Colonization to Globalization: French-Algerian Integration Analysis from Historical, Societal, and Economic Perspectives

Stephanie Soledad Rodriguez

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Honors Thesis
Stephanie Soledad Rodriguez
Department: Global Languages and Cultures
Advisor: Nicola Work, Ph.D.
April 2018
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Abstract
This cross-disciplinary research on French-Algerian relations is designed to expose the influence of historical, societal, and economic perspectives on the present and future of cultural and economic integration. Using a multi-disciplinary approach to analyze French-Algerian relations, this research comprehensively leverages seemingly unrelated factors that have impacted the transition of France-Algeria from European colonization to globalization. In this work, their colonial history and statistics on population, immigration, and employment are used to introduce the development of French-Algerian relations from 1830-2016. This research considers how French and Algerian government policies have shaped the development of societal factors by analyzing data on immigrant national identity, French and Arabic language usage, and Islam and secularism in France. The role of biculturalism in economic affairs, specifically considering the cultural conflict with oil, has influenced the development of economic integration between France and Algeria. As Algeria currently seeks economic diversification and 2018 French politicians recognize France’s unspoken relationship with Algeria, this work describes the current conflict in the oil industry and presents bilateral economic cooperation opportunities that could result in long-term economic stability and a young generation in France and Algeria that experiences positive outcomes of globalization.

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This Honors Thesis is a translated version of the French original, titled “De la colonisation à la mondialisation : Une analyse de l’intégration franco-algérienne de perspectives historiques, sociétales, et économiques”. In the event of any discrepancy between this translated thesis and the French original, the original shall take precedence.
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INTRODUCTION

As an undergraduate student during the November 2015 Paris attacks, while many of my classmates and fellow Americans showed their support in solidarity with those affected, I also questioned the roots of terrorist attacks in France and the relations between France and the Middle East. Thinking there might be a relation between the secularist fundamentals of France and its susceptibility to Islamic extremism, I found that much of the Muslim population in France was linked to its colonial period, specifically France’s North African colonies. Considering that the United States has been criticized and targeted for its democratization and globalization, I became curious to understand how France’s view of globalization has impacted their current international relations with Arab-African countries and their economic involvement in the oil industry. The scope of my question evolved into a much more extensive challenge, considering that international relations is multidisciplinary by nature and also the controversial framework for analyzing the oil crisis.

Many people ask me why I chose to study the relations between France and a North African country as opposed to France and the United States. While studying French language and culture throughout high school and college, the Maghreb (North African) culture in France was a common theme throughout my coursework. Deciding to make this the topic of my honors thesis gave me the opportunity to immerse myself into understanding the complexities of its role in present-day France and its impact on the economies in the Mediterranean region. Knowing that North African economies are economically dependent on their oil resources, I sought to integrate the current global oil
crisis into understanding France’s involvement in international economic development aside from its E.U. membership.

After analyzing France’s former African colonies, the one that exhibited the most complexity was the historical relation between France and Algeria (and, complementary to my interest in the societal impact of religious affiliation, most of Muslims living in France who have North African roots are descendants of Algerians). By studying the relations between these two countries without an emotional bias towards either France or Algeria, the result includes several objective considerations. Rather than aiming for a static conclusion, the goal with this research was to expose the complexities that have impacted the transition of France-Algeria from colonization to globalization using seemingly unrelated factors: post-colonial immigration policy, religion, and oil.

This work, as a cross-disciplinary project, follows a chronological analysis between historical, societal, and economic perspectives of French-Algerian relations. Chapters 1 through 4 provide the historical context for understanding the origin of Arab-Muslim influence in Algeria, French and Algerians colonial relations, Algerian independence, and the post-colonial political aftermath. In terms of societal perspectives, Chapters 5 through 8 analyze post-colonial societal development. Chapter 5 analyzes demographic statistics including French-Algerian population, immigration, and employment. Chapter 6 focuses on conflicting cultural elements between France and Algeria including language usage and national identity. Chapter 7 discusses cultural perception of religion, specifically the role of secularism and islamophobic tendencies in France. Transitioning into economic perspectives, Chapter 8 highlights the role of multiculturalism in economic affairs. Chapters 9 through 12 compare the current
economic environments of France and Algeria and their efforts towards future cooperation. Chapter 9 provides an economic overview of both countries, while Chapter 10 details trade cooperation between France, Algeria, and other countries. Chapter 11 explains French-Algerian conflicts and cooperation within the oil industry and the cultural association of oil. Lastly, Chapter 12 defends my argument that societal and economic integration through globalization are currently improving rather than threatening French-Algerian relations.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

When one thinks of early Algeria, one may be reminded of their French colonial past, or even the heavy influence of Ottoman rule of the sixteenth century. However, prior to its French invasion in 1830, or even Turkish rule from 1516 to 1830, Algeria has been home to four other notable invasions in world history.

CHAPTER 1 | EARLY ALGERIA

INVASIONS BEFORE 1830

Algeria’s geographic location and its societal conditions appealed the Phoenician-Carthaginian invasion, from 1100 to 147 B.C.E., the long-lasting Roman invasion in 146
B.C.E., later to be followed by the Vandal invasion from AD 432 to AD 533, the Byzantine invasion from 533 to 633, and prior to Turkish rule, the Arab invasion from 755 to 1516 (Stora, 2004, p. 2). This Arab invasion would later contribute the strongest and longest-lasting cultural influences on the Algerian people, even through the Turkish and French invasions.

Due to its geographic location, the entire North African region was used by those navigating to Europe or the Middle East. A common misconception among European scholars is that the Roman invasion, perhaps because of its duration, was the most culturally influential period in North African history (Ruedy, 1992, p. 11). However, the cultural exchange throughout time developed a group called the Berbers, a group of people whose culture and traditions prevailed prior to the Islamic conversion and Arabization of the Maghreb region (Metz, 1994, p. 3). Historically, according to Metz, the Berbers have been illustrated as “barbaric enemies, troublesome nomads, or ignorant peasants” (p. 5). The Berber’s economic progression was mainly attributed to farming, livestock, and their developments in manufacturing and commercialization (Ruedy, p. 10).

According to Metz, since the Berbers had already established their economic organization through agriculture and manufacturing, internal trade between Carthage and the Berbers increasingly imposed Carthaginian power over these indigenous Berbers. Such power and land captures led to military recruitment and even enslavement of Berbers. Displacement of the Berber society and its people continued throughout the Roman invasion, forcing tribes to move from their long-established regions to distant and unfamiliar lands. Though the inception of the decline of the Roman Empire carried a
heavy burden in world history, its affects were less significant in the North African
region (p. 7-8). Seizure of land, which became a far more societally harmful act during
the French invasions of Algeria, imposed severe implications on nomadic tribes. Land,
serving as a representation of sovereignty and liberty for these tribes, mandated an
already skill-deprived society to conform to utter displacement by the Romans.

This Berber displacement was transposed overtime through the Vandal invasion
starting in AD 432. As described by Metz, the Vandals were a Germanic tribe invading
from Spain and agreeing to restrict their North African invasions. Through conquering
Carthaginian rule, Vandal power subjugated Roman control over not only trade but also
prior Berber suppression. The AD 533 Byzantine invasion disintegrated the Vandal
Kingdom within a year and was “comprised by official corruption, incompetence,
military weakness, and lack of concern in Constantinople for African affairs” (p. 10-11).

**ARAB AND ISLAMIC INFLUENCE**

The Arab invasion that occurred after Byzantine rule was one that imposed a
cultural influence that still exists in present-day Algeria. While many Algerians living in
present-day France are Arab-Muslims, there is an important differentiation between Arab
influences and Islamic influences. The former, Arab influences, as previously stated,
stemmed from a historical invasion, while the latter was a long-term penetration of
religious customs that resulted in the most-followed religion by Algerians today.
According to Watkins (n.d.), Islam began to reach the coastal areas of the Maghreb
approximately fifty years after the death of Mohammad (The Coming of Islam, para. 1).
Despite this differentiation, the coming of Islam was correlated to the first Arab journeys into the Maghreb region beginning in 642, “penetrat[ing] nearly all segments of society, bringing with it armies, learned men, and fervent mystics… replacing tribal practices and loyalties with new social norms and political idioms” (Metz, p. 11). According to Stora, it is the Arab influence on the Berbers that have attributed Algeria an Eastern “personality”. Though tribal displacements and invasions overtime were significant to the instability of the Algerian identity, the formation of the Islamic community associated them to the *umma*, meaning the Muslim community tied by Islamic religious beliefs (p. 3). Many of the Berber converts to Islam aided the Umayyad Dynasty, a predominantly Muslim dynasty, to conquer the Northern African coast to achieve advantages on the Mediterranean coast (Metz, p. 12).

As correlation does not mean causation, though many Berbers converted to Islam from Arab power, Islamic Berbers during the Arab invasion did not endorse Arab rule. In fact, according to Metz, Arab rulers treated the Berbers, especially Muslim converts, as inferior citizens by imposing higher taxes on them and even enslaving them (p. 12). According to Ruedy, they began a revolt in 740 in the name of Kharijite Islam, *kharijite* meaning “those who leave”. The prosperity of the Berbers, revolting under this Islamic sect, led to a time in Maghreb history that some call “the golden age”. This age included the growth and fall of the Berber people and their empires (p.12).

Due to the Maghreb’s loss of control of their desert and sea front, economic decline permeated the whole Maghreb region between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As Ruedy describes, trade into the Maghreb became limited by the control of Arab nomads, and Christian rulers in the western Mediterranean region challenged
Maghreb traders with already declining commerce incomes. With governmental powers attempting to derive revenues from farmers who had been previously displaced and heavily taxed, the central Maghreb region found itself in an economic crisis, rooted by political and moral crises by the fifteenth century (p. 14–15).

According to Metz, with Ottoman rule from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Algiers became the governmental center of the Maghreb for the Ottoman Empire. Both Arabs and Berbers were displaced from their governmental positions, and Turkish became the official language. The governor of Algiers assumed the title of dey while the remainder of Maghreb area was partitioned as provinces (Constantine, Tetteri, and Oran) called beyliks, led by bey, elected by the dey, and governmental succession typically remained within circles of families (p. 19-21). According to Ruedy, increase in Christian domination in the Mediterranean region throughout the eighteenth century challenged the political structures established by the Ottomans in the late seventeenth century. The government sought external revenues from Algerian victories in Tunisia, being that internal revenues were insufficient to meet governmental needs (p. 20).

CHAPTER 2 | FRANCE IN ALGERIA: 1830-1954

ECONOMIC COLONIALISM

The power of colonialism during the French occupation of Algeria, through land seizure and government control, greatly impacted the Algerian society. From 1830 to 1954, the Algerian people struggled to achieve liberty and equality. Unified by their
colonial subjugation, the Algerian struggle heavily contributed to their national identity in the battle towards independent Algeria (Metz, p. 3).

According to Metz, from the fall of Napoleon I in 1815 up until the invasion of Algiers in 1830, France and its monarchy was under critical social, economic, and political pressure (p. 22). Economic pressure was apparent through Franco-Algerian relations, specifically regarding a 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 francs debt from an Algerian grain purchase that dated back to the late 1790s (Ruedy, p. 45). According to Ruedy, it was not until 1827 that the French Consul-General at Algiers, Pierre Deval, gave a pretext what would result in the French invasion in 1830. When Hussein Dey (the ruler of Algeria) demanded Deval explain why the King of France had not acted upon the debt, “Deval allegedly responded in the words to the effect that His Most Christian Majesty could not lower himself to correspond with the Dey” (p. 46).

This exchange between the Dey and Deval was considered an insult to both parties and resulted in the French blockading the Port of Algiers for three years and Hussein abolishing certain French trading posts. The financial consequences from these trade restrictions for France outweighed the slight impact that the blockade had imposed on Algeria (p. 45- 46). Causing increases in trade costs, specifically provoked by the economically-depreciated port of Marseilles in southern France, the apparent blockade failure of Algiers has been viewed by many as the breaking point leading to the French invasion of Algeria (Metz, p. 22).
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

The invasion of Algiers, beginning in March of 1830 and led by Charles X, did not drive the total and immediate colonization of Algeria. There was actually much resistance on both sides, and according to Evans (2012), specifically for the French due to the potential Muslim violence and risk of contracting cholera or typhoid fever (p. 14). According to Metz, France officially incorporated the occupied regions as a colony, with populations including approximately 3 million Muslims and implemented colonial administration called “regime du sabre”, or government of the sword, in 1834 (p. 23). The War Minister of France created this royal decree named “les possessions françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique”, meaning the French possessions in North Africa, later to be changed to “Algérie” in 1838 (Ruedy, p. 54). The royal decree of 1845, according to Metz, categorized the colonial administration based on regional population. These three categories were: (1) majority colons, (2) majority indigenous, and (3) mixed with a Muslim majority (p. 27).

The first category of colonial administration was assigned to those regions where European colons made up a majority of the population. This category was called “communes de plein exercice,” meaning groups that had full-exercise with elected officials (Metz, p. 27). Mainly made up of poor peasant farmers from the northwest shore of the Mediterranean and criminals deported from France, the European colons were referred to as pieds noirs, meaning black feet. With attempts to incentivize European settlement in rural areas, the colonial administration offered land in these rural areas. Though “rural colonization” conformed with the class of the European settler, land seizures by the colons created a profound impact on the tribal traditions of the rural
Algerian people. Just as there exists a differentiation between the colonizer and the colonized, there was class-differentiation between the colonizer’s class based on their occupation, where the working-class colonizers were almost comparable to the colonized (Metz, p. 24). The second category of colonial administration was assigned to regions where the population was mixed with a Muslim majority. The main difference between this category and the former is that some leaders were appointed rather than freely elected. Lastly, the third category of colonial administration was assigned to the indigenous group, where they continued to follow the previously mentioned “regime du sabre” (Metz, p. 27).

The French were strategic in ruling the Arab Algerians in a way that implemented their goals yet remained conscious of the colonized’s perspective. Specifically targeting regions whose populations were primarily comprised of indigenous Algerians, *Les Bureaux des Affaires Arabes* (Arab Affairs Bureaus) were established in 1844, which were directed by Arab-speaking officials (Evans, p. 15). The establishment of these bureaus caused conflicts in colonial visions between the colonizers and the government. According to Metz, while the colons argued both that forming such groups contradicted colonization and that the goal should be to assimilate Algeria to an administration more paralleled to that of “metropolitan France”, the French government was cognizant of the risk of unleashing Muslim-Algerian vengeance and of critically damaging government-indigenous relations. Subsequently, the *Bureaux des Affaires Arabes* were dissolved in the 1870s (Metz, p. 27).
NAPOLEON III

Under the Second French Empire, beginning in 1852, France had recovered from critical social, economic, and political pressures experienced during the First French Empire. Under Napoleon III’s rule, who became fascinated after his visits to Algeria in the 1860s, he limited interaction between the colons and the Muslims by restricting “European settlement” past coastal Algeria and reverted it to military rule, claiming that colons “[had] a corrupting influence on the indigenous population” (Metz, p. 29).

Furthering the governmental resentment by the colons, according to Evans, Napoleon III became a “hate figure” for the colons after his 1863 concept of a *royaume arabe* (Arab kingdom) to unite the two societies (p. 15). Napoleon III promulgated two decrees in the 1860s, promoting his vision of restituting the rights for Muslims in France-Algeria.

According to Metz, his first decree in 1863 addressed “tribal structure” and land seizure (p. 29). Evans describes the previously established law as an “instrument” for land acquisition, one that facilitated the European settler’s acquisition of tribal land. For example, French legal theories such as property contacts were indiscernible to Muslims, giving Europeans the advantage of acquiring undervalued tribal lands, complemented by the fact only the European settlers could acquire loans from the Bank of Algeria since usury, lending money with interest, was banned by Islamic law (Evans, p. 23-24). Metz describes Napoleon’s decree aimed at classifying and restricting tribal lands to the indigenous and inheritably distributing cultivable land to governmental entities (p. 30).

Legal measures between the 1870s and 1880s through colon delegation shifted land exchange back into the hands of the state and the settlers (p. 32).
Voting rights and land seizure weren’t the only deprivation that Muslims in France-Algeria experienced due to colon governmental dominance. The colons’ education control and lack of funding for Muslim schools negatively affected Muslim children’s educational development. According to Metz, colon rulers contributed five times more funding for European education than they allocated for Muslims, and the educational structure was mainly French and taught in French. It was not until the 1890s that uniting Muslims and Europeans in an educational setting was experimented, specifically for Muslim students to adapt to the French educational system and not vice versa. Muslim students who prospered became known as évolutés, meaning the evolved ones (p. 33-34). Many of these évolutés comprised of Muslims who complied with the harsh condition proposed by Napoleon III’s second decree regarding French citizenship.

Napoleon III’s second decree in 1865 shed light on a much more fundamental inequality between the French and the Muslims: acknowledging cultural differences. According to their 1865 constitution, Muslims were defined as “vote-less French subjects” (Evans, p. 22). In favor of Muslims, though accompanied by an oppressive condition, Muslims were protected under French law yet were upheld to Islamic law during non-criminal lawsuits and trials. However, protection under French law did not imply citizenship; the Muslim Algerian had to surrender his religion for the sake of full French citizenship (Metz, p. 30). An Arabic word commonly applied to such Muslims who did choose to abandon their religion for the sake of French citizenship was muturni, which Evans defines as, “a pejorative word meaning someone who has turned their back on their own culture: in short[,] a Muslim seduced by colonialism” (p. 22).
The Prussian’s capturing of Napoleon III and the fall of the Second French Empire set the scene for the final oppressive actions of the colons towards the Muslims that invoked a *jihad* against the French. Demanded by the French government “to destroy the military regime…[and] to completely assimilate Algeria into France,” Adolphe Cremieux issued the Cremieux Decrees in 1870, which included affirming colon government jurisdiction and bestowing Algerian Jews full-French citizenship (Metz, p. 30). Believing the Prussian’s capturing as “a sign from God,” a *jihad* began in Kabylia in March of 1871 lasting until the end of that year, resulting in failure by 150,000 Muslims, execution and deportation of commanders, confiscation of over 500,000 hectares of tribal land, and classification of Arabic as a foreign language in France-Algeria (Evans, p. 16).

Though France affirmed Algeria as part of France in the French Third Republic Constitution in 1875, affirming a nation’s intrinsic union did not signify an equally treated population. The 1881 *Code de l’indigène* (Native Code) presented coercive and restrictive provisions against solely Muslims as means for governmental compliance according to the colons. By these provisions, as Evans details, Muslims could face incarceration through negative expression of French government and by practicing tax avoidance (p. 22). Unsurprisingly, these codes were not Algerian Muslims’ only experience of taxation injustice. A specific example of higher taxation on Muslims than Europeans can be drawn from tax data in 1909. According to Metz, “Muslims, who made up [90%] of the population but produced [20%] of Algeria’s income paid [70%] of direct taxes and [45%] of total taxes collected” (p. 33).

According to Evans, “the most profound legacy [of the colonial period] was a psychological one” (p. 16). From the territorial invasion and occupation of their
government, to depriving them of French assimilation without shaming their religion, to
the death of approximately 30% of the population, the French *coup d’état* created a
vulnerable and impaired society. It is important to note, as Evans indicates, that the
impact of colonialism and the relation between the ruler and the ruled was not
homogenous across France-Algeria (p. 41). As one can imagine, rural regions may have
seen more interaction between the Muslims and the colons than in the urban and coastal
areas. There is no doubt, however, that the coercion, brutality, and injustice towards the
Muslim Algerians was about to erupt into measureless consequences for the oppressive
French rulers.

**ALGERIAN NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS**

One of the first political movements began before World War I in hostility
towards drafting Muslim Algerians to the French army without full-French citizenship.
This group, demanding equal rights, taxation, and property protection, were called the
*Jeunesse Algerienne* (Young Algerians) and were primarily comprised of *évolués* (Metz,
p. 35). They argued that assimilation should not be partial; “If Muslims were being asked
to spill blood for France, then they must be treated as French citizens,” (Evans, p. 43).
The beginning of the First World War on French soil caused what Stora calls a “loss of
innocence among Muslim Algerians” (p. 12). Enlisting 73,000 indigenous Algerians,
25,000 Muslims died and 119,000 were solicited to restore French labor post-WWI en
masse (Stora, p. 12-14). Living and working in France not only introduced the Algerians
to political and social norms in France but also to the pan-Arab nationalism ideas
developing in Middle Eastern countries (Metz, p. 35).
Under the ruling of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, Muslims began to see modifications to laws in their favor, specifically for those who fought in the war. In 1919, the Jonnart Law enabled more Muslims with voting rights (Metz, p. 35) as well as facilitated obtaining citizenship and increased Muslim representation in administration. As a result, Emir Khalid, who led the *Jeunesse Algerienne* and sought full-French citizenship for Muslims without forsaking Islam, joined the Algiers municipal council in 1919 (Evans, p. 43-45). Following the *Jeunesse Algerienne* and forming in 1926, *l’Étoile Nord-Africaine* (the Star of North Africa) became the first political movement supporting Algerian Independence. Initially established for interrelation of North African post-war working population in France, *l’Étoile Nord-Africaine* was led by its secretary general Ahmed Messali Hadj and was banned in 1929 and until 1934 continued to promote its demands undercover. Messali Hadj then sought to systematize the urban, working class both in Algeria and in France to ameliorate its conditions by establishing *le Parti du Peuple Algérien*— *PPA* (the Party of the Algerian People) in 1937 (Metz, p. 36-37).

Around the same time, a demand for Algerian Islamic reform began, promoting modern Muslim practices. *L’Association des ulémas musulmans algériens* (the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama) was formed in 1931 but was banned in Algeria by colonial administration. According to Metz, Shaykh Abd al Hamid Ben Badis, the lead reformist of the AUMA, preached that, “Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language, Algeria our fatherland” (p. 37). Regardless of the fact that the AUMA’s motives were backed by themes of union and alliance, the colonial administration sought to abolish any type of reform. Ben Badis justified that “this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be
France, and does not want to be France… [but] has its culture… good or bad, like every other nation of the Earth,” (Metz, p. 37-38).

Under the appointment of Maurice Violette as Governor-General in Algeria in 1936, the colon authority’s attitude towards reform remained the same but was challenged under a different context (Evans, p. 47). “An initiative cautious and reformist in its approach,” according to Stora, the Violette Plan was proposed granting French citizenship and civil rights to an exclusive group of Muslims, specifically in favor of the évolués (p. 19). According to Metz, the colons placed exceptions upon the proposed rights that resulted in the dissolvement of the Violette Plan (p. 39). Before resigning from his position in 1927, Maurice Violette cautioned the settlers saying:

The natives of Algeria, because of your errors, do not have a country. They are looking for one. They are asking to become part of the French patrie. Give it to them quickly or without that they will make another. (Evans, p. 48).

**WORLD WAR II AND THE BIRTH OF THE ALGERIAN WAR**

Once again, the Algerians supported the French during World War II. Supported by 56 Algerian nationalists, *Le Manifeste du peuple algérien* was proposed in 1943, requesting an Algerian constitution that would grant instant civil equality and citizenship as well as recognition of Muslim traditions. In response, French authorities proposed a plan that was remarkably similar to the former Violette Plan, one that proposed limited rights to, again, an exclusive and elite Muslim class (Metz, p. 40-41). Signed in 1944 by
General Charles de Gaulle in conflict with the settler’s goals, the decree favored Muslim representation (Stora, p. 21).

Its subjective power given to Muslims may have contributed to the formation of the *Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte* (Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty) whose mission was achieving Algerian independence. According to Metz, upon its banishment after a violent revolt in 1945, which resulted in the death of approximately 45,000 people, *l’Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) and *le Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) were formed in 1946, followed by the creation of *l’Organisation Speciale* (Special Organization) led by Ahmed Ben Bella through the MTLD (p. 42). Messali Hadj, previously leading *l’Etoile Nord-Africaine*, was elected to the Algerian assembly in 1947 but was ultimately deported to France in 1952 due to protests against France by the OS. Following the OS, Ben Bella established *le Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action* (Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action) in 1952, which was renamed as *le Front de Libération Nationale* (National Liberation Front) and mostly known for its *Armée de Liberation Nationale* (National Liberation Army) for heading the Algerian side of the Algerian War of Independence (Metz, p. 43-44).
CHAPTER 3 | FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR: 1954-1962

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

According to Stora, the Algerian War of Independence was one of the deadliest French decolonization periods of its time (p. 30). As Ottaway (1970) describes, Algeria was the first nation to gain international attention from its colonial oppression, causing sufficient political turmoil to result in the fall of the Fourth French Republic (p. 1). According to Ruedy, it is agreed by historical analysts that the leading goal between 1954-1958 was to establish the legitimacy of the revolution between Algerians and the colonial administration, while war period between 1958-1962 included struggles outside of solely Algeria and became more internationally recognized (p. 174). In 1954, the FLN invited all Algerians to join them in the fight towards achieving independence through “restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles and respect of basic liberties without distinction as to race or religion” (Ruedy, p. 159).

As Metz describes, many rural European settlers fled to Algiers as the FLN began to reach the rural zones, begging for France to declare a state of emergency and to penalize the FLN members. In defense, the colon authorities practiced ratonnades, literally meaning Arab-killings, targeting Arab-Muslims who were suspected to have association with the FLN (p. 46). While France remained quiet, the United Nations General Assembly called forth the Algerian issue in 1955. As Ruedy mentions, while France felt that the UN was imposing on its national interests, the growth of violence in France-Algeria was no secret (p. 165). The FLN invoked a nation-wide strike to gain more international exposure to the Algerian struggle (Metz, p. 49).
The Battle of Algiers, which began on September 30, 1956, was one of the most well-known demonstrations of the FLN’s potential through three bomb attacks (Metz, p. 49). According to Stora, two other specific incidents that increased the French-Algerian issue’s presence internationally were the 1956 hijacking of the FLN leader’s airplane and the 1958 French bombing of a Tunisian village (p. 68). After the French executed two FLN prisoners, Ruedy notes that a bloodshed of innocent Muslims was caused by FLN killings of Europeans in Algiers (p. 168). According to Metz, what started as violence towards Muslims in colonial administration evolved into guerilla warfare resulting in 6,000 Muslim deaths and 1,000 European deaths from 1954-1956. With Muslims forming secret social and judicial organizations nation-wide, the ALN executed approximately 800 shootings and bombings each month in 1957 (p. 49).

**FRENCH DENIAL OF WAR**

Despite the United Nation’s General Assembly claim regarding the consequential magnitude of discordance in colonial Algeria, France remained internationally silent for months. As Ruedy describes, France was confronted with three intensifying pressures: (1) growing Algerian nationalism, (2) public French concern for stability and recovery costs, and (3) international concern regarding France’s control on Algeria (p. 171). By 1956, France had acted to infuse its power in Algeria both indirectly and directly. Directly, according to Metz, 400,000 groups of French soldiers had been deployed to Algeria within the first two years (1954-1956). Indirectly, France established the *Section Administrative Spécialisée* (Special Administration Section) in 1955. Their main efforts were to further permeate Algeria with French influence and to halt the anti-French and
nationalist sentiments in rural regions. The leaders of this administration were called *képis bleus*, meaning blue caps, and they appointed volunteer Algerian Muslims who were called *harkis* (p. 50).

**DEGAULLE**

Known for his military involvement in WWI and WWII and his previous government roles, Charles de Gaulle, according to Metz, was seen by many as the sole politician to rectify French-Algerian tensions and to steer the French government towards the needs of its majority (p. 51). In June of 1958, Charles de Gaulle paid a visit to Algeria and affirmed to the *pied-noirs* “*Je vous ai compris*”, meaning, “I have understood you”, and exclaimed “*Vive Algérie française!*” Expressing both his commitment to improving economic and social conditions for Algerian Muslims, de Gaulle sought to target and confront the three pressures on France’s government. According to Metz, Muslim men and women became, for the first time, registered voters for the new French constitution (p. 52). These social and economic goals for Algeria were outlined in the Constantine Plan of 1958. As Ruedy describes, this plan included 5-year programs targeting educational improvements, land redistribution (specifically 250,000 hectares), and job creation through industrial investments. With new voting rights, 79.9% of Muslims voted and 96.6% were in favor of the new constitution for the French Fifth Republic (p. 171).

In reaction to the Muslim support of de Gaulle’s constitution, the FLN established *le Gouvernement Provisionnel de la Republique Algerienne* (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic). Stora states that the *GRPA*’s goal was to gain international political attention and assistance and to become the Algerian point-of-contact for future
French-Algerian negotiations (p. 83). According to Ruedy, de Gaulle responded “in a stunning misreading of the causes and psychology of conflict [and] offered reconciliation without recrimination on the basis of the unconditional surrender of all FLN forces” (p. 174). As Metz described, GRPA leader Ferhat Abbas argued that even cease-fire would not rectify the French-Algerian relation; the matter of Algeria required political and social negotiations in addition to military truce. Elected as the President of the Fifth French Republic in 1959, de Gaulle expressed his vision for France-Algeria as two associated countries where Europeans and Muslims were “partners” rather than enemies (p. 53).

**THE EVIAN ACCORDS**

Throughout 1961, de Gaulle’s government began to negotiate with the FLN. France and FLN leaders signed a French declaration of ceasefire in March 1962 called the Evian Accords. The agreements themselves, as described by Evans, could be divided into two main parts: self-determination for Algeria and French-Algerian relations upon Algerian independence. In summary, the colons were granted a three-year protection period with Algerians, after which they had to choose between French and Algerian citizenship. For these three years, France also committed to financially supporting Algerian development. De Gaulle’s declaration of the Evian Accords on the evening March 18th, 1962 described that self-determination embodied the Algerian desire, was in France’s interest, and was fundamental for French-Algerian bilateral association (p. 311). The true challenge, according to Feraoun (as cited by Evans) became to shape a future for France and Algeria to “march together fraternally on the path to civilization” (p. 312).
CHAPTER 4 | INDEPENDENT ALGERIA: 1962-1990

Historians have continued to disagree on the lives lost during the French-Algerian war. According to Martin Evans, the French government claimed, in terms of Algerians: 16,378 dead, 13,619 injured, and 18,296 disappeared (p. 337). However, historian John Ruedy claimed that the Algerians estimated 1 million lives lost, while colonial supporters claimed 375,000 (p. 190). Perhaps the most daunting number was listed by Helen Chapin Metz, where Algerians estimated 1.5 million dead versus the French who estimated 350,000 dead (p. 55).

Evans described these societal consequences to France as a “taboo subject”, without any confession regarding these deaths, any recognition of the European colon and harki transition, nor any social issues in France caused by the French-Algerian war (p. 350). Although de Gaulle’s 1958 Constantine Plan created a vision for an economically and socially prospering Algeria, as American political theorist Hannah Arendt once said, “every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning”. Despite the Evian Accords and the mass flee of Europeans from Algeria to France, war and violence continued in Algeria post-1962. According to Evans, as France progressed as a leader in international business without letting the Algerian question disrupt their growth in global power (p. 349), many Algerians took advantage of this period when there was no legal or authoritative process to appropriate European-abandoned land and businesses (p. 331).
POLITICAL AFTERMATH

This time period after 1962 reflected the self-determination that de Gaulle had mentioned was fundamental for the transformation for the future of Algeria and its association with France. Ottaway depicts the Algerian societal restructuring as a “scramble for [political] positions and well-being” (p. 33). With decolonization, the Algerians no longer had a mutual cause to support, causing an immense tension throughout all levels of Algerian society. As Metz described, the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (National Council of the Algerian Revolution) aimed to devise a plan for transforming the FLN into an all-inclusive political party in May 1962. This plan, called the Tripoli Program, targeted ensuring state ownership of large industries and services, fair land redistribution, and a continuing anticolonial strategy in all international relations (p. 56). As Ruedy describes, the Tripoli Program’s analysis of the colonial period determined that French-Algerian cooperation, denoted by the Evian Accords, presented the risk of neocolonialism. The culture of the new Algeria “was to be national, revolutionary, and scientific, as well as Islamic, in the modern and progressive sense of that term” (p. 191).

These opposing views and nation-wide social tensions caused a deadly civil war in August of 1962, in which thousands of Algerians killed one another (Ruedy, p. 194). As Evans noted, the fight for decolonization and independence was not as simple as the colonizer fighting the colonized (p. 336). While the decolonization period turned the French government against the will of the pieds-noirs, the fight for an agreeable independence turned the politically-motivated Algerians against the will of the less-heard. According to Metz, it was not until September 25, 1962 that the National
Assembly announced the existence of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. Within a year, nationalization had been declared upon all previously-owned revenue-generating European properties through the March Decrees of 1963 (p. 57).

These goals for nationalization did not result in the economic stability that the National Assembly had initially anticipated. According to Metz, starting in the late 1970s, Islamists in Algeria began to demand the integration of an Islamic government. By 1994, the Algerian government had established a populous Islamic university in Constantine and accustomed family law to conform to Islamic beliefs, specifically with women’s rights and liberties in the family (p. 62). This Islamic influence on the government’s reform became reinforced through the third constitution: the constitution of 1989. As Metz describes, without acknowledging the FLN and by abolishing the rights of women that had previously been in the 1976 constitution, political sentiments and societal trends were apparent in this new period. The Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) was established in 1989, causing politically-fueled Islamic aggression with the FLN, though the constitution did not allow for religious-based political parties (p. 63-64). Ruedy describes this period as a time of “political and economic liberalization”, one in which the standard of living for the average Algerian only worsened (p. 252). The Algerian population, frustrated with a violence-filled independence, a growing economic gap between the rich and the poor, and unresolved political agendas with the fall of the FLN and the rise of Islamic culture, sought an anti-colonial national identity and stable economic prosperity without French cooperation for fear of neocolonialism.
The Algerian fear of neocolonialism, a fear that was historically logical and socially significant, inhibited Algerians from achieving economic prosperity with their post-colonial remains, both physical remains as a nation and psychological remains as a people. Focusing on France and both its citizens and Arab immigrants, societal perceptions of post-colonialism and Arab-Muslim racism influenced societal behaviors, and, perhaps more economically consequential, also influenced immigration and employment policies.

After the Algerian fight to define a national identity, an identity which was to be independent of France in almost every aspect, the societal and cultural perceptions between France and Algeria prevail today. Economic and intergovernmental data indicates that Algeria’s independence from France and their cooperation challenges have limited Algeria’s economic stability and diversification opportunities since the end of the Algerian War of Independence. Some statistical indicators that can be interpreted to better understand roots of lack of integration between the French and the Arab-French are French employment rates, their policies, and views on immigration post-1962. Neil MacMaster’s research in his book titled *Colonial Migrants and Racism* explains aspects of French societal culture which have contributed to Arab-Muslim discrimination.

MacMaster’s two overarching explanations for the nation-wide discrimination against Arabs are both historically linked to the previously-reviewed colonial ties between France and Algeria. One of these explanations is the French hostility towards Algerians by European settlers and French soldiers who returned to France after the
Algerian War of Independence. The sense of defeat in the face of those who were once their subordinates generated French hostility among these French families towards Algerians. The other explanation is the fear of Islamic fundamentalism (MacMaster, p. 2). According to a SOFRES survey published in 1991 (as cited by MacMaster, p. 1), which served to assess and understand the French public opinion, French people rated immigration as a top domestic concern. Recalling that the establishment of the FIS in 1989 caused politically-fueled Islamic aggression with the FLN, this rise of Islamic presence in the political realm not only exemplified the power of Islamic fundamentalism but also threatened its permeation into French society.

Why would the Islamic fundamentalist culture of Algeria pose a threat to the French society post-1962 if Algerian nationalism defined their identity? Despite nationalist motives, the post-colonial economic environment of Algeria required seeking outside sources for both their health and their financial security. Environmental factors previously detailed, including the combination of land seizures and indigenous relocation with lack of control of their own industry investments, resulted in a population which MacMaster describes as “underemployed and desperately poor” (p. 3). Moreover, France’s labor shortage and low fertility rates post-WWI had already presented Algerians with the opportunity to legally immigrate to France for employment purposes (p. 4). Post-war needs, in both the French workforce and in relation to reconstruction, were not the only factors that presented the threat of a massive Algerian movement into France. MacMaster also considers the fact that France became the first European country to implement a regulated foreign labor system (p. 132) and, perhaps less apparently, the
socioeconomic effects on France in preserving its colonial power and colonial systems (p. 18).

The reason I use “less apparently” to introduce socioeconomic effects of colonial systems on France is because it may be more likely, in studies of colonial rule and power, that the negative impacts of colonialism are more associated with the colonized population than with the colons. For example, in analyzing the colonial relation between France and Algeria, there seemed to be much more emphasis on the socioeconomic disadvantages for Algerians than there were for French who were not pied noirs.

Considering the bilateral effects of colonial rule as an assessment for cultural integration is crucial for understanding not only why colonial perceptions prevail in national cultures for up to decades later but also for understanding how post-colonial environments create a shared source of growth opportunities for both economies.

Despite decades of French-Algerian cohabitation during the colonial rule in Algeria and the interwar period in France, MacMaster argues that Algerian integration into French society was a lengthy process because of Algerian marginalization in French society as a consequence of French racism (p. 12), further claiming that control systems imposed on migration into France were backed by political motives as opposed to economic motives (p. 19). Though anti-Arab sentiments throughout French society were initially created by the colonial elite (p. 119), several racist stereotypes, including violence, were developed regarding North Africans (p. 124). Conversely, the marginalization of Algerians in French society can also be regarded as a consequence of Algerian choices, particularly their decision to abandon the French language post-independence (p. 129). Language assimilation for communication could have been one of
the simplest, physical solutions for achieving a greater chance of integration ease. However, for Arab-Muslims, assimilating by use of French language could have implied an abandonment of their religion. By preserving the usage of Arabic, the Algerian’s mother tongue, it is likely that this was perceived by French society as an uncooperative intent of cultural integration.

MacMaster notes several psychological crises in French society, aside from the failure of colonialism and Algeria’s independence, which contributed to integration difficulties for French-Algerians. Irene L. Gendzier describes it as a “self-conscious” psychological state of the colonized during the process of cultural assimilation (Gendzier, p. 509). Based on the previous research, I think it is fair to assume that the colonizer felt an equivalent sense of assimilation resistance towards those who were no longer legally considered subordinates. In the words of France’s national motto, though policies and agreements defined a loss of power for the French and a gain of liberty for the Algerians, this did not guarantee, equality and fraternity through economic opportunity and cultural integration.

Despite Algerian independence and the implementation of systems that allowed for a high influx of migrants across French-Algerian borders, there was no denying that the tensions between these two countries would create societal discrimination to last for decades. MacMaster describes a discrimination “trap” among Arab-French that inhibited them from surpassing their socioeconomic status in French society (p. 217). This discriminatory system seems to be, unfortunately, one of the most common in societal structures favoring high socioeconomic inequality gaps and is extremely cyclical in nature.
To understand the economic effects of modern racism and discrimination, specifically its economic and trade effects within the oil industry, I will analyze statistical data on immigration and employment within France-Algeria since 1962 to assess how anti-immigration policies, bilingual socialization, and anti-Islamic sentiments have contributed to economic development deficiencies and lack of economic diversification in both France and Algeria, bilaterally.

CHAPTER 5 | FRENCH-ALGERIAN DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS SINCE 1960

Analyzing French and Algerian population fluctuations post-colonially can be used to conclude various aspects of French-Algerian societal trends and economic opportunities. I will use and interpret population, immigration, employment, and French-opinion statistics to evaluate how French labor and immigration policies have contributed to shaping French cultural opinions regarding French-Algerians and Arab-Muslims.

One of the biggest challenges in my statistical methodology to assess sociopolitical conflicts between France and Algeria is that, as noted by Patrick Simon (2012) of the INED (Institut national d’études démographiques), neither France’s census nor France’s social science surveys collect data regarding ethnic backgrounds of its citizens and inhabitants. To roughly quantify immigrant and foreigners, France’s census asks questions relating to citizenship and birthplace; it is even more difficult to estimate religious affiliation, as this data is compiled primarily through polls and surveys (p. 3).
Therefore, while my usage of French governmental data is limited, there are several other organizations that have provided detailed societal and economic studies that provide support to my analysis.

**FRENCH-ALGERIAN POPULATION SINCE 1960**

I first would like to point out that French-Algerian population fluctuations, post-colonially, didn’t show a direct correlation to the public expectation (the expectation of a mass migration from Algeria to France) based on economic and political environments at the time. Both France and Algeria were hurting – France was economically weak as they encountered a shortage in their workforce and a high need for post-war reconstruction, while Algeria was politically weak as they scrambled to define their governmental structures and economic policies. Both economies, undoubtedly, had suffered a major loss in their working-age population as a result of the inter-war period. However, the dual weakness between these two countries allowed for a system that could benefit both nations, although it actually resulted in a greater economic and developmental benefit for France. As Pierre George (1986) notes in his overview of immigration in France in his book titled *L’immigration en France*, many people assume that the Algerian War caused a drastic migration of Algerian citizens into France due to fragile political and economic conditions in Algeria, when in reality, France had implemented an organized immigration system through labor agencies to meet its labor needs (George, p. 18-19).

As shown in Figure 1 below, with information accessed from the World Bank (2016), the total population count in both France and Algeria increased immediately after
the end of French colonial rule in Algeria. It is apparent that Algeria’s population grew at a much higher rate than France, and this proves that there was no “great migration” from Algeria to France. If there had been a significant migration caused by Algerian independence, there would have been an inverse relation point somewhere between, at most, 15 years after 1962 in both French and Algerian population levels. The actual population change between 1962 and 1977 was approximately +13.8% and +51.3% for France and Algeria, respectively, meaning that Algeria was growing at a rate of more than 3.5 times faster than France during these years. Looking past the 15-year mark, Algeria’s population growth rate deviates from a linear growth rate, with a significant increase in population growth starting roughly starting in 1982 and up until approximately 2002, while at this time, France’s population continued to grow linearly.
However, as reflective as these population growths are of France and Algeria’s societal reactions to their respective sociopolitical climates, these population growth rates do not reflect the specific population share of immigrant and foreign people. A study done by the INSEE (2014), the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, compiled data on immigrant and foreign population in France from 1982 and 2014, capturing exact counts of immigrants and foreigners in the years 1982, 1990, 1999, and 2014, as shown below in Figure 2. Using Figure 1 population totals during these years, the immigrant and foreign population made up for 13.53%, 13.26%, 12.50%, and 14.96% of the total population, respectively. With very close values, the proportion of immigrants and foreigners during 1982, 1990, and 1999 only differ by, on average, .34% of the total population—less than half a percent. This means that, although there were population growths in France of 16% from 1962 to 1982 and of 8% from 1982 to 1999, the

**Figure 2**

![IMMIGRANT AND FOREIGN POPULATION IN FRANCE](image)

Source: INED, 2014
proportion of foreigners and immigrants within these growth rates have remained very stable. This indicates that there is likely no correlation in 1982 between the immigrant and foreign population in France and the population growth in Algeria above its linear growth rate.

George mentions, however, that the first oil crisis had an impact on immigration that resulted in a decline in immigration in not only in France but all over the world (p. 17). Since the first oil crisis occurred in the 1970s, which was due to an oil embargo on behalf of Arab countries in OPEC, this immigration decline, along with newly settled migration policies between France and Algeria in the Evian Accords in 1962, implies that immigration and employment rates during the first two decades of post-Algerian independence were in constant fluctuation due to both French-Algerian socioeconomic relations as well as global economic environments. It is clear that after these two decades, in 1982, immigrant and foreign population remained relatively steady before the beginning of the new century. A closer study of immigrant employment starting after the year 2000 might indicate how global economic changes, after the first oil crisis, impacted France’s foreign workforce and Algeria’s population.

**FRENCH IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY**

Before analyzing immigrant employment in France, it’s important to first understand France’s immigration policies post-colonially. According to an article written by Zappi (2003) and published by the *Migration Policy Institute*, in the 1960s and 1970s, France’s government established immigration policies with the intended result of
immigrants assimilating to and adopting French culture; in the 1980s, they shifted to an “integrationist policy”, where the French government funded initiatives for immigrants to assimilate into French culture while preserving their native culture (Zappi). According to Zappi, right-wing politicians began a process of rescinding government funding supporting immigrant integration in response to legislation changes under Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy in the early 2000s. Two main goals of these legislation changes included limiting foreign entry into France, specifically North Africa, as well as lengthening the process for aliens with temporary residence permits to acquire long-term residence permits (Zappi).

How did governmental policy and immigration goals differ from how the French public perceived North African assimilation or integration into French society? France’s organized immigration system, for the purposes of labor, limited the possibility of a massive North African insertion into France, and, as an article published in La documentation Française describes: « une intrusion massive de migrants n’est pas nécessaire pour que la composition de la population change substantiellement... [juste] une infusion durable » (Immigration : les chiffres, 2016). In other words, it takes a long-lasting infusion of migrants to substantially change the composition of a population as opposed to one period of high migration. It’s possible, that in a post-colonial context, a “great migration” might not have been as noticed as a gradual insertion of Algerians into French society, simply because of the societal and economic turmoil that France was enduring.

Interestingly, according to Séverine Labat (2011), in her article titled La France et l’Algérie à l’heure Postcoloniale : Entre Décolonisation et Dé-Nationalisation, many
Algerian immigrants were ones who already had French nationality (p. 139). This could have been due to the high access to nationality that children, born post-colonially with parents born in Algeria, had. Pierre George claims that the Evian Accords “introduisent des différences d’interprétation de la nationalité” for France and Algeria. In other words, they introduced an interpretive form of understanding nationality, although specific guidelines were defined in the agreements. Specifically, according to French law, France established two specific guidelines for children, born after 1962 with parents born in Algeria, to automatically acquire French nationality: (1) if born in France, one parent must have been born before July 3, 1962, regardless of French nationality retention, and (2) if born in Algeria, one parent must have retained their French nationality. However, Algerian law regarding Algerian nationality had much a less “strict” guideline for children born after 1962: whether born in Algeria or in France, they receive Algerian nationality (George, p. 31).

POLICY IMPACT:

FRENCH NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND VISAS

To assess how the right-wing changes to immigration integration in the early 2000s affected North African entry to France, Figure 3 illustrates French nationality acquisition between 1998 and 2016 of three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Between 1998 and 2016, the average acquisition of French nationality across all continents was approximately 130,923, with the African average at 79,155 (INSEE, 2016). The Maghreb average was 56,023, while the averages for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia were 19,567, 27,526, and 8,930, respectively. France’s popular opinion,
according to George, associates high immigration levels from the Mediterranean coasts with Algeria more than with any other Maghreb country because of French-Algerian historical ties, when in reality, the number of annual Moroccan immigrants has been increasing while the number of annual Algerian immigrants has been declining (p. 37). This immigration outcome can be confirmed in comparison with the acquisition of French nationality in most recent years shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3**

![Graph showing acquisition of French nationality](image)

Source: INSEE, 2016

The immigration legislation changes also aimed at making it more difficult to acquire new residence permits. George confirms that after specific legislation in the late 1980s regarding residence permits, specifically those that were valid for 10-years at a time, ensured issuance refusals in cases where foreigners’ criminal backgrounds...
“menacer l’ordre public”, or, presented a threat to public order of its citizens (p. 35).

However, after nearly 10 years later, we can see an increase in the number of new residence permits issued in France between 2010 and 2016 as graphed in Figure 4 below. The number of Algerians acquiring French nationality from Figure 3, starting in 2010 up until 2016, show the same trend as the new residence permits issued in France in Figure 4. Starting in 2010, there seemed to be a steady decline in both the acquisition of French nationality among Algerians as well as in new residence permits issued in France; yet, after 2012, there is a steady increase in both the acquisition of French nationality among Algerians as well as in new residence permits issued in France up until 2016. Though it seems that this trend is prevalent in the three Maghreb countries shown in Figure 3, there has been a steady decline in Moroccan acquisition of French nationality, so much that it has become approximately equal to the number of Algerian acquisitions in 2016.

**Figure 4**

![NEW RESIDENCE PERMITS ISSUED IN FRANCE](image)

Source: Franceinfo, 2017
However, as Émilien Urbach (2017) describes in his article for *l’Humanité*, these immigration numbers and proportions may be painting a different picture than the reality of France’s policies towards welcoming immigrants and foreigners. Though there was a 4.6% increase of residence permit distributions between 2015 and 2016, Urbach notes that France recently passed an amendment to its CESEDA, or Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum, making temporary residence permits tricky to sustain with stricter guidelines and making them a source for accessing personal information such as energy or telephone usage. The proportion of residence permits issued in France by motive are shown in Figure 5 below. A large portion of these residence permits were issued for both students and family-related reasons, while very few exhibited to be for humanitarian reasons (for refuge and safety). According to

**Figure 5**

![Pie chart showing residence permits in France by motive for 2016](image)

Source: France24, 2017
France 24 (2017), the approximate number of residence permits allowed in 2016 was 230,000; the proportion of those allowed in 2016, compared to those allowed in 2015, remained approximately the same for students, while the proportions decreased by approximately 2.3% for family purposes and increased approximately by 41% for humanitarian purposes, 9.4% for professional working-class immigrants, 4.1% for veterans and retirees.

**Figure 6**

![Diagram showing number of visas issued in France from 2010 to 2016](image)

Source: Franceinfo, 2017

French visas, as shown above in Figure 6, do not show a decline between 2010 and 2012 as nationality and residence permit acquisitions do. Since visa issuances have a much more linear relation than residence permit issuances, it is clear that France places a
much higher priority on focusing on its long-term inhabitants than its short-term inhabitants. *L’Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers*, the National Association of Assistance to Borders for Foreigners, reminds us that France actually takes a very nationalistic approach to welcoming foreigners in the sense that they are very active in tracking people who enter and leave France (Urbach). However, according to France24, the current French Minister of the Interior claims that the numeric decline in visas between 2015 and 2016 has been due to terrorist attacks (France24). The Minister of the Interior (as cited in *FranceTVInfo*, 2017) called this decline “l’effet des attenats”, or, “the effect of jihadist attacks”. I will discuss Islamophobia and jihadist cultural associations in a later section.

However, how can this data help quantify how Algerians have been impacted by French residence permit and visa issuances? According to residence permit statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior, a total of 19,428 residence permits were issued for economic purposes in 2014. While Moroccans and Tunisians accounted for 9.96% and 7.43% of those issued, respectively, Algerians accounted for only 3.84% of those issued. Of that 3.84%, 20 were granted permits lasting 3-6 months, 50 were granted permits lasting 6-12 months, and 680 were granted permits lasting a year or longer. Although Algerians acquired more than double the number of French nationalities than Tunisians did in 2014, Tunisians acquired almost double the number of residence permits than Algerians in 2014. Why are these values significant for Algerians’ contribution to immigrant employment in France? Long-term visas, which are abbreviated by the Ministry of the Interior as VLS, do not require the issuance of residence permits.
However, by bilateral agreement, Algeria is exempt from this regulation, meaning that they must acquire both residence permits and visas (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2016).

**ECONOMIC CAPACITY AND SOCIETAL WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT**

Though residence permit issuances for economic purposes only account for 10%, immigrant employment indicates the quality of immigrant contribution to the French economy. Focusing on the 9.4% increase of professional working-class immigrants and employment rates by migratory region, we can assess how much of France’s workforce, in recent years, has benefitted from working-class immigrants.

Figure 7 and Figure 8 below display employment rate by migratory origin in France and unemployment rate of immigrants and non-immigrants in France, respectively. While the employment rate of those not related to immigrants has remained almost unchanged between 2010 and 2015, the employment rate of people who are immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France have slightly changed. However, over these recent years, the employment rate of immigrants has always been above 50%. On the other hand, the unemployment rate among immigrants has also been sustained at a very low rate of unemployment (in Figure 8, Non-Immigrants includes Descendants of Immigrants from Figure 7). Though unemployment in France shows an increasing trend overall since 2006, the employment rate of those in France who are not related to immigrants have had relatively stable employment rates since 2010. Conversely, immigrants are experiencing both a decline in employment and an increase in unemployment since 2010.
**Figure 7**

EMPLOYMENT RATE BY MIGRATORY ORIGIN IN FRANCE, 2010-2015

Source: INSEE, 2016

**Figure 8**

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF IMMIGRANTS AND NON-IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE

Source: INSEE, 2016
How are these employment and unemployment rates reflective of Algerian immigrants in France? Figure 9 below displays the number of Algerian immigrants living in France in 2014. Roughly half of Algerian immigrants living in France in 2014 are of working-class age. A very low portion of Algerian immigrants are of high school and baccalaureate age, meaning that Algerians likely do not contribute largely to the proportion of Algerian residence permit requestors for school purposes. Labat refers to French policies on Algerian immigration as a decision of French political class (p. 141), which supports the idea that France’s governmental regulation on immigration and employment was more politically-driven than economically-driven. However, motives do not excuse consequences—more specifically, they do not excuse societal consequences.

**Figure 9**

![ALGERIAN IMMIGRANTS LIVING IN FRANCE, BY AGE, 2014](image)

Source: INSEE, 2017
Maghreb immigration to France, specifically Algerian immigration, has impacted the French opinion on Arab-French and Arab-Muslims, specifically these immigrant’s economic contribution through immigrant employment. Since 1982, one city that has felt the socioeconomic pressure of immigrants has been Marseille, France. As one of the largest cities with closest proximity to Algeria, Marseille is home to many Algerian immigrants, and, as George notes, it used to be a city that was not as industrialized as more northern cities in France. It was in regions such as these that he depicts as having felt immigration as “quotidiennement comme source de problèmes dans la vie économique et sociale”. That is to say, French living in areas highly inhabited by immigrants associated immigration as the source of social and economic problems in France. This association and marginalization, in return, created societal structures including ghettos and areas they would commonly refer to as “critical zones” (p. 129).

Figure 10 below details the proportion of French, in 2017, who believe that there are too many immigrants living in France, where a large majority of respondents agreed that there are too many. It is likely that the respondents of this survey were French people who have lived in areas of France with a high number of immigrants, such as Marseilles, or people who feel that immigrants have not assimilated or integrated well to French culture. Yves Bardon (as cited in The Local, 2016), who is a director for Ipsos, a French company that conducts surveys to assess international opinions, explained that: “In countries affected by high unemployment, like France, Spain and Italy, we can hypothesize that the respondents feel threatened by immigrants who are capable of taking jobs which don’t require qualifications”.
However, Jean-Christophe Dumont, who is a division head for the OECD (the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) specializing in international migration, claimed that immigrant contribution to the French economy outweighs public expenses for immigrants, including social benefits (Urbach). Urbach details the OECD’s study, whose data spans from 2001-2011, which concluded that “immigrés représentent 15 % des entrées en emploi dans les secteurs en croissance et 28 % dans les métiers en décroissance”, meaning that immigrants represent only 15% of employments in growing sectors, while they represent 28% of employment in declining occupations. So, in agreement with Bardon’s statement, while this does not necessarily indicate that immigrants are taking jobs that don’t require qualifications, it does imply that immigrants account for jobs in which French people are less willing, or perhaps may even be overqualified, to “take”.

Source: Sciences Po (Cevipof), 2017
Despite figures of actual immigration and its proportions in French society, we must also consider the proportion of immigrants in France who have entered and are working illegally in France. George indicates that illegal immigration is prevalent in French society and that it is, in part, beneficial for companies through cheaper labor and reduction of payroll taxes (p. 35). Though illegal immigration may be economically beneficial for certain French companies, illegal Algerian immigration has also indirectly allowed for a greater opportunity of Algerian integration into the working-class French society, and it is likely that this opportunity has presented a negative association with working-class Algerian immigrants. I do not mean to say that illegal immigration is an acceptable form of cultural integration nor to say that illegal immigrant employment is ethical. However, it is important to be aware that illegal immigration has also been contributing to the French opinion of immigrants’ assimilation for decades.

Labat argues that there is room for cooperation through standardized migration and employment policies. She claims that cooperation and negotiation in the context of illegal migrants is a sign that such standards are ones “où l’aide au développement apparaît comme la contrepartie de la fermeture des frontières” (p. 314). In other words, French-Algerian negotiations regarding development aid for its illegal migrants served as an alternative for closing off borders. Although the French public is not in agreement that their country is economically capable of supporting such migrations, as shown below in Figure 11 regarding the French opinion on France’s economic capacity to welcome migrants, having international policies with that alleviate the needs of both societies is crucial for nations’ whose historical tensions and colonial past seem to be inescapable.
CHAPTER 6 | NONCONFORMING CULTURAL ELEMENTS

THE IMPLICATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

It is apparent that France’s public policy on immigration and immigrant employment has contributed to shaping the French opinion on the possibility of Algerian integration, not only integration in the French workplace, but also integration into French society. In the case of French-Algerian integration, integration of Algerians into French society was not just a matter of conforming to French values and traditions, but it also
required the abandonment of what they associated with their Algerian roots and their Algerian identity. As Phillip Chiviges Naylor (1980) summarizes the internal Algerian sentiment post-colonially, “the Muslim farmer was not only made landless, but also, rootless” (p. 10). However, Algerian immigrant’s refusal to adapt to the French identity, specifically through their use of Arabic, and French language policies have caused economic disadvantages and socioeconomic progression impediments for Algeria.

**FRENCH LANGUAGE IN ALGERIA**

Gendzier (1976) observes that the usage of French language contributes to the psychological position of the colonized, including the role of language in the colonization period when France demanded the use of French in Algeria and categorized Arabic as a foreign language. The *pied noirs*, the European settlers fighting for the Frenchification of Algeria, also developed resentful feelings towards Arabic and its associations with the Algerian identity when they were dominated by an “Arab Algerian independence” (Naylor, p. 387). Algeria’s post-colonial government, in efforts to redefine their national identity, ensured that cultural components such as language usage were influenced by Arabization (p. 514). However, as societal restructuring continued in post-colonial Algeria, specifically in developing and reforming Arab education and the traditions that would inevitably become a part of the Algerian culture, Algeria did not foreclose itself to the use of Arabic. According to Rugh (2002) regarding Arab education, though Algeria passed a law in 1991 requiring that all school subjects should be taught in Arabic, schools in Algeria maintained a “French track” in their curriculum (p. 403).
France’s goal in Frenchifying Algerians has had a lasting impact on their ability to integrate into French society. As Naylor describes: “The ‘Frenchification’ of the colonized produced a cultural alienation which was more disturbing in the long run than systematic political and economic oppression” (p. 10). But though the adoption of French contradicted the nationalist goals of Algeria, John P. Entelis (1981) explains that the political culture of Algeria recognized the practicality of using French, where while “Arabic and Islamic components of national identity continue to be emphasized, Algeria pursues a practical policy of bilingualism” (p. 196). Therefore, rather than taking a theoretical approach of pursuing solely Arabic, not only in its educational reform but also in its societal norms, Algeria implemented a strategic outlook on the usage of French for societal development, allowing for greater future economic opportunities in its foreign policies. This strategy proved to be impactful for economic opportunities not long after its implementation. According to Entelis, many higher education instructors at the time were incapable of teaching French, and Algerians who completed their education in an education system that had been influenced by Arabization with the exclusion of French encountered hardships in finding jobs, since many public and private sector jobs required bilingualism (p. 203).

ARABIC LANGUAGE IN FRANCE

On the French side, Caubet (as cited in Hélot, 2015) mentions that the use of Arabic is not as valued nor is it regularly taught in school, even though it was categorized as a language commonly used in France in 1999, including its prefix “Maghrébi” Arabic (para. 1). As Hélot describes in her presentation of teaching Arabic in France, France
does not have any institutional policies restricting or prohibiting teaching Arabic; it is more often encountered as a taught language in cultural or religious organizations than in educational institutions (para. 2). So, although French schools are allowed to teach Arabic, they choose to not include them in their curriculums. Practicing Arabic in such way categorized the language as more of a cultural association rather than a globally learned language such as Chinese (in the context Arabic and North Africans, this cultural association proves to be real for the language speakers themselves as seen below in Figure 12). According to Hélo, language education policy research indicates that

**Figure 12**

NORTH AFRICAN YOUTH: "ARABIC IS CENTRAL TO MY NATIONAL IDENTITY"

- 79% Agree
- 13% Disagree
- 8% Neither Agree nor Disagree

Source: ASDA’A Burson Marsteller; PSB Research, 2017

educational policies, incorporating historical and sociopolitical issues, have both directly and indirectly contributed to societal discrimination against those who speak that language (para. 4). This analysis of Arabic in the French educational realm shows the
inconsistency between policy and practice, or, as Hélot describes it: a policy that seems inclusive on the surface but lacks institutional support (para. 3).

**LANGUAGE IN SOCIOPOLITICS**

Through bilateral analysis of Algeria’s use of French and France’s use of Arabic, it is apparent that the sociopolitical motives of language inclusion have impacted the cultural association of the respective language speakers. Peled, Ives, & Ricento (2014) introduce this topic as a “thematic issue” involving language policy and political theory. By using these two themes, they confirm that conflict regarding language usage is one that is often encountered because of the global challenges that we face, not just in educational realms:

This is because our linguistic and moral difference is nevertheless constrained by our mutual interdependence on one another. On a global level, we are becoming increasingly more dependent on individuals whose language and morals we do not necessarily share. (p. 296)

Peled, Ives, & Ricento further detail some of the global challenges we face today, such as financial crises and the climate change debate, that require interdependency and cooperation of linguistic and moral views for operating effectively in a global context (p. 296). This need for a cooperative view on language and culture interdependence is one that is not practiced between France and Algeria, and this is likely influenced by the high incorporation of language use in their respective national identities. However, it is a view
that I believe is very much needed in French-Algerian relations. Figure 13 below shows a 2017 study on the most-spoken languages worldwide. With Chinese, Spanish, English, Arabic, Hindi being within the top five, the fact that Arabic is ranked fourth on the list and France is not on the list at all indicates an important implication of language in French-Algerian relations. Language interdependency is, without a doubt, a necessary element for sociopolitical success in a globalized economy.

**Figure 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Spoken (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahnda</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethnologue, 2017

**FRENCH AND ALGERIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Despite the implementation of immigration and employment policies for political and economic needs, a society’s national identity is not a cultural element that can be standardized or limited through policy, rather, it is an element that is developed by societies and that evolves overtime. As Patrick Simon (2012) introduces in his
assessment of French national identity, “national identity is not only a product of individual feelings of belonging and attachment; it is also affected by external perceptions of identity” (p. 1).

The INED (Institut national d'études démographiques) and the INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) conducted an official survey called “Trajectories and Origins” in 2008 to help assess French and Algerians’ national identity. There were three questions in this INED-INSEE TeO statistical survey that best captured the developed and evolving national identity associations between French and Algerians. Firstly, immigrant participants were asked regarding their feelings of belonging in France (Figure 14 below). Of Algerian immigrants, 60% said that they “feel at home” in France, 42% said that they “feel French” (56% of Algerian immigrants who are citizens said that they “feel French”), while 44% said that they “feel Algerian” (p. 7).

Figure 14

![Figure 14](source: INED-INSEE, 2008 (cité par Simon, 2012))
Secondly, participants who were second-generation French, were asked the same questions regarding their feelings of belonging in France (Figure 15 below). Of second-generation French, 68% said that they “feel at home” in France, 68% said that they “feel French”, while 32% said that they “feel Algerian” (p. 9). Lastly, ethno-racial groups were asked questions regarding French societal treatment. Of the Maghrebians and Arabs who participated, 42% said that they “experience racism”, 34% said that they “experience discrimination”, and 43% said that they are “questioned about origins” (p. 14).

**Figure 15**

![FEELINGS OF BELONGING: SECOND-GENERATION FROM ALGERIA](image)

Source: INED-INSEE, 2008 (cité par Simon, 2012)

In the French-Algerian case, their respective perceptions of identity created cultural tensions that made a future of cultural integration of Algerians in France seem impossible. Simon indicates two French concepts that contribute to the French-Algerian
opposition. The first is the idea that “dual belonging”, or identifying with two national identities, is generally frowned-upon in France, while it is generally regarded as a positive cultural attribute in societies that are multiculturalist. In a multiculturalist society, for example, identifying with a dual belonging could be interpreted as being more well-rounded or could be seen as a positive opportunity of different ideas.

Secondly, he indicates that France’s criticism of dual belonging creates “a marginalization of visible minorities” (p. 1).

Through these three survey questions, I notice two important societal trends between Algerians in France and their national identity: (1) the changes of national identity feelings of Algerian immigrants between one generation and (2) the differences between how they feel and how they are perceived. It is apparent that there is a much higher sense of belonging among descendants of Algerian immigrants than among Algerian immigrants. This could be used to predict that overtime, as descendants of Algerian immigrants become less chronologically-linked to their Algerian roots, they will increasingly identify themselves more with French culture than with their Algerian roots. This trend of increased sense of belonging by generation is the same trend that was exhibited between immigrants and descendants of immigrants in employment rates from 2013-2015 in Figure 7.

Starting in 2013, descendants of immigrants had a higher employment rate than immigrants. However, the differences between how they feel and how are perceived is demonstrated in their employment rates. Although almost 70% of descendants of immigrants both feel French and feel at home in France, they have experienced an average of 7% lower employment rates and an average of 8% higher unemployment rates
than French who are not related to immigration. Although those survey questions were not asked in the context of employment discrimination and workplace integration, it is apparent that there is a disparity between how Algerians view their own integration into French society versus how the French society perceives Maghrebians and Arabs. Lastly:

The problem lies in [France’s] restrictive definition of this national identity: it ends up excluding visible minorities and Muslims from the national community… The real threat against national cohesion is the persistence of ethnic and racial discrimination, which targets Muslims more than ever. (Simon, p. 15-16)

CHAPTER 7 | CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS

FRENCH SECULARISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

As reviewed in the historical section of this research, Algerians have carried the cultural identity of Islam for centuries. France’s colonial administration categorized Algerians between those who abided by Islamic law versus those who abided by French law. As Bowen (2010) describes in his book titled *Can Islam be French?: “the opposite between Islamic law and French law thereby came to encode the opposition between backward and evolved… less and more civilized”* (p. 174). Moreover, many of the Algerian nationalist and political movements were centered around the right to retain Islam while obtaining full-French citizenship. Luckily, Algerian independence gave the Algerian government and its people the opportunity to create its own culture. According
to Entelis, “for Algerian ideologues, socialism can have no meaning outside the realm of Islamic belief” (p. 194). Despite this, Algeria’s 1989 constitution prohibited the creation of religious-based political parties.

However, on the French side, laïcité, the separation of church and state (what we refer to as French secularism) has been identified in French law since 1905. Thus, post-colonial Algerian immigration gave Muslims in France a “very specific profile” (Bowen, p. 18). So, if France does not “favour any one religion and guarantees peaceful co-existence in respect of the laws and principles of the Republic” (France Diplomatie, 2018), why does Simon note that religious discrimination in France, specifically discrimination against Muslims, is a true threat to national cohesion? As recognized in the former analysis of Arabic in the French education realm, inconsistencies between policy and practice create policies that are inclusive on the surface (in this case, secularism) but lacking institutional support (in this case, not the state and its administration, but France’s people and society).

**FRENCH SECULARISM AND ISLAM**

I first would like to note that, as mentioned by Esposito and Piscatori (as cited in Mortimer, 1991, p. 592), religious traditions are subject to innumerable interpretations. However, according to Bowen, Muslim’s view of national borders did not define any importance to practicing their religion (p. 27). This aligned with the basis of French secularism. France describes the underlying principles and values of secularism as:
In other words, its basis for secularism included: (1) the freedom of conscience and to manifest one’s convictions within the limits of public order, (2) the separation of public institutions and religious organizations, and (3) equality for all before the law regardless of beliefs or convictions. They also define secularism as “pas une opinion parmi d’autres mais la liberté d’en avoir une” (Gouvernement.fr). In other words, secularism is not necessarily an opinion among others, but it is the right to have an opinion.

Based on these principles, it is clear that the main goal of secularism in France is to define the separation between state law and individual religion or belief. However, when French people were asked what the main goal of secularism was in France, they defined it beyond its main principles. Figure 16 below depicts the French opinion in 2015 on the meaning and purpose of secularism in France. Though 59% of the survey respondents believed that the purpose of secularism is to fulfil its proposed agenda, 36% believed it served for purposes of limiting religious impact in society: 19% believed it is for the purposes of making all religions equal and 17% believed it is for the reduction of religious influence in society. So, although a majority of French believe that secularism in France meets its goals, a 2015 study conducted by the same organizations found that more than 75% of French believe that secularism is in danger in France (shown in Figure
17 below). Does this imply that French believe that France is in danger of having religious influence overpowering its national authority?

**Figure 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separate religions and politics</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure freedom of conscience</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put all religions on an equal footing</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the influence of religions in our society</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IFOP, 2015

If this were the case, which religions would be the strongest influences against the goals of secularism? Though the French government prohibits data collection of demographic religious affiliation, the demographic estimates from the Central Intelligence Agency indicate the French population is: 63-66% Christian, 7-9% Muslim, 0.50-0.75% Buddhist, 0.50-0.75% Jewish, 0.50-1% other religion, and 23-28% without religion (CIA, 2015). This implies that, if religion is endangering secularism in France,
Christianity would be a larger contributor to this threat than Islam based on its national presence. However, when the respondents from Figure 16 were asked what they considered to be the sources of secular endangerment (shown in Figure 17 below), there were six common reasons for threat identified. Of these six sources, only one was directly related to Christianity (EU integration of predominantly Christian countries), while one was directly related to Islam (demand for state subsidy of mosque construction) along with two other reasons that suggest Islamic traditions.

**Figure 17**

![Pie chart showing the percentage of respondents who believe secularism is in danger in France.](image)

Source: IFOP, 2015
The two sources that I claim to indirectly elude to Muslim traditions are (1) “cultural and religious communities mix less and less in France” and (2) “there are more and more people with conspicuous religious symbols”. I defend the first by asking, which cultural and religious communities could be the ones that are most mixing less in France? Being that Christianity has historically and traditionally been the most common religion in France, whereas Muslim presence has gradually emerged in France since the
implementation of secularism, it is most likely that the Muslim religious community is the predominant community that is mixing less with France. In terms of cultural community, throughout this study of French-Algerian relations, a common theme of lack of French-Algerian integration has been because of their differences in traditions. I defend the second by the religious controversy that was occurring in France in 2015 regarding Islam and secularism. Although more than 10 years after the amendment of the prohibition of wearing religious attire in certain public and state-owned spaces, Muslim women were particularly targeted during this time regarding discrimination for the usage of their traditional Muslim veils. These veils could be contributing to what the French participants of this study defined as “conspicuous religious symbols”, as this continues to be a controversial topic regarding Islam in France. These religious attributions in France, aside being viewed by the French as threats to their secular nation, are also seen as threats to both their identity and their safety.

**ISLAMOPHOBIA IN FRANCE**

Islamophobia sentiments are not unique to France, nor are they representative of France as a whole. However, Islamophobia has been rapidly developing throughout France and the sharing of this feeling has been felt on an international level. While a French survey from 2006 indicated that the majority of France believed that Islam could “fit” into its social landscape (Bowen, p. 3), a French survey in 2016 (shown below in Figure 17) indicated that 47% of French believed that the presence of a Muslim community in France is a threat to their national identity, while only 19% believed that the presence of a Muslim community in France enriches the country’s culture.
French people’s reaction to Islam as a threat to their national identity has been clear in their opinions regarding reasons why French secularism may be in danger. However, an islamophobia topic that is perhaps less discussed because of its complexity to analyze are islamophobic criminal incidents. As Marie-Claude Lutrand (2005) explains:

Les réalités géopolitiques du monde contemporain, la montée de l’islam politique sur la scène internationale, la recrudescence du terrorisme islamiste contribuent à influencer plus ou moins consciemment les représentations que les Européens se font de l’islam. (p. 288-289)
In other words, there are several factors that are contributing to influence the representation of Islam that Europeans believe. These include contemporary geopolitics, the rise of political Islam, and the Islamic terrorism.

How these representations have manifested themselves throughout French society is apparent in anti-Islam actions. Figure 20 below illustrates the number of Islamophobic criminal incidents by region in France occurring in 2015. Those regions with the highest number of incidents include Île-de-France (northcentral France), Nord Pas de Calais (north of France bordering Belgium), and Rhône Alpes (southeastern France bordering both Italy and Switzerland). Interestingly, these three regions also include three large French cities, including Paris, Lille, and Lyon. So although it may seem as though anti-Muslim criminal attacks are occurring nationwide, this may be due to higher immigrant populations within these regions. The real question is, will these numbers continue to grow, and if so, will there be changes to French secularism or other policies that may impact it?

One factor of the “islamophobic equation” that can be estimated is the growth of Arab-Muslims in France, particularly those from Algerian descent. Just as we noticed a change of national identity among Algerian immigrants between one generation in 2008 (predicting that overtime, as descendants of Algerian immigrants become less chronologically-linked to their Algerian roots, they will increasingly identify themselves more with French culture than with their Algerian roots), there is also an interesting trend between levels of religious affiliation among descendants of Algerian immigrants in France in 2008. Although we do not have precise data on the religious affiliation of
Algerian immigrants, we do know that many fought for the right for French citizenship without having to surrender their religion and that an overwhelming majority of Algerian immigrants were Muslim. Figure 21 below displays the degree of religious affiliation of descendants of Algerian immigrants in France in 2008.

What is most-telling about this data is, not the 51% of strongly religious (since that is a fair assumption based on the centrality of Islam to Algerian culture), but the 30%
of descendants of Algerian immigrants in France who claim they do not have a religious affiliation. While this 30% could be as simple as descendants of Algerian immigrants who were raised in a home without a religion, it is possible that part of this 30% are Algerian immigrants who have felt the need to declare themselves as without religion to untie themselves from, what I consider, the strongest component of negative perception of Algerian immigrants in France. As Bowen describes: “immigration trajectories and settlement patterns… have created a population of immigrants and their children and grandchildren less segregated by ethnic identities and religious tendencies” (p. 21). While the presence of a Muslim community is considered, by some, as a threat to France’s national identity, the outward actions of France towards its Arab-Muslim immigrants have also presented a threat to the identity of descendants of Algerian immigrants.
CHAPTER 8 | BICULTURALISM IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

It is evident that conflicting cultural components of language and religion have presented integration barriers between France and Algeria. As seen in the French-Algerian case, the idea of biculturalism, in the sense of national identity, language usage, and religious affiliation, is not a universally accepted value. The Islamophobic nature of contemporary French society has not only strengthened discriminatory attitudes towards French-Algerians and Arab-Muslims in France, but it has also influenced France’s national identity and its relations with other countries aside from Algeria. The Algerian identity with Islam, as Rémy Leveau (1992) mentioned in his article titled *Maghrebi Immigration to Europe*, “[blurred] the traditional European boundaries” in France’s secular society (p. 171). So, this placed both societies in a conflicting position; even if France was willing to integrate French-Algerians into French society, this implied asking for biculturalism to be an accepted norm of French society. As Leveau claims, “religion is a provocative way to ask for integration, and the French system cannot answer the questions it raises without having to modify itself” (p. 172).

With the cultural conflict that both countries encounter bilaterally, it seems as though French-Algerian relations, societally, are not far from where they were in colonial times. As Benjamin Rivlin (1955) described, both France and Algeria were driven to endure the struggles and accomplish their political agendas (p. 116); and now, they continue to endure the struggle of maintaining their identity and their traditions while accomplishing their political agendas: for the French, remaining as an economic power in the EU while upholding to its secular standards, for the Algerians, continuing to lead economically in the Maghreb while protecting itself from neocolonialism, and for the
French-Algerians, finding identity and equality in an anti-bicultural nation. Labat argued that it is imperative, when analyzing French-Algerian bi-nationality, to associate their colonial ties with their migrant history. She specifically describes bi-nationality as associated with “des mécanismes de reconfiguration et de reformulation de la construction des identités collectives” (p. 142), in other words, reconfiguration and reformulation mechanisms of constructing collective identities.

As stated previously, what is also imperative is viewing these tensions bilaterally. Muslims seek comfort in their culture of origin in times of oppression, both socially as well as systematically, yet demand to be treated just like the French (Safran, 1986, p. 111). This continuous “demand” for equal treatment, when what French-Muslims seek is contrary to the French state’s values, is the reason why religion plays such an important role in the conflict of biculturalism in economic affairs between France and Algeria.

Catherine Withol de Wenden (as cited in Labat) described the French as being “le « grand perdant » face à ces « nouveaux visages de mobilité et de la co-présence, ici et là-bas »” (p. 142). In other words, the French were seen as the bigger loser in the face of mobility and co-presence (biculturalism by immigration).

So, if there seems to be “no room” for biculturalism in France, and both French public policies and state policies support secularism and the Frenchification of its immigrants, is there “room” for cooperation between France and Algeria, specifically for cooperation that could have positive bilateral outcomes for both countries’ agendas? As Leveau described:
It would be futile to believe that one is going to put an end to these cultural, economic, and social flows by using visas, computerized controls, and other repressive measures…. The gains will be meaningful only if a true policy of economic transfers to those countries is coupled with a policy aimed at the integration of minorities with respect for their double culture and interests. (Leveau, p. 180)

As a means for such “gains”, there are economic growth opportunities through French-Algerian cooperation, despite their conflicts in social politics. Post-colonial statistics and policies on Algerian immigration and French employment, as well as cultural elements of language usage and religious affiliation, are indicators of the past conflict in colonialism and the future of biculturalism in France. However, bilateral economic growth opportunities do exist, specifically through economic and cultural globalization. Using the oil industry as the economic sector for conflict and cooperation analysis, this research will defend the need for cultural exchange in France, paired with economic diversification in Algeria, to achieve bilateral economic growth opportunities and positive globalization outcomes. The reason I will use the oil industry, as I will discuss in eleventh chapter, is because of the cultural association with oil and its importance in French-Algerian relations from colonial times through current times.
Before doing an in-depth analysis on France and Algeria’s current economy and how their economic cooperation is possible through the oil industry and through economic diversification, the basis of this claim requires an overview of how these economies have performed and developed post-colonially.

Gross domestic product, one of the simplest methods of measuring and calculating a country’s economic position, is defined as the value of goods and services produced domestically within a given year. Figure 22 below shows France and Algeria’s GDP (gross domestic product) in U.S. dollars from 1962 until 2016. In 1962, Algeria’s GDP was approximately $2 billion, while France’s GDP was approximately $76.3 billion, meaning that, post-colonially, France was producing approximately 38 times more goods and services than Algeria. Surprisingly, France’s GDP growth rate outcomes were higher than their projections from 1962 to 1970. According to Hough (1982), France’s GDP was expected to grow by 5.5% from 1962-1965 and 5.7% from 1966-1970, but the actual results were +5.8% and +5.9%, respectively (p. 119). On the other hand, Algeria’s GDP suffered significantly, and even reached negative values, because of their dependence on other countries and their post-colonial, societal struggles. According to Ruedy, in 1964, Algeria’s national revenue was insufficient to pay its national expenses by 40%. Moreover, aside from Algeria’s dependence on the Soviets and the Arabs, their dependence on France accounted approximately 1 billion francs per year (p. 215). Over time, the economic gap in GDP between France and Algeria grew larger. In 2008, just before the rise of the Arab Spring, France’s GDP was approximately $2.9
trillion, while Algeria’s GDP was $171 billion, just over double of what France’s GDP had been 46 years prior.

**Figure 22**

![GDP In U.S. Dollars, 1962-2016 Graph](image)


To put these figures in a more global perspective to understand their economic performance in comparison to their respective regions, Figures 23 and 24 below show France and Algeria’s GDP in relation to their economic region (France in the northern Mediterranean coastal region and Algeria in the Maghreb region, excluding Libya). Both France and Algeria have outperformed their respective regions since the 1960s. However, being an economically leading nation did not imply having equivalent economic opportunities in their respective regions. France had joined the EU just before Algerian independence, meaning that it had been subject to political and economic union with
other European countries; on the other hand, Algeria did not join the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) until its creation in the late 1980s.

**Figure 23**

![Graph showing GDP in U.S. dollars, 1962-2016](image)

Source: World Bank, 2018

**Figure 24**

![Graph showing GDP in U.S. dollars, 1965-2016](image)

Source: World Bank, 2018
CHAPTER 9 | FRENCH-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT COMPARISON

To understand the possibilities as well as the limitations of French-Algerian economic cooperation through the oil industry and globalization, a general overview of their respective economic environments is necessary to assess the development of governmental priorities that have shaped their international trade relationships.

FRENCH AND ALGERIAN ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Starting with France, according to the CIA (2018), it is one of the most-visited countries worldwide and its economy is well-diversified. While the French government has privatized most of France’s largest companies, the government also has a high influence within the power and transport industries. As previously stated in the review of immigrant employment in France, France’s unemployment rate is approximately 9.5%, while the youth unemployment rate remains roughly around 24%. Under President Francois Hollande (France’s previous president, from 2012-2017), France’s budget deficit is approximately 3.1% of GDP, while its public debt is approximately 96.1% of GDP. Under this presidency, some of the main economic policies were focused on improving France’s competitiveness across its active industries as well as job creation to alleviate its increasing unemployment rates. Approximately $42.6 billion have been spent on Le Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi (Competitive and Employment Tax Credit— CICE) in 2012, Le Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité (Responsibility and Solidarity Pact) in 2014, a government plan for stimulating investment, and a government plan for emergency jobs for the purpose of supporting France’s economic improvement.
goals. Other legislation that was passed under Hollande in efforts to support France’s
economic growth included the *Loi Macron* (Macron Law) in 2015 and the *Loi El Khomri*
(El Khomri Law) in 2016. Despite these labor and employment improvement efforts,
France’s 2017 labor force is estimated at 30.68 million people, where 2.4% of the labor
force is occupied in the agricultural sector, 18.3% is occupied in the industrial sector, and
79.3% is occupied in the services sector (CIA, Section: Economy).

The economic environment in Algeria, however, paints a very different economic
landscape than the diversified and prosperous France. As summarized by the Central
Intelligence Agency, much of Algeria’s economy is under the control of the state, using a
socialist model. Contrary to the French approach, Algeria has diminished the
privatization of its larger companies and industries and has instead established more
import restrictions and limited foreign economic affiliations. The CIA describes
hydrocarbons as the “backbone” of the Algerian economy, mainly since the hydrocarbon
sector contributes to 30% of Algeria’s GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and 95% of profits
from exportation. In contrast to France’s high debt, Algeria’s external debt in 2017 was
only 2% of GDP. While Algeria is not nearly as much of a visited country in France, it
does hold a high stake in global trade due to its natural resources: Algeria is the world’s
sixth largest exporter of gas and is home to the 10th and 16th largest reserves of natural
gas and oil reserves, respectively (globally, as of 2018) (Section: Economy).

Though the hydrocarbon sector has allowed for great economic stability post-
colonially and international attractiveness for foreign investors, recent decline in oil
prices has negatively impacted Algeria’s economic stability. For example, according to
the CIA, Algeria’s oil stabilization fund, which was valued at approximately $75 billion
in 2013, is valued at $7 billion in 2017. Naturally, while France’s economic reforms are more focused on the employment of their citizens, Algeria’s economic reforms are focused on compensating for these declining revenues. Algerian reforms include the reduction of government spending, tax increases, promoting domestic production, and complementing domestic affairs by establishing import restrictions, all while also prioritizing its societal needs by maintaining their governmental subsidies in public sectors such as education, healthcare, and housing programs. Algeria also faces employment challenges similar to France, specifically for youth employment (Section: Economy). Moreover, according to the World Encyclopedia of Nations (2018), over 90% of Algeria’s industrial and commercial workforce just before 1962 were Europeans (Section 19). So, despite France’s labor shortage due to the interwar period, the lack of skilled workforce in Algeria was incomparable to that of France’s. Algeria’s labor force in 2017 was approximately 11.82 million people (approximately 1/3 of France’s labor force), and in 2011, 30.9% of the workforce was occupied in the agricultural sector, 30.9% was occupied in the industrial sector, and 58.4% was occupied in the services sector (CIA, Section: Economy).

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Historically, France has implemented several economic development plans to ameliorate its economic environment. According to The World Encyclopedia of the Nations, France had several economic plans with changing priorities: machinery (1947-1953), agriculture (1954-1957), stabilizing the monetary system (1958-1961), private consumption (1962-1965), private consumption and employment (1966-1970), GDP

While Algeria’s current strategy for economic development is focused on the diversification of its economy to lessen its dependence on the hydrocarbon sector, Algeria’s lack of recognizing this dependence in earlier plans of economic development have contributed to the severity of their economic risk. According to the World Encyclopedia of Nations, post-colonially (from 1967-1969), their first economic development phase prioritized agriculture and skilled labor. Unlike France’s economic development plans, Algeria’s focus did not shift far from their initial goals. Their second phase (1947-1977) prioritized industry and agriculture, their first five-year plan (1980-1984) prioritized housing, and their second five-year plan (1985-1989) prioritized agriculture. Though Algeria’s trade balances and public debt were aided by the economic performance of the hydrocarbon sector, Algeria’s 2002 agreement with the EU helped shift its priorities towards privatization, trade, and employment, and the Algerian government began to invest in infrastructure projects to ameliorate its employment position between 2005 and 2009. This was followed by a five-year plan in 2010, also supporting infrastructure and employment (Section 39). Though it can be argued that France had a major advantage in developing and pursuing much more diverse economic development plans because of their membership in the European Union, their historical
economic performance, and political stability, it is evident that Algeria abandoned the priority to focus economic development in agriculture and agricultural technologies.

**FRENCH GDP**

While Figure 22 and Figure 23 displayed France’s GDP in comparison to Algeria and to its bordering countries in the northern Mediterranean coast, Figure 25 below shows the annual percentage change of GDP in France starting in 1980 and projected until 2022. Although the calculations used in this economic overview are stated in United States dollars, since France is a part of the European Union, it uses the EUR (euro) as its currency. The FRF (French Franc) was replaced by the euro zone’s usage of the euro in 1999, and since then, their monetary policy is set by the European Central Bank. As seen in Figure 25, France’s GDP declined with the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Since many European countries were in the euro zone and under the same monetary system, there was an initial panic in recovering from this financial crisis to find stability.

**Figure 25**

Source: IMF, 2017
According to the CIA, France’s 2017 GDP is estimated at $2.826 trillion, the 2017 GDP growth rate is estimated at 1.6%, the 2017 GDP per capita is estimated at $43,600, and the 2017 gross national savings is estimated at 22.1% of GDP (CIA, Section: Economy).

**ALGERIAN GDP**

While Figure 22 and Figure 24 displayed Algeria’s GDP in comparison to France and to the other Maghreb region countries, Figure 26 below shows the annual percentage change of GDP in Algeria starting in 1980 and projected until 2022. These values, again, are stated in United States dollars, although Algeria uses the DZD (dinar) as its currency (luckily for Algerian’s national sovereignty, they were able to maintain the dinar currency despite undergoing various historical invasions and French colonialism). In contrast to France and many other country’s GDP percentage changes, Algeria’s GDP did not see an unusual decline with the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. On the contrary,

**Figure 26**

![ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF GDP IN ALGERIA](image)
according to the World Encyclopedia of Nations, Algeria saw a “sharp increase” in export profits and trade balance (Section 19). According to the CIA, Algeria’s 2016 GDP is estimated at $175.5 billion, the 2016 and 2017 GDP growth rates are estimated at 3.3% and 1.5% respectively, the 2017 GDP per capita is estimated at $15,100, and the 2017 gross national savings is estimated at 34.9% of GDP (Section: Economy).

CHAPTER 10 | INTERNATIONAL TRADE

According to the World Encyclopedia of the Nations, one of the fastest-growing sectors in French trade, which has also been a growing global trend, is e-commerce. France’s main trade ports include Marseilles (along the Mediterranean coast to facilitate trade between North Africa and the Middle East), Bordeaux (along the western coast of France to facilitate trade within both Western Africa and South America), and Le Havre (along the northern coast of France to facilitate trade with North Africa and Northern Europe) (Section 30). Despite being one of the most economically powerful goods and service exporter worldwide, France’s balance of trade was positive in 1961 for the first time in 34 years but experienced rising trade deficits in the 1970s and 1980s. France’s foreign trade deficit was $46 billion in 2010, which was approximately 7.4% of GDP at the time (Section 31).

Algeria’s foreign trade is much more restricted than France’s. Post-colonially, most of Algeria’s businesses became privatized, and, according to the World Encyclopedia of the Nations, European Islamophobia limited Algerian interaction with European countries in trade. With close geographic proximity to France’s coastal trade
zones, Algeria’s most prominent trade cities are those along the Northern coast (this is also geographically imperative since the majority of central and southern Algeria is desert land) (Section 30). An overwhelming majority of Algerian foreign trade is accounted by crude oil and natural gas, while imports comprise mostly of industrial products and foods (Section 31). By consequence, the fluctuations in prices and global demand of crude oil and natural gas are what have dictated Algeria’s trade surpluses and deficits as well as their dependence on financially supportive programs such as those provided by the IMF.

**TRADE: EXPORTS**

According to the CIA, France’s 2017 exports were estimated at $541.3 billion (+$34.3 billion from 2016). Figure 27 below shows France’s top export partners based on 2016 data. According to the International Trade Centre (2016), France’s product exports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2016 were valued at $488,885,072. France’s service exports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2016 were valued at $236,760,408.

According to the CIA, Algeria’s 2017 exports were estimated at $33.15 billion (+$4.09 billion from 2016). Figure 28 below shows Algeria’s top export partners based on 2016 data. According to the International Trade Centre (2015), Algeria’s product exports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2015 were valued at $34,795,951. According to the International Trade Centre, Algeria’s service exports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2015 were valued at $3,455,001.
**Figure 27**

FRANCE'S TOP EXPORT PARTNERS, 2016

Source: CIA, Section: Economy

**Figure 28**

ALGERIA'S TOP EXPORT PARTNERS, 2016

Source: CIA, Section: Economy
TRADE: IMPORTS

According to the CIA, France’s 2017 imports were estimated at $576.3 billion (+$39.6 million from 2016). Figure 29 below shows France’s top import partners based on 2016 data. According to the International Trade Centre, France’s product imports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2016 were valued at $560,554,863. France’s service imports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2016 were valued at $235,679,261.

Figure 29

Source: CIA, Section: Economy

According to the CIA, Algeria’s 2017 imports were estimated at $49.99 billion (+$0.56 million from 2016). Figure 30 below shows Algeria’s top import partners based on 2016 data. According to the International Trade Centre, Algeria’s product imports
(stated in U.S. dollars) in 2015 were valued at $51,803,071. According to the International Trade Centre, Algeria’s service imports (stated in U.S. dollars) in 2015 were valued at $11,076,761.

**Figure 30**

![ALGERIA'S TOP IMPORT PARTNERS, 2016](chart)

Source: CIA, Section: Economy

**FOREIGN INVESTMENT**

Though export and import partnerships in France and Algeria indicate which economic relations are helping sustain their economies, analyzing foreign investment can also be an indication of not only the partnership between other countries but also the confidence in economic prosperity.

According to the World Bank Group (as cited from the IMF, Balance of Payments database, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), France’s 2017 foreign direct investment (FDI) was estimated at $35.4 billion, while Algeria’s was
estimated at $1.637 billion. The World Encyclopedia of the Nations notes some interesting incentives and limited caveats to investing in France. Top investors in France include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium, while on the other hand, France primarily invests in the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. Some investment incentives include the centrality and access that France has as a member of the European Union, meaning that they are subject to free movement of people, capital and goods.

Another advantage of France’s membership in the European Union is that it is obligated to accept investments from other European countries. France also has a highly skilled workforce with capabilities in technological advancements; more importantly, the French government has established straightforward investment regulations to attract external investors. However, one economic component that does negatively impact foreign investment attraction are there high tax rates on corporation (in 2010, the corporate tax rate in France was 33.3%) (Section 38).

While the Algerian FDI is not even 1% of Algeria’s GDP, according to the World Encyclopedia of the Nations, almost every sector of the Algeria’s economy is dependent on FDI, even its highly regulated hydrocarbon sector. Much of FDI has increased since the government forced foreign competition upon Sonatrach (an Algerian government-led organization that specializes in hydrocarbon exploration) (Section 38). Algeria’s abundance of natural resources has been a natural attraction for FDI in their exploitation of Algeria. I do not mean to say that all countries that invest in Algeria for purposes of its natural resources are exploiting Algeria’s resources. However, these types investments as
well as organization competing with Sonatrach are contributing to Algeria’s dependency on their hydrocarbon sector.

**INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

Although it is clear that France and Algeria have very differing economic environments, both economies are active participants in organizations that promote development through international cooperation. According to the World Encyclopedia of the Nations, France joined the United Nations in 1945 and has most notably, as a member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), supported international settlements regarding Iraq. France is a founding country of the European Union and has also been a member of the WTO (World Trade Organization) since 1995. According to the World Encyclopedia of the Nations, Algeria joined the United Nations shortly after its independence in 1962.

**CHAPTER 11 | OIL: THE CONFLICT AND COOPERATION**

As of 2018, the oil industry continues to have a volatile and uncertain economic future. As shown in Figure 31 below, one can see the volatility in the average annual oil prices of OPEC countries from 1990-2017 (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Gabon, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and the United Arab Emirates). These price fluctuations, not adjusted for inflation, exhibit a decline between 2008-2009,
presumably due to the global financial crisis, yet exhibit an increase from 2010-2012, interestingly correspondent to the same years as the Arab Spring. Although these oil prices reflect the sensitivity of the oil industry performance to global economic and political events, the impact is just as profound on countries whose national economies are highly dependent on oil rents and oil exports, such as countries like Algeria.

**Figure 31**

Despite a global history of oil crises and the rise of environmental ethics regarding the global consumption and production of oil, oil-dependent countries like Algeria face perils in economic diversification to evade the drastic impact of oil price fluctuations on their national economies. Moreover, Algeria’s colonial past has presented other economic hindrances for economic diversification, including anti-neocolonialist
economic and government policies. However, such hindering policies have begun to shift towards prioritizing economic diversification and attraction of foreign investment, in part due to cooperation efforts between France and Algeria. Although France and Algeria have begun to pursue cooperative projects, targeting both economic and foreign relation objectives, they have reflected the difficulty in ameliorating Algeria’s economic dependence on oil. Despite this, these cooperation efforts have begun to demonstrate how the ministers of these two countries are fostering a positive foreign relation between France and Algeria that illustrates a potential new beginning for not only French-Algerians but also for the global perception of North African globalization.

**CURRENT OIL INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT IN FRANCE AND ALGERIA**

Algeria, as previously mentioned, has the world’s 16th largest oil reserves. According to the EIA, Algeria’s hydrocarbon sector is responsible for 25% of Algeria’s GDP and over 95% of Algeria’s export revenue according to the International Monetary Fund (as cited by the EIA, 2016). Although Algerian oil fields produce crude oil with low sulfur content, the average prices of Algerian-produced crude oil have declined in tandem with the OPEC price averages, and its effect is reflected in Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves. As shown in Figure 32, the sharp decline in average oil prices from 2013-2016 was from $109.45 to $40.68 per barrel. Algerian petroleum export revenues averaged $77.60 per barrel in 2014 and declined to $52.79 in 2015, staying slightly above the OPEC average. However, the impact was apparent in Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves, which reached a high at the end of 2013 at $194 billion yet declined to $153 billion in 2015 (EIA, 2016). Despite these declines, Amine Mazouzi, the CEO of
Sonatrach, has confirmed that Algeria will continue to invest in oil exploration and production. In conjunction with the Ministry of Energy, Algeria’s goal is to promote this sector for international partnerships (International Trade Administration, 2016).

Knowing that France is among Algeria’s top export partners, how has this decline in the average price of crude oil impacted France’s current account? France’s consumption and investment in oil has continued to act as a politically-controversial component of its economy. According to Dupin (2017), although France only produces oil that meets 1% of its national demand, the demand for oil in France is declining, and France’s Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of the Ecology have indicated a conflict of interest regarding France’s investment in and consumption of oil. Francis Duseux, president of l’Union Française des Industries Pétrolières (French Union of Petroleum Industries), has noted the need for promoting and simplifying governmental frameworks that encompass the goals of the economy, industry, and energy, without causing the Ministry of Ecology to influence the Ministry of Energy to always act in favor of the environment.

The conflict is apparent in the number petroleum exploration and exploitation permit requests to the French Ministry of the Environment in light of prohibition of hydraulic fracturing. Of 160 pending permits, only 8 have been issued since 2012. Duseux recognizes that this is “une vraie prise de position politique et c’est une erreur”, meaning that the oil discussion is one wrongly defined by political position, specifically in the context of France’s economy. Duseux seeks to influence the way in which oil is recognized by these ministries, while reducing the national energy bill and ensuring adherence to environmental rules (Dupin, 2017). Despite the decline of France’s oil
imports, Duseux argues that the demand for petroleum is rising on a global scale, specifically in the context of automobile usage and dependence (Plumet, 2017). So although the rise of oil demand is untrue for France, as illustrated by France’s declining oil consumption in Figure 32 below, the global demand for oil suggests an increase in oil exports for Algeria’s other top export partners such as Italy, Spain, and the United States.

Figure 32

![Chart showing total oil consumption in France from 2006 to 2016](image)

Source: BP, 2017

However, the surplus of Algerian oil production and decline of global demand is not expected to affect Algeria in the long-term, according to its former Minister of Finance. As published in *Jeune Afrique*, the former Minister of Finance Abdellatif Benachenhou is confident that, by 2030, Algeria’s hydrocarbon production will approximately meet its domestic demand. This is further supported by the findings of
Abdelmadjid Attar, the former CEO of Sonatrach, who projects that domestic consumption will account for 85% of its hydrocarbon production. Benachenhou believes that this domestic demand, in reference to potential upcoming environmental policies that could impact export revenues, will eliminate Algeria’s dependence on these exports (Alilat, 2017). Moreover, given Algeria’s decline in foreign exchange reserves, this projection of increase in demand implies that the demand may be more of a threat for European countries that are dependent on Algerian oil.

**OIL AS A CULTURAL ELEMENT**

Just as described by the president of the UFIP, the discussion of oil has become one that is highly defined by political position and filled with controversy. Surely, for countries like Algeria, the topic about oil is imperative for its economic stability and its continued projects in achieving economic diversification. Similarly, the oil topic is necessary for France in the context of its ministries’ environmental objectives and how oil is impacting France’s economy. However, setting aside the current economic role of oil and its subjective dilemmas, the role of oil can be analyzed as a multi-faceted controversy for French-Algerian relations. As a natural resource that has served as a sector for Algeria’s economic and political structures to seek “common ground” after decolonization, Algerian oil has arguably been the most powerful factor in helping Algeria establish itself as an economic power in the Maghreb and triumph despite overwhelming economic dependence on France.

France has also historically shown a political response to Algerian oil, through its stricter control over Saharan oil reserves while still Algeria was still under colonial rule.
While France was able to exploit the resources by the technological advancement and skilled labor that the Algerians did not have, France attempted to capitalize on this oil, knowing that it could either become economic security for them or an incredible economic opportunity for independent Algeria (Muradova, 2016). The role of oil, in a societal context, is apparent in the power of national pride and association of postcolonial Algeria. However, as suggested by Hamza Hamouchene (2017), it is this dependence and this controversy that may “open up the cracks in the stagnant political model”.

Aside from the supplier power that Algeria’s oil reserves provides, Algeria has used it strategically to form international partnerships for the financial investment in exploration of its oil territories (International Trade Administration, 2016). Domestically, Hamouchene describes the Algerian political structure as having used their oil resources as a way to “purchase relative peace”. Opening up its most cherished resource to external markets is, of course, economically strategic. However, it also demonstrates that the Algerian government, which was constructed upon underlying neocolonialist fear, has recognized the utilization of oil for partnership beyond economics.

Beyond its economic contribution, oil has historically symbolized a source of growth and development and not just in the French-Algerian context. Darren Dochuk, Associate Professor at the University of Notre Dame, has studied the role of oil as a cultural force in the context of American dominance in the 20th century, a study that I found to be strikingly applicable to Algerian dominance in the Maghreb in the decolonization period. Dochuk, who seeks to understand the interdependence between religion and oil in historical and economic progress, has found that oil and the influence of religion have contributed to shaping a perceived power within this resource and the
challenges in finding alternative solutions amidst our current oil crisis (University of Notre Dame, 2016). Although his presentation and research on this topic is focused on economically powerful United States families of the 20th century involved with oil, Dochuk does mention the existence of this relation in Arab countries. Dochuk asks questions like, “how did they, countries like Saudi Arabia, attach a particular kind of religion to industry?” and, “how do they see oil as their own exceptionalism and as God’s blessing to them?” (as cited in Wallheimer, 2017).

This comparison of the influence of religion in the perception of economic and political power is one that exists within the Algerian oil case. Early Algeria was built upon religious influence and the Arabization of its culture long before its capitalization on oil and its reserves in the Sahara. Frankly, Algerian growth post-colonially was very much influenced by their Islamic ideals and Arab culture. Although France attempted to exploit this power, their loss has become Algeria’s gain, even in declining times for the industry. Oil, as a cultural element, was source that brought Algeria out of turmoil and gave them a sense of national accomplishment and power. However, these ties, the ties between oil, politics, and power, are ones that have shaped their societal and political dependence on natural resources and have hindered the support for Algerian economic diversification.

**FACTORS HINDERING ALGERIAN ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION**

The Algerian economy was not always greatly dependent on its oil exports, considering that most of the Berber population in early Algeria were farmers. During the Roman empire, many of Algeria’s neighboring Mediterranean countries actually
depended on Algerian agricultural products (Mohammed, et al., 2017, p. 26). According to the World Bank, in 1959, Algerian hydrocarbon exports accounted for 12% of total exports, while agriculture accounted for 61% (as cited by Mohammed, C. et al., p. 26). Moreover, most of the Algerian population, after the pied noirs returned to France, lived in rural areas and were highly skilled in agriculture. It was the years after independence, during which new economic and political institutions were being established, that created what Mohammed, Mohamed, and Abderrahim (2017) refer to as the “oil curse”. The transition of economic dependence from agriculture to oil is interesting – while they remain dependent on a natural resource, they face challenges in the sustainability of this structure. In this case, when I say “sustainability”, I am talking about the scarcity of this resource (non-renewable) and the sustainability of its economic success (price volatility).

Mohammed et al.’s study on oil rents (production value minus the cost of production) finds a correlation between oil rents and institutional quality using empirical evidence. They found that higher dependence on oil rents (and dependence on natural resources in general) leads to higher corruption in economic and political institutions (p. 7-8). A comparison between Algerian and French public-sector corruption complements and extends the results of this study. According to Transparency International (2018), the outcomes of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 indicate a strong correlation between corruption and inequality. Inequality includes unequal distribution of societal power and wealth. On a scale of 0 being “Highly Corrupt” and 100 being “Very Clean”, France ranked 70 and was the 23rd least corrupt out of 180 countries surveyed, while Algeria was ranked 34 and was the 112th least corrupt. Algeria’s corruption perception index was very similar in value to other Maghreb countries, while France’s corruption perception
index was somewhat median in comparison to other EU countries. The correlation between corruption and resource dependence is apparent in this comparison, since France is a country whose top exports include machinery and aircraft (and not a natural resource). However, the correlation between corruption and inequality complicates goals such as economic diversification.

With high inequality in power and wealth distribution, Algeria can expect policy changes geared towards economic diversification to be a very long-term process. Although they have begun to attract foreign investment and international oil companies (IOCs), the role of state control minimizes their diversification potential. According to Chris Stephen (2017), IOCs “remain wary, put off by political uncertainty, onerous investment conditions and the ever-present risk of terrorism”. One factor that he mentions that makes foreign investors less attracted to Algeria is that Algerian law requires that foreign investors must be partnered with Sonatrach and therefore must give up at least 51% of the contract value to Sonatrach. However, the IMF and the World Bank recommend economic liberalization as the solution to begin recognizing their strengths outside of oil (as cited by Stephen). Economic liberalization in Algeria, aside from opening up opportunities for economic development, could help reduce societal inequality, reduce institutional corruption, and improve foreign relations, specifically relations with France.

**FRENCH-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION**

Even without Algerian economic liberalization, the development of French-Algerian economic cooperation has already begun to show progress. The Comité mixte
économique franco-algérien (COMEFA), a France-Algeria bilateral economic committee, was established in 2013 to improve trade and commercial relations (Izouaouen, 2015). These committee meetings, occurring roughly every quarter, involve collaboration between the ministers of the economy for both countries.

France has also begun to invest in Algerian sectors other than oil and gas including transportation, automobiles, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals across 450 French companies (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, n.d.). France seeks to increase its investment in Algeria to support France’s automotive industry through production plants for Peugeot and Citroën (Réunion du COMEFA le 12 novembre à Alger, 2017). Aside from strict manufacturing and infrastructure investments, one of the agreements that I found to be most integrative was one related to immigration and employment of both French and Algerian graduates. Promoting international business, both countries have agreed to facilitate the access of French jobs for Algerian graduates and to facilitate the access of Algerian executive-level jobs for French graduates (Izouaouen).

According to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, the goals of French-Algerian economic cooperation have extended beyond tangible trade:

Notre relation a aujourd’hui pour objectif de contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité de notre environnement pour contrer les forces destructrices de l’extrémisme violent. Notre relation a également pour objectif d’apporter emploi et prospérité à nos deux pays et de développer un idéal de coopération dans le respect des identités
In other words, Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian describes COMEFA as seeking peace and security against violent extremism (possibly eluding to Muslim terrorist attacks). He also states that they are seeking to find an ideal cooperation which respects one another’s national identity and national sovereignty.

The progress of this committee from solely trade and investment-related agreements indicates a positive strategy for French-Algerian relations. By considering factors such as national identity and national sovereignty, French-Algerian cooperation may reach more sustainable solutions that are not only accepted by their respective government bodies and economic institutions but also by their citizens. Rather than making agreements solely for visible outcomes such as job creation and economic growth, seeking an internal common ground between French and Algerians can be the beginning development of cultural exchange and positive globalization outcomes for France and Algeria.

**OTHER COOPERATION INDICATORS**

Organized committees such as COMEFA aren’t the only indicators of French-Algerian cooperation. Both French and Algerian government institutions have begun to promote French-Algerian cooperation themselves and are proposing legislative changes to improve cooperation opportunities.
Algeria has recognized that it is not only the environmental instability of its institutions that make relations with other countries difficult to achieve but also the framework and laws of its institutions. The Algerian government recognizes the perceived threat of doing business in Algeria. To ameliorate this sentiment, Algeria has invested in higher security presence at its oil and gas centers, ensuring a safer environment for international investors (EY, 2015). Algeria’s ranking has improved on the World Bank’s list of “Ease of Doing Business”, rising from 163rd to 156th most difficult out of 190 countries from 2015 to 2016 (as cited by Stephen). Noureddine Boutarfa, Algerian politician and the Minister of Energy has emphasized dialogue with E.U., recognizing that they must compromise with European countries in modifying Algerian tax laws and energy policies for better partnerships (Chikhi, 2017).

Today, French-Algerian relations continue to be a sensitive and controversial topic in France. The Algerian war of independence is one that has been considered “France’s undeclared war” by many historians. While French presidents since De Gaulle have generally acknowledged the relation with Algeria but have not taken the initiative to jumpstart integrative changes, current French President Emmanuel Macron has a different view for the future of French-Algerian relations, specifically targeting the youth. In a 2017 interview during his presidential campaign, Macron acknowledged that French colonization in Algeria was “un crime contre l’humanité” (in other words, a crime against humanity (LePoint, 2017). Macron urges the Algerian youth to not blame the colonial past for its current political, economic, and legal instability, rather to seek proactive opportunities for job creation (Chikhi et al., 2017). In response to the high Algerian demand for French visas, Macron has responded: “un visa, ce n’est pas un projet de vie”.
In other words, a visa is not a life project. It is clear that President Macron seeks a sustainable development of moving forward with a French-Algerian generation who might be able to coexist in the long-run.

CHAPTER 12 | COOPERATION THROUGH GLOBALIZATION

Biculturalism in the context of economic growth and development leads me to my final observations of French-Algerian integration within another controversial scope: globalization. Some economists and business owners argue that globalization leads to many positive outcomes for the global economy including growth for developing countries through increased investment and cost-savings for developed countries through outsourcing. However, there is also a strong argument against globalization. Globalization is viewed as an overarching threat to job security, a threat to GDP growth, and in the French-Algerian case, a threat to national identity. Globalization has been described as “The French Challenge” by Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier. According to The Economist, “French politicians have been queuing up to support the right to cultural protectionism” (as cited by Gordon, P. et al., 2001, p. 42). However, I will argue that societal and economic integration through globalization are currently improving rather than threatening French-Algerian relations.
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

As discussed in earlier chapters, French-Algerian economic cooperation has contributed to the Algerian priority of economic diversification and to the “French challenge” of globalization. Through the establishment of COMEFA and the COMEFA agreements, France is achieving higher transparency in their contribution to Algerian immigration and employment needs while acting in their own interest. Although France and Algeria have opposing priorities regarding oil, France’s continued investment in Algeria could help decrease Algeria’s economic dependence on France in the long-term.

Economic cooperation between Algeria and France is no easy task, considering France’s policy priorities as a member of the E.U. However, implementing negative integration, to a certain extent, could be a feasible alternative. Negative integration is the removal of barriers, and it is what E.U. members practice for higher integration. Implementing positive integration (which is creating and modifying integrative policy) poses the risk of threatening respective national identities, which could return inefficient results for the sake of long-term cooperation. Implementation of negative integration could boost Algeria’s ease of doing business and attraction for foreign investment. In the long term, these changes could alleviate France’s need for investment in Algeria and even decrease the Islamophobic tendencies by serving as a model of societal cooperation through economic partnership.

SOCIETAL GLOBALIZATION

Societal globalization is almost inevitable with economic cooperation. While respecting national identity and national sovereignty, French-Algerian cooperation can
result in long-term societal cooperation. Such exchanges can promote the long-term development of industries for Algeria other than the oil industry, exposing both countries to differing economic environments and potential workforce advantages.

One particular integrative opportunity within societal globalization that I find important for France is the use of Arabic. Pursuing greater cultural exchange in France, such as the promotion of Arabic as a globally learned language rather than culturally associated language, could be a competitive skill for younger French workforce generations. This could be especially advantageous in conjunction with the COMEFA agreement in which Algerian graduates will have easier access to jobs in France and vice versa. With a French president who is starting conversations on how to move forward from a dehumanizing history, the execution of COMEFA agreements can begin to foster a new generation with French-Algerian cooperation.

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

My goal with this research was to add to the scholarly discourse regarding historical, societal, and economic influences of French-Algerian relations, in the hopes of highlighting the potential for bilateral economic opportunities. European colonization, employment, immigrant national identity, language, religion, oil, and globalization – all seemingly unrelated factors – are interconnected in a way that further complicates the conversation of the future of French-Algerian relations.
With each factor that I analyzed, I identified others that expanded my awareness of the extreme complexities of postcolonial cooperation. It also became difficult to draw conclusions knowing that all available survey data is neither fully inclusive nor fully representative of the facts and sentiments of entire populations. The achievement of bilaterally positive outcomes in the French-Algerian situation is one that does not have a simple, prescriptive solution. Improving Algerian economic diversification is not as simple as convincing other nations to invest in Algeria, and improving the French employment rate is not as simple as creating employment opportunities outside of France.

An important viewpoint to consider is that the complexity of this relation is not unique to France and Algeria. Postcolonial international relations also continue to impact international economic development in nations across Europe, Africa, and Asia. For example, despite the Dutch occupation of Indonesia, current relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands are improving economically and politically, and even in education and in science (Puja, 2017). However, other postcolonial relations between European and African countries, such as the relations between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seek ways to decrease bilateral cooperation (Agence France Presse, 2018). Moreover, other oil-dependent countries are also experiencing the economic consequences of declining oil prices like Algeria. While some are Middle Eastern countries including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, other countries include Venezuela and Russia.

In the French-Algerian case, although colonialism in Algeria was enacted long ago, tensions continue to develop and manifest themselves in other forms. This leads to me more questions regarding the future of French-Algerian cultural and economic integration goals: (1) Will the fear of neo-colonialism interfere with either France’s or
Algeria’s potential to realize a mutually co-constructed economic future? (2) With an aging generation of pieds-noirs, are future generations of French youth likely to be less discriminatory towards Algerians? (3) Would the promotion of teaching Arabic in France reduce islamophobic tendencies in France? (4) If opportunities arise for the young French workforce to find viable careers in Algeria, will they do so? Will they stay when the French economy improves? Whether they stay or not, will the Algerian economy have benefitted from it? (5) Will the synergies that arise from enhancing the partnership between France and Algeria provide business prospects for Algerians in France or elsewhere in Europe?

I conclude with noting that there is value in questioning controversial topics – including immigration policy, religion, and oil – within the context of globalization. I also endorse that using a multidisciplinary approach to question controversy is imperative for obtaining sustainable and valuable conclusions. As Dr. Michael Salovesh (1971) concludes his doctoral dissertation, the question of how well my analysis has fulfilled its goal is one that I leave to the reader.
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