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On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

Raymond M. Herbenick

The term 'experience' is obviously used in a variety of ordinary ways in daily life situations and in a multitude of technical ways in both psychological and philosophical matters. Unfortunately, this amenability of the term 'experience' to such a variety of employments often leads some philosophical pundits to point out the futility involved in attempting to discuss the topic of experience. On this view, experience is regarded as an unanalyzable, intuitive ultimate of sorts or the term 'experience' is taken as a logically primitive term. No doubt this reluctance to discuss the concept of experience takes into account Wittgenstein's admonitions against what he called certain "dead-ends in philosophy" and "misleading analogies between the form of expression in different regions of language".¹ But it also glosses over Wittgenstein's provocative suggestion that the super-concept of experience as used in the context of a theory of language may very well have a "humble use" much as the words 'table', 'lamp', and 'door'.²

Now this super-concept of experience in its super-order relationships with such other super-concepts as proposition, world, proof and truth will not be treated. Nor will the use of the term 'experience' in strictly non-technical contexts, e.g., in humble utterance such as "Experience is the best teacher", or, "One learns from experience", or, "Work experience is required". Rather I shall be concerned with certain psychological and philosophical uses of the term experience in ways that are often suggestive of a conceptual scheme or model for the description, understanding and explanation of human behavior. For example, William James speaks of that immediate flux of life which furnishes the material for our subsequent reflections as "pure experience".³ E. C. Tolman regards immediately given experience as a "common matrix out of which both physics and psychology are evolved".⁴ The Gestalt psychologist K. Koffka conceives experience as the "dynamic relation between the field of forces of the ego and the object," a kind of vectorial magnitude.⁵ Hayek in his book *The Sensory Order* regards experience as fundamentally a pre-sensory "linkage" or formation of new connexions by the simultaneous occurrence of several afferent impulses.⁶ Professor Schrag notes the "vectorial" character of experience and further suggests that the "mixing of metaphors whereby experience is depicted at once as a field and as a stream" is required by the phenomena themselves.⁷ In fact, Professor Schrag goes on to state that:

The experienced world is a concretely delivered configurative field and

dynamic process of pre-reflective and reflective experiencing, intentionally directed to figure and background, affording both non-thematic and thematic significance, with an engaged and embodied experience at its center.⁸

All of this is but a selective indication of the interest in the topic of experience demonstrated by psychologists and philosophers.

It is in this context that I shall deal with the use of the term 'experience' as found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, a phenomenology which purports to offer an alternative view of experience to those commonly based on conceptual models used in physiological-neurological contexts and psychoanalytic-psychiatric contexts. In some physiological and neurological contexts, experience is conceptually modelled along the lines of the stimulus-response structure of reflex arc theory, while in some psychoanalytic and psychiatric contexts, experience is conceptually modelled along the lines of the stimulus-response structure found in the theory of the unconscious. It is to these conceptual models of experience that Merleau-Ponty addresses himself in offering a description, understanding, and explanation of the experience of human behavior as intentional. It should be noted that nowhere does Merleau-Ponty deny the validity of reflex arc theory (although he does question the validity of the theory of the unconsciousness) so long as the conceptual model is viewed in the light of total human experience. Typical of this view are Merleau-Ponty's remarks in his essay "From Mauss to Claude Lévi-Strauss" (*Signs*) concerning anthropological science. One must in virtue of anthropology "neither try to prove the primitive is wrong nor to side with him against us but to set itself upon a ground where we shall both be intelligible without any reduction or rash transposition".⁹ Before examining Merleau-Ponty's concept of experience, however, it is crucial that the record be set straight on a number of misrepresentations and misinterpretations of his methodology.

A review of critical works on Merleau-Ponty's thought shows the diversity of critical interpretation and disparity in assessment. No doubt he would find this both amusing and dissatisfying—much as Descartes did as evidenced by Descartes' injunction to his readers against his "ivy-climbing" commentators and disciples in Part VI of the *Discours*. For example, Gurwitsch believes that Merleau-Ponty inadequately pursued "consistent and thoroughgoing investigation of the noematic aspects of perception"¹⁰ while Zaner faults Merleau-Ponty for his rejection of noetic reflection in favor of noematic reflection.¹¹ De Waelhens claims that Merleau-Ponty clearly recognized the problem involved in the phenomenon of 'my body qua mine',¹² while Zaner denies the claim on the view that Merleau-Ponty begs the question with his concept of the anonymous body.¹³ Professor Schrag contends that Merleau-Ponty should be credited with exposing the "bogus dichotomies of experience"¹⁴ but Ballard argues that the French phenomenologist's appeal to existence is not a solution to the realist-idealist dispute on experience.¹⁵

Some commentators even seem to be strange bedfellows with themselves.

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

Ballard, for example, maintains that the descriptions produced by Merleau-Ponty are the result of the mythological function of language and thus have the status of myths. Yet, he proceeds to marvel at the "excellence of his descriptions and importance of his views".¹⁶ Zaner, too, after what he takes to be his devastating critique of Merleau-Ponty's methodology and philosophical theses, winds up with a definition of the requisite phenomenology of the human body hardly distinguishable from that of Merleau-Ponty's.¹⁷ While systematically outlining Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, Professor Kwant warns that a systematic survey of Merleau-Ponty's ideas on the body-subject is incompatible with the understanding of his philosophy.¹⁸

The preceding comments are rather harmless criticisms and evaluations, aimed no doubt at the proverbial 'straw-man'. But others are not so inconsequential—especially if one expects to elucidate Merleau-Ponty's concept of experience. I have in mind those comments, stateable in the form of three theses, which have been uncritically accepted by a number of commentators on Merleau-Ponty's thought. These theses, which I later hope to show as patently misguided, may be stated in the following manner:

Thesis 1—Merleau-Ponty skeptically denies reflection in principle.

Thesis 2—Merleau-Ponty skeptically denies adequate reflection in principle.

Thesis 3—Merleau-Ponty advocates as the only alternate way of knowing to analytic reflection a "philosophical ventriloquism" in the form of radical reflection, existential analysis, lyricism, or mythologizing.

Thesis 1 is maintained by de Waelhens, who contends that for Merleau-Ponty it is "impossible to get outside perception",¹⁹ and by Zaner, who argues that for Merleau-Ponty the "cognitive act of apprehension is unable to apprehend lived experience".²⁰ Thesis 2 is held by Kwant, who believes that for Merleau-Ponty reflection (especially through inductive methods) cannot adequately "indicate pre-conscious intentions".²¹ Finally, Thesis 3 is maintained by Zaner, who believes that Merleau-Ponty allows "living the body" as the alternative to analytic reflection,²² and by Ballard, who observes that Merleau-Ponty does not deny the validity of scientific knowledge but tries to formulate a context out of which scientific knowing emerges—a context describable without recourse to physical or mathematical models on the conditions that: (1) one assumes a docile pre-suppositionless attitude; (2) that one contemplates the phenomena in silent astonishment; (3) that one leaps beyond common language usage to myth by way of analogy and animistic images; (4) that one seeks a psychoanalytic-empathetic understanding of the phenomena,²³ or, in brief, on the condition that one seeks to "impart a certain experience rather than a new principle or a new way of rendering experience intelligible."²⁴

Now, on the basis of these uncritically accepted theses, it is fashionable to

set up the following dilemma, as Ballard does,²⁵ namely that, if pre-cognitive experience is unknowable, then the domain of the pre-cognitive remains pre-cognitive and thus ascribable as 'ambiguous', and that, if the pre-cognitive is knowable, then the pre-cognitive is not strictly pre-cognitive and thus not ascribable as 'ambiguous'. Granted the first horn of the dilemma, the pre-cognitive domain of experience would be unintelligible. Granted the second horn of the dilemma, the pre-cognitive domain would only be pre-cognitive in a nominal sense since it would be intelligible. However, this dilemma supposes a determinancy principle of transparency of consciousness principle. If one instead assumes an indeterminacy principle or non-transparency of consciousness principle—as Merleau-Ponty does²⁶—then one can escape the horns of the dilemma by maintaining that the pre-cognitive is knowable in some respects and under certain circumstances and in virtue of certain modes of knowing but that it is also unknown or unknowable in other respects and under other circumstances for want of certain modes of knowing. But one can also escape the horns of the dilemma by showing that each of the three theses upon which it may rest inadequately states Merleau-Ponty's views on the role of reflection. Now each of these three theses denies reflection upon the pre-reflective on the premise that Merleau-Ponty's methodology provides *no reflective method* for conceptually modelling or pre-reflective experience. At best, Thesis 3 attributes to Merleau-Ponty's methodology what J. L. Austin in his article "The Meaning of a Word" calls 'demonstrating the semantics of a word', i.e., the procedure used in ordinary life whereby one speaker disposes another person to imagine or even actually to experience situations that are appropriately and inappropriately talked about through language.²⁷ No one denies that many of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of experience are given through this procedure of demonstrating the semantics of a word. Hence, Ballard is right in his contention that Merleau-Ponty is attempting to "impart a certain experience". However, to maintain that Merleau-Ponty's methodology of description is simply a matter of demonstrating the semantics of certain expressions is to grossly misrepresent his methodology and make unintelligible much of his early work in *The Structure of Behavior* and in *The Phenomenology of Perception*. Contrary to Ballard's view, Merleau-Ponty does seek to impart a new principle or a new way of rendering experience intelligible through the reflective procedure of intentional analysis. I suggest that part of the reason why commentators have a difficulty in recognizing the systematic account of human behavioral experience given by Merleau-Ponty (e.g., Zaner²⁸ writes that "we must proceed with caution in order to unravel this extremely complex notion of the intentional arc since we have practically no clues from Merleau-Ponty") is their uncritical adherence to Thesis 1, 2, and/or 3 or some variant thereof whereupon one overlooks his descriptions of experience apparently produced through reflective intentional analysis with its inherent presuppositions. I propose therefore to anticipate discussion of Merleau-Ponty's concept of experience by first showing Merleau-Ponty's method of intentional analysis as an alternative to the technique of 'demonstrating the semantics of a word'. To

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

do this, I will briefly consider three points: (a) Merleau-Ponty's statements of intent with regard to intentional analysis; (b) Merleau-Ponty's statement of the theory of intentional analysis; and lastly (c) Merleau-Ponty's statement of the presupposition of intentional analysis.

Careful analysis of *The Structure of Behavior* and *Phenomenology of Perception* shows the complex set of objectives apparently instrumental to Merleau-Ponty's task of elucidating human action. None of these objectives serves to rule out the possibility of reflection upon the pre-reflective. In the former work, Merleau-Ponty questions the following theses:

- (1) the study of human behavior requires the rejection of the notions of intention, utility, or value as subjective in order to understand human behavior;²⁹
- (2) the study of human behavior requires the rejection of certain "aims of life" apparent in such human actions as speech, work, or dressing in order to describe human action;³⁰
- (3) the study of human behavior requires the reduction of seemingly intentional behavior to the anatomical model of regulated, pre-established nerve pathways in order to explain human behavior;³¹
- (4) the study of perceptual behavior requires the reduction of the human body to a mosaic of sensations and perception to the physical model of pure sensations for purposes of explanation;³²
- (5) the study of human behavior requires the projection of explanations of elementary perceptual reactions by physical models in cases involving artificial isolation of these elementary behavioral responses from the context of action in which they are naturally integrated to more complex responses either artificially isolated or naturally integrated for purposes of explanation.³³

That is to say, Merleau-Ponty questions any study of human behavior that seeks to describe, understand and explain human behavior without recognizing the 'intentional' character of human experience in virtue of which one ascribes intentionality to human action. Above all, he is wary of those who would obscure the relation between blind automatism and intentional activity by setting up an irreconcilable opposition between the two,³⁴ as well as of those who, while using a classical physical model and rejecting intentionality, make "intelligence" or "good timings" or some other escape-label intervene as an explanatory principle of certain types of human bodily behavior.³⁵ (For example, psychologist Clifford T. Morgan³⁶ after a discussion of reflex arc theory and its requirement that complex responses be viewed as composed of numerous simple reflexes writes that the complex scratch-reflex "happens to be a nicely timed alternation of flexion and extension reflexes.") Now, although Merleau-Ponty rejects these

theses, he does not thereby conclude that reflection upon experience is impossible. Rather, as he states, he intends to "link consciousness with action" in order to enlarge the idea of human action.³⁶ The total process and properties of intentional human behavior (or human action) viewed as a natural whole in a context of action are to be described and understood through intentionality, for example, those practical intentions of lived-realities such as may be involved in a football-game.³⁷ The requirements include: (1) description of a nascent perception or lived perception that is genetically prior to verbalized or express perception; (2) description of the phenomenal body as a center of action which radiates over a milieu; and (3) reformulation of the notion of consciousness as a network of intentions some of which are clear to oneself and some of which are lived rather than known, or, as a dialectic of milieu and action in the human order of experience.³⁸ Given these ambitions, it seems rather implausible that Merleau-Ponty would rule out the possibility of reflection upon the pre-reflective. It seems more plausible that he would seek either a method of reflection that serves as a viable alternative to that exemplified in experimental knowing or seek an alternative conceptual model to those evidently employed by classic physiologists and psychoanalysts with the understanding that such a model may have little or no experimental value.

In his *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty is even more explicit on the matter of alternatives to classic conceptions of experience as espoused both by empirical and intellectualist theorists especially in their studies of perceptual experience. Empiricist theories based on sensation, association and projection-of-memories models rely upon "blind processes in which there is *nobody who sees*."³⁹ Intellectualist theories based on attentive and judgmental models turn the perceiving subject into an "acosmic" thinking subject.⁴⁰ The former "cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it" while the latter fails to realize that "we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or again there would be no need for looking".⁴¹ Nevertheless, both types of theory work with an anthropomorphic definition of sensation, assume that the 'objective world' is first in time and in virtue of its meaning, and leave no room for the indeterminate.⁴² This does not suggest that either type totally overlooks the natural world.⁴³ Nor does it suggest that either type cannot "build-up equivalents" of the sundry structures of experience.⁴⁴ Merleau-Ponty admits that they can construct "some semblance of subjectivity".⁴⁵ One apparent objective is thus merely to point out "everything that is made incomprehensible" by such constructions as the "reflex arc" or the "unconscious" (e.g., the human and cultural world) so that an inclusive account of experience may be suitably rendered.⁴⁶

Now the alternative to empirical and intellectualist theories of perceptual experience is the phenomenal field model conceived of as the "whole perceptual context."⁴⁷ On this view, consciousness is not enclosed in the body.⁴⁸ Nor is consciousness viewed as given.⁴⁹ Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, experience is given and comes to be known through a radical reflection that enables one to become

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

aware of the dependence of consciousness upon an unreflective life.⁵⁰ Two forms of this radical reflection are discernible: (1) through 'living the body'⁵¹ (since the experience of one's own body runs counter to a reflective procedure that distinguishes the field into subject and object); and (2) through adopting a "new way of looking at things which reverses the relative positions of the clear and obscure, which must be undertaken by everyone, whereupon it will be seen to be justified by the abundance of phenomena which it elucidates".⁵² This latter type of radical reflection presumably avoids the mistake of making models more real than what they model "as long as the attempt is made to build up the shape of the world instead of recognizing, as the source which stares us in the face and as the ultimate court of appeal in our knowledge of these things, our *experience of them*".⁵³ Merleau-Ponty calls it an "intentional analysis" or an "existential analysis".⁵⁴ And it is this form or method of radical reflection upon perceptual experience and other forms of experience that Merleau-Ponty views as a viable alternative to empiricist-laden and intellectualist-laden theories of experience.

Now in opting for this "phenomenological positivism" Merleau-Ponty is quite clear on these two forms of radical reflection.⁵⁵ 'Living the body' as a kind of demonstration of the semantics of expressions attempts to:

- (1) re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world as we live it;⁵⁶
- (2) make reflection emulate the unreflective life of consciousness;⁵⁷
- (3) return to the world of actual experience prior to the objective world, restore to things their concrete physiognomy, restore to subjectivity its inherence in history, and rediscover the phenomenal layer of living experience;⁵⁸
- (4) reawaken our experience of our body and our world;⁵⁹
- (5) resume contact with sensory life which is lived within;⁶⁰
- (6) revive perceptual experience buried under its own results;⁶¹
- (7) elucidate the singular fact by varying it through the imagination and then thinking upon the invariable element of mental experience;⁶²
- (8) get through to the individual only through the hybrid procedure of finding an example and then stripping it of its facticity;⁶³
- (9) describe without constructing or forming.⁶⁴

But intentional analysis with its attendant phenomenal field model of experience attempts to:

- (1) give a direct description of our experience as it is without taking account of its psychological origin and without casual explanations scientists, historians, and sociologists may be able to provide;⁶⁵

- (2) rediscover direct experience through circumscribing the phenomenal field;⁶⁶
- (3) experience phenomena not as though we are ignorant of a reality leading to which there is no methodical bridge but through an 'intentional analysis' which makes explicit the pre-scientific life of consciousness and which is not an irrational conversion;⁶⁷
- (4) understand and make amenable to conceptualization our effective involvement in the world;⁶⁸
- (5) understand, i.e., take in the total intention, namely, what things are for representation and the unique mode of existing experienced;⁶⁹
- (6) seek an understanding from all angles simultaneously since all views are true provided they are not isolated or take out of context;⁷⁰
- (7) go back to the experiences to which words such as 'feeling', 'seeing', 'hearing' refer in order to redefine them along intentional lines;⁷¹
- (8) allow for a phenomenology of origins by broadening the notion of intentionality to include intentionality in act and operative intentionality;⁷²
- (9) describe the *phenomenon* of the world, that is, its birth for us in that field into which each perception sets us back, where we are as yet still alone, where other people will appear only at a later stage, in which knowledge and particularly the sciences have not so far ironed out and leveled down the individual perspective. It is through this birth that we are destined to graduate to a world, and we must therefore describe it.⁷³

It seems rather clear then that Merleau-Ponty does hold the view that lived experience can be reflected upon and thereby recognized through these two distinct procedures, forms, or methods of radical reflection. Furthermore, it appears that intentional analysis is not presuppositionless in its descriptions according to the phenomenal field model of experience. At least this is borne out by Merleau-Ponty's views that:

- (a) the thinker never thinks from any starting-point but the one constituted by what he is;⁷⁴
- (b) reflection is conditioned by the situation;⁷⁵
- (c) we begin neither without nor with psychology alone in examining perception and the phenomenal field for one must frequent the phenomenal field through psychological description and then purge psychological description of its psychologism.⁷⁶

But what is the presupposition of intentional analysis as a form of reflection and the phenomenal field as the conceptual model of experience? For Merleau-

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

Ponty, the concept of *Fundierung* serves as the presupposition of intentional description of the phenomenal field of human experience in virtue of which human behavior may be described, understood and explained.

[Technically speaking, Merleau-Ponty in Parts I and II of the *Phenomenology of Perception* seeks a description and understanding of human behavior rather than an explanation through radical reflection. But in Part III he indicates that intentional analysis is inadequate for the explanation of human behavior and hence suggests that a phenomenology of phenomenology is required for such explanation in terms of the temporal intentionality of the body-subject.⁷⁷]

Fundierung is a two-way, non-casual relation of originator to originated. By this Merleau-Ponty means, for example, that the symbolic function of consciousness rests on the visual as on a ground.⁷⁸ This implies that vision is not the cause of the symbolic function but rather a necessary condition for the symbolic function, or, a founding term of reflection. He writes in Part III of the *Phenomenology of Perception* that:

The founding term, as originator—time, the unreflective, the fact, language, perception—is primary in the sense that the originated is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the former, and yet the originator is not primary in the empiricist sense and the originated is not simply derived, since it is through the originated that the originator is made manifest.⁷⁹

In viewing intentional human experience in terms of this relational concept one should therefore, according to Merleau-Ponty, recognize beneath the intentionality of act (e.g., thetic consciousness of objects) an 'operative' intentionality (*fungierende Intentionalität*) which is the condition of the possibility of thetic intentionality.⁸⁰ Briefly, this means that operative intentionality is taken as that which "produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluation and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language."⁸¹ It means that typical intentionalities of act such as thetic judgments and voluntary posits are subtended by other forms of intentional experience.

Now Merleau-Ponty apparently examines the basic intentional structure of human experience, which he calls "*être-au-monde*,"⁸² in terms of this relational concept of *Fundierung*. The lived-body or phenomenal body is construed as the vehicle, so to speak, of *être-au-monde*.⁸³ as a "synergic system" and the "third term" tacitly understood in the figure-background structure, the phenomenal body opens onto a system of "self-other-things" and is anchored to a world.⁸⁴ On the side of the world, two 'layers' may be recognized, namely, a "sedimented or acquired world" (cultural and/or human world) and a "primary world or spontaneity" (natural or phenomenal world).⁸⁵ On the side of the phenomenal body, two, 'layers' may be identified, namely, the "customary body" and the "momentary body".⁸⁶

But he also examines the phenomenal body's activities in terms of the concept of *Fundierung*. For example, the phenomenal body is said to be describable in terms of motor acts, expressive acts, erotic acts, sense acts, time acts and perceptual acts as well as explainable in terms of temporality.⁸⁷ This means according to the concept of *Fundierung* that motility, expression, sexuality, sensation, perception, and temporality are operative forms of basic or original intentionality. And it further implies that a "host of intentions" runs from the body considered as a center of potential action over a milieu.⁸⁸ It is in virtue of such a "network of intentions,"⁸⁹ "flow of experience,"⁹⁰ and "interlocking of intentionalities"⁹¹ that the normal human subject is said to have "integrated experience."⁹² And it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty postulates that these forms of original intentionality or processes are based on an 'intentional arc' which goes limp in a patient whose experience has disintegrated and which endows experience with its degrees of vitality and fruitfulness in the normal subject.⁹³ Borrowing the term from Fischer's *Raum-Zeitstruktur und Denkstörung in der Schizophrenie* (p. 250), Merleau-Ponty contends that this 'intentional arc' subtends the life of consciousness (i.e., cognitions, desires, and perceptions) and "projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects."⁹⁴ In addition, it is alledged to bring about the unity of the senses and intelligence, of sensibility and motility, etc.⁹⁵ It is this 'umweltintentionalität' (one single intention inferred from the phenomena of the body's synergy) that conditions either the unity of experience or the disunity of experience.⁹⁵ (However, Merleau-Ponty confesses that it is incomprehensible how such intentionality could come to dwell in a molecular edifice.)⁹⁶

Given Merleau-Ponty's theory of intentional analysis together with its presupposition of the relational concept of *Fundierung*, how should human experience be characterized? How should it be described especially if it is assumed that the phenomenal body as a center of potential activity radiates over a milieu? I believe that if Merleau-Ponty were to respond to this question, he would reply that two forms of intentional experience are distinguishable though inseparable: (1) that occurring within the matrix of the cultural or human world and the personal momentary body; and (2) that occurring within the matrix of the natural-phenomenal world and the pre-personal customary body. For lack of better terminology, I suppose the former could be termed "personal and/or interpersonal experience" while the latter could be termed "pre-personal experience." On such a view, the concept of man is not that of a psyche joined to an organism but "the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts."⁹⁷ These are, on his view, not materially exclusive conceptions to choose from but "two stages of a unique structure which is the concrete subject," with pre-personal experience subtending personal experience in accord with the concept of *Fundierung*.⁹⁸

It should be noted that the topic of pre-personal experience is not without precedent in either philosophical or psychological contexts. Leibniz, for example,

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model
in his Preface to *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* attacks Locke's view of conscious perceptions and argues that there are "a thousand indications which lead us to think that there are at every moment numberless perceptions in us, but without apperception and without reflection; i.e., changes in the soul itself of which we are not conscious."⁹⁹ In Book II he further contends that:

All impressions have their effect, but all the effects are not always noticeable. When I turn to one side rather than the other, it is very often through a series of minute impressions of which I am not conscious, and which render one movement a little more uncomfortable than the other. All our unpremeditated actions are the result of a concurrence of minute perceptions, and even our customs and passions, which have such influences in our deliberations, come therefrom; for, these habits grow little by little, and, consequently, without the minute perceptions, we should not arrive at these noticeable dispositions.¹⁰⁰

More recently, Professor Gerd Brand has observed that for the later Husserl "intentionality is functioning but at the same time is anonymous, and anonymous on two different levels."¹⁰¹ In the natural attitude of consciousness of objects, functioning intentionality is completely anonymous, i.e., functioning but unknown. It is world-experiencing. Once uncovered through the phenomenological reduction and intentional analysis, it is delivered from the state in which its functioning was unknown. As Brand interprets Husserl:

When this uncovering becomes a genuine explanation, intentionality is continuously further delivered from the anonymity characteristic of it as functioning, but it nonetheless remains anonymous. Functioning intentionality always transcends itself, and transcends that part of itself which is already explained and therefore already delivered from anonymity, in the direction of the world in whose anonymity (as familiar foreign domain) it maintains itself.¹⁰²

However, Husserl is quoted as holding that "when I 'uncover' this perception in regard to its intentional components and just as my present experience and its present Being-intention, then I meet new experiences, but I say, nevertheless, that what they show, now uncovered, is the same as that which was implicitly contained in the old experience and was intended by it."¹⁰³ Criticizing the view that "thoughts go from an impersonal unconscious and 'personalize' themselves by becoming conscious," Jean-Paul Sartre in his *The Transcendence of the Ego* argues that the ego-life has its place on the reflected level while the unreflected consciousness must be considered as autonomous.¹⁰⁴ His conclusion is that the unreflected has ontological priority over the reflected because unreflective consciousness does not need to be reflected in order to exist and because reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-degree consciousness.

In psychological contexts, several examples also may be given to illustrate the phenomena of pre-personal experience. Gestalt psychologist K. Koffka writes that

without the 'totally unconscious' tonic reflex, our poise and balance would not be preserved:

At every moment of our life the tonus of our musculature is regulated. Were it not, we could neither sit nor stand nor walk. But all these adjustments take place without our knowing about them.¹⁰⁵

Even the accomodation of the oculomotor system is 'automatic' and occurs 'unconsciously' without our taking cognizance of its taking place. In fact, he argues we have as a rule no direct knowledge of the dynamics of our eye-movements. We may sense that our eyes wander but this awareness of our eye-movements may be very different from the actual eye-movements.¹⁰⁶ Koffka further adds:

But more often than not we are not aware of these movements at all. When we are not, the whole interplay of forces described in the preceding discussion has no counterpart in experience, just as the interplay of forces that produces sensory organization remains almost entirely outside experience (which contains only the results of these dynamics). Köhler, who was the first to emphasize this aspect of sensory organization, called it 'silent organization' (1929, p. 371). The silence then refers also to the movements which contribute to this organization.¹⁰⁷

Using the topology of the three mental processes developed in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, namely, the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious, Freud applies these theoretical constructions to various types of human behavior. For example, in his *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* Freud analyzes jocular thought into unconscious, pre-conscious, and conscious thinking. The pre-conscious is said to lack the "cathexis of attention with which consciousness is linked" and is given the name 'automatic.'¹⁰⁸ The formation of jokes in the first person involves, then, a preconscious thought which is given over for a moment to the unconscious for revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious perception.¹⁰⁹ Thus, at the level of the unconscious, jokes are said to be *made* but at that of the preconscious the comical and humor are said to be *found*.¹¹⁰ Carl Jung's treatment of the "unconscious" also approximates the pre-personal domain of experience. In his *Aion: Contributions to the Symbolism of Self*, he envisions the ego as the center of the field of consciousness and as resting on a psychic base and a somatic base. Each base is comprised of the conscious and the unconscious. On the side of the somatic base there is a totality of endosomatic perceptions. Two possibilities are seen. Those stimuli crossing the threshold of consciousness are termed "conscious perceptions" while those stimuli that remain below the threshold level of consciousness are termed "unconscious perception."¹¹¹ On the side of the psychic base, three possibilities arise with respect to bringing psychic contents from the unconscious to consciousness. First, there may be a temporary sublimation of psychic contents which are reproducible voluntarily *via* memory; second, there may be unconscious contents which cannot be reproduced voluntarily; and third, there may be contents incapable of being

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

brought to consciousness at all but which may be hypothesized.¹¹² The self or personality therefore is the total field of consciousness and the sum total of unconscious contents resting on the psychic and somatic bases, while the ego is conscious personality. Now the unconscious may be looked at from two stand-points according to Jung: (1) that of the psychology of consciousness; and (2) that of the psychology of personality. On the former view, the unconscious is composed of the somatic base with those perceptions that are subliminal to consciousness, the psychic base of those perceptions capable of reproduction voluntarily to consciousness, and those perceptions that cannot be known in consciousness. On the latter view, the unconscious is composed of the *personal* and the *impersonal*, that is, those contents acquired by the individual himself during his lifetime which are an integral part of individual personality and could therefore just as well be known to consciousness, and those contents that are collective and which form an omnipresent, unchanging and everywhere identical condition or substrate of the psyche per se.¹¹³

The point of this brief excursion into the preceding views on pre-personal experience in philosophical and psychological contexts serves only to show that Merleau-Ponty does not work outside of a traditional interest in the topic. No doubt he would criticize Locke's views on the pre-natal experience of a human person (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 1, 21), Leibniz's 'minute impressions' model of experience, Husserl's contention that all aspects of functioning intentionality can be uncovered fully through the phenomenological reduction and intentional analysis, and Freud's thesis that the unconscious causally produces events at the preconscious and conscious levels of experience. But he would also seem to be rather comfortable with Sartre's claim of the ontological priority of unreflective consciousness to reflective consciousness, Koffka's characterization of the 'unconscious' character of the perceptual-motor system, and perhaps (as evidenced by his later writings) Jung's conception of the unconscious. Let us therefore examine Merleau-Ponty's conception of pre-personal experience as found primarily in his early works, recognizing as B. Pontalis observes in his article "Note Sur Le Problème de l'Inconscient Chez Merleau-Ponty" that the 'unconscious' did not pose a specific problem in the *Phenomenology of Perception* where it was subsumed under the "rubric of the prepersonal" but did become of interest to Merleau-Ponty in his lectures on the experience of forms of passivity (e.g., sleep, memory, unconscious) in 1955-1956 whereupon he defined the unconscious as an "ensemble of institutions more or less coordinated," as "our primordial institution," and as "symbolic matrices" in order to avoid what he called 'demonology.'¹¹⁴

Granted that pre-personal experience is genetically prior to personal experience, how shall pre-personal experience be described or indicated—especially since the originator becomes manifest only through the originated according to the concept of *Fundierung*? At least three types of descriptions or indications are distinguishable in the *Phenomenology of Perception*: (1) that through 'living the body' techniques viewed as forms of 'semantic demonstration;' (2) that through 'intentional

analysis' according to the *Fundierung*-based conceptual model of the phenomenal field; and (3) through a combination of both of these maneuvers. Type 1 is exemplified as follows:

At the very moment when I live in the world, when I am given over to my plans, my occupations, my friends, my memories, I can close my eyes, lie down, listen to the blood pulsating in my ears, lose myself in some pleasure or pain, and shut myself up in this anonymous life which sub-tends my personal one.¹¹⁵

The fact that my earliest years lie behind me like an unknown land is not attributable to any chance lapse of memory, or any failure to think back adequately; there is nothing to be known in these unexplored lands. For example, in pre-natal existence, nothing was perceived, and therefore there is nothing to recall. There was nothing but the raw material and adumbration of a natural self and a natural time. This anonymous life is merely the extreme form of that temporal dispersal which constantly threatens the historical present.¹¹⁶

Type 2 may be illustrated by the following texts:

... 'living' (*leben*) is a primary process from which, as a starting point, it becomes possible to 'live' (*erleben*) this or that world, and we must eat and breathe before perceiving and awakening to relational living, belonging to colours and lights through sight, to sounds through hearing, to the body of another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human relations. Thus sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the routes, instruments or manifestations of personal existence: the latter takes up and absorbs into itself their existence as it is anonymously given.¹¹⁷

The body is our general medium of having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. At all levels it performs the same function which is to endow the instantaneous expressions of spontaneity with 'a little renewable action and independent existence.'¹¹⁸

Finally, Type 3 may be exemplified as follows:

Bodily existence which runs through me, yet does so independently of me, is only the barest raw material of a genuine presence in the world. Yet at least it provides the possibility of such presence, and establishes

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model
our first consonance with the world. I may very well take myself away from the human world and set aside personal existence, but only to re-discover in my body the same power, this time unnamed, by which I am condemned to being. It may be said that the body is 'the hidden form of being oneself,' or on the other hand, that personal existence is the taking up and manifestation of a being in a given situation.¹¹⁹

My personal existence must be the resumption of a prepersonal tradition. There is, therefore, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am here, and who marks out my place in it. This captive or natural spirit is my body, not that momentary body which is the instrument of my personal choices and which fastens upon this or that world, but the system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular focus into a general project.¹²⁰

But what, in the sleeper and the patient, makes possible a return to the real world, are still only impersonal functions, sense organs, and language. We remain free in relation to sleep and sickness to the exact extent to which we remain always involved in the waking and healthy state, . . .¹²¹

On the bases of these 'descriptions' it is clear that this pre-personal experience (i.e., the 'anonymity' of the phenomenal body and the 'generality' of the natural world) is not simply a marginal consciousness. Nor does it exclusively pertain to perceptual experience—although Merleau-Ponty does maintain that perception is always in the mode of the impersonal 'one' with something anonymous in it.¹²² Rather it includes on the body-subject side of *être-au-monde* AT LEAST the following distinguishable factors besides perception in the *Phenomenology of Perception*:

- (1) autonomous motion enabling me to perform certain actions;¹²³
- (2) the atmosphere of sexuality/erotic perception underlying forms of experience;¹²⁴
- (3) anonymous or pre-personal time of our bodily functions;¹²⁵
- (4) primordial silence prior to speech;¹²⁶
- (5) evaluations made, e.g., pain; ¹²⁷
- (6) someone at the core of time;¹²⁸
- (7) halo of generality or atmosphere of sociality about my absolute individuality.¹²⁹

Pre-personal experience thus involves the complete synergic system of motility, perception, sexuality, temporality, and language. One can therefore hold, contrary to Professor Schrag's view,¹³⁰ that for Merleau-Ponty there is a primacy of experience (namely, pre-personal experience) rather than a primacy of perceptual experience. Granted this way of 'slicing' experience, what distinguishes the pre-

personal and what are Merleau-Ponty's reasons for so distinguishing human experience?

With regard to the distinction made between pre-personal experience and personal experience the following lines are drawn by Merleau-Ponty:

PERSONAL SIDE OF EXPERIENCE

1. ERLEBEN: life of human relations.¹³¹
2. MOMENTARY BODY: instrument of personal choices fastening upon this or that world.¹³²
3. CREATES A SITUATION: in understanding a book, in becoming a mathematician, or in taking up and absorbing existence as it is anonymously given.¹³³
4. PHENOMENAL BODY: moves towards personal acts rather than simply allow itself to take corporeal form.¹³⁴
5. IRREDUCIBILITY: of personal acts to those of an organism.¹³⁵
6. RESPONSIBILITY: that for which I am responsible and for which decisions are made.¹³⁶
7. INTERMITTENT INVOLVEMENT: envelope oneself in a particular context (e.g., that of a love or of an ambition).¹³⁷

PRE-PERSONAL SIDE OF EXPERIENCE

1. LEBEN: life of eating, breathing, colors, lights, sounds, sexuality, etc.¹³¹
2. CUSTOMARY BODY: system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular focus into a general project.¹³²
3. EXPRESS A SITUATION: in seeing the blue sky or in serving as the routes, manifestations, and instruments of personal existence.¹³³
4. PHENOMENAL BODY: allows itself to take corporeal form rather than move towards personal acts although it allows such personal acts to be done.¹³⁴
5. IRREDUCIBILITY: of organism to personal acts of the existential self.¹³⁵
6. NON-RESPONSIBILITY: that which remains marginal to the self (e.g., experience of sensation) for which I am not responsible nor for which decisions are made.¹³⁶
7. CONTINUAL RELIANCE: rely upon in order to keep oneself alive which can be practically taken for granted.¹³⁷

In other texts not of a parallel nature in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty speaks of personal experience as that which "gives a fresh significance to my life"¹³⁸ and that which allows one to "develop personal acts into stable

dispositional tendencies."¹³⁹ And he similarly notes that pre-personal experience: (1) is the counterpart to the natural world as the given and general existence of one's sensory functions;¹⁴⁰ (2) enables one to center his existence but not completely;¹⁴¹ (3) is a life of given consciousness from which there emerges a life of the eyes, hands, ears, etc., on the fringe of one's personal life and acts;¹⁴² (4) is in the perception of the world the "doing of pre-personal forms of consciousness";¹⁴³ (5) includes biological existence which plays the role of an inborn complex beneath personal life;¹⁴⁴ and (6) includes pre-natal and infantile experience.¹⁴⁵ Thus, it appears that for Merleau-Ponty personal experience is the intelligent and volitive living of human relations in a human and cultural world whereas pre-personal experience, which "subtends" (i.e., is genetically but not logically prior) personal experience, involves *at least* marginal awareness, operative bodily habits (including perception) and pre-natal experience in a setting of the natural world.

What then are the reasons for such a distinction according to Merleau-Ponty? Several reasons can be gleaned from the *Phenomenology of Perception*—although they should not be necessarily construed as adequate warrants. First, Merleau-Ponty believes that such a distinction obviates the difficulties involved in the 'problem of other minds'. He argues:

If the perceiving I is genuinely an I, it cannot perceive a different one; if the perceiving subject is anonymous, the other which it perceives is equally so.¹⁴⁶

Secondly, Merleau-Ponty argues that such a distinction recognizes indeterminacy or the 'fact' that human experience does not entirely coincide with the cognitive representations of human experience. In acknowledging the limits of knowledge by description and by acquaintance he asserts that:

I can experience more things than I represent to myself—and my being is not reducible to what expressly appears to me concerning myself.¹⁴⁷

Lastly, Merleau-Ponty argues that such a distinction helps to explain the difference observed between human behavior and animal behavior as well as between normal human behavior and disintegrated human behavior observed even earlier in *The Structure of Behavior*. He claims that man requires an habitual body because of a need for distance between self and that which elicits actions to avoid the plight of animals believed to be embedded in a matrix of syncretic setting and condemned to actuality.¹⁴⁸ Without attempting to appraise these 'justifications', it is obvious that for Merleau-Ponty the pre-personal side and the personal side of experience are to be distinguished in order to show the foundations upon which the symbolic function rests and to illustrate some limits of the symbolic function of consciousness and of ourselves as knowers.¹⁴⁹ And it is also evident that for Merleau-Ponty the pre-personal and personal sides of human experience are distinguishable along the lines of what counts and what does not count as properly human action.

CONCLUSION

Granted Merleau-Ponty's theory of intentional analysis and given his description of the pre-personal in accordance with his conceptual model of experience, what criticisms are appropriate? I suspect that contemporary linguistic theorists of human action offer the best possibilities in this regard since they are largely concerned with the intentional characterization of human actions from the standpoint of a language which purports to signify mental events (e.g., via such verbs as 'believe,' 'hope,' 'wish') or to signify overt behavior (e.g., via such verbs as 'ridicule,' 'hunt,' 'honor'). This is further warranted, I believe, by Merleau-Ponty's early attempts to: (1) link consciousness with action;¹⁵⁰ (2) view the phenomenal body as the center of potential action over a milieu;¹⁵¹ (3) call attention to the 'fact' that the main areas of the phenomenal body are devoted to action;¹⁵² and (4) to define 'my body' as "wherever there is something to be done."¹⁵³

Now there seems to be some agreement between Merleau-Ponty's views on human action and those of certain linguistic theorists of human action. Margaret Boden in her recent article, "Intentionality and Physical Systems," in *Philosophy of Science*,¹⁵⁴ concedes with Merleau-Ponty that intentional description and physical description of human action are logically distinct and thereby not inter-translatable. Features of intentionality, she says, may be explained completely by a purely casual account (e.g., via robot simulation of Charcot's hysteric paralysis cases) although not adequately, since "to understand why the structure of the behavior is as it is" one must appeal to certain 'ideas' which mediate between stimuli and responses which may be defined either in psychologically functional terms (e.g., 'body image') or in physiological terms (e.g., 'cerebral model').¹⁵⁵ In his article, "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation", in *Mind*¹⁵⁶ Peter Alexander suggests with Merleau-Ponty that the term "unconscious" does have an ordinary usage, namely, when I say that I was unconscious of what I ate for breakfast because I was not thinking of it or trying to recall it. And it has an ordinary usage when there is a reason for behaving in a certain way and yet someone is unconscious of his reason at any given time for so acting. These ordinary uses are distinct from the technical sense of the term "unconscious" in psychoanalysis according to which what is unconscious is beyond all normal powers of recall. Such uses suggest instead a kind of marginal awareness of acting or of reasons for acting—which in part for Merleau-Ponty counts as pre-personal experience. P. F. Strawson's views in his chapter entitled "Persons" in *Individuals* also resemble Merleau-Ponty's views in part. Acknowledging that each person's body plays a unique role in his experience—especially perceptual experience—and that this unique role consists of many contingent facts such as the opening of the eyelids, the orientation of the eyeballs, and the stance of the body in visual perception, Strawson argues that this unique role and these facts explain at least three things: (1) why I regard my body favorably and as more important perhaps than any other body; (2) why I feel peculiarly attached to it; and (3) why I speak of my body as mine.¹⁵⁷

However, several important disagreements are also discernible. Boden, for example, would no doubt regard the terms 'intentional arc', 'pre-personal experience', and perhaps 'operative intentionality' as "evasive labels", "pseudo-explanations" and or perhaps 'mind-laden theoretical terms' such as the theoretical terms 'suggestion', 'secondary consciousness', 'dissociation of personality', and 'subordinate personality' which are often proffered in explanation of pathological cases involving hysteric paralysis where: (1) there is no apparent physical injury or record of injury; (2) under hypnosis normal organic functioning resumes; and (3) the extent of the injury does not coincide with the anatomy involved—although it may coincide with the layman's idea of the anatomy involved.¹⁵⁸ Boden nevertheless concedes that the postulation of cerebral models mediating between stimulus and response in determining the molar behavior of the organism also introduces the notion of one's 'belief' about the anatomy and also thereby tends to make more respectable the use of the term 'subordinate personality' as a psychologically functional predicate.¹⁵⁹ Thus, what appears to be a strong disagreement turns out to be an agreement between Boden and Merleau-Ponty, namely, that the 'mediator' between stimuli and responses may be conceptualized either in terms of neurophysiology or of functional psychology. Disagreement does come, however, on the scope of the attribution of intentionality to human agency. Boden makes it clear that she "is not discussing the view that all psychological phenomena (including basic sentience and pain) are intentional."¹⁶⁰ Intentional behavior is defined on her view as that which is guided by thought, as that which requires explanation in terms of the notion of the direction of the mind upon some object, or as any behavior guided by the purposes, desires, beliefs, concepts, or ideas of a psychological subject.¹⁶¹ Obviously, for Merleau-Ponty, such a limitation of the scope of intentional behavior is unacceptable however defensible in linguistic theories of human action.

A similar disagreement is voiced by Alexander. Maintaining that rational and irrational human behavior are such that they could have been consciously planned even if in fact that were not (e.g., habits, skills, or any behavior for which it is possible to give reasons for and against), he then suggests that, if reflexes (e.g., fainting/jumping when startled) and sheer accidents of an unforeseeable nature (e.g., unavoidably running over a pedestrian who dashes out in front of a car) are to be termed 'behavior', then they should be called 'non-rational' behavior.¹⁶² Non-rational behavior includes therefore any behavior of which it does not make sense to say that it was or was not done for a reason. From Merleau-Ponty's perspective, however, it is not clear that some of the lowest behavioral forms or passive areas of awareness (such as sleep, unconscious, or the memory) do or do not have reasons for which they are done. Nor is it evident that the assertion "complicated reflexes such as the 'scratch-reflex' are not done for a reason" is patent nonsense. The sentence 'A fly landed on my hand so I scratched it [my hand] because it [my hand] itched' may indeed signal 'non-rational behavior' if itching is counted a reason for scratching my hand. But it may also signal 'rational behavior' if itching is counted a reason for scratching my hand. What Merleau-

Ponty would no doubt seek clarification of is some criterion for counting one's itching as a reason or not a reason for scratching.

One final point of disagreement should be noted. On Strawson's view, the facts concerning the unique role of my body do explain why I speak of my body as mine. But they do not explain why I should have a concept of myself at all as a person nor why I should ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body standing in this special relation to the thing to which we ascribe thoughts and feelings but to the thing itself to which we ascribe those thoughts and things.¹⁶³ To avoid both the pretension of a 'solution' to the problem of other minds and *a priori* genetic psychology, Strawson argues that such an explanation requires a certain 'category-preference', namely, that the term 'person' be taken as a logically primitive term while the expressions 'animated body' and 'embodied anima' be taken as derivative terms.¹⁶⁴ In short, the concept of the person is taken to be logically prior to that of an individual consciousness for the apparent reason that it is "easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature" and with the belief that Cartesian dualism and "no-ownership dualisms" are inadequately defensible theses.¹⁶⁵ Assuming the primitiveness of the concept of person, it thus appears that material predicates (e.g., 'bald,' 'pale,' 'hairy') and person-predicates (e.g., 'hope,' 'honest,' 'joy') are equally predicable of persons inasmuch as corporeal characteristics and states of consciousness are ascribable to persons. Now Merleau-Ponty, if I may be somewhat presumptuous, would no doubt agree with Strawson's objective, namely, to indicate a logically primitive term that serves as an alternative to dualistic-laden primitive terms such as 'animated body.' But I suspect that Merleau-Ponty would argue that, as a way of identifying particular structures of behavior, one should choose as a logically primitive concept not the concept of a person but the category of 'être-au-monde' or 'embodied-consciousness-engaged-in-the-world' in virtue of which one may derive the concept of the 'customary body at the natural world' (i.e., pre-personal experience) as genetically prior to that concept of the 'momentary body at the human-cultural world' (i.e., personal experience). According to the genetic non-causal relation called *Fundierung*, this means that pre-personal experience is prior to personal experience from the standpoint of origins. But it does not mean that pre-personal experience is logically prior to personal experience. Given the primitive concept of 'embodied-consciousness-engaged-in-the-world', it therefore appears that material-predicates (e.g., 'bald', 'white', 'tall') person-predicates (e.g., 'joy', 'wish', 'expectation') cultural-predicates (e.g., 'usury', 'theft', 'incest'), and pre-person-predicates (e.g., 'sleep', 'posture', 'poise', 'tonus') are predicable of this intentional structure of human experience with its distinguishable poles of subject and world, its distinguishable domains of the customary and the momentary on the side of the subject and those of the natural and the cultural-human on the side of the world, and its levels of personal and pre-personal experience. This does not imply that predicates are classifiable only in terms of one of the four domain

types of predicates or in terms of any one particular domain. But it does suggest that talking about either pre-personal experience or personal experience as understood by Merleau-Ponty is not in principle impossible. And, I would add, neither idle talk nor trivial talk. Thus, when Merleau-Ponty argues that "I can experience more things than I represent", he is not thereby also arguing that "I can experience more things than I *can* represent"—at least not without qualification.

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FOOTNOTES

- ¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 436; 90.
- ² *Ibid*, I, 97.
- ³ W. James, "The Thing and Its Relation", *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, II (1905), pp. 29-41.
- ⁴ E. C. Tolman, "Psychology Versus Immediate Experience", *Philosophy of Science*, II (1935), pp. 356-380.
- ⁵ K. Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. pp. 353, 372.
- ⁶ F. Hayek, *The Sensory Order*, pp. 104, 165-167.
- ⁷ C. Schrag, *Experience and Being*, pp. 23, 84.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- ⁹ M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, p. 122. Criticism of the reflex arc model of experience is typified by Merleau-Ponty's remarks in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (p. 229): "Synaesthetic perception is the rule but scientific knowledge shifts the center of gravity of experience so we unlearn how to see, hear, and feel in order to deduce from our bodily organization and the world as the physicist conceives it, what we are to see, hear, and feel." Also see p. 55. Criticism of the unconscious model of experience is typified by his remarks in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (p. 158): "Freud's psychoanalysis is not opposed to the phenomenological method—'every action has a meaning'—and makes every effort to understand this event, short of relating it to mechanical circumstances." Also see Merleau-Ponty's article "Man and Adversity" in *Signs*, pp. 227, 229-230.
- ¹⁰ A. Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness*, p. 301.
- ¹¹ R. Zaner, *The Problem of Embodiment*, p. 204.
- ¹² A. de Waelhens, *Une Philosophie de L'ambiguïté*, pp. 8, 109-110.
- ¹³ Zaner, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
- ¹⁴ Schrag, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- ¹⁵ E. Ballard, "On Cognition of the Pre-Cognitive", *Philosophical Quarterly*, XI (1961), p. 242.

- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.
- ¹⁷ Zaner, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.
- ¹⁸ R. Kwant, *The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, p. 43.
- ¹⁹ de Waelhens, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-386.
- ²⁰ Zaner, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-142.
- ²¹ Kwant, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 32.
- ²² Zaner, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 158.
- ²³ Ballard, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-244.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 242.
- ²⁶ Merleau-Ponty argues in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (p. 169) that "there is in human existence a principle of indeterminacy . . ." This positive phenomenon (p. 6) has no place, he further adds, in empiricism and intellectualism (p. 28). Both overlook the "positive indeterminacy of modes of consciousness" (p. 446) and the phenomenal field which "places a fundamental difficulty in the way of any attempt to make experience directly and totally explicit" (p. 60). Thus, both fail to make us aware of the limits of knowledge and of ourselves as knowers (p. 324). Also see pp. xiv, 23, 63, 42-43, 296, 347.
- ²⁷ J. L. Austin, "The Meaning of a Word", *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 24-26.
- ²⁸ Zaner, *op. cit.*, p. 174.
- ²⁹ M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, pp. 8-9.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- ³² *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 150, 156-157.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- ³⁶ C. Morgan, *Introduction to Psychology*, p. 536.
- ³⁷ Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, p. 173.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 150, 168; pp. 169, 156-157, 161, 169, 173, 185.
- ³⁹ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 21.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 26, 28.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24, 7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. xiv, 61, 213, 219, 329, 359. Also see p. 45 and p. 47.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 23. This is in line with Merleau-Ponty's remarks in *The Structure of Behavior* (p. 47) that he is not proposing an alternative hypothesis for experimental testing but is introducing a new category, namely, that of 'form.'

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59, 136, 244.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xviii. Merleau-Ponty credits Hume as having gone "in intention, further than anyone in radical reflection, since he genuinely tried to take us back to those phenomena of which we have experience, on the hither side of any format on of ideas,—even though he went on to dissect and emasculate this experience" (*Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 220).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. x.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 365. Also see p. 84.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 418. Also see pp. xviii, 428, and 429.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 84, 395.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 234, 326, 101, 57, 140-141, 144.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130. Also see p. 87 where Merleau-Ponty distinguishes the *Umwelt* as a setting from the *Welt* as a world.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 254.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 387; 174, 185-186; 157; 213; 374; 83, 416.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 109. Also see p. 242.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 417.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 119. Also see p. 258.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. xviii, 232, 136.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 450-451.

⁹⁹ G. Leibniz, *Leibniz: Selections*, edited by P. Wiener, pp. 374-375.

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 413.
- ¹⁰¹ G. Brand, "Intentionality, Reduction, and Intentional Analysis in Husserl's Later Manuscripts", *Welt, Ich, und Zeit*, translated and edited by J. Kockelmans in *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, p. 199.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- ¹⁰⁴ J. Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, pp. 98, 57-59.
- ¹⁰⁵ Koffka, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 311-316 *passim*.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 318.
- ¹⁰⁸ S. Freud, *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, p. 220.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208.
- ¹¹¹ C. Jung, *Psyche and Symbol: A Selection From The Writings of C. G. Jung*, edited by Violet S. de Laszlo, p. 2.
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ¹¹⁴ B. Pontalis, "Note Sur Le Problème de L'Inconscient chez Merleau-Ponty," *Les Temps Modernes*, XVII (1961), pp. 287-303.
- ¹¹⁵ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 164.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 347.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 146.
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- ¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 214-216, 240.
- ¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 388, 138-139.
- ¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 168.
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84, 453.
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 175, 177, 179-180, 182, 183-184, 188-189, 197.
- ¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

128 *Ibid.*, p. 422.

129 *Ibid.*, pp. 347-348, 362, 364.

130 Schrag, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

131 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 160.

132 *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 254.

133 *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216, 106.

134 *Ibid.*, pp. 88.

135 *Ibid.*, p. 84.

136 *Ibid.*, p. 216.

137 *Ibid.*, p. 84.

138 *Ibid.*, p. 240.

139 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

140 *Ibid.*, p. 330.

141 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

142 *Ibid.*, p. 216.

143 *Ibid.*, p. xi.

144 *Ibid.*, p. 84.

145 *Ibid.*, p. 347

146 *Ibid.*, p. 356.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 296.

148 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

149 *Ibid.*, p. 324.

150 Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, p. 173.

151 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 109.

152 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

153 *Ibid.*, p. 250. Also see p. 380.

154 M. Boden, "Intentionality and Physical Systems", *Philosophy of Science*, XXXVII (1970), pp. 200-214.

155 *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 208.

156 P. Alexander, "Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation", *Mind*, LXXI (1962). Reprinted in *Readings in The Theory of Action*, pp. 159-178, edited by N. Care and C. Landesman. See especially pp. 165-166.

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model

¹⁵⁷ P. F. Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 84-88.

¹⁵⁸ Boden, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* In *The Structure of Behavior* Merleau-Ponty argues: "Since our least conscious reactions are never isolable within the whole of nervous activity, since they seem guided in each case by the internal and external situation itself and capable, up to a certain point, of adapting themselves to that which is particular to it, it is no longer possible to maintain the sharp distinctions between 'reflex' activities and 'instinctive' or 'intelligent' activities which the classical conceptions established theoretically" (p. 43).

¹⁶² Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167. Also see preceding footnote for Merleau-Ponty's critique of this view.

¹⁶³ Strawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-88.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109. Also see pp. 89, 99.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*