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Locating Royce’s Reasoning on Race

Abstract

In this paper I contribute to Curry and Tunstall’s challenge to the view of Royce as anti-racist by locating Royce’s reasoning on race among that of his white contemporaries. In Section I, I show how Royce’s reasoning about science and race was utterly conventional, consistent with dominant theories of evolutionary, scientific racism of the day. Section II demonstrates that Royce’s advocacy of administration and his discussion of racial antipathies align with racial conservatives’ emphasis on social stability based on white superiority and control. Section III draws out implications for contemporary research on Royce and other historical recovery projects.

In the Fall 2009 issue of The Pluralist, Tommy Curry and Dwayne Tunstall challenged the current, dominant view of Royce as an anti-racist. In “Royce, Racism and the Colonial Ideal,” Curry presents Royce as a white supremacist, an admirer of British colonialism, and an advocate of black assimilation to Anglo-Saxon cultural practices (14-15). Tunstall, in “Josiah Royce’s “Enlightened” Antiblack Racism?” presents Royce as a nonessentialist regarding race, yet as a cultural antiblack racist, with a colonial attitude comparable to that held by John Stuart Mill (40). In the same issue of The Pluralist, Jacquelyn Kegley analyzes Royce’s 1905 essay, “Race Questions and Prejudices,” and maintains that Royce was a progressive antiracist, although she acknowledges that he shared some biases of the time (8). Scott Pratt and Shannon Sullivan basically agree with Kegley in their introductions to the 2009 reissue of Royce’s 1908 collection of essays, Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems. Setting Royce’s essays in the context of his philosophy of loyalty, Pratt presents Royce as racially
inclusive, with an egalitarian and democratic view on governance (8-9). Sullivan finds problematic Royce’s recommendation of “administration” as a response to race-friction, and takes it to illustrate Royce’s ignorance of structural racism (26-27). Nonetheless, she insists that Royce articulated an anti-racist position at a time when few philosophers, particularly white males, had the courage to do so (21).

In this paper I contribute to this debate, extending evidence in support of Curry and Tunstall’s presentation of Royce as holding white supremacist views. This paper addresses Curry’s concern that Royce’s thinking on race has not been situated in relation to white thinkers of his time (31). Here I locate Royce’s reasoning in “Race Questions and Prejudices” among his white contemporaries’ scientific and political debates regarding race. White supremacists of the time, while agreeing that whites were a superior race to blacks and that whites should govern, held a range of positions regarding the science and evolution of race, and offered many different proposals on how race relations should be socially and politically ordered. By locating his reasoning within the debates of his day, I show that in “Race Questions and Prejudices” Royce was arguing as a racial conservative, defined below, against a particularly vile form of populist racism, then prevalent. Because racial conservatism was so widely held by intellectuals of the day, Royce did not need to state his fundamental assumptions explicitly; his reasoning is opaque to today’s readers. However, there are plenty of clues in the questions he chose to address or not address, the arguments he chose to use and not use, and in the recommendations he made and did not make. This analysis shows that it is completely implausible to claim that Royce was anti-racist. Royce’s racial logic discussed in this paper, is of a piece with the colonial logic Curry and Tunstall identify in their essays; my conclusions complement their own. In addition, I will argue, that compared with other writings by white intellectuals of his day, Royce’s essay should not be
taken as a serious exploration of race questions. The sources he names were not respected intellectuals. His reasoning is jumbled and he does not draw out the implications of his views.

In his essay, Royce makes two basic claims: science has not established that racial characteristics, particularly mental ones, are fixed and unchanging; and race-friction can be controlled by better administration. In the first section, I show how Royce’s reasoning about science and race was utterly conventional, consistent with the dominant theories of evolutionary, scientific racism of the day. In section II I show that his advocacy of administration and his discussion of racial antipathies align with racial conservatives’ primary concern for social stability based on white superiority and control. Section III draws out the implications for contemporary research on Royce, as well as for other historical recovery projects.

I. Science and Race at Century’s Turn

Royce gives two responses to the question of “just what the results of science are regarding the true psychological and moral meaning of race differences” (“Race Questions” 267). First, he responds passionately that we should be suspicious of scientists who seem to shape their theories to suit their own prejudices. Second, Royce claims that science has not established that racially linked mental characteristics are fixed and unchangeable (“Race Questions” 268, 284-85). When we examine Royce’s claims and the evidence he provides for them, we find that the conclusion that he was anti-racist does not follow.

Scientists and Prejudices

Sullivan and Kegley regard Royce’s response to the first claim, that scientists shape their theories to suit their prejudices, as a dose of healthy skepticism toward scientific claims about
race (Sullivan 22, Kegley 3). To test this claim, we need to follow Royce’s clue and identify just to whom and what he is responding. He names Houston Stewart Chamberlain and his book, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, as his prime example ("Race Questions" 267).

Chamberlain was certainly worthy of Royce’s scorn, but he hardly counted as a scientist. British born, Chamberlain found his spiritual and literal home in Germany, in the bosom of the Wagnerians (Field 3-4). After Richard Wagner’s death in 1883, Chamberlain became particularly close to his widow, Cosima, married the Wagners’ daughter, Eva, and did all he could to promote the cult of the Wagnerians at Bayreuth, with its glorification of all-things Teutonic and scorn for all things Jewish (Biddiss 85-86). For Chamberlain, history is the story of the growth and disintegration of races. He states the thesis of *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* in the book’s introduction, “We are left with the simple and clear view that our whole civilization and culture of today is the work of one definite race of men, the Teutonic” (xxix). He then proceeds to hyperventilate for 1200 pages. In Chamberlain’s account, year one is the birth of Christ, who was Aryan, not Jewish. The Teutonic race awakened to consciousness in 1200 CE, in time for Italian Renaissance masters to join Martin Luther as highpoints of Teutonic history, which approached full, Wagnerian flowering in the nineteenth century (Biddiss 82-84). The villains of the story are the Jews. The Jews are either a pure race, or a mongrel race, depending on which page of the book one reads. Capitalism, socialism, liberal democracy and most any other target of Chamberlain’s excessive nationalism, are all the devilish work of the Jews, who threaten “to destroy our whole laboriously won civilization and culture” (quoted in Field 189-190).

While Chamberlain had studied botany, and gives a thin veneer of Darwinism to the writing, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* is in no sense a scientific exploration of race.
Chamberlain proudly called himself a dilettante. He was a popularizer and a synthesizer, who excelled in the “scavenger” method of writing, as one commentator described it (Field 173, 174, 199). Every anti-Semitic prejudice and every Teutonic exaltation show up in his virtually unintelligible rant. After their 1923 meeting, Chamberlain wrote to Hitler, “At one blow you have transformed the state of my soul. That Germany in its hour of greatest need has given birth to a Hitler is proof of its vitality.” Chamberlain met with Hitler four more times before he died in 1927 (quoted in Biddiss, 87).

Royce’s critique of Chamberlain is exactly right, but why bring him up at all? If Royce was interested in surveying then current scientific evidence on race, why did he not discuss Nathaniel Shaler, Edward A. Ross, Joseph Le Conte, or the many other scientists who wrote extensively on race?

Royce’s discussion of the Japanese, rather confirming him as a critic of scientific orthodoxy as Kegley and Sullivan maintain, also demonstrates his lack of engagement with science (Kegley 3-4; Sullivan 23-24). His discussion here is a methodological pastiche. Curry discusses the imperialist context of Japanese modernization and rising military power; I need not address that here (18-19). In this section Royce traces changes in his thinking about Japanese racial characteristics. After childhood impressions of Japanese culture as unknown and forbidding, Royce came to think of the Japanese as a plastic and child-like race, eliding two distinct racial characteristics (“Race Questions” 268-69). Scientists at the time defined plasticity in terms of a race’s ability to adapt when confronted with civilized white people. Plastic races could adapt; rigid ones could not. Le Conte considered African races and the Japanese to be plastic. Native American races were rigid, as evidenced by the fact that they were dying out, becoming in the inelegant term of the day, “exterminated” (Le Conte, “Race Problem” 359-361).
The contributions of civilized white people to this process were, of course, unmentioned. Royce then turns to personal experience with Japanese students as evidence that the race was not plastic and child-like ("Race Questions" 269). Scientists of racial evolution would interpret these students either as representing individual variations, present within all racial types, or as evidence of the Japanese race’s plasticity, given that some of them were able to adapt to the civilized ways of Harvard University. Royce then makes this peculiar statement: “Mr. Hearn and his kin have now let us know in a literary way something of the true heart of Japan” ("Race Questions" 270). Here Royce leaves science and personal experience, and enters the realm of popular culture and folklore. Greek-born, Lafcadio Hearn pursued the exotic, the criminal, the sensational, and the supernatural. In New Orleans, the West Indies, and Japan he collected ghost stories, fairy tales, folk music, and legends. He lived in Japan from 1890 to 1904, married a Japanese woman, and took a Japanese name. He spoke Japanese poorly and could not read or write the language. He had great nostalgia for feudal Japanese customs, and hated Japan’s modernizing trends. His writings fed the U.S. market for Oriental exotica (McNeil). Had Royce intended a serious scientific critique, he would not have presented personal, idiosyncratic experience and images from popular culture as scientific evidence.

**Science, Heredity and Racial Characteristics**

In his second response to what science can tell us, Royce states, “[T]here is hardly any one thing that our actual knowledge of the human mind enables us to assert, with any scientific exactness, regarding the permanent, the hereditary, the unchangeable mental characteristics which distinguish even the most widely sundered physical varieties of mankind.” He concludes, “No race of men, then, can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can
now know with exactness to be unchangeable” (“Race Questions” 284, 285). Kegley bases her praise of Royce as an anti-essentialist, and hence, an anti-racist, on these statements (3). Tunstall also reads Royce as an anti-essentialist, but identifies cultural factors as the basis for Royce’s racism (40). Odd though it sounds, we should take Royce’s insistence as a clue to how his views on science and race were utterly conventional. Made in 1905, Royce’s statements are exceedingly curious. Who was he arguing against? He certainly was not arguing against the consensus of the scientific community. Although they debated the details, members of the scientific community at that time considered racial characteristics as both non-essentialist, and heritable. Today, this sounds like a contradiction. However, most social scientists of the day worked with the Lamarckian assumption that characteristics acquired through interaction with a given environment could become heritable, and that this process was a central factor in racial evolution. They conflated “race,” “culture,” and “civilization” into the same scientific paradigm, and spoke of mental capacities, moral characteristics, and cultural practices as both evolving and heritable. As organisms adapted to their environment, their behavioral responses could become habits, and their habits turn into heritable instincts (Stocking 246). ¹ These views among scientists held dominance from the latter part of the 19th century until the end of the new century’s first decade, and persisted into the 1920s when knowledge of modern genetics and Franz Boas’s anthropological cultural relativism took hold (Stocking 122; Fredrickson 314-315). ² Royce himself endorsed Lamarckian evolution in an 1898 speech, stating, “But now the outer aspect of nature unquestionably moulds both the emotions and the customs of mankind, insensibly affects men’s temperaments in ways which, as we know, somehow or other tend to become hereditary, however we may view the vexed question concerning the heredity of acquired characters” (“The Pacific Coast” 133).
Today’s readers need to be wary of the equivocal term, “environment.” The term can refer to the physical, social, and cultural setting in which individuals live their lives, and includes factors such as available nutrition, education, degree of social respect or hostility, and so on. Scientists of Royce’s day, concerned with racial evolution, used the term on a grander scale. They thought of environment as a wide frame to which a given race adapted and in which it evolved. British Lamarckian Herbert Spencer provided the basic framework (Stocking 117-118).

In the U.S., sociologist E. A. Ross, for example, warned his colleagues to avoid the two extremes of ignoring racial differences as insignificant on the one hand, and of assuming that they are fixed and permanent, on the other (“Causes of Race Superiority” 67). Primitive races, particularly those in tropical climates, had means of sustenance readily available. Because they did not have to pursue distant goals, they did not need the higher-level mental capability of foresight, or the ability to suppress immediate impulses. Consequently, these mental capacities had not evolved in them to the point of heritability (“Causes of Race Superiority” 75-76, 83). Teutons, by contrast, living in a northern clime Ross calls “harsh, though not depressing,” evolved racially linked capacities of courage, initiative, and self-exertion (Social Control 16-19).

Geologist Nathaniel Shaler, Royce’s colleague at Harvard, gives a similar picture. He appreciates African peoples’ musical and religious sensibilities, their quick sympathy, and their powers of imagination (“Negro Problem” 702). African children seem mentally quick, but with physical maturation, Shaler writes, “[T]he animal nature generally settles down like a cloud on that promise” (“Negro Problem” 700). Because they lack impulse control, they have limited abilities to work cooperatively and to work toward future goals. Shaler considers these traits as marking the divide between savage races and civilized ones. Also, African peoples lack a “monogamic instinct,” which takes centuries to develop (“Negro Problem” 701-02). Shaler concludes that
during two hundred years of slavery, the virtues of whites had been implanted in American blacks, but these virtues had not become firmly rooted, that is, they had not changed from habits into heritable instincts (“Science and the African Problem” 42).

Placed in the context of Lamarckian racial evolution, many of Royce’s statements seem less bizarre, although they cannot be interpreted as anti-racist. For example, Royce’s account on the conditions under which Teutons evolved differs in details from Ross’s account, but they are participating in the same conversation. Ross agrees with Royce that all races, including their own, had had similarly debased practices, superstitions, and immoralities during the primitive stage of racial development (Royce, “Race Questions” 280-81; Ross, Social Control 16-19). Many scientists regarded climate as having a significant effect on racial evolution. Shaler, commenting on how Africans evolved in tropical climates, had doubts about blacks’ capacity to adjust to the cooler and snowier north (“Negro Problem” 707). These scientists would have agreed with Royce’s statement that climate and physical environment prevented Africans, indigenous Australians, and Plains Indians from forming great civilizations, but had they been in a different environment, they might have developed differently (“Race Questions” 284). We need to be clear on what Royce is claiming, and what he is not claiming. He is claiming that science cannot tell us that given mental capacities are fixed, permanent, and unchanging. Nowhere, however, does he deny that some races are superior to others in a heritable sense; nor does he deny that mental and moral capacities are linked to racial inheritance. The vast majority of scientists of the day agreed with him. (Stocking 112, 122, 242).

The Scientific Racism of Joseph Le Conte
In this section I show in a more extended way how Royce’s reasoning aligned with conventional evolutionary scientific racism of his time. Because Royce’s reasoning is not carefully developed, this task is not straightforward. My method is to summarize the racial views of Joseph Le Conte and show where they overlap with Royce’s. Royce knew Le Conte intimately; I cannot imagine that Royce did not know his views on race. Had Royce been arguing from an anti-racist stance, Le Conte, not Chamberlain, would have been his target.

Geologist Joseph Le Conte was Royce’s much beloved science professor and mentor at Berkeley, with whom Royce maintained a long and affectionate relationship (Clendenning 49-50, 215-218, 236-27, 286-87). Historian George Fredrickson writes that Le Conte was “the South’s most distinguished natural scientist”, and says that his 1892 essay, “The Race Problem in the South,” was “probably the decade’s most sophisticated application of Darwinian theory to the American race problem” (247). Le Conte writes in his autobiography, published posthumously in 1903, that the positions he offered in that essay “are now acknowledged almost universally by thinking men” (301).

Joseph Le Conte was a slave owner. In 1844 he inherited his portion of his father’s Georgian plantation and its 200 slaves. Le Conte owned these men and women for nearly two decades, until emancipation (“Race Problem” 349-50). Le Conte considered his father a model slave owner, firm, but kind. Of his slaves he wrote, “I have never known a laboring class more orderly, contented, and happy” (“Race Problem” 349). He states that Southern slave owners did not treat their slaves as property; for example, he himself felt responsible for his slaves’ well-being, and did not separate slave families for economic gain (Autobiography 232-33; “Race Problem” 350). Like many in the South, his wealth-holdings were devastated by the Civil War (Autobiography 231).
Le Conte states that during the time of slavery, the distance between the white “civilized” race, and members of the African “savage” race was so great, that slavery was the only possible way for the two races to cohabit in the same territory. The only alternative was “extinction of the weaker race” (“Race Problem” 354). Slavery was good for the slaves; by constant contact with and control by whites, they were able to develop beyond the stage of savagery. By the time of the Civil War, slaves had evolved to the point where they were ready for some measure of freedom, that is, to be under the control of the state, rather than of individual slave owners (“Race Problem” 361). The post-war problem in the South was that the labor system was totally disrupted. Had the slaves remained working at their pre-war tasks as wage-laborers, the disorder in the South could have been avoided (“Race Problem” 358).

Le Conte defines his position on race as “scientific sociology.” Organisms evolve from simple to complex; so does society. The scientific study of society is in its infancy and is incredibly complicated. He recommends that scientists use Herbert Spencer’s method of comparison to move the science along. This involves comparing how, at a given point in time, different races are at different stages of evolution. It also involves tracing the development of a given race through the stages from “barbarism to civilization,” and tracing the evolution of the human race as a whole from stone, to bronze, to iron age, and beyond (Autobiography 152-53.) Using Lamarckian principles of evolution, Le Conte differentiates the improvement of a race from improvement of individual members of that race. As individual members are educated, they can contribute in very small measure to what will become the heritable mental capacities of the race as a whole. As a race’s intellectual capacity becomes more evolved, a correspondingly larger portion of individual achievement can be due to individual effort (“Race Problem” 365-66).
This scientific theory had implications for race relations of the day. Le Conte states his “fundamental proposition”: “Given two races widely diverse in intellectual and moral elevation, and especially in capacity for self-government—i.e., in grade of race evolution; place them together in equal numbers and under such conditions that they can not get away from one another, and leave them to work out for themselves as best they can the problem of social organization, and the inevitable result will be, must be, ought to be, that the higher race will assume control and determine the policy of the community” (“Race Problem” 359). This, he claims, is the best arrangement for both races. Statements in the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing equality cannot take priority over social arrangements that are essential for the survival of both races. Constitutional rights must take second place to what Le Conte calls “the sacredest of all rights,” that is, “the right of the weak and the ignorant to the control and guidance of the strong and the wise” (“Race Problem” 363-64, 360). Le Conte observes that blacks after the war that lived in close association with whites continued to improve. The problem lay in the “black belt,” where many blacks had little contact with whites. They had no ambition, did not want to work for wages, and so were stagnating (Autobiography 234-35). White Southerners cared about blacks and wanted them to improve. As evidence Le Conte notes how much whites in the South contributed to black education (“Race Problem” 364).

Le Conte regretted the use of a strict color line. He considered it a rude, but necessary instrument for the time being, as it was essential to differentiate those people capable of participating in self-government from those who were not (“Race Problem” 378-79). The evolution of mental capacities, especially the capacity for self-government, is a very slow process. Le Conte writes, “The Negro race as a whole is certainly at present incapable of self-government and unworthy of the ballot; and their participation without distinction in public
affairs can only result in disaster.” Le Conte recommends literacy and property restrictions on the right to vote, with both whites and blacks being held to the same standard (“Race Problem 376-77).

To readers today, Le Conte’s views shock. Royce in his essay does not go into the same level of detail as Le Conte, and I am not claiming that he shared all of Le Conte’s views. I do not have the evidence for that. Although the tone of the two essays is very different, Royce’s essay shares the same general shape as Le Conte’s, however they may have differed on the details. Both write about mind as evolving from primitive, to civilized (Royce, “Race Questions” 279-81; Le Conte, Autobiography 152). Both Royce and Le Conte agree that different races have differing capacities for civilization and that this is an important test, although Royce adds that it had not yet been fairly administered. Both agree that some races are more “plastic” than others, and hence more capable of incorporating the effects of environmental change into heritable mental characteristics (Royce, “Race Questions” 282; Le Conte, Autobiography 84, “Race Problem” 360-62).

Le Conte, in his clearly racist essay, articulates some of the same points that scholars today use as the basis for claiming that Royce was anti-racist. Royce claims that science does not give us definitive conclusions about enduring mental characteristics of various races. Le Conte, also, states that scientific sociology is too undeveloped to give precise answers to these questions (Royce, “Race Questions” 282; Le Conte, Autobiography 152-53). The kinds of comparative work Le Conte calls for, comparing the paths toward civilization taken by various races, is what Royce presents in his section on how primitive peoples of all races, including the Germanic ancestors of current Anglo-Saxon whites, shared the same psychological traits (Le Conte, Autobiography 152-53; Royce, “Race Questions” 280-81). Finally, both express sentiments of
shared humanity among all members of the human race (Royce, “Race Questions 288; Le Conte “Race Problem” 374-375). One can believe that all persons are members of the same human race and still believe there are fundamental hierarchies among them. In sum, Royce’s critique of science and race is not directed at the dominant scientific positions of the day, and he does not challenge the racist dimensions of these theories.

II. Politics and Race at Century’s Turn

The question remains, why was Royce so insistent that science could not tell us that racially linked mental characteristics were fixed? Why was his tone so different from Le Conte’s? A more promising place to locate the target of Royce’s ire is in politics, not science. Royce’s claims about race fit well within the debate among white supremacists about how to achieve social and racial order. What Kegley, Sullivan, and Pratt identify as anti-racist claims in Royce’s essay, are better understood as statements of a racial conservative, directed against racial radicals. A little history will help to explain and locate the terms of this debate.

After the Civil War, the South was under military occupation for a decade. During Reconstruction, black men in the South could vote and hold public office. The Compromise of 1877, giving Rutherford B. Hayes electoral votes in exchange for agreeing to pull Federal troops out of the South, led to an era of “Conservative Restoration” (Williamson 79). Historian Joel Williamson helpfully sorts Southern whites’ attitudes toward race into three “mentalities,” or groupings of loosely associated ideas, emotional bents, and attitudes (4-6). Racial liberals, an extremely tiny group, were optimistic about blacks’ ability to continue to progress after Reconstruction. They believed in equal opportunity and thought blacks could achieve considerable equality with whites. They were often paternalistic and uncomfortable with physical
amalgamation. This group had virtually no voice in the South after the 1880s (Williamson 85-108). The largest and most long-lasting group Williamson calls racial conservatives. That blacks were inferior to whites was for them a given. The task was to establish a stable social order where blacks and whites each had a place, and knew their place. Understanding that slavery was over, racial conservatives wanted to secure an updated version of social organization that would complement their memories of the stable days during slavery, when masters were benign and slaves content. The order represented by Booker T. Washington suited them well. They and he advocated that blacks become educated, or at least trained to hold low-level positions in the economy, primarily as small-scale farmers. Blacks were to be industrious and exhibit suitable Victorian morality. They would accommodate to being excluded from political participation, which might in the future, when they had advanced enough, be granted them (Williamson 6, 56-57, 70-72). Of course, and most emphatically, blacks did not demand social equality; they didn’t even want it. Now whites and blacks often occupied the same space. To share a dining room as diner and server, or a railroad car as master and servant, was unproblematic. To share these spaces as social equals was to many whites, a most terrifying indicator of social disorder (Painter 112-113). Using the Sambo image, a ubiquitous popularization of Kipling’s “half-devil and half-child,” racial conservatives focused on the child half, positing that blacks needed guidance, education, and yes, control, by well-meaning, paternalistic white superiors (Fredrickson 285-86).

Williamson dates the period of racial radicalism from 1889 to 1915, after which racial conservatism regained its former dominance. Racial radicalism burned most brightly for a decade between 1897 and 1907; it is understandable that Royce’s 1905 essay on race would respond to these political events (Williamson 6). In 1888, northern Republicans gained control of the presidency and both houses of Congress, and many Southerners feared a re-introduction of
federal control over their elections. Toward century’s end, economic recession and rising industrialization in the South made Booker T. Washington’s vision outdated (Williamson 111-115, 70-73). Racial radicalism was essentially a populist movement both politically and culturally, making blacks the scapegoat for any ill (Fredrickson 266). John Bassett, professor at Trinity College (which became Duke University) made exactly this point in a 1903 article in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* (“Stirring up the Fires” 301-302). Particularly frightening to whites was the racial radicals’ image of the “new Negro,” raised post-slavery, who had never felt the restraining hand of white control. Using the devil half of the Sambo image, racial radicals claimed these blacks were “retrogressing” toward instinctual bestiality, and eventual extinction (Williamson 111). For racial radicals, the question was how to contain outbursts of black bestiality, particularly sexual ones, until the race became extinct. It was during the radicals’ reign that Jim Crow segregation laws were enacted, lynching became widespread, and the quality of life for blacks in the south reached its nadir (Williamson 182-84, 253-54). Thomas Dixon’s 1902 novel, *The Leopard’s Spots*, was an early version of his 1905 novel, *The Clansmen*, on which the 1915 box office hit, *Birth of a Nation*, was based.

For the most part, Southern white intellectuals were racial conservatives. They dominated at universities such as Duke, Vanderbilt, and Johns Hopkins, as well as at the state universities of Virginia and the Carolinas. Technical schools, such as Clemson and Virginia Polytechnical Institute, were radical (Williamson 272-73).

One indication that Royce fits within the racial conservative mentality is the way he defines the race question. The problem arises, he says, because “we find to-day more ways and places in which men find themselves in the presence of alien races, with whom they have to learn to live in the same social order” (“Race Questions” 265). To frame the question, in 1905, as men
finding today, that they are in the presence of alien races, is a particularly interesting construction. Blacks had lived on the eastern seaboard since 1619, virtually as long as whites. Under slavery, blacks and whites had shared the same social order, one in which the racial hierarchy was clear and enforced. Royce’s formulation of the question was typical of racial conservatives. Royce does not ask, as racial liberals did, whether full Constitutional rights for blacks should be enforced; he does not call for a vast increase in educational, economic, and political opportunities for former slaves and their children; he does not discuss whether slavery might have been the root cause of U.S. racial problems. Finally, he does not call for social equality between blacks and whites, the most difficult stance for any white person to hold publicly.

Royce states clearly that he is concerned with new tensions. His question, he says, is about “our own pressing Southern question.” He says that Southerners “of late” have used methods of keeping blacks in an inferior position that have caused great friction and irritation. This irritation has come about because of “recent Southern methods of teaching the negro his place” (“Race Questions” 271). In light of these statements, the most feasible reading is to locate Royce as a racial conservative, concerned with tensions exacerbated by the recent rise of racial radicalism.

**Royce on Jamaica**

Royce’s racial conservatism becomes more clear when his essay is set next to Sydney Olivier’s *White Capital and Coloured Labour*. In his essay Royce claims to have extensive knowledge of race relations in Jamaica. He visited there three times, traveled extensively throughout the island, read widely, and spoke to many people, including blacks (“Race Questions” 271-72). Royce concludes that the race-question, so irritating and troublesome in the
American South, did not exist in Jamaica, or at least had been substantially solved. White men and women moved freely among blacks with no fear of assault; race friction in the form of public controversy and anxiety was absent. While English whites controlled the island politically and economically, Royce observed that blacks could be found in some of the professions, including the civil service and the police force, as well as among the peasants and the poor. Jamaica was well administered, police and courts functioned smoothly, and the English did not flaunt their superiority. Royce concludes that the answer to the U.S. race problem was to adopt the pattern of English administration (“Race Questions” 272-75).

Curry rightly spends time on Sydney Olivier’s portrayal of race relations in Jamaica (Curry 21-25). Olivier was the island’s Colonial Secretary and Acting Governor from 1900-1903, and Governor from 1907-1913 (Lee 93, 108, 119). He often hosted American visitors to the Island; Royce’s account is based on Olivier’s. Curry presents Olivier as not entirely free of racism and imperialism, but as more enlightened about race and more opposed to imperialism than Royce. It is true that many of Olivier’s statements, which Curry quotes, sound relatively enlightened (Curry 21-25). However, Curry misses three lines of thought that strongly shaped Olivier’s presentation of his views on race: Olivier was a socialist, he held Lamarckian evolutionary views on race, and he presupposed a three-tiered, rather than a two-tiered racial caste system. Once these are taken into account, it becomes clear that Olivier and Royce were fairly close in their basic positions.

First of all, Olivier was not as much of an anti-imperialist as Curry presents him. Olivier was a Fabian socialist. His project in Jamaica was to translate socialism into the colonial context. When Olivier came to Jamaica, he wanted to reform the great sugar-producing estates owned by absentee landlords, which he considered a particularly evil manifestation of capitalism (Lee 92).
Basically, Olivier opposed exploitation and cruelty in the name of profit. He viewed much of British imperialism, as it was in fact carried out, as rapacious capitalist profit seeking, with African populations treated cruelly in the process. When he mocks white views of African peoples, he is mocking how exploitive white imperial capitalists view them (Olivier 1-10). As Curry acknowledges, Olivier had no doubts that Europeans were entitled to seek economic opportunity in any part of the world that pleased them (Curry 22, Olivier 8). Now one could argue, I suppose, that socialist imperialism without profit-driven cruelty is better than capitalist imperialism with such cruelty, but both are imperialist and both require cruelty. Olivier’s image of humanitarian colonizers was of missionaries who aimed to civilize and Christianize the indigenous population. If they also reaped some economic advantage in the process, that was acceptable (El-Amin 530). In line with scientific evolutionary racism, Olivier claimed that Africans and people of African descent were savages who lacked moral conscience. They were incapable of conceptualizing moral objections to killing people who got in their way. If indigenous blacks objected to the presence of imperializing whites, of course the white imperialists had the right to kill blacks who objected to their presence. This was not capitalist cruelty; it was merely self-preservation (Olivier 164-66).

The next point Curry misses is the Lamarckian evolutionary view of race development that Olivier held (Olivier 11-18). On this, Olivier was essentially in agreement with Le Conte and Royce. Olivier describes people of African descent as an “excitable and imaginative race,” backward, uncivilized, immature, and incapable of keeping the peace by themselves (50, 3, 6-8). Serving as slaves in the West Indies enabled Africans to elevate their levels of morality and civilization (57-58). They understood working under force, and they thrived under the affectionate familial relations they had with their owners (79-80). Like Le Conte, Olivier thought
race tensions in the U.S. were essentially provoked by constitutional promises of equality (Olivier 55-56). Newly released from slavery, whether in Jamaica in 1833 or in the U.S. three decades later, blacks lacked intellectual and psychological capacities for participating in governance. Like Le Conte, Olivier approved of blacks in Jamaica voting if they met property and literacy requirements; very few of them did (52-60).

There is a third complication in using race relations in Jamaica as a model for the U.S. South that Royce missed, and it may be that Olivier missed how Royce missed it. In White Capital and Coloured Labour, Olivier states that Royce “very precisely endorsed” his views on race relations in Jamaica. In fact, Olivier inserted the material on Jamaica from Royce’s article, approximately 25% of the whole essay, into his book to demonstrate this concord (61). The source of misunderstanding is that Jamaica had a three level racial caste system, with a “coloured” or mixed-race intermediary group that Olivier distinguishes very distinctly from both the ruling English class and the vast majority of the population that he describes as a “nearly pure negro peasant class” (33). Royce writes that in Jamaica “there are negroes in government service, negroes in the professions,” and so on (“Race Questions” 273). In Olivier’s eyes, these people were not “negroes,” but mixed-race. What he means by mixed-race is variable. Sometimes he explicitly includes people of mixed European and African ancestry that the category (Olivier 33). He considered himself to be of mixed race, citing his “Puritan-Saxon,” French, and Irish ancestry (El-Amin 521), and he refers to “white Creoles,” of mixed European ancestry (Olivier 35). Olivier would be astonished at Pratt’s claim that Royce wanted to include “full participation by non-whites” in his proposed administrative order, an order, Pratt says, that would foster loyalty through “on-going negotiations among the groups seeking to realize their
own futures” (8-9). Olivier intended no such thing in Jamaica. If Royce in fact “very precisely endorsed” Olivier’s position, then Royce intended no such thing, either.

When Olivier defends race-mixing, he is responding to a debate among race evolution scientists as to whether the offspring of “interbreeding” tends to create people who are physically or intellectually weak, and thus not of good evolutionary material. Le Conte and Shaler worried about this (Le Conte, “Race Problems 367-373; Shaler “Negro Problem” 706). Royce side steps this argument, placing the impetus to amalgamate on blacks who wanted lighter-skinned offspring (“Race Questions” 373). Essentially, Olivier is having it both ways. He agrees that the first few generations of mixed-race offspring have hereditary weaknesses. Still, he thinks the mixed-race class serves a useful function by giving the society as a whole an “organic unity.” The mixed race class makes for “a bureaucracy to keep the peace” between the much more widely separated white controlling class and the African peasant class. Mixed race children fathered by white men, will be “an advance on the pure bred African” mother. Olivier is opposed to mixed-race children issuing from white mothers. Since women can bear relatively few children in a lifetime, it is a bad idea to “breed backward from her” (38). Ensuring white male control over white women as well as people of color was always deeply embedded in racial debates of the day (Painter Chapter Four).

I do not have evidence to attribute all of Olivier’s views on race to Royce. However, given the specificity of Olivier’s racism, Royce’s enthusiastic endorsement of Jamaican administration as the solution to the race problem, is troubling. Sullivan and Kegley are right to worry about Royce’s stress on administration as a problematic endorsement of institutionalized racism. Their explanation is that Royce was ignorant of the psychological and ontological violence that colonialism inflicted on the colonized (Sullivan 27; Kegley 5). Even Tunstall writes
of Royce’s “unwitting perpetuation of white supremacy” (44). It is true that Royce was not familiar with Charles Mills’ epistemology of ignorance that Sullivan brings into the discussion (31). However, Royce, like Le Conte and Olivier, was neither ignorant nor unwitting in his defense of white supremacy. He knew exactly what he was advocating: an administrative scheme that would maintain a racial caste system while minimizing overt racial friction.

**Thomas Nelson Page and Lynching**

We find further confirmation that Royce was responding to racial radicals by examining Royce’s reply to Thomas Nelson Page, given in section IV of his essay. In *The Negro: The Southerners’ Problem*, Page states that the superiority of the white race is “absolute and unchangeable,” a superiority that is “inherent and essential” (292-93). Perhaps Royce’s insistence that science had not established fixed, heritable racial characteristics was directed at Page and his fellow racial radicals, rather than scientists. Examining more closely what Page said and how Royce replies to him, further confirms that Royce is writing as a racial conservative, and not as an anti-racist.

Thomas Nelson Page was a popular novelist, one of the most successful in the South. Williamson classifies him as a racial conservative to begin with, writing of Southern whites as paternalistic, and of blacks as child-like. Page then turned to racial radicalism, finding the stereotype of the black beast a surer route to commercial success (Williamson 336, 178). In his essay Royce responds explicitly to Page’s chapter on lynching in *The Negro: The Southerners’ Problem* (“Race Questions” 276-77). The story Page tells is crystal clear. During slavery, white masters were benevolent and black slaves were content, their passions kept in check through the kindly control exercised by their white masters. White women were perfectly safe to go among
their black slaves; rape did not exist (84). The rape of black women by white men is, of course, not mentioned. Problems began during Reconstruction, when northerners taught blacks that they could be social equals with whites, and cast southern whites as their enemies, rather than their kindly protectors. By the end of the nineteenth century, faithful, ex-slaves were old and outnumbered. “New issue” blacks, that is, men raised since emancipation, without the gentle, restraining hand of slavery, thought equality meant equal access to white women. Their animal instincts were unrestrained, and they began to ravish white women, even in their own homes. White men, understandably outraged, turned into lynch mobs, to effect justice (95-99). Again, white male control over white women is a sub-text.

Page is clear that he considers lynching to be criminal and barbaric (87-90). He reviews the difficulties: the white population in the South is heavily rural, with few police; black rapists can find sanctuary in forests and in sympathetic black communities. Whites had already tried to administer swift and sure justice in the form of quick executions, but this seemed to inflame black passions, rather than deterring them (97-98). Yes, lynching is a barbaric crime, but it will not cease until blacks take control of their own communities, cooperate with the authorities, and make clear to rapists among them that their actions will not be tolerated (111-116). Page is open to giving blacks police authority over their own communities. In fact, this is the only hope; if it is utopian, as Royce accused Page of thinking, that is because the crimes of black rapists and white lynchers alike “have their roots so deep in racial instincts that nothing can eradicate them” (Royce, “Race Questions” 276; Page 119).

This is the story to which Royce responds. He does not question the romantic myth of antebellum slavery, or the myth of ruinous reconstruction, or the myth of the black rapist. In fact, he refers to “extremely dangerous criminals” who “get sympathy from some portion of their
ignorant fellows”, referring to the alleged rapists who were sheltered in the black community (“Race Questions” 276). He does not question that white men are entitled to control white women. He does not question Page’s claim that the root cause of disorder is the black rapist, even though Page includes the same statistics from the Chicago Tribune that Ida B. Wells-Barnett had been publicizing for over a decade, that demonstrated only a minority of lynch victims had been charged with rape (Page 90-92). All Royce questions is whether the South had tried hard enough to create an orderly administration, in which blacks respect the law and police their own community. What bothers him is disorder, not racial hierarchy (“Race Questions” 276).

Antipathies

In his reply to Page, Royce tells us not to confuse the essential with the accidental. He writes, “We are likely to take for an essential race-characteristic what is a transient incident, or a product of special social conditions. We are disposed to view as a fatal and overwhelming race-problem what is a perfectly curable accident of our present form of administration” (“Race Questions” 277). What does Royce mean here by “essential” and “accidental?” Sullivan interprets Royce as saying that physiological differences between races are accidental in the sense that they do not have intellectual or moral significance (27). A more likely interpretation is that Royce considers race-friction as manifest in “lively and intense irritation,” and race-hatred as enacted by lynch-mobs, to be accidental and eliminable through Jamaican-style administration. Racial radicals considered these things to be inevitable; racial conservatives did not.
If race-friction is “accidental,” then what does Royce think is “essential?” Royce concludes, “Our so-called race-problems are merely the problems caused by our antipathies” (285). To further confirm that Royce is not an anti-racist, we need to place his discussion of antipathies within historical context. Sullivan focuses on Royce’s statement that antipathies are capricious, and should not be named and turned into race hatred. Instead, she claims, “society can and should educate our habits to eliminate them” (32). Kegley as well, points to Royce’s characterization of antipathies as capricious, repeating his point that they should not be given sacred standing and used to justify hatred (7). By stressing capriciousness Sullivan and Kegley select the characteristic that best suits their interpretation, ignoring the darker terms that fill out Royce’s description of antipathies. Yes, Royce says antipathies are capricious and childish, “on a level with a dread of snakes, or of mice” (“Race Questions” 286). He also says that these “childish phenomena” are something we share with dogs and cats, that is, they are not childish in the sense that adults outgrow them, but they are a deeply embedded part of our evolutionary inheritance. These antipathies, he writes, “are very elemental, widespread, and momentous mental phenomena,” and have an “instinctive basis” (“Race Questions” 285-86). Because they are instinctive and capricious, we must be on guard. Note Royce’s comment that civilized people of his day had to guard against the re-emergence within themselves of the mental traits of “primitive people.” “Any frenzied mob of civilized men may relapse in an hour to the level of a very base savagery,” he writes (“Race Questions” 281). His view is consistent with the more explicit statements made by University of Chicago sociologist, William I. Thomas. In 1904 Thomas wrote that humans’ racial instincts evolved earlier than did their deliberative capacities, and because these instincts are more deeply embedded, they are not amenable to rational control. These racial instincts particularly developed during the tribal phase of race evolution,
functioning to strengthen tribal affiliation, and provide the necessary distrust toward potentially hostile outsiders (607-610). Le Conte gives a similar analysis, adding that the evolutionary function of these racial instincts was to “preserve the blood purity of the higher race” (“Race Problems” 365).

In his survey of the writings of whites on race from the early nineteenth century until World War One, Fredrickson found antipathies right in the center of the discussion. Summarizing the position held by the vast majority of whites, he writes, “Racial prejudice or antipathy is a natural and inevitable white response to blacks when the latter are free from legalized subordination and aspiring to equal status. Its power is such that it will not in the foreseeable future permit blacks to attain full equality” (321). How to handle these antipathies was a matter of much debate. Writers proposed a range of solutions to keep whites’ antipathies from being irritated by the presence of blacks. Racial radicals used them to justify the color line, and to explain why lynching was an unfortunate, but necessary response (Fredrickson 275). Others suggested deporting American blacks to Africa, South America, or the Philippines, or to set aside a special state within the U.S. for them (Archer 235-244). Royce’s discussion of antipathies belongs inside this debate.

Royce’s claims about antipathies are best read as those of a racial conservative, criticizing racial radicals. Here, Royce’s analysis is close to Olivier’s and uses similar language. In fact, Olivier also inserted the section on antipathies from Royce’s essay into his book (169-171). Olivier, viewing the U.S. South from his orderly, white supremacist island, thought that Southerners had turned race antipathies into fetishes, and had constructed a social and political order that both exacerbated the resulting hysteria, and tried to contain it. Doing this, he predicts, will only further irritate the suppressed race, and so cannot hold a long-term solution to racial
problems (173, 175). The answer for both Olivier and Royce on how to keep racial antipathies from being dangerously aroused lies in administration. What to Royce is “essential” is that the instinctual base of race antipathies cannot be eliminated, at least not before racial evolution has time to run its course.

In the essay’s penultimate paragraph Royce writes, “I have said little or nothing, in this paper, of human justice. I have spoken mainly of human illusions. We all have illusions, and hug them. Let us not sanctify them by the name of science” (“Race Questions” 288). Precisely what are the illusions to which he refers? Sullivan identifies white supremacy as the illusion, and claims that Royce is asking his readers to dispel this illusion and eliminate the practices based on it (32). Royce’s discussion of antipathies, placed in historical context, makes this interpretation implausible. The “illusion” here belonged to racial radicals who did not believe whites and blacks could occupy the same territory without whites’ instinctive racial antipathies being intensely irritated. Royce proposes a well-administered white supremacist social order as a viable alternative to the racial strife of the U.S. South, thus dispelling the illusion. This, Olivier maintained, and Royce agreed, is why there was no race-problem in Jamaica.

**An Unserious Inquiry on Race**

In the previous section I pointed out how Royce did not question recognized scientists of the day, and how his essay did not explore the scientific questions regarding race that would have marked him as anti-racist. Here I argue that Royce’s essay was not a serious exploration of the politics of race. I noted above that Royce did not pose the questions that racial liberals posed. Here I use a lower standard, measuring his essay against the writings of other racial conservatives of his time.
If Royce seriously thought the U.S. South could adopt a Jamaican-style administrative structure to deal with the race problem, he would have anticipated John M. Mecklin’s objection that the history, demographics, and political contexts of the two locations were significantly different. Curry is right to note Mecklin’s criticism, but he should be careful also to note Mecklin’s racial conservatism and thorough support for white supremacy. Mecklin agreed with Le Conte and Olivier that Reconstruction was a disaster. Like them, he defined it as a time when northern whites encouraged blacks to believe the thoroughly fallacious notions, expressed in the founding documents of the U.S., that all persons share inherent equality and inalienable rights (“Philosophy of the Color Line” 345-48). Mecklin blames Reconstruction for the race-friction in the South that made the color line necessary. He did not need to be anti-racist to anticipate difficulties in establishing a stable, white supremacist legal order in the U.S. South, given this history.

Royce’s essay is silent about the political implications of his position. He does not discuss whether blacks should have political equality with whites, including the right to suffrage, with or without literacy and property qualifications. Henry W. Grady, editor of the Atlanta Constitution and a white supremacist, opposed social equality, but thought political equality should be retained (Fredrickson 206). George Washington Cable, the closest to a racial liberal the South could offer, did not think blacks and whites were biologically equal. Nonetheless, he opposed racial segregation, and supported full civil rights for blacks. He believed in a social hierarchy, but one in which genteel, educated blacks would be integrated with equivalently placed whites in the social order (Fredrickson 222-227). While these positions are hardly enlightened, the point is that Royce didn’t even consider them.
Sullivan states that Royce was one of very few white male philosophers willing to write on race issues. This may be true for philosophers, but many white male racial conservatives wrote extensively on race. Williamson notes that southern racial conservatives were firmly opposed to lynching, viewing it as an assault on social order (259). Even Shaler argued against the view that “male negroes are sexually dangerous animals” (“The Negro Since the Civil War” 38). Place Royce’s muted objection to lynching next to Andrew Sledd’s absolutely clear condemnation, published in the Atlantic Monthly in July 1902. Sledd, a professor at Emory, agreed with racial conservatives that blacks were an inferior race, but he still argued that they had fundamental, inalienable rights that deserved equal respect under law. Lynching was not justice, he said, but “a wild and diabolic carnival of blood” (70). Lynchers should be prosecuted for murder. Sledd, living in the South, lost his job (66-71; See also Williamson, 259-62.) By contrast, it was not difficult to criticize lynching from a seat in the north. The Chicago Tribune, for example, gave a graphic description of the lynching of Richard Coleman, stating, “citizens openly assist[ed] in torture of the prisoner.” The New York Times called the lynching an exhibition of “brutality and barbarity of the most revolting character” (“Burns Negro at Stake”; “The Kentucky Lynching”). For Royce to present “Race Questions and Prejudices” as a talk to the Chicago Ethical Society, and have it published in the University of Chicago’s International Journal of Ethics, took no courage at all.

Finally, Royce does not discuss whether whites have humanitarian responsibilities toward blacks. Aside from oblique references to “up from slavery” and black self-respect, Royce does not even endorse Booker T. Washington’s educational efforts, a standard trope for racial conservatives. Even Page praised Washington effusively, writing that he “always speaks for the right” (114). Shaler explicitly calls for increased educational opportunities for blacks,
particularly in skilled technical fields. Numbingly racist though his position is, Shaler thought whites, having brought Africans to American in the slave trade, had an enormous duty toward them. He writes, “If they fall and perish without a trial of every means that can lift and support them, then our iniquitous share in their unhappy fate will be as great as that of our forefathers who brought them here” (“Negro Problem” 707-708). Many racial conservatives understood themselves to have obligations of noblesse oblige toward blacks, and took these responsibilities seriously. In 1913 the Southern Sociological Congress held a University Commission on Race Questions that included both white and black delegates. Declaring that all personalities are sacred, they called for public welfare agencies and churches to minister to both races, and to respond to needs ranging from education, health, housing, and economic development, to recreation facilities (McCulloch). These racial conservatives believed in white superiority and cannot be called anti-racist. Sullivan is right to point out how such paternalistic attitudes debase those the benefactors claim to help (30). Their vision of an orderly society is as white supremacist as that of racial radicals. I am not defending them, but merely pointing out that they understood and responded to dimensions of race relations that Royce did not acknowledge or engage.

### III. Implications

This essay gives a caution. I have great respect for the philosophical acumen and care with which Kegley, Pratt, and Sullivan work. They are excellent philosophers. The problem with their interpretations is that they assume that the meanings of the words Royce used are self-evident to late 20th and early 21st century readers, and that Royce constructed his argument with consistency. Given these assumptions, the philosopher’s task is to use philosophical analysis to
reconstruct Royce’s position. In this paper I have shown that these assumptions cannot be relied upon when reading “Race Questions and Prejudices.” To us, Royce’s language is highly coded. He wrote, as we all do, using the vocabulary and linguistic constructions available to him at the time. We literally do not know what his words mean unless we first place them within their historical and rhetorical context. My strongest recommendation is that philosophers engaged in historical recovery projects read history extensively, and study a range of primary documents of the era. Tools of philosophical analysis are not useful unless one knows what the words meant to audiences of the day, and identifies the conversations within which those words held salience.

The second assumption, that Royce worked from a consistent point of view, and that philosophical analysis can construct that view, is in this case false. I think that the reason fine philosophers today read Royce’s essay as anti-racist, is because of this expectation. Royce flits from discourse to discourse, jumbling science, politics, and popular culture, without developing the implications of the position he is occupying in any given paragraph. By contrast, Le Conte, Shaler, and Olivier work out their evolutionary perspectives in a consistent manner, and as they draw out the implications, their racism shows right up. Even Thomas Nelson Page works with a kind of consistency, vile though it is. Once one enters the thoroughly mythologized world of the romantic, white South, one can follow his reasoning, which he lays out with excruciating clarity. We need to remember that even fine philosophers produce badly constructed essays on occasion.

What are the implications for further research on Royce? In his introduction to Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems, Royce states that the collected essays are applications of his philosophy of loyalty (37-38). Pratt develops this theme in detail (1-19); Sullivan gives “Race Questions and Prejudices” a central place in Royce’s philosophy of loyalty (20). My findings here call for a re-evaluation of the other essays in Race Questions,
Provincialism, and Other American Problems, and of The Philosophy of Loyalty. Curry is right to locate Royce’s essay on “Provincialism” within the context of bringing North and South into some sort of national unity (27-30). The problem for whites in the South was how to maintain what they saw as their distinctive, i.e., white supremacist culture, while at the same time healing the wounds from the civil war and forming a more universal loyalty out of the sectional loyalties that whites held. Though unmentioned, race is the essay’s sub-text.

The Philosophy of Loyalty should be interpreted with the full freight of white, Southern provincialism in mind. Royce’s discussion of loyalty to lost causes should be read explicitly as a defense of the “Lost Cause.” We do not need to use loyalty to the Nazis as the hypothetical test case, implying, as McDermott does in his introduction to the book, that Royce died before the “real” test took place (xvii-xviii). The “Lost Cause” was the real test. It was a paean to white supremacy; every white ear at the time knew exactly what it meant. It meant continuing loyalty to the mythology of pre-Civil War Southern society, a time when blacks and whites, men and women, were kept in their respective places in the racial and gender hierarchy. Loyalty to the Lost Cause was in service to that remembrance. In stating his devotion, Royce gives a succinct definition of the Lost Cause. “In the South, the story of the Civil War—a war so earnestly fought out to the point of an absolutely honourable, because inevitable defeat—this story, I say, now survives, in the ideals of the new generation of Southerners, as a very precious memory of heroism and of endurance. It survives in sentiments of pride, and of affection for their dead” (“Tendencies of American Civilization” 228-229). Royce’s description of concrete measures that demonstrate loyalty to loyalty is a virtual checklist of exactly what the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the Sons of Confederate Veterans, and other Lost Cause societies were doing (The Philosophy of Loyalty 115). Here we need to read Royce’s silences. If Royce were truly anti-
racist, he would have seen service to lost causes and advocacy of provincialism as enormously problematic. A serious philosophical examination of loyalty to loyalty would assess Royce’s position in the context of the Lost Causers’ contributions to white supremacy, whites’ historical amnesia, the persistence of prejudice and structural racism, and yes, to the epistemological ignorance that Sullivan and Mills so eloquently decry.

We need to acknowledge that good people, of fine intellect and moral sensibilities, live and think and write in their own time. Journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates, in a January 2010 posting on his Atlantic blog, tries to understand those who insist that some blacks served in the Confederate Army. He replies to them this way:

Ultimately this is about Lost Causers and their cloying need to believe in the perfection of their ancestors. It's quite sad. Paul Robeson is one of my heroes. But he was wrong about communism, and grievously wrong about Stalinist Russia. I love John Brown. But his scheme was crazy.

Forcing ones ancestors to be Christ-like, is the ultimate act of selfishness. . . . They are not allowed to live in our memory as fully-formed humans, but instead are petrified by our need for a Godhead. You have to let them live, else your reverence is pageantry, and your estimation, blasphemous.

They were human. And we were all human.\textsuperscript{vii}

We are right to celebrate Royce, James, Dewey, Addams, and other early pragmatists, and to seek wisdom in their writings. They were not always right. They lived in a racially toxic era, they breathed in the toxins, and they were at times hideously wrong. We dishonor them and ourselves if we do not acknowledge this truth.

ii Stocking illustrates how Lamarckianism receded by carefully tracking how W.I. Thomas moved away from it between 1897 and 1912. See Stocking 260-263.

iii Southern whites’ contribution to black education was a frequent trope. For specific examples of others who used the same line, see Fredrickson 204-209.


v Doing this work takes time, but it is not hard to do. Finding primary documents is greatly facilitated by databases such as JSTOR and Reader’s Guide Retrospective. Some university websites and Google books make obscure texts available.

vi Historian David Blight gives a clear account of the Lost Cause in Race and Reunion. See Chapter 8, “The Lost Cause and Causes Not Lost.” Particularly troubling was the way Lost Cause societies ensured that history texts in the schools would present their version of the antebellum South, the Civil War, and its aftermath.

vii I thank my colleague, Una Cadegan, of the University of Dayton History Department, for bringing this posting to my attention.

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