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**Presidential Versus Vice Presidential Home State
Advantage: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral
Significance, Causes, and Processes, 1884-2008**

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Abstract: This study compares the electoral significance, causes, and processes associated with presidential versus vice presidential home state advantages. Our analysis of presidential election returns from 1884 through 2008 demonstrates that presidential candidates generally receive a large, statistically significant home state advantage. However, vice presidential home state advantages are statistically negligible and conditioned on the interactive effect of political experience and state population. Furthermore, the results indicate that the mobilization of new voters primarily accounts for presidential home state advantage, while vice presidential home state advantage is mainly due to the conversion of existing voters. Although home state advantages do occur in presidential elections, according to our analysis a presidential or vice presidential home state advantage has not changed the outcome of any presidential election since 1884.

Introduction

The perception of a home state advantage in presidential elections has been evident throughout American political history. Most presidential nominees have come from populous states with the potential to deliver many electoral votes (Adkison 1982).¹

Likewise, party leaders and presidential nominees have tended to select vice presidential running mates from large states (Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997), although seemingly less so in recent decades (Hiller and Kriner 2008; see also Baumgartner 2008). Today, the prospect of a home state advantage influences popular discussion of vice presidential selection, and even presidential campaign strategy (see Devine and Kopko 2011).

The perception of a home state advantage was not subjected to systematic empirical analysis, however, until the 1970s and 1980s, when political scientists began studying its strength and causes. The home state advantage literature today boasts many theoretical, methodological, and empirical advances. Yet it also has important limitations that we seek to address in this paper.

First, most studies of the home state advantage analyze presidential or vice presidential candidacies, but not both.² In this study, we provide the most comprehensive comparison of presidential and vice presidential home state advantage to date. We analyze and compare the strength and causes of presidential versus vice presidential home state advantage, using identical empirical measures and methodologies that are consistent with the leading works in that literature. Most fundamentally, we attempt to document and explain the differential strength of presidential and vice presidential home state advantages. Based upon the discrepant power of their offices and recent studies of interaction effects on the vice presidential home state

advantage, we expect vice presidential advantages to be rather small and highly conditional, in contrast to relatively large and universal presidential advantages. If this is so, our analysis will help to guide expectations for whether and when to expect substantial presidential and/or vice presidential home state advantages. Also, this analysis will contribute to scholars' understanding of voting behavior in presidential elections, particularly in terms of the weight given to presidential versus vice presidential characteristics.

Second, previous studies of home state advantage have not explored the process by which a home state advantage occurs. In this study, we seek to identify patterns in state voting behavior that could help to explain the occurrence and size of a home state advantage. Vote choice, after all, is the product of numerous influences, most notably party identification and candidate attributes (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008). Given the abundance of alternative motivations, the decision to vote on a home state basis is actually quite remarkable and surely limited to a relatively small subset of the state electorate. Previous studies of the home state advantage, however, offer little insight into the characteristics or behavioral patterns of those individuals who provide a home state advantage.

Home state advantage could be attributable to various aggregate behavioral patterns. We propose the following explanations: disproportionate partisan conversion among the previously existing state electorate, disproportionate partisan mobilization of previous non-voters, or a combination thereof.³ This conceptualization closely mirrors a major debate in the partisan realignment literature about whether critical elections and subsequent realignments are best explained by conversion among existing voters or mobilization among previous non-voters. We draw upon this literature to interpret the process by which home state advantages occur.

Our analysis of that process begins by measuring the effect of home state candidacy on home state turnout. After analyzing presidential versus vice presidential home state turnout advantage, we incorporate a turnout variable into empirical models predicting the size of home state electoral advantages. The effect of home state turnout on home state advantage can be conceptualized as a continuum, where at one extreme mobilization completely explains home state advantage, and at the other extreme, conversion completely explains it. Between these extremes lies a combination of the two effects, whereby home state advantage is to some degree the product of voter mobilization *and* voter conversion. We seek to determine whether home state advantages are primarily attributable to mobilization or conversion. This inquiry represents an important new dimension in the home state advantage literature, advancing beyond questions of when and to what extent advantages occur to questions of *how* they take shape.⁴

Literature

Theoretically and methodologically, Lewis-Beck and Rice's (1983) analysis is foundational to the home state advantage literature. In regard to theory, Lewis-Beck and Rice grounded their study of the presidential home state advantage in V.O. Key's "friends and neighbors" hypothesis. According to Key (1949), candidates for elected office should perform best among voters living in close geographic proximity to them. Key provided four reasons for this advantage; local voters are most likely to: 1) be familiar with the candidate and his/her political qualifications and views; 2) come into personal contact with the candidate's staff, associates, or even the candidate him/herself; 3) view the candidate as knowledgeable about local concerns and inclined to direct government resources toward addressing them; 4) share a common sense of geographic identity and therefore see the candidate as "one of our own."

Originally, Key's conception of the friends and neighbors hypothesis was exclusive to elections at the state and sub-state level.⁵ He did not believe the hypothesis had any applicability to the home state advantage in presidential elections because "states gradually have become more alike in the manner of their presidential voting" (Key 1956, 26-27). Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) rejected Key's line of argument while adopting his theory. Loyalty to a home state presidential candidate, they argued, "is not wholly unreasonable" because in such situations "We are offered the psychological satisfaction of identification with a president who is more like our 'friends and neighbors.' Further, we might hope that as president he would remember the 'folks back home' when distributing federal largess." At a more sentimental level, "It gives us a chance to show 'pride in our own' by voting for a native son" (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983, 552).

Lewis-Beck and Rice also contributed to this line of research by conceptualizing the home state advantage in terms of "how many votes [the presidential candidate] got [in his home state] beyond what was expected" (549). They measured home state advantage as the difference between a home state's deviation from past partisan voting trends and the nation's deviation from the same. The formal equation is:

$$H = (S_a - S_e) - (N_a - N_e)$$

where H is the presidential candidate's estimated home state advantage in a given election; S_a is the vote percentage won by the presidential candidate in his or her home state in a given election; S_e is the average vote percentage won by the presidential candidate's party in his or her home state over the five most recent presidential elections; N_a is the vote percentage won by the

presidential candidate nationally in a given election; and N_e is the average vote percentage won by the presidential candidate's party nationally over the five most recent elections.⁶

Lewis-Beck and Rice estimated the average presidential home state advantage in the 1884-1980 elections to be 4.0%, and statistically distinguishable from zero. Next, they regressed the home state advantage on three predictors, all of which were statistically significant: home state population, presidential incumbency, and the party of the presidential candidate. Of the three predictors, population is the most theoretically interesting; reflecting upon Key's four reasons for expecting a friends and neighbors effect, Lewis-Beck and Rice argued that "All of the aforementioned conditions for strong local bonds are maximized in small states" (552).⁷

Lewis-Beck and Rice's work soon inspired similar analysis of the *vice* presidential home state advantage. Dudley and Rapoport (1989) adopted, with minor revision, Lewis-Beck and Rice's home state advantage equation to study vice presidential candidacies in the 1884-1984 presidential elections. "Such an extension," they argued quite reasonably, "seems particularly warranted since the vice-presidential candidate is one political nomination still made by party elites who can purposely take regional appeals into account" (537).⁸

Dudley and Rapoport estimated the average vice presidential home state advantage to be only 0.3%, and not statistically different from zero. Using the same methods as Dudley and Rapoport and a dataset updated to include elections through 2008, Devine and Kopko (2011) have since estimated the average vice presidential advantage to be slightly higher, at 0.69%, but still not statistically significant.

Although Dudley and Rapoport, as well as Devine and Kopko, did not estimate the presidential home state advantage in these studies, their data and methods so mirror those of Lewis-Beck and Rice that it would seem vice presidential candidates attract smaller home state

advantages than presidential candidates. The reason for this discrepancy is likely due to significant differences in presidential versus vice presidential candidacies: Presidential candidates are far more visible on the campaign trail and more powerful once in office than their vice presidential running mates; therefore, voters should be more influenced by characteristics of the presidential candidate than those of the vice presidential candidate, whether geographic or otherwise (see Dudley and Rapoport 1989, 540; Tubbesing 1973, 708).⁹

Echoing Lewis-Beck and Rice's analysis of the presidential home state advantage, Dudley and Rapoport also found state population – but not incumbency or party affiliation – to be a statistically significant predictor of the size of a vice presidential home state advantage. For every one percent reduction in the state's proportion of the national population, vice presidential home state advantage increased by 0.86%.¹⁰

Devine and Kopko (2011), however, demonstrated that population's effect on the vice presidential home state advantage is conditional. After testing the Dudley and Rapoport model in their updated dataset and finding the same substantive effects for each variable as before, Devine and Kopko tested a separate model adding state experience and its interaction with population. The results showed a significant interaction whereby the vice presidential home state advantage is largest for candidates from small states who also have a great deal of experience within their state's political system. What is more, the explanatory power of the Devine and Kopko model, measured in terms of the adjusted R^2 value, is nearly double that of the Dudley and Rapoport model.

Is the same interaction effect at work among home state *presidential* candidates? Is the vice presidential home state advantage not only smaller on average, but uniquely conditional in its effects? Do the variables explaining home state advantage for presidential and vice

presidential candidates differ? If so, how and why? The answers to these questions matter greatly to scholars' understanding of the home state advantage and, more generally, voting behavior in presidential elections. To answer them, we present an analysis based on identical empirical models that allow for direct comparison of the strength and underlying causes of presidential and vice presidential home state advantages.

As noted previously, our second objective in this study is to identify the process by which home state advantages occur. For guidance, we turn to the partisan realignment literature (see Bass 1991; Rosenof 2003). Realignment scholars have vigorously debated whether to attribute critical elections and subsequent realignments to the conversion of existing voters or to the mobilization of new voters.¹¹ Advocates of the conversion hypothesis are many (Burnham 1970; Darmofal and Nardulli 2010; Erikson and Tedin 1981, 1986; Ladd and Hadley 1978; Sundquist 1983). They contend that realignments are attributable to the disproportionate conversion of established voters toward identification with, and electoral support for, one major party. This view is challenged by advocates of the mobilization hypothesis (Andersen 1979; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell 1985, 1986) and the generational replacement hypothesis with which mobilization is closely associated (Beck 1974, 1982; Franklin and Ladner 1995; Jennings and Neimi 1974, 1981; Norpoth, Sidman, and Suong 2013). Such scholars argue that realignments are primarily attributable to new voters, previously abstaining or legally excluded, entering the electorate and disproportionately favoring one major party.¹²

What intrigues us about this debate, for present research purposes, is the similarity between realignment scholars' conceptualization of vote change in the realignment process and our conceptualization of vote change in response to a home state candidacy. We envision three possible processes leading to the occurrence of a home state advantage: 1) a subset of voters who

would normally support the other party's presidential ticket will be persuaded to vote for a ticket that includes a home state presidential or vice presidential candidate; 2) a subset of citizens who would otherwise not vote in the presidential election will decide to vote and specifically to vote for the ticket including a home state presidential or vice presidential candidate; or 3) a relatively even admixture of these two processes. These scenarios map quite intuitively onto realignment scholars' conceptions of conversion and mobilization, respectively. We find it valuable to have such an analog within the realignment literature, since our inquiry into the processes underlying home state advantage is without precedent. By drawing upon the realignment literature, we hope to gain theoretical and methodological guidance that might validate the inferential strategies we use to distinguish between a home state advantage process primarily driven by conversion versus mobilization.

Methodology

To measure home state advantage, we use the Lewis-Beck and Rice equation. The only modification we make is to quantify electoral performance using two-party vote share rather than raw vote percentage (see also Devine and Kopko 2011; Dudley and Rapoport 1989; Mixon and Tyrone 2004).¹³

Our other metric of home state effect, which we call home state turnout advantage, is modeled after the same equation. In formal terms, we calculate turnout advantage as:

$$T = (S_v - S_p) - (N_v - N_p)$$

where T is the home state presidential or vice presidential candidate's estimated turnout advantage in a given election; S_v is the turnout rate in the candidate's home state in a given election; S_p is the average turnout rate in the candidate's home state over the five most recent presidential elections; N_v is the national turnout rate in a given election; and N_p is the average national turnout rate over the five most recent elections.

Like Lewis-Beck and Rice's home state advantage equation, the turnout advantage equation is designed to quantify the extent to which turnout in a given election exceeded what would otherwise be expected, based upon past state turnout and current national turnout. Thus, if turnout in a presidential home state rises substantially but at the same rate as the entire nation, in comparison to past trends, we find no unique turnout advantage in the candidate's home state. On the other hand, if home state turnout increases by 10% over that state's recent average while national turnout increases by only 4% over the nation's recent average, we credit the home state candidacy with generating a unique 6% increase in state turnout.

We expect in both cases to find that presidential candidates generally receive a greater home state advantage, in terms of two-party vote share and turnout, than vice presidential candidates. As previously noted, presidential candidates are more salient than vice presidential candidates during campaigns and far more powerful once in office. Thus, we would expect voters to be more motivated by characteristics of the presidential candidate than characteristics of the vice presidential candidate when deciding whether and for whom to vote.

Turning to the causes of presidential versus vice presidential home state advantage, we test two models from previous studies and a new set of models incorporating turnout effects. We conduct our analysis in this manner to demonstrate how adding new variables to more established models affects key variables and overall predictive power.

Our first model comes directly from Dudley and Rapoport (1989), with a slight modification for presidential candidates. It includes the following independent variables: population (home state population divided by the national population, in the appropriate year);¹⁴ party affiliation of the home state candidate (Republicans are coded 1 and Democrats are coded 0); previous political positions held by the home state candidate (current and past senators or governors are coded 1 and all other candidates are coded 0); presidential incumbency (presidential incumbents or their running mates are coded 1 and all other candidates are coded 0); in the vice presidential model only, vice presidential incumbency (vice presidential incumbents are coded 1 and non-incumbents are coded 0).¹⁵

Next, we test the Devine and Kopko (2011) model, which adds to the previous list of independent variables total state political experience and its interaction with population. Political experience is operationalized as the candidate's number of years holding elected office at any level within his or her home state – including municipal, county, state, or federal positions representing a state-based constituency.¹⁶ To create the interaction term, we multiply this political experience variable by the home state population variable previously described.

For vice presidential candidates, we can expect the same findings as Devine and Kopko (2011) since we use the same data and, to this point, the same empirical models. Specifically, we expect to find that population is significantly and negatively related to home state advantage in the Dudley and Rapoport model, while in the Devine and Kopko model less populous states yield significant home state advantages only when the home state candidate also has extensive experience within state politics.

For presidential candidates, however, our expectations are less certain. The friends and neighbors hypothesis emphasizes, above all else, the persuasive influences of familiarity and

shared identity on vote choice. Therefore, we might expect even highly visible and, if successful, powerful presidential candidates to perform better in states with smaller, more cohesive populations; indeed, this is what Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) found in their initial study of the presidential home state advantage. Is the population effect conditional on experience for presidential candidates, though? One might suspect that a home state presidential candidate is so visible, and the opportunities to benefit from his or her success so attractive to state voters, that presidential home state advantage is not conditioned by experience and perhaps not even affected by population. In other words, the conferring of a presidential home state advantage might be better described as universal than conditional. Given the plausibility of either explanation, we do not see an adequate basis for hypothesizing in one direction or the other about the effects of population or its interaction with experience on the presidential home state advantage.

The final set of empirical models is designed to provide indicative evidence as to *how* home state advantages occur, on balance – whether through the conversion of a preexisting electorate or the mobilization of new voters into that electorate. We see no reason to hypothesize that one or the other process explains the home state advantage in general, or for presidential versus vice presidential candidacies. Our goal is to identify which process takes place, not to prove the superiority of either explanation. To distinguish empirically between the two processes, we add one more independent variable to the Dudley and Rapoport models and to the Devine and Kopko models: home state turnout advantage. Admittedly, this is not a perfect method for distinguishing between conversion and mobilization in the present context; an ideal measurement strategy would include sophisticated real-time data collection (e.g. field

experiments) or at the very least surveys. Obviously, though, it is impossible to collect or access such data for elections going back to the 19th century.

Notwithstanding this important qualification, using home state turnout is a reasonable and intuitive way of testing the underlying causes of home state advantage for the time period herein analyzed. The logic of our interpretation is straightforward: A statistically significant and positive relationship between state voter turnout (measured relative to past state and national turnout trends) and home state advantage (measured relative to past state and national partisan voting trends) suggests that mobilization is the principal catalyst for a home state advantage. On the other hand, if increased voter turnout has no discernible effect on home state advantage, then changes in home state partisan voting should be primarily attributable to changes within the *existing* electorate, i.e. conversion.¹⁷

The integrity of our inferential strategy is supported by analogous arguments in the realignment literature. Darmofal and Nardulli (2010, 261), for example, provided this guide for distinguishing between realignment caused by conversion versus mobilization:

if conversion of voters is responsible for all of the enduring change in the locale, there will be a shift in the core partisan voting populations for the affected parties with no shift in the size of the overall core electorate. If mobilization is the operative dynamic, there will be an enlargement in the size of the core electorate and a relatively greater increase in the size of one of the partisan core voting populations.¹⁸

Stated more concisely:

Conversion requires a shift among core voters, but no change in the size of the core electorate. *Mobilization* involves both an enlargement in the size of the core electorate and a relatively greater increase in one of the major party constituencies, but no reshuffling among core partisans (261).

Like realignment scholars, we use changes in the size of the electorate and partisan performance to draw inferences about the process underlying aggregate vote shifts. The major difference between our approaches is not conceptual, but temporal; realignment scholars seek to explain long-term shifts in partisan preference, whereas we seek to explain episodic shocks to partisan preference.

Our final methodological note, though technical, is quite important: For all of the regression models included in this analysis we use clustered standard errors. Clustered standard errors are appropriate when, contrary to the assumptions of ordinary least squares regression, observations in the data are not independent and identically distributed (see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007, 447-454).¹⁹ The data used in our empirical models almost always include two observations from the same election year (a Republican and a Democratic presidential candidate or a Republican and a Democratic vice presidential candidate). Clearly, these observations are not independent of one another; the strength of the Democratic presidential candidate has bearing on the Republican presidential candidate's performance in his or her home state, and vice versa. Regrettably, this point has never been raised or put into practice in the home state advantage literature. Accounting for the non-independence of observations is not only methodologically appropriate but also empirically consequential; as demonstrated in our analysis, using clustered standard errors increases the estimated explanatory power of models tested with the same

variables and data in previous analyses. However, with respect to the models herein tested, using clustered standard errors does not lead to any change in the substantive results from past studies.²⁰

Data

The data for our analysis come from 1884-2008 presidential election returns,²¹ which we obtained from the online CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection.²² After excluding cases in which a presidential or vice presidential candidate came from the same state as another presidential or vice presidential candidate, 53 presidential candidacies and 56 vice presidential candidacies remain available for empirical analysis.²³

Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive results for the presidential and vice presidential home state advantages, respectively. The average presidential home state advantage is 3.61%, and it is statistically distinguishable from zero ($p = 0.000$). The average vice presidential home state advantage, however, is only 0.69%, and it is not statistically distinguishable from zero ($p = 0.316$). These estimates indicate, as expected, that presidential candidates command larger and more reliable home state advantages than vice presidential candidates. In fact, 71.7% of presidential candidates earned a positive home state advantage, with nine of those advantages exceeding 10%. In contrast, only 58.9% of vice presidential candidates earned a positive home state advantage, with four of those advantages exceeding 10%. Such systematic differences are more apparent when examining a graphical distribution of home state advantages. For this reason, we provide histograms of presidential and vice presidential home state advantage in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.

(TABLES 1 AND 2, AND FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE)

The second through fifth columns of Tables 1 and 2 highlight the electoral significance, or in most cases insignificance, of home state advantage. The second column lists the estimated home state advantage for each candidate included in our dataset since 1884. The third column lists the actual two-party vote share won by each candidate's presidential ticket in his or her home state. The fourth column subtracts each candidate's home state advantage (second column) from his or her actual two-party vote share (third column) to arrive at an estimated "counterfactual" home state two-party vote share, or the expected vote share had a home state candidate not been on the presidential ticket. The fifth column identifies candidates whose home state advantage, according to our estimates, made the difference between his or her ticket winning a majority of that state's two-party vote share. Impressively, 11 of 53 presidential candidates (20.8%) are estimated to have made the difference between winning and losing their home state, and all in a positive direction. A meager four out of 56 vice presidential candidates (7.1%), however, appear to have made the difference between winning and losing a home state for the party ticket, with one candidacy (Spiro Agnew, 1968) even making a negative difference.²⁴

Consider the significance of these findings. Vice presidential selection is often portrayed by media pundits and political insiders as a major opportunity to pick up states that a presidential ticket would otherwise lose. Yet, since 1884, only *four* vice presidential candidates are estimated to have made the difference between winning and losing a state, and one candidate, Agnew in 1968, appears to have cost the ticket his home state.²⁵ Even more striking is the fact that in every election in which a presidential or vice presidential candidate "delivered" his home state, according to our estimates, the outcome of the national election would have been the same absent that home state advantage. In other words, according to our analysis a presidential or vice

presidential home state advantage has not changed the outcome of any presidential election since 1884. We consider this to be strong evidence that the significance of the home state advantage in presidential elections, today and throughout American history, has been vastly overstated.

Turning to our other metric of home state candidacy effects, the turnout advantage, we again find discrepancies between presidential and vice presidential candidates. Home state presidential candidacies generate a statistically significant increase in voter turnout of 1.49% ($p = 0.038$). For vice presidential candidates, home state turnout increases by a smaller margin, 1.07% on average, and it is not statistically significant ($p = 0.114$). Taken together, the evidence thus far strongly indicates that voters respond differently to home state presidential and vice presidential candidacies, with presidential candidates alone generating significantly increased voter turnout and two-party vote share. Might it also be the case that presidential and vice presidential home state advantages are shaped by different causal mechanisms and underlying processes? To answer this question, we turn next to analysis of our empirical models.

Tables 3 and 4 present results from OLS regression models of presidential and vice presidential home state advantage, respectively. In each table, we estimate four empirical models of home state advantage: the Dudley and Rapoport model, the Devine and Kopko model, and re-estimations of each model with the turnout advantage variable added.

(INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE)

In Table 3, only two variables consistently predict presidential home state advantage at the conventional 0.05 significance level: *Incumbent President* and *Turnout Advantage*. Presidential incumbency reduces a presidential candidate's home state advantage. Perhaps this finding is not surprising given the nature of the presidency. After four years in office, home state

voters are likely to view the president as a national figure concerned with the interests of all states, thus making him less identifiable as “one of our own.”

More central to our concerns is the positive statistical relationship between voter turnout and presidential home state advantage. To interpret the magnitude of this relationship, we rely on the coefficient estimate in the Dudley and Rapoport model that includes *Turnout Advantage*.²⁶ The beta coefficient estimate for turnout advantage in this model is 0.28, meaning that for every one-unit increase in turnout advantage (that is, a one-point increase in turnout relative to past state and current national trends), presidential home state advantage increases by 0.28 points.

While there is a positive relationship between *Turnout Advantage* and presidential home state advantage, we cannot claim with absolute certainty that the increase in presidential vote share is *solely* due to the mobilization of new voters. First, our use of aggregate data means that we cannot cite a direct individual-level link between mobilization and presidential home state advantage; rather, the evidence is strongly indicative of such a relationship. Second, it is undoubtedly the case that *some* voters, no matter the overall mobilization trend, will change their normal voting behavior to support a home state presidential candidate (i.e., voter conversion). However, we cannot claim to a statistical certainty that conversion systematically explains part of the presidential home state advantage. Rather, the results from Table 3 indicate that the infusion of new home state voters is directly associated with a better-than-expected performance by the home state presidential candidate. This evidence suggests that the presidential home state advantage is primarily attributable to voter mobilization.

One variable that fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the Dudley and Rapoport models is home state population. This result is notable because it directly challenges Lewis-Beck and Rice’s (1983) finding that home state population significantly and

negatively influences presidential home state advantage. However, population's effects might be conditional upon the presidential candidate's home state political experience, as Devine and Kopko (2011) find for vice presidential candidates. To determine whether this is the case, we examine evidence from the Devine and Kopko models that include the interaction of home state population and political experience. Following conventional methodological precedent, we do not use significance levels and raw beta coefficients from Table 3 to substantively interpret the effects of the interaction variable or its constituent terms, both of which are coded continuously (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004). Instead, we graph the interaction of home state population and experience to evaluate their joint effect on presidential home state advantage. Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of home state political experience on presidential home state advantage, using data from the Devine and Kopko model that also includes *Turnout Advantage* (see Table 3, fifth column).

(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE)

Interestingly, while Devine and Kopko (2011) found that the interactive effect of state population and political experience was a statistically significant predictor of vice presidential home state advantage, no such relationship exists for presidential candidates. The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 3 encompass zero for all levels of state population. Thus, home state population does not significantly influence presidential home state advantage at any level of political experience. The presidential home state advantage is universal rather than conditional, in this sense; presidential candidates may expect a substantial advantage in a relatively populous or less populous home state and with minimal or substantial state political experience.

The models presented in Table 3 are re-estimated in Table 4 for vice presidential candidates. We also graph the interaction effect of home state population and political

experience on vice presidential home state advantage, rather than substantively interpreting the interaction results from Table 4. Figure 4 displays the marginal effect of experience on vice presidential home state advantage, using the Devine and Kopko model with *Turnout Advantage*.²⁷

(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE)

As expected, Figure 4 shows clear evidence of an interaction effect. The marginal effect of home state experience on vice presidential home state advantage is statistically significant only in relatively less populous states. As home state population increases, the marginal effect of political experience on home state advantage decreases. At approximately the median population level (represented by the red line in Figure 3), the marginal effect of political experiences ceases to be significant. Thus, according to our estimates, political experience only causes a statistically significant increase in vice presidential home state advantage if the vice presidential candidate resides in one of the least populous states in the country. Unlike presidential home state advantage, which is consistent across home state population and experience levels, the vice presidential home state advantage is highly conditional.

The performance of *Turnout Advantage* indicates another major difference between presidential and vice presidential home state advantage. For presidential candidates, we find indicative evidence that voter mobilization is associated with home state advantage: *Turnout Advantage* is statistically significant and positively signed in Table 3. For vice presidential candidates, on the other hand, we find no evidence of an empirical relationship between voter mobilization and home state advantage: *Turnout Advantage* falls short of statistical significance in Table 4, although its addition does result in a slight increase in the adjusted R^2 value. We

interpret this evidence to indicate that vice presidential home state advantages, when they occur, are primarily attributable to voter conversion rather than mobilization.

Admittedly, this is a complicated matter of inference since we are unable to test a direct measure of voter conversion. However, the logical basis for our inference is strong. Voter mobilization is unlikely to be the primary cause of vice presidential home state advantage, since home state turnout does not significantly increase for vice presidential candidates, on average, and we find no significant empirical relationship between *Turnout Advantage* and the size of a vice presidential home state advantage.²⁸ Our findings fit only with an explanation based primarily on voter conversion. Recall language previously cited from Darmofal and Nardulli (2010, 261): “*Conversion* requires a shift among core voters, but no change in the size of the core electorate.” Indeed, we find no statistically significant change in home state turnout for vice presidential candidates, on average. Moreover, when there are fluctuations in home state turnout, they have no discernible impact on vote choice. Changes in partisan voting preference therefore cannot be credibly attributed to mobilization, based upon this evidence; instead, they are likely attributable to changing preferences among the previously established electorate, i.e. conversion.

Discussion

Our analysis of 1884-2008 presidential election data indicate several major differences between presidential and vice presidential home state advantages. First, presidential candidates and vice presidential candidates do not enjoy the same home state advantage. The presidential home state advantage, on average, is 3.61% and statistically distinguishable from zero ($p =$

0.000). The average vice presidential home state advantage is 0.69%, and it is not statistically distinguishable from zero ($p = 0.316$).

Second, home state turnout advantage varies by candidacy type. On average, presidential candidates garner a statistically significant turnout advantage of 1.49% ($p = 0.038$) in their home state. Vice presidential candidates see an average turnout advantage of 1.07% in their home state, but this increase in turnout is not statistically distinguishable from zero ($p = 0.114$).

Third, and most importantly, the variables that predict home state advantage for presidential candidates do not predict home state advantage for vice presidential candidates. Increased voter turnout in a candidate's home state is significantly and positively related to presidential home state advantage, but it is not significantly related to vice presidential home state advantage. As new voters go to the polls in a presidential candidate's home state, that candidate receives a significantly higher proportion of the two-party vote share than otherwise would be expected based on recent state voting trends and current national voting trends. Vice presidential candidates, on the other hand, do not enjoy a statistically significant home state turnout advantage and turnout has no discernible impact on their electoral performance. When vice presidential home state advantages occur, then, we attribute them primarily to conversion among the established electorate rather than the mobilization of new voters.

Also, consistent with previous findings, vice presidential home state advantage is conditioned on the interaction of state population and political experience; only vice presidential candidates who reside in less populous states and have a significant amount of political experience representing a home state constituency enjoy a positive home state advantage that is statistically distinguishable from zero. However, in the context of presidential candidates, home state advantage is empirically unrelated to state population and the candidate's years of state

political experience. When excluding state experience and its interaction with home state population, the population variable fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance for presidential candidates. Considering also that presidential home state advantages are large and statistically significant, on average, we conclude that presidential candidates *generally* earn a higher percentage of the vote in their home state than their party would otherwise earn. Thus, we discover an important difference between presidential and vice presidential home state advantages: the latter is highly conditional and usually very modest, while the former occurs generally and it is typically substantial in size.

These findings have important implications for predicting and understanding home state advantage in presidential elections. The partisan realignment literature has identified mobilization and conversion as explanations for major shifts in partisan voting throughout American history. We have applied this theoretical framework to presidential elections since 1884 and our findings suggest that both mobilization and conversion are at work in the context of presidential and vice presidential home state advantages – mobilization is primarily responsible for the former and conversion is primarily responsible for the latter.

Perhaps it is understandable that the same underlying process does not explain a home state advantage for each type of candidacy. After all, presidential and vice presidential candidates differ in terms of their visibility on the campaign trail and the office of the president is more powerful than the office of the vice president. As such, home state voters likely evaluate these candidates in a different manner when casting their ballots; presidential candidates' characteristics are more likely to motivate changes in electoral behavior than vice presidential candidates' characteristics. But there remains the question as to why mobilization appears to be the primary cause of presidential home state advantage while conversion appears to be the

primary cause of vice presidential home state advantage. Although our results do not provide specific insights into this question, there are several possible explanations that we can suggest.

The increase in voter turnout due to a home state presidential candidacy may be due to levels of excitement among the electorate. Voters may be more likely to turnout and vote for a presidential candidate for a variety of reasons. For example, the state could claim the president as “one of their own,” the state will likely be the home of the presidential campaign headquarters and perhaps a presidential library, and there will likely be increased media coverage of a home state presidential candidate. All of these factors could lead to more enthusiasm among voters, particularly new voters, and increase voter turnout.

Vice presidential candidates, on the other hand, rarely generate a home state advantage, and these candidates do not significantly increase voter turnout based on our descriptive statistics analysis. It is highly unlikely that voters would feel the same level of enthusiasm for a vice presidential candidate as a presidential candidate. As noted previously, vice presidential home state advantages usually occur when the candidate has extensive political experience in a less populous state, as V.O. Key’s friends and neighbors hypothesis would suggest. Voters may alter their past voting behavior on the basis of a vice presidential candidate’s extensive political experience serving their home state, particularly in a small state where elected representatives are more familiar and more closely associated with specific geographic identities and interests. Voters may conclude that if the vice presidential candidate was a successful public official with years of experience representing the home state, that candidate would make a valuable addition to the presidential ticket and warrant the voter’s support. While these are potential explanations as to why mobilization or conversion would influence the outcome of a home state election, without further investigation we can only speculate as to the reasons for our findings.

Conclusion

In this study, we compare the electoral significance, underlying processes, and causal factors associated with presidential and vice presidential home state advantages. According to our estimates, presidential home state advantages occur quite regularly and they are substantial in magnitude, while vice presidential home state advantages are less common and statistically negligible. We also find that different causal mechanisms influence home state advantages for each type of candidate. Our evidence indicates that the mobilization of new voters is the principal cause of presidential home state advantage, while the conversion of existing voters is the principal cause of vice presidential home state advantage. Moreover, vice presidential home state advantages are empirically associated with candidates who have extensive political experience in a less populated home state, while presidential home state advantages are not significantly related to population, experience, or the interaction of those two variables. In other words, vice presidential home state advantages are highly conditional while presidential home state advantages occur more generally.

Perhaps our most fundamental finding is that, despite the longstanding perception of a powerful home state advantage in presidential elections, at no time since 1884 has a presidential or vice presidential home state candidacy determined an election's outcome. This is not to say that presidential and vice presidential candidates cannot or will not deliver a home state that decides an election's outcome in the future; our analysis does suggest, however, that political observers and campaign strategists tend to dramatically overstate the electoral significance of home state candidacies.

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TABLE 1. THE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE, 1884-2008

Party/Year	Home State Advantage	Actual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Counterfactual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Change in State Vote?	Party/Year	Home State Advantage	Actual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Counterfactual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Change in State Vote?
R2008	3.44	54.31	50.87		R1944	-	-	-	-
D2008	4.01	62.73	58.72		D1944	-	-	-	-
R2004	3.99	61.51	57.52		R1940	6.36	50.72	44.36	Yes (+)
D2004	3.44	62.74	59.30		D1940	-2.35	51.79	54.14	
R2000	6.82	60.96	54.14		R1936	3.29	46.13	42.84	
D2000	-1.73	48.04	49.77		D1936	-0.83	60.16	60.99	
R1996	8.65	60.07	51.42		R1932	-2.85	39.04	41.89	
D1996	0.58	59.35	58.77		D1932	-0.45	56.67	57.12	
R1992	3.06	52.24	49.18	Yes (+)	R1928	5.23	65.42	60.19	
D1992	5.28	59.99	54.71		D1928	11.59	48.79	37.20	
R1988	-	-	-	-	R1924	-0.15	71.47	71.62	
D1988	-2.61	53.98	56.59		D1924	10.27	47.12	36.85	
R1984	-1.93	58.22	60.15		R1920	-	-	-	-
D1984	2.97	50.09	47.12	Yes (+)	D1920	-	-	-	-
R1980	3.96	59.47	55.51		R1916	2.94	53.66	50.72	
D1980	13.66	57.66	44.00	Yes (+)	D1916	-4.48	43.96	48.44	
R1976	7.18	52.74	45.56	Yes (+)	R1912	3.12	39.57	36.45	
D1976	14.89	66.94	52.05		D1912	5.93	66.73	60.80	
R1972	-	-	-	-	R1908	-2.68	53.24	55.92	
D1972	14.30	45.67	31.37		D1908	13.83	50.79	36.96	Yes (+)
R1968	0.41	51.66	51.25		R1904	-	-	-	-
D1968	4.33	56.56	52.23		D1904	-	-	-	-
R1964	11.13	50.50	39.37	Yes (+)	R1900	-1.38	53.39	54.77	
D1964	-8.63	63.44	72.07		D1900	12.80	48.34	35.54	
R1960	1.27	50.27	49.00	Yes (+)	R1896	-2.22	52.55	54.77	
D1960	-	-	-	-	D1896	21.11	52.74	31.63	Yes (+)
R1956	-3.34	65.67	69.01		R1892	1.22	49.31	48.09	
D1956	0.27	40.37	40.10		D1892	-	-	-	-
R1952	4.52	69.28	64.76		R1888	1.22	50.23	49.01	Yes (+)
D1952	3.16	45.04	41.88		D1888	-	-	-	-
R1948	2.77	50.54	47.77	Yes (+)	R1884	0.90	58.07	57.17	
D1948	5.29	58.34	53.05		D1884	-2.22	50.05	52.27	

Note: Like Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) and Dudley and Rapoport (1989), we calculate home state advantages using state and national data from the five preceding elections, except for 1888 and 1884, when we use the four preceding elections and three preceding elections, respectively.

TABLE 2. THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE, 1884-2008

Party/Year	Home State Advantage	Actual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Counterfactual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Different Outcome w/ Home State Candidate?	Party/Year	Home State Advantage	Actual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Counterfactual Home State Two-Party Vote Share	Different Outcome w/ Home State Candidate?
R2008	2.00	61.06	59.06		R1944	-0.97	50.18	51.15	
D2008	6.00	62.64	56.64		D1944	-5.70	51.47	57.17	
R2004	6.97	70.31	63.34		R1940	0.64	45.93	45.29	
D2004	0.01	43.76	43.75		D1940	-0.93	47.79	48.72	
R2000	10.64	70.98	60.34		R1936	-1.30	40.75	42.05	
D2000	7.89	59.26	51.37		D1936	-3.97	87.61	91.58	
R1996	-6.85	33.98	40.83		R1932	0.18	45.17	44.99	
D1996	-4.76	51.29	56.05		D1932	1.49	88.70	87.21	
R1992	2.64	53.83	51.19		R1928	12.39	72.69	60.30	
D1992	-0.81	52.60	53.41		D1928	-0.40	60.51	60.91	
R1988	1.52	60.13	58.61		R1924	0.82	71.58	70.76	
D1988	-	-	-	-	D1924	4.23	38.54	34.31	
R1984	4.03	63.79	59.76		R1920	0.83	71.11	70.28	
D1984	1.43	45.98	44.55		D1920	-4.66	29.45	34.11	
R1980	1.84	57.17	55.33		R1912	-	-	-	-
D1980	2.59	52.21	49.62	Yes (+)	D1912	-0.84	65.08	65.92	
R1976	-3.92	53.88	57.80		R1908	1.03	56.59	55.56	
D1976	0.99	56.64	55.65		D1908	3.05	49.22	46.17	
R1972	1.57	62.12	60.55		R1904	-2.47	57.31	59.78	
D1972	-	-	-	-	D1904	3.41	43.20	39.79	
R1968	-1.04	49.04	50.08	Yes (-)	R1900	-0.22	54.78	55.00	
D1968	13.32	56.22	42.90	Yes (+)	D1900	1.17	45.69	44.52	
R1964	-8.37	31.35	39.72		R1896	10.36	62.35	51.99	
D1964	0.51	63.91	63.40		D1896	-9.59	30.08	39.67	
R1960	-	-	-	-	R1892	-	-	-	-
D1960	-14.71	51.01	65.72		D1892	2.26	51.63	49.37	Yes (+)
R1956	-0.62	55.58	56.20		R1888	-	-	-	-
D1956	0.28	49.69	49.41		D1888	-0.56	48.73	49.29	
R1952	3.67	56.87	53.20		R1884	-0.25	51.93	52.18	
D1952	-7.16 ⁺	64.83	71.99		D1884	-0.06	50.68	50.74	
R1948	3.68	49.77	46.09						
D1948	5.18	57.77	52.59						

Note: Like Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) and Dudley and Rapoport (1989), we calculate home state advantages using state and national data from the five preceding elections, except for 1888 and 1884, when we use the four preceding elections and three preceding elections, respectively.




FIGURE 1. HISTOGRAM OF PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE




FIGURE 2. HISTOGRAM OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

TABLE 3. MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

Variables	Dudley and Rapoport Model	Dudley and Rapoport Model, Plus Turnout	Devine & Kopko Model	Devine & Kopko Model, Plus Turnout
Party ID	-2.04 (1.64)	-1.50 (1.58)	-2.00 (1.76)	-1.45 (1.71)
Incumbent President	-3.91* (1.49)	-3.99* (1.49)	-4.00* (1.53)	-4.05* (1.51)
Senator or Governor	-3.34 (1.66)	-2.24 (1.68)	-3.63 (2.07)	-2.33 (2.10)
Population	-0.39 (0.20)	-0.33 (0.20)	-0.51 (0.32)	-0.44 (0.34)
Political Experience	-----	-----	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.12)
Population x Political Experience	-----	-----	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Turnout Advantage	-----	0.28* (0.11)	-----	0.27* (0.12)
Constant	10.20* (2.09)	8.45* (2.01)	10.45 (2.21)	8.76 (2.12)
N	53	53	53	53
Adj. R ²	0.2851	0.3332	0.2930	0.3360

* p < 0.05; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.




FIGURE 3. THE MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE ON PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

TABLE 4. MODELS OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

Variables	Dudley and Rapoport Model	Dudley and Rapoport Model, Plus Turnout	Devine & Kopko Model	Devine & Kopko Model, Plus Turnout
Party ID	2.37 (1.37)	2.18 (1.36)	2.43 ⁺ (1.38)	2.28 (1.36)
Incumbent Vice President	0.58 (1.72)	0.44 (1.79)	0.79 (1.79)	0.62 (1.88)
Incumbent President	-1.57 (1.44)	-1.24 (1.51)	-1.95 (1.44)	-1.63 (1.49)
Senator or Governor	-1.12 (1.20)	-1.21 (1.12)	-1.75 (1.12)	-1.85 ⁺ (1.07)
Population	-0.74* (0.27)	-0.74* (0.26)	-0.05 (0.32)	-0.10 (0.28)
Political Experience	-----	-----	0.24* (0.10)	0.23* (0.10)
Population x Political Experience	-----	-----	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)
Turnout Advantage	-----	0.16 (0.13)	-----	0.13 (0.12)
Constant	3.43 (1.81)	3.34 (1.75)	0.59 (2.21)	0.56 (2.12)
N	56	56	56	56
Adj. R ²	0.1683	0.1925	0.2600	0.2755

* p < 0.05; two-tailed test. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.




FIGURE 4. THE MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE ON VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

¹ Adkison’s claim has held up well over the past three decades. From 1984-2008, the average state comprised 1.96% of the national population, while the average presidential home state in this period comprised 4.09%. Moreover, in ten of fourteen presidential home states, the population share was higher than 1.96%.

² Exceptions include Garand (1988), Rosenstone (1983), and Tubbesing (1973). However, these studies do not account for recent presidential and vice presidential nominees, and their predictive power is limited.

³ Tubbesing (1973, 712) and Garand (1988, 102) implicate, but do not thoroughly test, mobilization's effect on presidential and vice presidential home state advantage. Also, justifications for including the party identification variable in home state advantage models are framed in such a way as to suggest mobilization. DiSarro, Barber, and Rice (2007), for example, explain: "Democrats turn out to vote at lower rates than Republicans, so there are more Democrats available to be mobilized by the emotional appeal of a home state candidate on the ballot" (562).

⁴ Since voter mobilization and conversion are individual-level processes, a direct test of our hypotheses would require individual - rather than aggregate - level data. However, using individual-level data would severely restrict the scope of our analysis and the sample-size for our empirical tests since the availability of such data, particularly at the state level, is quite limited for many election years and essentially nonexistent prior to the advent of scientific polling in the 1930s. Weighing all relevant considerations, we find aggregate-level data to be most appropriate for the purposes of this analysis, as have other scholars in the home state advantage and party realignment literatures. Nonetheless, it is important to note that our analysis provides indirect evidence regarding mobilization and conversion processes because we use aggregate-level data. Verifying our conclusions more directly, by using individual-level data, is a worthy goal for future analysis.

⁵ The friends and neighbors hypothesis, in fact, performs well in empirical studies of state and congressional-level elections (see Black and Black 1973; Kjar and Laband 2002; Tatalovich 1975).

⁶ Following Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983), Dudley and Rapoport (1989), and Devine and Kopko (2011), we use averages from the preceding three and four elections for 1884 and 1888 data, respectively, due to complications arising from the Civil War and Reconstruction.

⁷ Subsequent studies of the presidential home state advantage have estimated the average advantage to be lower (Garand 1988), virtually identical (DiSarro, Barber, and Rice 2007), or much higher (Mixon and Tyrone 2004) than 4.0%. The discrepant estimates are largely due to differences in methodological approaches; Garand (1988) used a modified version of the Lewis-Beck and Rice equation that captured raw party vote share, and Mixon and Tyrone examined only eight presidential candidacies between 1972-2000.

⁸ Indeed, Dudley and Rapoport found that parties favored geography over any other type of ticket balancing (i.e. ideology, religion, state versus federal experience) in vice presidential selections since 1884.

⁹ Recent scholarship supports this expectation. Only under certain conditions does a vice presidential running mate influence vote choice at the national level. Two recent studies that utilize American National Election Study data highlight the potential for a running mate to influence presidential vote choice. Ulbig (2010) found that vice presidential candidates can significantly influence vote choice, particularly when a vice presidential candidate attracts a high level of media attention. According to Knuckey's (2012) analysis, Sarah Palin had the largest running mate effect on vote choice since 1980, quite possibly costing Republicans the 2008 presidential election by alienating crucial swing voters. These studies underscore the conditional nature of a vice presidential candidate's effect on individual vote choice.

¹⁰ Results from other home state advantage studies are mixed on the effect of population. Mixon and Tyrone (2004) found it to be a significant predictor of presidential home state advantage,

Garand (1988) found it to be significant only for Democratic presidential candidates, and for DiSarro et al. (2007) it was the only predictor not to reach statistical significance (however, a county-to-state population ratio variable was significant and moderately correlated with the state population variable).

¹¹ Some scholars question whether partisan realignments occur in the first place (see Mayhew 2002, Shafer 1991). However, for a rebuttal in support of partisan realignment, see Norpoth, Sidman, and Suong (2013).

¹² A third hypothesis, demobilization, attributes realignment to the abstention of large number of voters in a manner that distinctly favors one major party (Binkley 1943; Kleppner 1987; Shively 1992). Also, some scholars (e.g. Brown 1991; Wanat and Burke 1982) attribute realignment to relatively even contributions of conversion and mobilization.

¹³ Our rationale is the same as that found in Devine and Kopko (2011, 8): “third-party candidacies sometimes substantially reduce the vote percentage earned by a presidential ticket, thereby distorting direct comparisons of past and present party performance.” Garand (1988), who used raw vote percentages for a given political party, argued that using the two-party vote share leads to distortions when a major party is excluded from a state ballot, requiring 100% of the vote share to be assigned to the other major party. However, such cases are rare and usually amenable to reasonable modifications. For instance, Alabama listed States’ Rights Party nominee Strom Thurmond on its ballot in 1948 and not Democratic nominee Harry Truman. When calculating the state voting trend for 1952 vice presidential candidate John Sparkman, of Alabama, we simply count Thurmond’s vote share for the Democratic Party. This is hardly unreasonable, since Thurmond had been elected Governor of South Carolina as a Democrat and the States’ Rights Party was a splinter faction from the Democratic Party. Likewise, in states

where Republican Party nominee William Howard Taft was excluded from the ballot in 1912, we count for Republicans the vote share earned by former Republican president and 1912 Progressive Party nominee Theodore Roosevelt.

¹⁴ State and national population figures were obtained from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, published by the U.S. Census Bureau. We used U.S. Census Bureau population projections for elections occurring between decennial census reports. When population projections were not available, particularly for elections before 1930, we estimated population figures in relation to the preceding and successive census reports (see also Devine and Kopko 2011).

¹⁵ Vice presidential home state advantage models typically control for presidential incumbency, since evaluations of the incumbent president are likely to strongly influence evaluations of incumbent or non-incumbent vice presidential candidates. Presidential home state advantage models, on the other hand, typically do not control for vice presidential incumbency. Again, vice presidents are far less salient and powerful than their presidential counterparts; thus, it is not particularly likely that evaluations of an incumbent vice president will strongly influence evaluations of the president throughout history.

¹⁶ To determine which years, and in which offices, the candidates served, we relied primarily on two sources: the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress* (<http://bioguide.congress.gov>) and the National Governors Association website (<http://www.nga.org>) (accessed June 11, 2012). To determine how many years a candidate spent in elected office, we subtracted the first year from the last year of service in that office.

¹⁷ Conversely, if a *decrease* in voter turnout were significantly associated with home state advantage, this would indicate a process of demobilization. Thus, we are able to test an

additional hypothesis beyond those upon which we, and the realignment, literature primarily focus: mobilization and conversion.

¹⁸ Darmofal and Nardulli defined the “core electorate” as “The average proportion of the eligible electorate that voted across a series of elections” and the “core partisan voting population” as “the average proportion of this core electorate that supported [a specific party] over the series of elections” (262). The baseline turnout and party preference measures we use to estimate home state advantage and turnout advantage could be defined identically.

¹⁹ For further information as to why it is necessary to correct for observations that are not independent and identically distributed, see, for example, Huber (1967), Moulton (1990), and Rogers (1993).

²⁰ The substantively similar finding leads us to believe that our empirical models are not misspecified (see King and Roberts 2012).

²¹ We begin our analysis in 1884 for reasons most clearly stated in Devine and Kopko’s (2011) Footnote 9.

²² See: <http://library.cqpress.com/elections/export.php>. Election data for 2008 were obtained from the Federal Elections Commission website, <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008presgeresults.pdf> (accessed June 11, 2012).

²³ Excluded presidential candidacies include: Grover Cleveland (1888, 1892); Theodore Roosevelt (1904); Alton Parker (1904); Warren Harding (1920); James Cox (1920); Thomas Dewey (1944); Franklin Roosevelt (1944); John Kennedy (1960); Richard Nixon (1972); George H.W. Bush (1988). Excluded vice presidential candidacies include: Levi Morton (1888); Whitelaw Reid (1892); James Sherman (1912); Thomas Marshall (1916); Charles Fairbanks (1916); Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1960); Sargent Shriver (1972); Lloyd Bentsen (1988).

²⁴ In separate analysis, we find that the inclusion of third-party candidates in our home state calculations does not change the win/loss estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2.

²⁵ Of all candidates to earn this dubious distinction, Agnew is among the most plausible. As Governor, and later as Vice President, Agnew was a notoriously abrasive and often alienating figure. Moreover, his elevation to the national stage, and subsequent role as leading “attack dog” against the Democratic ticket and associated liberal interests, easily could have inspired a backlash among voters from his traditionally Democratic home state of Maryland.

²⁶ While the Devine and Kopko model that employs *Turnout Advantage* yields a larger adjusted R^2 , the Dudley and Rapoport model is more efficient and parsimonious since it employs two fewer independent variables. We also conducted an F-test to determine whether the two models differ in terms of explanatory power; an F-test reveals no substantive difference ($p = 0.93$). Therefore, we believe it is more appropriate to rely on the Dudley and Rapoport model estimates when discussing the effect of *Turnout Advantage* for presidential candidates.

²⁷ Because this model employs the *Turnout Advantage* variable, the estimates for vice presidential home state advantage in Figure 4 can be directly compared with the estimates for presidential home state advantage in Figure 3.

²⁸ Voter demobilization is not a likely cause, either. If it were, we should see a statistically significant *decrease* in vice presidential home state turnout, on average, and a statistically significant and negative relationship between *Turnout Advantage* and home state advantage in Table 4.