2011

Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution

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The widespread social protest that resulted in the overthrow of Ethiopia’s imperial regime in 1974 was soon followed by a series of radical and deep-going social changes that heralded the implementation of a socialist policy. Nevertheless, despite the unprecedented changes that took place, scholars do not agree on the true nature of the social transformation of Ethiopia. Those who speak of a genuine socialist revolution clash with those who denounce counterrevolutionary digressions. Some maintain that the transformations are minor against a background of overwhelming continuity. Another smaller group insists that socialism was used as a smokescreen for the implementation of state capitalism. Let us review briefly their main arguments for the purpose of getting a sense of the theoretical challenges that the Ethiopian transformations pose to existing theories of revolution.

The Ethiopian Revolution as a Classic Case

Christopher Clapham, a long-time student of Ethiopian politics, is among those who maintain that Ethiopia has gone through a genuine socialist revolution under the military regime known as the Derg. He criticizes Western scholars, especially those with leftist creeds, for literally ignoring Ethiopia and its sweeping socialist revolution. “Despite the high level of recent interest in revolutionary socialist development strategies in Africa, and indeed in the Third World generally, the case of Ethiopia has been very largely neglected,” he writes. The neglect is inexcusable given the “consistency and determination” with which the military regime has implemented a development strategy thoroughly inspired by Marxism-Leninism.
To show that a genuine, determined effort of socialist development was launched in Ethiopia, Clapham reiterates the various socialist measures that the Derg took, such as the nationalization of all rural and urban lands, industries, and financial establishments, and the creation of mass-based organizations, such as peasant and urban dwellers’ associations. Not only was this a genuine effort to apply socialism, but it was also fairly successful, as opposed to so many regimes in Africa that claimed to be revolutionary while being either ideologically ambivalent or unable to effect radical measures. In short, the Ethiopian regime has implemented “a classic Marxist strategy of development, sincerely and fairly efficiently.”

Clapham’s analysis is backed by Crawford Young who, as a scholar quite familiar with African developments, could not but emphasize the exceptional commitment of the Ethiopian regime to the ideology and development policy of socialism. During the 1960s and 1970s, many African regimes—even military ones—claimed to be socialist. Such were the cases of Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar, Tanzania, Guinea, and Somalia, to name a few. Yet none of them has implemented changes remotely comparable to the staggering transformations of the Ethiopian social fabric. It is true that regimes that had an earnest commitment to the socialist ideology had appeared in Africa, as in Mozambique and Angola; however, such regimes were established as a result of anti-colonial struggles targeting the end of foreign rule. Unlike the Ethiopian case, these were not the outcome of internal class confrontations causing the overthrow of a traditional ruling elite, nor were their social transformations comparable to those accomplished by Ethiopia’s military regime. According to Crawford, fully aware of the contrast of the Ethiopian case with other African regimes that claimed a similar ideological allegiance, “Soviet as well as Western observers have suggested that it is the only true African revolution to date; others that claim this designation, they suggest, are in reality mere national liberation movements.”

To emphasize to what extent the ideological consistency and the magnitude of the transformations deserve a serious study, two scholars who have investigated the Ethiopian Revolution closely do not hesitate to write that the “revolution was reminiscent not of the recent upsurges in the Third World but of the classic revolutions of Europe—France in 1789 and the February 1917 revolution in Russia.” Indeed, all the basic ingredients that single out the classical cases of the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions are manifest in the Ethiopian Revolution. As in the classical revolutions, the Ethiopian transformation displays: (1) the momentum of class struggle resulting in the overthrow of a landed nobility and its imperial state; (2) the complete change of the social system through a radical and sweeping nationalization of the means of production; (3) deep alterations in the structure of the state and its ideological configuration; and (4) a shift in Ethiopia’s international alignment from the West to the East. The change, thus, was both total and drastic.

In terms of violence, too, the Ethiopian Revolution does not pale in comparison with the great revolutions of France, Russia, and China. Confirming those
Controversies over the Nature of the Ethiopian Social Change

scholars who readily define revolution by violent changes, the unfolding of the Ethiopian upheaval has changed the society into a battlefield strewn with untold human and material destruction. The death toll was so enormous that one scholar writes, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration:

History offers few examples of revolutions that have devoured their own children with such voraciousness and so much cruelty. It can be estimated that, of ten civilians who had actively worked for a radical transformation of Ethiopia, only one escaped arrest, imprisonment, torture, execution or assassination. The revolution swallowed the whole of the young generation of Ethiopian intellectuals.

In attempting to analyze the reasons why Western scholars paid little attention to the great social significance and theoretical importance of the Ethiopian Revolution, Clapham finds circumstantial reasons, including the limited familiarity of Western scholars with Ethiopian realities and the difficulty in attaining accurate information about the country. Also, social cataclysms due to prolonged civil wars and recurring famines have eclipsed the extent and depth of the social changes. According to Clapham, though, the main reason is the "persistent reluctance on the part of Western Marxists to regard Ethiopia as a case of 'genuine' revolutionary socialist development." How else is one to explain the neglect of Ethiopia's transformation when leftist circles in the West make so much fuss about revolutions in such countries as Algeria, Libya, Mozambique, etc., where the extent of the changes comes nowhere near the Ethiopian mutation? The main reason does not seem to be lack of interest, but rather misinformation leading to the belief that what was occurring in Ethiopia was not a radical revolution. In addition, many Western Marxists were already sympathetic to the Eritrean cause of independence, and so they based their opinion on what Eritrean insurgents were saying about the Ethiopian Revolution.

Are the above reasons enough to explain the little interest of Western scholars in Ethiopia and its transformation? Scholars nurturing doubts about the socialist nature of the Ethiopian transformation would suggest that Clapham is not telling the whole story. Many Western scholars, including Marxist ones, became suspicious and unconvinced of revolutionary developments in Ethiopia because of the history of the Ethiopian Revolution. The military regime seized power and established itself as an absolute authority by virtually destroying the civilian left, which was the revolutionary force of the country. The annihilation of revolutionaries prevented the social upheaval from going in the direction of genuine radical changes. Though transformations have occurred, these transformations do not deserve the name of socialism since their most visible outcome was the extermination of leftist forces. Such a regime, the opponents say, is no more, no less than "a fascist military dictatorship."

The fact of a military dictatorship claiming to implement a genuine socialist program was already enough to trigger suspicion. Apart from exterminating the revolutionaries, the members of the military clique that controlled power did not have a prior ideological commitment to socialism; nor did they show any ten-
dency to support popular struggles. Repression of popular mobilizations and demands has been their most consistent attitude from the start. In light of this repressive policy, one can safely maintain that the effected changes, whatever their magnitude, cannot "transform a conventional military force into a revolutionary vanguard capable of leading a quasi-feudal society toward socialism."10

Besides questioning the socialist commitment of the military, many scholars have also challenged Clapham's qualification of the Ethiopian Revolution as a fairly successful experience. The Revolution did not register outcomes that match the realizations of the great classical revolutions. Instead of growth, for instance, the country underwent a sharp economic decline, causing a general deterioration in conditions of life. The reorganization of the political structure did not produce a stronger central state either; on the contrary, the state was so weakened that it progressively lost control of some important regions and was finally defeated by insurgents from these liberated regions. These failures revealed the Revolution's inability to efficiently mobilize the working people for the purpose of defending the Revolution and achieving higher production outputs, especially in the agricultural sector. Thus, they attest to the gap that developed between the masses and the military leadership.

Let us not forget that a characteristic deficiency also hampered social protests in Ethiopia from the get-go. When the urban uprisings exploded, no political organization existed in Ethiopia that was capable of leading the protests. The popular protests were largely spontaneous and unorganized. Unlike other large upheavals, no revolutionary party with a clear program and ideological commitment assumed the leadership of the social unrest. This absence of a prior organizational and ideological leadership casts doubt on the revolutionary inspiration of the social protests. According to one author:

"The Ethiopian revolution was not a movement with a clear political goal trying to implement a given programme, but a series of attempts by weakly organised groups acting out of basically corporate interests to influence the course of events in a way that suited their needs and aspirations."11

To the extent that the leadership shortcoming relates to the important issue of organization and ideological commitment, this gives substance to the idea that the military rulers talked about socialism but implemented a different policy. Once suspicion is raised about the real goal of the radical measures of the Derg, the door is wide open to views that tend to deny the revolutionary nature of the Ethiopian transformations.

The Ethnonationalist Position

Chief among the detractors of the Ethiopian transformations are Oromo scholars with ethnonationalist views. They regard Ethiopia as a colonial empire, established by the Amhara feudal class after Emperor Menilik conquered and subjugated non-Amhara peoples during the scramble for Africa. These ethnonationalist scholars purport that, though the main social problem that precipitated the
overthrow of the imperial regime was the abject fate of the subjugated non-Amhara peoples, the Revolution did not bring about their liberation. On the contrary, the state was further centralized in the name of socialism and made the sole owner of the resources of these peoples by a radical policy of nationalization. What is more, the Amharization of the "colonized" peoples was intensified: enhancing previous practices, the new military regime was "determined to Ethiopianize the colonized nations completely by destroying their culture, identity, and peoplehood through its so-called modernization policies."12

The conclusion of this type of analysis is that the socialist nomenclature of the military regime is anything but true. Though the language changed through the adoption of a different ideology, the imperial practices of Amharization and expropriation were actually intensified. In other words, "under Derg control, there have been no changes that constitute transformation."13 As a result of the radical measures, the state was neither decentralized nor taken away from the control of the Amhara elite. Still less did these measures allow the "colonized" peoples to take control of their lives and resources. Through the omnipotence of the state, made possible by the socialist ideology, the Amhara elite was able to reach a degree of control and dominance that surpassed by far what the imperial regime had achieved. Clearly, the adoption of the popular ideology of socialism was a device to fool the dominated peoples into believing that the time of equality and freedom had come, when in reality the radical measures were simply consolidating the "colonial" state.

The problem with the ethnonationalist position is that the idea of mere continuity is simply not credible; too much has changed in Ethiopia for this to be the case. To assume that the radical measures have simply consolidated the imperial state is to fly in the face of the structural changes that have altered all the features of the country. The overthrow of the monarchy and of the landed aristocracy is a structural change that seriously undermines the argument according to which the Amhara rule has been strengthened more than ever before. To quote Teshale Tibebu, "the revolution destroyed the power base of the ruling class of the Ge'ez civilization" and its "most important outcome . . . was the rise of the people of the South to public visibility" following the emancipation of southern peasants from tenancy, thanks to the nationalization of all rural land.14 The political landscape has also been altered significantly by the rise of a new multiethnic elite in place of the exclusive aristocracy.

As to the accusation that state centralization has been enhanced, the argument cannot be used to discredit the revolutionary developments of the country. History shows that centralization has been a consistent goal of revolutionaries, who used state power to consolidate the national territory and effect radical transformations. As Clapham reminds us, "the central goal of revolutionary leaders . . . is to take over the state structure established by their predecessors and to use it, suitably adapted, as an agency for economic development, national integration, and the consolidation of their own power."15 In this regard, Ethiopia is not a discrepant case: for Ethiopian revolutionaries, too, the centralized use of the state meant the consolidation of national unity through the elimination of
class barriers and the promotion of economic development and ideological uniformity. One can question the validity of the strategy to achieve economic and democratic advancements but not its conformity to revolutionary conceptions.

The Fascism of the Derg

Closely related to the ethnonationalist stand is the position of those scholars who tie the revolutionary measures of the Derg to the needs of a dictatorial rule. Because such scholars are most sensitive to the elimination of the civilian left, they readily characterize the military regime as a fascistic and counterrevolutionary rule. Two prominent representatives of this line of thinking are John Markakis and Nega Ayele, who write:

Discarding pretences, the military government used massive violence against the vanguard of the popular movement; that is, the radical intelligentsia, labour activists and students. In trying to blunt its spearhead, the regime was undermining the movement and was performing, therefore, a counter-revolutionary task.

Markakis maintains that popular uprisings with legitimate grievances had initiated a revolutionary process. But the rise of the Derg and the subsequent suppression and elimination of revolutionary forces stopped the process and morphed it into counterrevolution. The main reason for the Derg to seize power was to prevent the revolutionary forces from capturing state power. For this purpose, the Derg used fascistic methods of suppression, but it also appropriated some of the demands of the revolutionaries (such as land reform), to gain legitimacy.

The main leftist opposition to the Derg, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), fully endorsed the counterrevolutionary role of the Derg. The adoption of a fascist policy was necessary to monopolize power so as to reverse the tide of history. Challenge, the Journal of the World-Wide Union of Ethiopian Students, described the Derg as “the fascist military junta that slyly encroached the seizure of state power to itself and established a counterrevolutionary regime totally inconceivable to the fundamental interests and aspirations of the masses.” The implementation of some populist measures concealed the real purpose of the Derg, and so eased the reversal of the social trend. These measures gave legitimacy to the Derg while strengthening its grip on the country. The real purpose of the policy of nationalizations is thus quite clear: the Derg justified and achieved absolute power on everything in the name of the popular ideology of socialism, thereby concealing its counterrevolutionary agenda.

The major drawback of the position denouncing fascism and counterrevolution is its implausibility. For one thing, the measures taken by the Derg were totally uncharacteristic of a fascistic policy. As one previous member of the EPRP concedes, “fascism was applied to the Ethiopian situation by superficial analogy and without any analytical reasoning. It did not carry much convic-
For another, the thesis of counterrevolution creates the impression that the Derg squashed an imminent socialist revolution. Such an assumption is highly questionable, and even more questionable is the belief that revolution could have occurred without the Derg. The civilian left was too weak and too divided into rival groups to be able to institute a government of its own. Moreover, without the Derg, it would have been difficult to overthrow the imperial regime, and even harder to prevent a conservative military coup, there being no doubt that, at that time, “the left had no center of leadership and no central organ to coordinate the struggle.”

Socialism as Nationalism

The uncertain commitment of the military to the ideology they professed, as opposed to the resilience of their nationalist allegiance, has led some authors to conclude that socialism was a cover-up for a nationalist policy. More than the commitment to social equality, the military were nationalists, both by profession and personal conviction. In effect, the primary declaration of the Derg expressed a resounding nationalist commitment and deliberately avoided any reference to socialism. As a scholar notes:

Although the Dirgue was from 1975 onwards to parade itself to the outside world as the champion of Marxism-Leninism in Africa, it is vital to remember that its coup d' état was based on a solid bourgeois and nationalist platform, epitomized in its slogan Ethiopia Tikdem, or “Ethiopia First.”

And nothing of what the Derg said and accomplished later on ever questioned the initial nationalist stand. The nationalization of all lands and industries falls under the category of consistent nationalism pursuing a radical policy of integration and nation-building. Moreover, it endows the state with sweeping power, the very kind of power necessary to initiate economic development through “the formation of State Capitalism.” The socialism of the Derg was a disguise; in reality the Derg established state capitalism, which of course required the elimination of the civilian left.

The main weakness of the thesis of socialism as a cover-up to promote state capitalism is that it creates a false dichotomy between nationalism and socialism. The story behind the conversion of many Third World intellectuals to socialism assigns great weight to the frustration of nationalist feelings. Many intellectuals became Marxist radicals because socialism appeared to them as the most consistent nationalist stand. It is not clear why the young officers who took control of the state would have to fake socialism to promote a nationalist agenda when the two ideologies have so much in common. Another weakness of the theory is the lack of credibility. The very association of the Derg with capitalism, of any kind, sounds discordant. Neither the petty bourgeoisie, nor the merchants, nor even state bureaucrats have gained any appreciable advantages from the measures taken by the Derg. None of them had the slightest hint that some form of capitalism was being built in Ethiopia. By contrast, the Derg’s nationali-
zation of urban and rural land, industries, banks, insurance companies, etc., have entirely wiped out the landed nobility, as well as the nascent bourgeoisie, just as they have altered the life conditions of lower classes. As much as the structural nature of the change is undeniable, its alleged capitalist inspiration sounds highly dubious.

The Middle Course Position

Unable to deny the depth of Ethiopia's transformations, some scholars steer a middle course between those who deny the reality of the Revolution and those who applaud it for its authenticity. Among them we find John Haberson, who suggests the term "transformation" as a better qualification than the term "revolution." For him, the term "revolution" has a normative connotation that is not fully relevant to the Ethiopian case, while "transformation" carries a more neutral meaning. What this means is that deep transformations have indeed occurred, but not all of them yielded positive results. Stated otherwise, "the Ethiopian transformation in some respects does, and in other does not, merit designation as a revolution with the normative connotations the term carries."22

While in terms of social transformation changes "fundamentally different from and very much better than those existing prior to 1974" were introduced, the downsides were no less far-reaching.23 First, in regards to the improvement of conditions of life, the "new structures have not brought more favorable socio-economic results."24 Second, the foundations of the state have been dangerously weakened rather than strengthened, for "despite the professed objectives of the participants, the post-imperial Ethiopian transformation has taken a course that has seriously undermined instead of strengthening those state foundations."25

Though not appealing to a similar distinction between "revolution" and "transformation," Andargachew Tiruneh, a serious Ethiopian analyst of the Revolution, has also denied the qualification of revolution on the ground that the change did not produce social improvements. "The transformation undergone by Ethiopia is not," he argues, "progressive and, therefore, not a social revolution," the understanding being that when a social revolution occurs, "the changed mode of production is essentially more progressive than the one it replaces."26 Let alone being progressive, the so-called Revolution was a backward movement both politically and economically. A more repressive regime replaced the imperial state, and economic productivity dropped from what it used to be in the previous regime. In particular, the Derg "has put an end to the development of the emerging commercial farms which certainly were extremely efficient in terms of raising productivity."27

The middle course position becomes shaky when we see the transformations from the viewpoint of those who were mistreated by the ancien régime. For the millions of peasants who were freed from tenancy, the transformations had the value of revolution in that those transformations unmistakably altered their lives for the better. Furthermore, the combination of positive and negative outcomes defines any revolution so that the reluctance to characterize the Ethio-
pian transformations as revolution does not seem fair. Because all the promises of the Revolution were not realized and many shortcomings were observed, and also because an intense and violent struggle developed between revolutionary forces, it is wrong to conclude that it was not a real revolution. These failings are not unique to the Ethiopian Revolution. As stated by Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, "while revolutions can transform for the better the lived conditions of the oppressed, no revolution produces a perfect society, or the one that most of those who participate in it expect at first to see: the Ethiopian revolution is no exception to this generalization."28

Neither the Russian nor the Chinese Revolutions achieved democracy and freedom, nor did they realize full equality and universal economic prosperity. All their achievements were marred by severe shortcomings. True, the achievements of the Ethiopian Revolution are not comparable with the Chinese and Soviet advancements. Still, the measurement of achievements must take into consideration the disparity of conditions when the revolutions broke out and the particular and contingent ordeals each revolution had to face. Because Ethiopia was even more backward socially and technologically than Russia when the upheaval erupted, the construction of socialism was destined to stumble along the way, for the hurdles were greater.

The Ethiopian Case as a Challenge

Seeing the major role of the Derg and its populist inspiration in a context of social rebellion devoid of organized leadership, many observers have inferred the lack of applicability of Leninist formulas to the Ethiopian case. Short of standard classification, a Western Ethiopianist, Rene Lefort, has come up with the term "heretical revolution." The anomaly of a radical revolution occurring without the leadership of a revolutionary party explains the initial vacillations of the Derg and the hesitation of the socialist camp to openly come out in support of the Ethiopian Revolution. "Moscow remained very reticent towards a revolution which did not fit into the tried and tested Marxist schemas,"29 says Lefort. The concept of "heresy" does not remove the initial incongruities any more than it denies the attribute of revolution because some established formula was not respected. Instead, it leaves the question open: it recognizes the unusual nature of the military leadership but does not prejudge its possible outcome. For Lefort, whether it was a heresy or not, "the future alone will judge."30

Lefort's wait-and-see position and the controversy over the nature of the Ethiopian transformations clearly indicate that we are dealing with a special case in which basic ingredients of revolutionary transformations coexist with unusual, if not discrepant, components. The most important incongruity is undoubtedly the role of the Derg as a military entity. The Derg overthrew the ancien regime and implemented radical socialist measures while eliminating the civilian left, which had advocated these same measures. Grasping the reasons why the Derg was increasingly radicalized to the point of appropriating the program of a highly radicalized civil left should be the first concern of any scholarly attempt
to understand the Ethiopian Revolution. The concern amounts to asking how the conflict of social forces created the groundwork for the formation of the Derg and its rapid promotion as the most powerful antagonist to civilian and other military groups. Only when we situate the Derg in these conflicts can we begin to theorize about the Revolution.

The best way to undertake such a task is first ask whether the major theories of revolution have a provision for the type of discrepancies that occurred in Ethiopia. Before speaking of "counterrevolution," "transformation," "heresy," or "state capitalism," not only is it necessary to make sure that the Ethiopian Revolution exhibits the major characteristics by which revolutions are generally defined, but also to know whether the Ethiopian discrepancies can be reduced to the level of local variations that fall short of invalidating the fundamentals of revolution. In the case where no such provision is found, the alternative is either to deny that a revolution took place or to call for a reexamination of existing theories.

If we start by saying that military men are congenitally unable to espouse a socialist ideology, the inescapable conclusion is that the transformations of the Ethiopian social landscape are anything but revolutionary. We have seen how such a conclusion, in whichever way it is argued, comes up against important facts. The best approach is to look into the major theories of revolution with the view of accommodating the Ethiopian anomalies. As one author remarks, "despite the fact that the army played . . . the central role, it would be wrong to regard the change simply as a coup d'etat which replaced one authoritarian régime with another." Despite many inconsistencies, the fact remains that both the depth of the changes and their social fallouts rank the Ethiopian transformations among the most radical revolutions.

If we manage to see the Ethiopian Revolution as a special case of a general pattern, our understanding will be theoretically sound with the added input of an enriched conception of revolutions. If the effort fails because the anomalies are too important to fit into a general formula, then the existing theories must be deconstructed and a new theoretical framework liable to include the Ethiopian deviations must be sought. Otherwise, the attempt to theorize about revolutions must be dropped in favor of a narrative approach underlining contingencies.

The challenge is not a new one: for instance, the peculiarities of the Ethiopian Revolution bring to mind Iran's deviations in some components of revolutionary change. Instead of revolutionary intellectuals, Islamic clerics, who upheld a premodern ideological outlook, assumed the leadership of a radical change that overthrew a government still in full control of its repressive apparatus. The prominent theoretician of revolutions, Theda Skocpol, frankly admits that the discrepant nature of the Iranian Revolution "challenged expectations about revolutionary causation that [she] developed through comparative-historical research on the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions." My contention is that the Ethiopian Revolution poses no less challenging questions about the causes and the uneven directions of revolutions. The only difference is that, while important Western scholars of revolution have reflected on the Irani-
Controversies over the Nature of the Ethiopian Social Change

an Revolution, they have literally ignored the Ethiopian Revolution, even though, unlike the Iranian clerics, the Derg had adopted the secular and modernist ideology of socialism.

The next chapter will review the main theories of revolution with the view of assessing to what extent their explanation of revolutions enlightens the Ethiopian case. In particular, it will try to detect whether their interpretation leaves an opening for something like the intervention of the Derg, that is, for an ad hoc intrusion suddenly propelling a social situation of protest toward a radical path.

Notes

1. Derg is an Amharic word for committee or council. It designates the Coordinating Committee of the armed forces that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974 and seized power under the title of Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC).


Chapter 1