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Heidegger and the Problem of Meaning

John Opalek, M.S.C.

It is assumed that the “meaning of meaning” is genuinely a philosophical problem. It is the conviction of this writer that Heidegger has made essential contributions towards a solution of the problem. These contributions will be presented as such, no attempt being made at evaluation.

This paper restricts itself to an explanation of the light which Heidegger’s *Being and Time*¹ has cast on the problem. Since, as will be made clear, the concept “world” functions in that work as the carrier of meaning, this study, accordingly, focuses its attention on that central concept.

Heidegger admits that a change has occurred in his thinking.² He calls this change a “reversal” (*Kehre*). *Being and Time* pertains to his pre-reversal philosophy. In view of this fact, the value of the present study might be questioned. Does not the reversal signify that Heidegger has abandoned the thinking of *Being and Time*? Does not this abandonment in turn signify that this work, contrary to the claim of the preceding paragraph, does not, in fact, provide any solution to the problem of meaning? The answer to these misgivings is given by Heidegger himself. The appeal to Heidegger’s own self-interpretation is not in any sense intended to resolve the still raging controversy over the nature of the reversal. Rather, it is simply intended to indicate, first, that *Being and Time* has not been disavowed by Heidegger and, second, that the access to the post-reversal philosophy is, because of the peculiar circularity of Heidegger’s thinking, necessarily through *Being and Time* itself.

After announcing the reversal (in 1947), Heidegger immediately adds: “The reversal is not a change in the standpoint of *Being and Time*.”³ In a Preface to later editions of *Being and Time* Heidegger remarks that its actually published portion “remains even today an indispensable way, if our *Dasein* is to be moved by the question (of the meaning) of Being.”⁴ In a letter of 1962 Heidegger writes: “The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of *Being and Time*. The thinking of the reversal resulted from the fact that I have remained with ‘Being and Time’ as with the matter-to-be-thought, which is to say, I have inquired into that view-towards which already in *Being and Time* was designated as ‘Time and Being’ . . . The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on condition that this is constantly kept in mind: only through what has been thought by Heidegger I does one have access to the to-be-thought of Heidegger II. But (the thought of) Heidegger I is possible only if it is contained in (the to-be-thought of) Heidegger II.”⁵

As is well known, Heidegger’s intention in *Being and Time* is ontological: to

reopen the question of the meaning of Being (*Sein*), which is approached through "Dasein,"⁶ which is to say, through that being (*Seiendes*) whose privilege it is to be "Being-in-the-world." The latter is a unitary phenomenon, in which, nevertheless, three equiprimordial and constitutive structural moments must be distinguished: (1) world, (2) the being which is in the world, (3) its Being-in as such.⁷ The purpose of this study is to explain the meaning of the first of these structures. Hence, it is imperative to determine as closely as possible in what sense the term "world" is assumed by Heidegger in his analysis.

Heidegger himself furnishes the needed clarification in a list of the four different ways in which "world" may be used.⁸ It should be noted that the list is simply an enumeration of all possible approaches to an identical phenomenon. The phenomenon is distinguished into those of its meanings which are grounded and those which ground. (The difference between "the grounded" and "the grounding" is the difference between the "ontic" and the "ontological.") Two sets or orders of concepts are contrasted. The first set is prephenomenological in nature; it includes both an ontic and an ontological concept. The second set is phenomenological, including, again, both an ontic and an ontological concept. It is to be understood that the phenomena of the first set are derivate, being grounded in the phenomena of the second set. In his list Heidegger, therefore, insinuates that the phenomenon which structures Dasein is not arbitrarily termed "world," but that, on the contrary, it is far more deserving of that title than any other derivate phenomenon.⁹

The first of the prephenomenological concepts is ontic in nature. It is ontic not precisely because it is the (concrete) possibility of disclosure which the factual Dasein, as such, is, but rather because it is a particular possibility of the factual Dasein: this particular possibility being that by force of which Dasein "immediately and for the most part" interprets its Being as merely another instance of being. This particular possibility of interpretation accordingly represents world as the complex of all beings which both confronts Dasein and includes it as another member. The characteristic of this concept is that it presents world as a something distinct from Dasein. World thus conceived is simply the way in which it normally and self-evidently appears to Dasein.

This ontic concept provides the materials for an investigation of the grounds of the phenomenon so presented. The various ontologies, including metaphysics, have investigated these grounds, the result of such investigation being an ontological, but still prephenomenological, concept of world. Here, of course, there are as many ontological concepts possible as there are ontologies. To illustrate the concept, Heidegger mentions the "world of the mathematician": the phenomenon including all beings approachable through the concept of "quantity." Another example would be the "world of the metaphysician": the phenomenal complex ("Nature") of all "natural" things ("substances") as comprehended by the concept representative of their Being, "substantiality."¹⁰

The second set of concepts is phenomenological in nature. The first of these concepts presents world, no longer as opposed to or distinct from Dasein, but rather as the "where-in" itself with which Dasein identifies and in which it exists.¹¹

The concept is called "existentiell," because the phenomenon so presented is the being whose Being is "existence." Thus, world, in this sense, is the "There" of Being under factual form. Factual Dasein is said to "be-in" this world. This "Being-in" is not to be taken as a relationship of container and contained.¹² Rather, as mentioned above, it is to be understood as an existential structure of Dasein, which (structure) Heidegger describes, intending a first rough approximation, as a sense of familiarity with . . . ,¹³ and which (structure) is further on more exactly defined in terms of its moments, namely, "sensitivity" (*Befindlichkeit*), "understanding" (*Verstehen*), and "speech" (*Rede*).¹⁴ Thus, Dasein's living "in" the world that was described in the prephenomenological concepts is a derivate mode of its Being as Being-in-the-world. If the derivate mode of Being-in is recognized as the particular existentiell possibility which Dasein "immediately and for the most part" is and which is grounded in the world which is its Being, then one is well on his way towards gaining an initial appreciation of Heidegger's puzzling phenomenological description of world: "not as the being which Dasein essentially is not . . . , but rather as the 'where-in' a factual Dasein as such 'lives'."¹⁵

Heidegger states that the phenomenon presented in the above concept has "pre-ontological significance."¹⁶ This simply means that the contents of the phenomenon are not thematized as such by Dasein. Hence, it will be the first task of the Existential Analytic to describe these contents. This being the case, it is readily seen in what sense the Analytic is rooted in the existentiell, that is, the ontic.¹⁷ In that the existentiell concept of world remains to be examined in its ground, that is, in its Being-structure, it is ontic in nature.

In the second phenomenological concept world appears as "worldness" (*Weltlichkeit*), that is, as the ground of the preceding phenomenon. The concept is, therefore, ontological in nature. In so far as worldness is considered to be a structure of "existence," the concept is said to be "existential."

This paper undertakes to explore the two phenomenological concepts of world. It will describe the world of Dasein's pre-ontological concern, the world from which immediately arise the various meanings which occupy Dasein in its day-to-day living. It will then proceed to examine worldness, as the ultimate locus of meaning.

1. THE PHENOMENON OF WORLD

Heidegger analyzes the phenomenon of world in two stages. He presents an analysis, first, of what he terms "reference" (*Verweisung*) and, second, of what he calls "destination" (*Bewandtnis*). These phenomena will be examined in that order. It is to be noted that in the following analysis the expression "world" is taken to designate the contents of the existentiell concept of world.

a. The Phenomenon of Reference

"Reference" is the Being of the beings which immediately encounter in the world of Dasein's pre-ontological preoccupation. Even though world is not a structural determinant of the encountering being, nevertheless "the path which the investigation of the phenomenon of 'world' must follow is through . . . being and its

Being.”¹⁸ Heidegger's intention in the analysis of reference is to exhibit the immediately encountering beings as essentially relative in their Being, that is, as in their Being pointing to a certain something (world) as to that from out of which they in their Being encounter. In this essential relativity their “inner-world-ness” (*Innerweltlichkeit*) or “world-like-ness” (*Weltmässigkeit*) announces itself. More simply still, world announces itself (shines forth) in their Being. In other words, in the phenomenon of reference the Analytic considers itself to have found the direction from which it must approach the phenomenon of world.

In order to exhibit the immediately encountering beings as world-like, Heidegger inquires into what characterizes them ontically. He finds this characteristic in the fact that they originally encounter as “tools” (*Zeug*).¹⁹ This apparently most obvious and innocuous of statements, nevertheless, is most crucial, as, once it is granted the rest of the Analytic follows, so to speak, “spontaneously.” Beings encounter as tools only because *Dasein* permits them to so encounter from out of a predisclosed world and proximally from out of a previously discovered tool complex. In turn, the Analytic is able to identify the immediately encountering being as tool, only because it maintains *Dasein*'s existentiality in view. Unless tool is approached from this point of view, one does not have in mind the Heideggerian notion of tool. Rather, one would simply be viewing tool as “tool thing”²⁰ and its “toolness” as one of its “properties.”²¹ The claim that being originally encounters as tool is, therefore, neither a simple recognition of a fact nor a simple observation of a given property. No amount of theoretical or practical inspecting (intuiting) will reveal being as tool.²² The claim is, hence, neither a perhaps annoying belaboring of the obvious nor an ascription to it (the tool) of a weight that it does not in fact possess. And, finally, the claim need not appeal to a sympathetic stretching of the imagination in order to be accepted as fundamentally significant.

Heidegger next inquires into the ontological structure of tool: what is the “tool-ness” (*Zeughaftigkeit*) of tool? In other words, what is the Being of tool? The clue to the answer is provided by the recognition of the phenomenon that a tool never occurs in isolation: the tool has Being only in a tool complex.²³ In the complex “the tool is essentially ‘something in order to . . .’ ”²⁴ It is essentially “something for . . .” (*um zu . . .*). The “for-ness” is the ontological constituent (Being) of tool,²⁵ accounting for its ontic specificity. Thus, the hammer is the being that it is, because its Being is “for hammering.”

The for-ness of a being is a “reference” (*Verweisung*): “a reference of something to something.”²⁶ Heidegger insists that reference is ontologically constitutive²⁷ and that it is a phenomenon.²⁸ The tool complex thus encounters as a referential complex.

The for-ness of a being is its “at-hand-ness” (*Zuhandenheit*). At-hand-ness is the Being of the being which encounters: “At-hand-ness is the ontologico-categorical determination of being, as it is ‘in itself.’ ”²⁹ It is “the type of Being of tool, in which it shows itself from out of itself.”³⁰ The referential complex is, thus, a complex of beings-at-hand.

Tools in their variously complexified at-hand-ness refer not only to other tools

but also (and ultimately) to “the wearer and user,”³¹ that is, to Dasein itself.³² It is precisely at this point that world announces itself in the Being of beings, for in this reference they indicate Dasein as the where-in they encounter and out of which they encounter. In the fullness of their referential character beings manifest themselves to Dasein as world-like, as inner-worldly. However, they thus show themselves to Dasein not expressly, not noticeably. For being, just as soon as it displays itself in its at-hand-ness, immediately withdraws itself into its at-hand-ness, in order precisely to be-at-hand.³³ Withdrawing into itself, being maintains itself in its Being, as a “being-in-itself” (*An-sich-sein*).³⁴ Thus, “unobtrusiveness” (*Unauffälligkeit*) characterizes the Being of being.³⁵

Although it is the case that ordinarily the world-like-ness of beings is not expressly manifest to Dasein, there are, nevertheless, two modes of concern in which world-like-ness becomes noticeable, even though Dasein does not or may not be able to thematize (“explain”) what has thus been brought to view. The first instance,³⁶ a deficient mode of concern, occurs when being is encountered in its “unhandiness” (*Vorhandenheit*).³⁷ Unhandiness may encounter under the form of “out-standing-ness” (*Auffälligkeit*): the tool is damaged (“the car has a flat”); the materials are unusable (“the shoe does not fit”). The tool appears no longer to “belong” . . . to the referential complex. Unhandiness may present itself under the form of a “pressing necessity” (*Aufdringlichkeit*): a needed tool is found to be missing. Thus, there appears to be a gap . . . in the referential complex. Finally, unhandiness may appear under the form of “insistence” (*Aufsässigkeit*): “the job remains to be finished;” “this emergency must be taken into account.” The insistent being “clamors” to be integrated . . . into the referential complex.

The second instance is a positive mode of concern, in which being encounters as “sign” (*Zeichen*),³⁸ whether conventional (“35 M P H”) or natural (“the robin is a harbinger of Spring”). Heidegger considers the sign to be a most significant type of tool, in that the ontic concretion (that is, the fact that it is *this* tool) of its Being (reference) consists precisely in its being “a tool which brings a tool complex expressly before (Dasein’s) view-about (*Umsicht*), so that together with this the world-like-ness of the at-hand announces itself . . . Signs always signify primarily the ‘where-in’ one lives.”³⁹ The sign is significant as a tool because the ontological character of tool is manifest in the sign’s onticity itself. Tools, in their Being, refer Dasein to world. This referring to world is concretized (“onticized”) in the individual sign. The sign, therefore, serves a double orientational function. First, it functions existentially, in that, permitting a complex of beings-at-hand to become accessible, it enables Dasein to orientate itself in its world.⁴⁰ Second, in indicating the direction which the Analytic is to follow, it provides ontological orientation: for the sign “as this determinate tool functions . . . as something which points out the ontological structure of at-hand-ness, referential complex, and worldness.”⁴¹

It should be mentioned that at-hand-ness (reference) is the Being-characteristic not only of manufactured items (“hammer, saw, needle . . .”) but also of the natural, social, political, cultural, religious . . . items of Dasein’s world.

In allowing being to encounter as reference, that is to say, as a being whose

essence (Being) consists in directing Dasein's gaze (*Blick*) beyond itself towards its ground, the Analytic has found its bearings, as it has assumed the characteristic attitude of phenomenology, which is "to allow what shows itself to be seen from out of itself, in the way in which it shows itself from out of itself."⁴² In the discovery of the phenomenon of reference the Analytic has been set on a course leading to a disclosure of the phenomenon of world. "The farther, therefore, we forge in our understanding of the Being of inner-world being, the phenomenal basis for the opening-up of the world-phenomenon becomes so much the more broad and certain."⁴³ The further specification of the Being of inner-world-being which the Analytic requires is provided by the phenomenon of "destination."

b. *The Phenomenon of Destination*

It has been shown that reference characterizes the Being of beings. Hence, that to which they refer must already have been predisclosed. The referent in question is world, out of whose foregoing disclosure beings encounter. "World is always already 'there' in every at-hand. In all that encounters world has already been precedingly, although unthematically, uncovered . . . World it is, out of which the at-hand is at-hand."⁴⁴ The phenomenon of destination is intended to clarify the nature of this foregoing disclosure.

Heidegger opens his analysis of destination with a number of questions, in which the present problem (the contents of the phenomenon of world) is exactly determined, and in which, as any genuinely ontological question must succeed in doing, the answer is foreshadowed. "How can world allow the at-hand to encounter? . . . What is the meaning of this foregoing release (*Freigabe*), and how is it to be understood as an ontological determination of world?"⁴⁵

At this point Heidegger's own "definition" of the phenomenon of world is given. The definition is given with the purpose of concretely indicating the concept which the present inquiry will have to clarify. The definition reads:

The where-in of the self-referring understanding as the in-view-of-which of the allowing-to-encounter of being in the mode of Being of destination is the phenomenon of world.⁴⁶

The first step towards the clarification of the above definition is to be found in Heidegger's further determination of the nature of reference: "To state that the Being of the at-hand has the structure of reference means: it has in itself the character of referred-ness (*Verwiesenheit*)."⁴⁷ Referred-ness is, in turn, identified with "destination" (*Bewandtnis*).⁴⁸

The transmutation of "reference" into "referred-ness" and, thus, into "destination" seems to be thoroughly arbitrary, since it appears to be simply a matter of redefining a term as suits one's purposes. Heidegger's procedure, however, is not arbitrary. It is rather quite in keeping with his phenomenological method, which in the present instance means that an inner-world phenomenon is detectable as such only on condition that world is brought into view and determinable in its contents only on condition that it is interpreted in terms of what is kept in view.

At present Heidegger is engaged precisely in the process of interpreting the phenomenon of reference. He is inquiring into the nature of the world's foregoing releasing of being. How can Being release being? How can Being reveal itself? This is possible only if Being "allows itself to destine" (*Bewendenlassen*). Thus, destination or referred-ness shows itself as the Being of the at-hand.

Two essential aspects must be distinguished in destination: the "with-which of destination" (*das Womit der Bewandtnis*) and the "by-which of destination" (*das Wobei der Bewandtnis*). These aspects are best explained through an example. The hammer is for nailing, which is for shoemaking. The hammer's destination (Being) is, therefore, the following: in itself or with itself as this specific at-hand-ness it is bound up with or by the shoe. "The relation of the 'with . . . by . . . ' is what is intended to be signified by the term reference."⁴⁹ Now, Heidegger's point is: only on condition that destination is given in its integrity is the at-hand able to encounter. This implies that the with-which of destination encounters out of its by-which, which must already have been pre-uncovered. It implies, further and in general, that any particular destination encounters out of a destination complex, which must have been foregoingly uncovered. However, the prediscovery of destination complex is not as yet destination in its integrity, for the complex itself "ultimately goes back to a towards-which (*ein Wozu*), by which it no longer has destination."⁵⁰ Out of the predisclosure of this "primary towards-which" being and being complex encounter. Since this towards-which does not function "as possible by-which of a destination," it is not an inner-world being, but rather world itself. This towards-which must be conceived as a "for-the-sake-of-which" (*Worum-willen, Um-willen*): it is for the sake of its own Being, as that out of which beings encounter; it is characterized by "concern" for Being. But "concern for Being" or "being for the sake of Being" is, as Heidegger subsequently demonstrates,⁵¹ the Being of Dasein. Thus world is Dasein as the foregoing disclosure of Being, that is, as the "There of Being." Dasein, as the foregoing allowing of being to encounter in its Being, that is, as the foregoing allowing of being to destine, is the phenomenon of world.

To render his concept of world acceptable, Heidegger must be able to account for world as a predisclosing of Being which, nevertheless, is a destining of Being towards . . . , a referring of Being to . . . To this end he introduces into the analysis the phenomenon of "understanding." Understanding is a "project" (*Entwurf*).⁵² Project is to be taken, not in the ontic sense of "preplanning," but rather in the ontological sense of "being able to manage or handle Being,"⁵³ "knowing how to be Being" (*Sein-können*).⁵⁴ This ability is not a conceptualizing; it is nothing thematic. As understanding, Dasein is in its Being essentially possibility. It is in its Being (Being's There as disclosed) the possibility of its Being (Being's There as projected). In its Being it refers itself to its own Being. In its Being it has its own Being to be: it is destined to Being. Its Being is its project.

These considerations permit a further determination of the phenomenon of world. As mentioned, Dasein's Being is the "foregoing disclosure of Being." It is Being as thus taken to which Dasein refers, or which it projects, or which it

understands. The complex notion, "Dasein having to be the disclosedness of Being," is the phenomenon of world. This is the world in which factual Dasein "moves about." This is the world from out of which Dasein articulates its particular possibilities, that is, all of the meanings with which historical man has identified. Taken thus, world clearly presents itself as a structural moment of Dasein.

Heidegger's "definition" of world, if repeated at this point, will possibly sound more intelligible:

The where-in of the self-referring understanding as the in-view-of-which of the allowing-to-encounter of being in the mode of Being of destination is the phenomenon of world.

2. THE PHENOMENON OF WORLDNESS

Heidegger explains what he intends to convey by the term worldness: "The structure of that towards which Dasein refers itself is what makes for the worldness of world."⁵⁵ Inquiring into the structures of world, his purpose is to allow what renders world possible to manifest itself as such.

World and the uncovering of being do not just simply happen. Dasein has a "view" (*Sicht*) in revealing Being. In revealing being, Dasein is "in view of" (*Umsicht*) of Being. In revealing being, Dasein is concerned about something: there is, so to speak, "reason" for its viewing. Dasein projects world, not blindly, but rather "meaningfully." This meaningfulness is what structures world, what renders it possible.

It must be recalled that Dasein is, in each revelation of destination complex and particular destination, a projection of itself towards its own Being, a referring of itself to that Being, a relating of itself to that Being. Heidegger asks: what is the relation-character (*Bezugscharakter*) of this relation? In other words: what is the essence of this self-relating? what is the condition of possibility of this relating? what is its Being?⁵⁶

The relation-character of this relation is called *be-deuten*, which Heidegger explains as follows. In revealing beings, Dasein "signifies unto itself."⁵⁷ That is, it "points out to itself" or "gives itself to see" what it is as Dasein. "Dasein gives itself to understand in originary fashion what it is in its Being . . . in so far as it is Being-in-the-world."⁵⁸ As self-referring understanding Dasein points out to itself what its meaning is, what is significant or meaningful for itself.

The references in which Dasein gives itself to understand (what it is) constitute an original unity, which Heidegger in a later chapter will identify as "care" (*Sorge*), but which at present he calls "meaningfulness" (*Bedeutsamkeit*). This unity is worldness, which "makes out the structure of world . . . in which Dasein as such already is."⁵⁹

What, then, is the meaning of meaning? The answer: Dasein's revelation of itself to itself as the manifestness of Being. To be Being-in-the-world, which is to say, to be the uncoveredness of being, is what is ultimately significant. What

finally "matters" is Dasein's projection of its Being as a "taking care of Being."

So as to leave no doubt about what he intends by worldness, Heidegger states the Dasein, as the project of meaning, is "the ontic condition of the possibility of uncovering being."⁶⁰ The ontic condition of possibility of which Heidegger speaks is Dasein's status as the particular being that it is. Yet the ontic prerogative of this being is its ontologicality: its prerogative consists in allowing world to be. Without Dasein there is no world. Why is there no world without Dasein? Being is by nature phenomenon. Therefore, in revealing itself, it is necessarily "There;" it necessarily carries along its own Dasein. Not only is there no world without Dasein, it must quite simply be affirmed that "Being 'is,' provided that Dasein is."⁶¹

Being encounters as "food," "clothing," "shelter": it carries biological significance. Being encounters as "mass," "force": it carries scientific significance. Being encounters as "family," "nation": it carries social significance. Being encounters in its "beingness": it carries metaphysical significance. Yet these and similar instances are entirely derivative forms of meaning. In their case it must always be asked: what is the meaning of their meaning? what is it that Dasein "really" intends in these so-called "meanings?" The answer: Dasein means or intends itself, as the presence of Being. "Meaning (thus) is an existential of Dasein, not a property with which being is beladen, (which) lies 'behind' it, or (which) floats somewhere as an in-between order."⁶² "Only Dasein 'has' meaning."⁶³ Any other interpretation of the phenomenon of meaning stems, Heidegger thinks, from a "forgetfulness of Being."

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NOTES

1 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Halle, 1927), References in the text are to the ninth edition (Tubingen, 1963).

2 See "Letter" to W. J. Richardson, pub. as "Preface" in W. J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, 1963). See below note 5.

3 *Ueber den Humanismus* (Bern, 1947), p. 17.

4 *Being and Time*, "Preface."

5 "Letter" in op. cit., pp. xvi-xxii.

6 *Dasein* means literally "Being's There," which is taken by Heidegger to be the Being of man.

7 *Being and Time*, p. 53.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 64-5.

9 Unawareness that Heidegger in his list presents four meanings of *one* phenomenon and the criterion of distinction is not simply the contrast between the ontic and the ontological, but rather, and more exactly, this contrast as approached from two different points of view, is what renders Biemel's presentation of the list thoroughly unilluminating: see W. Biemel, *Le concept du monde chez Heidegger* (Louvain, 1950), pp. 20-1. The same might be said of Richardson's presentation of the list: see in op. cit., p. 52.

10 *Being and Time*, p. 63.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 *Ibid.*, pp. 130-66; for corresponding "inauthentic" moments, see pp. 166-80.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 64. Or, differently expressed, being is the pre- and co-theme; the genuinely intended theme is Being: see p. 67.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 67, 83.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 69, 75.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 68-9.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 74, 83.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 68, 76, 77, etc.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 75.
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Ibid.*, par. 16, pp. 72-6.
- 37 "Unhandiness" would be a literal translation of *Unzuhandenheit* (see p. 73) rather than of *Vorhandenheit*. However, "unhandiness" manages to catch the sense of the latter expression, which means, literally, "what lies before the hand," in the sense of "what is in its way," which is the meaning conveyed by "unhandiness."
- 38 *Ibid.*, par. 17, pp. 76-83.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 80. Heidegger italicizes the entire first part of the quotation.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 82. Heidegger italicizes the whole.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 76-7.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 83.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 86. Heidegger italicizes the whole.
- 47 *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 *Ibid.*
- 51 See, for instance: *ibid.*, par. 29, pp. 134-40; par. 31, pp. 142-8; chap. 6, pp. 180f.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 145.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 144.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 86, 87.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 87, 88.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

