1989). Once the issue is framed in these terms, gender politics is moved away from the center of the question, though it certainly maintains some relevance as there may be a social or biological pattern to men's and women's different experiences of childcare. Here I would like to explain why I am hopeful that there is a positive, though certainly not universal, connection between mothering and positive peace, offering an argument that is more experiential than philosophical.

The term I have inherited in this debate is "mothering," and that term fits my own experience, for it is as a mother that I have come to have extended contact with children. However, my real focus in this short essay is not "mothering" but the experience of caring closely for a child. I do believe that this sort of caring can be called "natural" in the sense that it is part of human nature. Most people are moved to care for particular children whose lives become closely tied to theirs. This caring can also be called "natural" in the sense that humans share this trait with what we call "nature," i.e. many other animals. Certainly there are exceptions, people who do not successfully care for children when the task is thrust upon them. But it would be a curious and rather disingenuous philosophical inversion of language to elevate the exceptions over the rule, and to say that the exceptions prove that it is "not natural" for humans to care for children.

Some authors argue that caring for children is not natural because caregivers must learn as they go (Fisher, forthcoming). This seems to me to be a spurious objection. Surely it is "natural" to learn from experience, or from trial and error, as David Hume argues in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* ([1751] 1977). (In fact, there Hume says that learning from experience is the one instinct human animals possess.) The learning between caregivers and children is reciprocal. Caregivers and children learn from one another in all types of relationships, both healthy and unhealthy. In fact, if the relationship continues as children mature, it often becomes one of reciprocal caretaking and advicegiving. It is this process of learning that seems most significant to me. Although scholars talk about "modeling" public relationships on the mother-child relationship, I cannot see any way of mapping caregiver-child relationships onto other relationships except through self-conscious learning.

What, then, is learned, and how is it extended beyond the caregiver-child relationship? I shall give three examples from my own relatively comfortable experience.



(1) One may discover that the world is not a hospitable place to nurture the child one loves, and thereby become motivated to create new communities and institutions. For example, our (very few) local Jewish institutions are very much like the ones I myself was raised in as a child. They are sexist, discouraging women from officiating in worship; racist, i.e., unenthusiastic about the participation of intermarried families; hierarchical, because run by rabbis and entrenched boards; and warist, in their attitudes about the State of Israel. These are not attitudes and behaviors I wish for my children to learn. Therefore, I have become involved in creating an alternative religious collective, committed to gender equality, wide participation, and peace. It is extremely work-intensive, so far requiring about forty hours per month, but if it offers a better environment for my children's growth, it is worth the work.

(2) By viewing injustice through the eyes of an innocent, i.e., the reports and reactions of a child, one may become motivated to work for justice. For example, our family recently visited San Francisco on professional business. The number of destitute people in San Francisco is alarming, especially when compared with our own Bible Belt city in which hundreds of churches offer ministries to the poor. My daughter, who had never seen such street life, was upset by it, and became very excited about participating in a helping project. When we returned home, I phoned around and discovered there were few existing organized charitable activities a five-year-old would be allowed to participate in. However, I ended up volunteering myself to work six hours a month at a local food pantry. If my daughter had not called my attention so strongly to the needs of others, if I had not been made to see that I must nurture my daughter's caring instincts, I might not have done it.

(3) One may become generally more sympathetic to the existence and importance of all children, and factor them into understandings and therefore actions regarding social policy. For example, upon learning of the recent U.S. missile strike against "a terrorist encampment" in Afghanistan, I recalled the fact that many Palestinian "terrorist camps" were actually housing and welfare systems for families (Friedman, 1989). I worried about the children injured and the families fractured by the strike, and once again strengthened my resolve to speak out, in writing and in person, against possibly ill-considered violence.

The above examples are of times I myself was changed through close interaction with children. Interaction with children does not automatically produce these results; nor does it guarantee that other priorities will never override them. However, close interaction with children offers many opportunities for learning about positive peace and for taking those learnings to the public sphere. Many people report taking advantage of these opportunities in the fullest sense; others learn only on the local sphere and fail to generalize their learnings. Part of our job, as intellectuals concerned with public affairs, is to point out the split consciousness that leads people to fail to make analogic connections between themselves and others, or between their own needs and the community's. The language of "mothering and peace" used by other intellectuals has helped me make some of the connections I describe above. And if the language of "mothering," judiciously used, can help others make connections, then I am in favor of it.



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**Human Values: The Key to Solving Global Problems**

**Alexander Chumakov**

First Vice President, Russian Philosophical Society

The twentieth century and the United States are synonymous with achievements in the spheres of science and technology along with the attendant positive and negative circumstances arising from these developments. Not surprisingly, therefore, when philosophers from all over the world gathered in Boston in August 1998 for the 20th World Congress of Philosophy to discuss the most important contemporary problems the majority of these problems were bound up with the revolution in the spheres of science and technology. Since morality is closely intertwined with social and technological achievements, I want to underline the necessity of moral reevaluation and the need to be flexible and tolerant concerning value orientations if we wish to avoid global instability.

Undoubtedly, contemporary global problems find their roots in the consequences of scientific and technological progress. The most important of these problems are the threat of global nuclear war, ecological imbalance, unsustainable population growth, and a growing developmental gap in the socio-economic conditions among countries intertwined in this unprecedented global economy. Yet, the reason for many of these problems is pedagogical because only through education (which facilitates a realization of our role in the existence of global problems) does the human race have a chance to minimize, if not eliminate, the negative consequences of science and technology.

Despite constant efforts and urgent attempts to overcome these global problems the best we have are only some moderate results. Important decisions have not been made and important actions have not been taken. Serious reasons exist to think we are proceeding in the wrong direction in trying to find solutions. Our efforts aim to influence effects, not causes. As a result, we disclose new unintended problems even as we overcome some



difficulties. And like a person trying to remove weeds by their leaves without removing their roots we go on wondering why the weeds continue to grow thicker and richer. So to seek the roots of our global problems one should first attempt an active beginning. This beginning should start with the human condition including relations with others and the environment.

In the last decade, science and technology have abruptly changed the human condition. Prior to the twentieth century, a nation's habits, norms, values, and social relations tended to be resistant to external influences and to be conservative in character. Under the pressures of science and technology, especially influencing a nation's economy, the modern world began transforming into our more global contemporary world. As this transformation continues, every aspect of the human condition alters. For example, transnational corporations turn the sphere of trade among countries into a global common market. Communication advances create a common space of information (which increases the speed while decreasing the time for social relations). Alterations in our spiritual life, also, go hand-in-hand with these changes in culture, science, and politics. Thus, all of these transformations which influence our human condition create a smaller planet in which people become more interdependent.

This context of rapid transformations helps to explain the recent changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Closed societies (to use a term of Karl Popper) and totalitarian regimes strive for self-isolation. Such isolationist policies attempt to remove a country and its people from global interdependence. However, as the Soviet Union's disintegration exemplifies, the open societies of the West turn out to be in a more favorable position to derive benefits (not the least political stability) from the transformations associated with the advances in science and technology.

Despite the pressures of global interdependency (which impels social, political, and economic change), the world remains divided into highly developed and underdeveloped nations with the gap between these two groups ever-widening. Only one billion (called a golden billion) among the six billion inhabitants of our planet currently live in conditions which sustain, promote, and guarantee quality of life. The majority of our planet's inhabitants live in poverty and see no prospects for themselves.

Thus, at the same time that an integrated world community is forming with a common abode, a common fate, and a common responsibility for everything that takes place in the world, the realization comes that no one can escape participating and sharing in the responsibility for discussing and attempting to overcome our common problems. Such problems will become more aggravated if the world continues to be divided by nationalistic policies which encourage a continual widening of standards of living among various populations. This situation of ever-perpetuating socio-economic inequality is a serious barrier to the interrelating of diverse populations globally. Can such an interdependent society become a reality? Can the ideal of a world community be transformed from an ideal into an actual open society? The answers to these questions are not obvious at all.

Our contemporary world still represents a mixed picture of sovereign national states. Some of them are rich and successful. The majority lag hopelessly behind in their socio-



economic development. All of them undertake immense efforts defending their national sovereignty and carrying out politics exclusively on the basis of national interests. Such a nationalistic approach is unacceptable in our new context, when acknowledgement of global interdependency and the maintaining of a balance in social and environmental relations become the most important conditions for the advancement and survival of human beings.

In other words, our given circumstances leave us no choice but to seek to achieve a coordination of our actions, a unity in our aims, and an overcoming of the nationalistic separatism in our world. A necessary consideration, in overcoming such nationalism, is the recognition and acceptance of the diversity of cultural traditions which currently exist in various nations and among people. Although the contemporary transformations wrought by science and technology implicitly prescribe a recognition of and respect for diversity (which in earlier times was ignored), this prescription is extremely difficult to accomplish because the socio-economic and political stability currently existing is based on an international economic interdependence which is supported by military complexes. By having military armaments as the foundation for international interdependence humanity is put on the brink of an impending disaster.

However, imposing a value system (which respects diversity) on the basis of force or decree is unthinkable. Only two ways exist of regulating social relations in a civilized manner--by morality and by law. Yet moral development and legal processes take time to develop and renew slowly. Moreover, people need to respond now while they have time. We should not nourish illusions that we can guarantee our security by only banning and/or eliminating the proliferation and use of our nuclear arsenals. While such acts are necessary steps, they are insufficient to removing us from our dangerous situation.

People live not only in a nuclear century, but in an epoch which poses numerous possibilities and means by which we may eliminate ourselves on a global basis. For example, the destruction of the ozone layer of the planet's atmosphere, the possibility of chemical or biological warfare or terrorism, and the destruction/meltdown of nuclear power stations offer similar fates as nuclear warfare. Of course, we should continue to promote the elimination of nuclear weapons, but people must recognize that no comprehensive solution exists, and hence there is no secure future for humanity.

Although knowledge of these techniques may not be eliminated (because we still depend on science and technology for our survival), the primary effort of people should be directed away from destroying each other (militarily and especially socio-economically) and our environment and toward the creation of moral, just, peaceful, and sustainable social and environmental relations. In order to reach these goal, we need to reinterpret and reevaluate ourselves and our world and alter our behavior and value orientations. Human values must reflect the idea that all of us live as one large family on one small earth. We have no where to go and cannot change this awful aspect of our existence.

What we can and must do is reevaluate our values, promote a global oriented morality, and implement appropriate international laws. In this case, human rights legislation becomes of utmost importance. Yet prior to such legislation is the necessity that everyone receive an education which facilitates an understanding of our current global



situation along with a respectful appreciation for diversity and otherness. All human beings must recognize themselves as inhabitants of one world and act accordingly. Hence, all nation-states, despite their traditions, beliefs, and values, are obligated to give priority to the common interests of human beings in order to preserve all life on earth. No one can with certainty forecast the fate of humanity or of our planet. But the degree to which we are able to influence conditions of life on our planet requires each of us to acknowledge global values and our responsibility for acting on such values.

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### Bibliography on Memory, Representation, and Reconciliation

Reginald Raymer and Donna Harding

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#### Remembrance and Reconciliation: The Nazi Genocide

Batov, Omer. *Murder In Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation*. NY: Oxford UP, 1996. 89-186.

After providing evidence linking the industrialized killing in World War I and the Nazi genocide, the last half of his book examines connections between historical and cultural representations of genocide, industrialization, and memory.

Friedlander, Saul. *Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana UP, 1993.

A collection of this historian's essays from 1985-92 that considers the issues of public-collective memory (monuments, museums, commemorations) and "dispassionate" historiography within the contexts of contemporary Germany and other European nations.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ed. *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution."* Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992.

A collection of essays which considers the Holocaust as posing questions and problems about the limits of interpretation, representation and remembrance. (Both books by Friedlander are good places to begin as well as the anthology by Berel Lang.)

Hayes, Peter. Ed. *Lessons and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1991.

Divided into sections on themes, deeds and encounters, this anthology of prominent researchers of the Nazi genocide provides a nice starting point for anyone interested in the issues of remembrance and reconciliation. See especially



the essays by Saul Friedlander, Yehuda Bauer, Berel Lang, Alvin H. Rosenfeld, James E. Young, and the Holocaust Educational Foundation Volunteers.

Hilberg, Raul. "The Goldhagen Phenomenon." *Critical Inquiry*. 23.4 (Summer 1997): 721-28.

A noted Holocaust historian considers and criticizes Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* for clouding rather than clarifying the memory of the Nazi genocide.

Krondorfer, Bjorn. *Remembrance and Reconciliation: Encounters Between Young Jews and Germans*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1995.

An engaging account of encounters between third generation Jewish and German students about the Nazi genocide which contends that reconciliatory practices began by jointly confronting a divisive past.

Lagerway, Mary D. *Reading Auschwitz*. London: Altamira, 1998.

Using less well-known survivor accounts of Auschwitz, Lagerway explores the complexities, difficulties and questions which confront contemporary researchers of the Holocaust and how such accounts complicate our memory of the Nazi genocide.

Lang, Berel. Ed. *Writing and the Holocaust*. NY: Holmes and Meier, 1988.

An outstanding collection of essays by historians, literary critics, philosophers and writers that examines the questions, problems, and issues of remembrance and indirectly reconciliation in the context of writing about the Holocaust. (This book is quite important for understanding the issues.)

Langer, Lawrence L. *Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays*. NY: Oxford UP, 1995.

In a series of essays, Langer examines the tension between humanistic values (such as the inviolable spirit of humanity, natural innocence, and good and evil) and the Nazi genocide, and how various writers have attempted (successfully and unsuccessfully) to commemorate and reconcile with these new realities and tensions.

———. *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1991.

An analysis of the oral testimonies of Holocaust survivors which reveals the ongoing traumatic impact of the Holocaust on the victims and the ways that memory functions to challenge these experiences.

LaCapra, Dominick. "Lanzmann's *Shoah* : "Here There Is No Why" " *Critical Inquiry*. 23.2 (Winter 1997): 231-69.

An analysis of Claude Lanzmann's film *Shoah* that raises questions about the film as a vehicle for both remembrance and reconciliation.

Magnus, Bernd. "Holocaust Child: Reflections on the Banality of Evil." *Philosophy Today*. 41 (Supplement 1997): 8-18.

A narrative account of Magnus' experience with the Nazi genocide considered in terms of what it means to remember.



Young, James E. "The Holocaust as Vicarious Past: Art Spiegelmann's *Mauss* and the Afterimages of History." *Critical Inquiry*. 24.3 (Spring 1998): 666-99.

An analysis of the cartoon accounts of Spiegelmann's experiences with the Nazi genocide and the role and questions such works create in recalling the past.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993.

A cross-cultural analysis of Holocaust memorials by a noted historian. (This book is must reading concerning the issues of remembrance.)

\_\_\_\_\_. *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988.

A consideration of how historical memory, understanding and meaning are constructed in Holocaust narratives.

### Remembrance and Reconciliation: Other Examples of Genocide

Bennet, James R. "From Patriotism to Peace: The Humanization of War Memorials." *The Humanist*. 58.5 (Sept/Oct 1998): 5-9.

A brief consideration of the function of war memorials historically and cross-culturally and how issues of remembrance have changed from glorification to putting a human face on war.

Bosworth, R.J.B. *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Bosworth explores the ways the main countries of World War II remember that experience in historical writing. The author contends that the traumatic history of this war remains crucial to the politics and culture of these post-war societies.

Charney, Israel W. *How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Human Cancer*. NY: Hearst Books, 1982.

Confronting the questions of innocence and hope in the aftermath of the Nazi genocide, Charney probes the origins behind human destructiveness and genocide in an attempt to warn and remind people that reconciliation implies positive attempts at social change.

Gottlieb, Roger S. "Some Implications of the Holocaust for Ethics and Social Philosophy." *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 8.3 (Fall 1981): 307-28.

Drawing a distinction between authentic and inauthentic memory, Gottlieb contends that problems raised by the Holocaust concerning human nature and rationality may offer some help in promoting social justice and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Kearney, Richard. "Remembering the Past: The Question of Narrative Memory." *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 24.2/3 (April 1998): 49-60.

An exploration of the difference between narrative-as-story and narrative-as-history as represented by psychotherapeutic case histories and testimonies of victims of genocides.



Lifton, Robert Jay and Eric Markusen. *The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat*. NY: Basic Books, 1990.

An investigation of the psychological mechanisms of psychic numbing and doubling which renders a person's complicitous and influences how individuals make sense of genocidal experiences.

Raymer, Reginald. "Fields of Memory? Fields of Silence? (Unpublished paper, 1995).

Drawing upon the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Pierre Bourdieu, this essay examines through the language and symbols of the perpetrators and victims of the Holocaust how at a linguistic level the basis for judgment and memory has been undermined. From this context, the essay explores how such linguistic violence continues to infect language and attempts to silence representations of remembrance and reconciliation.

Richards, Jerald. "Reflections on the Possibility and Necessity of Forgiveness in Politics."

Address given at 1997 Concerned Philosophers for Peace, Oct. 1997, 1-9. Analysis and evaluation of considering the possibility of forgiveness in politics and the obstacles posed by religious beliefs.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Remembrance of the Past and Representative Repentance in International Relations." Address given at 1998 Concerned Philosophers for Peace, Oct. 1998, 1-8.

A consideration of the possibility and necessity of international repentance and the role of remembrance in this process.

Shriver, Donald W. *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*. NY: Oxford UP, 1995.

Shriver contends that forgiveness in politics is necessary in the contemporary world if human beings are to entertain any realistic hope of nonviolent conflict resolution of wars, revolutions, and destructive encounters.

Vetkesen, Arne Johan. "Impartiality and Evil: A Reconsideration Provoked by Genocide in Bosnia." *Philosophy and Social Criticism*. 24.5 (Sept 1998): 1-35.

Within this philosophical discussion of the role of the impartial observer and evil, Vetkesen addresses the issue of remembrance and briefly raises the issue of reconciliation in arguing that there are no impartial observers.



## Book Review

James P. Sterba. *Justice for Here and Now*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 246pp. ISBN 0-521-62188-7 (hardcover). ISBN 0-521-62739-7 (pbk.).

I think the colloquium was entitled "The Ethics of Divorce". After the presentation, time was allotted for discussion. The first discussant proposed a suggestion that the presenter make a minute change in what he had said about the ethical exchange of belongings after a divorce. "Who had the ethical right to own grandma's cooking utensils" was the subject matter. For forty-five minutes, it seemed every question referred to "grandma's cooking utensils" and how it produced a major flaw in the presenter's argument. Though it was a minor point in the reading, the suggestion was a topic of fierce debate. My lasting impression was that this philosophical discussion appeared to be a way of triumphing over the opponent, by any means possible. As a result, I remember the apparent "flaw" of the argument more than the presenter's main thesis. In fact, I cannot remember the title of the colloquium.

In *Justice for Here and Now* (1998), James Sterba expresses his concern about this "warmaking model of doing philosophy." This process or way of doing philosophy, according to Sterba, "undercuts the very possibility of your having truly justified philosophical views" (p. 4). The main argument of the book is to seek a philosophical reconciliation by way of a broader understanding for the sake of progress and justice. In sum, Sterba argues that in order for there to be genuine philosophical progress there must be "fair-mindedness, openness, and self-criticalness" (p. 10).

Throughout the book, Sterba seeks reconciliation of seemingly opposing philosophical views in order to advance intellectual insight and openness. He discusses how opposing parties can vehemently disagree and also try to understand the opponent's position, in a broad sense, in hopes of arriving at a peaceful and just reconciliation.

Sterba's defense of a peaceful model of doing philosophy is achieved in three steps. The first requirement of a peacemaking model of doing philosophy is to question whether morality should be grounded in rationality. After considering contemporary ethicists Kurt Baier and Alan Gewirth, Sterba argues that "a commitment to morality is not only rationally permissible but also rationally required" (p. 40).

In Chapter 3, Sterba offers the second requirement of a peacemaking model of doing philosophy. By illustrating the works of Tibor Machan, Douglas Rasmussen, John Hospers, Eric Mack, and Jan Narveson, Sterba attempts to reconcile the *prima facie* conflicting views of Spencerian libertarians and Lockean libertarians. In sum, Sterba argues that "a libertarian conception of justice supports the practical requirements that are usually associated with a welfare liberal conception of justice" (p. 76).

Because they bring out the need for a reconciliation between seemingly opposing philosophical view points, I believe chapters four and five serve as the strongest support



of Sterba's overall thesis. In Chapter 4, Sterba develops his argument by suggesting the third requirement of a peaceful model of doing philosophy, namely, that "the rights to welfare and equal opportunity also lead to the idea of a gender-free or androgynous society that many feminists defend" (p. 173). Of course, the idea of a gender-free or androgynous society is not without its conflicting interpretations (e.g., Ann Ferguson's *Androgyny as an Ideal for Human Development* and Joyce Trebilcot's *Two Forms of Androgynism*). However, Sterba argues that a "proper understanding" could reveal a peaceful reconciliation between the two ideas of combining both masculine and feminine traits and the freedom to choose the appropriate gender characteristics, regardless of sex.

What I find most interesting is how Sterba conjoins theory and application in this chapter. I like how he ties in the theory of a gender-free or androgynous society with the practical applications of societal change. For instance, he suggests that if we are to achieve the feminist ideal of a gender-free or androgynous society then we must modify available day-care facilities, the distribution of economic power, and the overt violence perpetrated against women in our society.

My historical analysis attributes feminism as having a panoramic embrace of many societal injustices. For instance, the 19th century women's rights movement, including the women suffrage movement, was entwined with the anti-slavery movement (Angela Davis, *Women, Race, Class* 1981, p. 42). In Chapter 5, Sterba does an excellent job of demonstrating the importance of interpreting feminist justice as a broad agenda. According to Sterba, "a peacemaking way of doing philosophy requires that we build as broad a political consensus as possible" (p. 101). To support this, he focuses on the connection between feminist justice and other forms of justice: racial justice, homosexual justice, and multicultural justice. He goes on to demonstrate the injustices and the unreasonableness of racism, sexism, heterosexism, and eurocentrism with factual claims that are superbly documented. By exercising a broader understanding of feminist justice, Sterba concludes that we can progress toward eradicating various forms of injustices.

However, there is one area of concern. In his final chapter, Sterba argues that the have-nots should consider trying to change or eliminate existing injustices. He says, "Assuming that normal politics, legal protest, civil disobedience, and revolutionary action have all been tried and reasonably judged to be ineffective...it would seem that criminally disobedient acts would be morally permissible" (p. 179).

The problem I see with Sterba's advocating "criminally disobedient acts" is that it could pose more harm than good, especially for the have-nots. Sterba argues that political allies are needed for the have-nots in order to effectively press their case for basic human rights. In addition, he suggests that civil disobedient acts by the have-nots are morally permissible if all other avenues have reasonably failed. However, civil disobedient acts do not necessarily result in winning over effective political allies; indeed, it may be the case that civil disobedience may only justify further domination by the haves, for it would only fuel the righteousness of that dominant group. How can a group that commits unjust acts demand just treatment? Did the LA riots result in strong political allies for the have-nots?



Overall, I would recommend this book, especially as a teaching text. I have found it very useful when discussing the theoretical and practical connections of feminist justice and ideals to other forms of injustice. In addition, there is much to be said for Sterba's insistence on the need for understanding and reconciliation in contexts where philosophical discourse becomes divisive. For instance, if the discussion at the colloquium had culminated with a broad understanding and reconciliation of the presenter's main idea, instead of pinpointing the illusive "flaw," then perhaps there would have been greater philosophical progress (and I could have a better recollection of the colloquium's title). The debate is won once a reconciliation is determined, until then, Sterba suggests, we are not only losing out on philosophical progress but on peace and justice.

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### Announcements

1. **Call for Dues.** If you have not paid your 1998-1999 dues, you may still do so. Annual payment of dues is crucial to our meeting the cost of printing and mailing the newsletter. (The call for 1999-2000 dues will be made later this fall.) Membership in CPP is \$25/year (\$5/year for students and low income) and includes receipt of the newsletter. The newsletter is also available to libraries and other interested parties for \$25 per year. Send payment to: Jerry Richards, Philosophy Program, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY 41099-2200.
2. **Call for Items for CPP Newsletter.** We welcome the submission of brief essays. We also like to receive submissions of book reviews, news, announcements, and related items. Send essays and news to William C. Gay, Editor. Send book reviews and suggestions for book reviews to Judith Presler, Book Review Editor. Both can be reached at Dept. of Philosophy, UNC Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001. Email: <wcgay@email.uncc.edu>; <jlpresle@email.uncc.edu>; FAX: 704/547-2172.

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