

12-2017

Policy Implications: An Analysis of Intercountry Adoption in Relation to Nationalism

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Honors Thesis

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Abstract

This research seeks to answer the question: Does level of nationalist sentiment expressed within a country affect the restrictiveness of the country's intercountry adoption policy? Current literature has examined the influence of the level of nationalism expressed in a country on adoptive parents in choosing from which country to adopt; however, no study has examined the link between nationalism and country-specific intercountry adoption policy. The variable of nationalist sentiment warrants study, for the Hague Convention posits that intercountry adoption is a valid option only if "a suitable family cannot be found in his or her [the adoptable child's] State of origin" in order to preserve the child's nationality of birth (Varnis, 2001: 42). This statement implies that domestic adoption is considered to be in the better interest of the child versus intercountry adoption. In addition to the fact that "nationalists might subscribe to the view that children 'belong' to their countries of birth and are better off growing up there (Leblang et al, 2015)," countries may be reluctant to act as sending countries in intercountry adoption because adopting out their children indicates an inability of the country to care for its children and thus "injures its national pride (Varnis, 2001)." Although current literature somewhat addresses nationalist sentiment in terms of its effect on intercountry adoption, no study has empirically examined the potential link between nationalist sentiment and actual adoption policy restrictiveness, as my project proposes to do. Given the current fragility of the practice of intercountry adoption as a whole, its recent politicization, and the rise of populist/nationalistic leaders around the world, this research is especially relevant.



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INTRODUCTION

Functioning as a social and legal means of forming a family as a subset of adoption, intercountry, or international adoption refers to the process of familial formation by which a child is adopted by a family residing in a country other than that of the child's country, thereby removing the child from his or her country of birth (Groza & McCreery Bunkers, 2014). Whereas intercountry adoption has been practiced as an institution for centuries, insufficient empirical data regarding intercountry adoption flows as well as the influencing factors for intercountry adoption from the point of view of adoptive parents and manifest in the adoption policies of states has been gathered (Selman, 2010). Because intercountry adoption "now involves the transfer of more than 30,000 children each year from over 50 countries, (Masson, 2001: 142)" such study is exceptionally necessary. In addition to my fascination with the sheer need for additional research into intercountry adoption, the sociological and political aspects of adoption fascinate me. While I passionately appreciate the goal of intercountry adoption to provide a family for a child in need of a permanent, loving home, I recognize the sensitivity of the practice in terms of the cultural divorce that often occurs in the migration of the child from his or her country of origin to the country of adoption. Aligning with my concern, the Convention on the Rights of the Child does not render foreign adoption an option that the state is required to provide but rather requires the provision of foster placement, domestic adoption, or institutionalization in order to preserve birth nationality (Varnis, 2001). Therefore, in order to attempt to reconcile that which is in the best interest of the adoptable child with the institution of intercountry adoption, I will be researching intercountry adoption policy (The United Nations, 1948). Specifically, my research will

examine whether or not a correlation exists between level of governmental nationalism within a country and its international adoption policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Promulgated in 1993, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption formally recognized the value of intercountry adoption in providing a family for children and “provided a framework for cooperation between sending and receiving countries to ensure that intercountry adoption was only carried out in the best interest of the child (Selman, 2010: 6).” Much of the current literature regarding intercountry adoption references the Hague Convention and analyzes whether its implementation has affected the number of intercountry adoptions as well as the level of restrictiveness manifest in sending countries’ adoption policies.

Currently, little empirical research regarding adoption policy exists; however, two empirical studies examining the Hague Convention have been conducted in recent years. In an empirical study of adoption policy restrictiveness among Sub-Saharan African countries, data analysis indicated that Hague signatory countries are more likely to have less restrictive adoption policy than non-Hague signatory countries (Breuning & Kousser, 2009). However, in a later empirical study of over one hundred sending countries, the data demonstrated that openness to intercountry adoption is not explained by accession to the Hague Convention to a degree of statistical significance (Breuning, 2012). Therefore, while empirical data indicates a marginal correlation between the Hague Convention and the restrictiveness of adoption policy, these findings suggest the Hague Convention may not actually be as effective as intended in terms of keeping intercountry adoption processes transparent.

However, when combined with data analyzing the motives of adoptive parents as well as the expectations of birth parents, the effects of The Hague Convention and level of restrictiveness of adoption policy can be analyzed differently. Although not empirically confirmed, one article theorized that implementation of The Hague Convention in the United States, while adding necessary regulation to the intercountry adoption process, would most likely deter families from adopting due to the additional and potentially frustrating required steps (Bailey, 2009). Similarly, one study found that prospective adoptive parents are more likely to adopt from countries “with a high bureaucratic-regulatory quality, all else equal (Leblang et al., 2015)” than from those lacking a high bureaucratic-regulatory quality. Such a quality aligns with the measures of adoption policy restrictiveness utilized by Breuning and Kousser (2009); however, since Leblang et al. (2015) theorizes that because adoptions from Hague signatory countries are more costly than adoptions from non-Hague signatory countries, the study hypothesizes that adoptive parents are more likely to adopt from non-Hague signatory countries as confirmed via analysis of international adoption flows of “19 receiving countries and up to 209 sending countries/entities, over the period from 1991-2010 (Leblang et al., 2015: 618).” Although not empirically confirmed, one study also recognizes that high adoption costs as a result of the Hague Convention and competition among adoption agencies will result in decreased standards for adoption practices and thereby harm rather than help children (Masson, 2001). Thus, the efficacy of the Hague Convention warrants further study, for if adoptive parents are seeking to avoid adopting from Hague signatory countries, the goal of the Hague Convention to protect the best interest of the child may be undermined. Also, largely due to ethical concerns, minimal evidence as to the effects

of The Hague Convention and the adoption process on adopted children themselves exists, as current literature merely describes a single case of re-adoption due to discrepancies in Hague regulation between countries (Gibbs, 2011), and reports on the attitudes of two small groups of children who were either domestically or internationally adopted (Hawkins et al., 2007) thereby necessitating further research regarding the Hague Convention's efficacy in protecting the rights of children.

Additionally, several studies of adoptive parents indicate that their motivations for adopting and their personal preferences regarding adopting a child influence the number and types of adoptions, both domestically and internationally, which demonstrates that adoptive parent motivation as well as level of restrictiveness of a sending country's adoption policy while under the regulations of the Hague Convention determine the number of children adopted each year (Breuning, 2013; Groza & McCreery Bunkers, 2014; Ishizawa & Kubo, 2014; Leblang et al, 2015). For instance, empirical studies have shown that in choosing between domestic and international adoption as well as in choosing a sending country if pursuing intercountry adoption, adoptive parents will seek the option that allows for greater likelihood of adopting an infant and the option that allows for the shortest amount of time to complete the adoption process (Ishizawa & Kubo, 2014; Leblang et al, 2015). The former desire translates into the conclusion that "countries that send larger numbers of children do tend to send proportionally more very young children," (Breuning, 2013: 429), which further suggests that the motives of adoptive parents are one of the biggest factors influencing the number of children adopted out.

While the aforementioned school of thought posits adoptive parents' motivations as central to explaining levels of intercountry adoption by sending country, other studies have examined adoption flows from the perspective of birth parent preferences as well as the way in which nationalist sentiment influences adoption policy (Groza & McCreery Bunkers, 2014; Leblang et al., 2015; Roby & Matsumura, 2002; Roby & Ife, 2009). For instance, in an interview study of birth mothers from the Marshall Islands whose children were adopted by American parents, over 80% of birth mothers interviewed stated that at the time of relinquishment, they believed that their child would be returned to them after reaching adulthood, which demonstrates differences in cultural expectations surrounding adoption between those of the Marshall Islands and the United States (Roby & Matsumura, 2002). The authors of the research lament the fact that The Hague Convention has not sought to mitigate such a disparity in expectation. Further criticizing The Hague Convention, one study theorizes that the Hague Convention hinders the autonomy of birth parents as it stipulates that the state, in tandem with professionals, makes the decision on where to place children, thereby negating birth parents' rights (Groza & McCreery Bunkers, 2014).

Tied to birth parents' rights is the variable of nationalism in terms of the way in which nationalist sentiment affects intercountry adoption. Tenuously making the connection between intercountry adoption and nationalism, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found that countries with higher levels of nationalism were less open to international trade. However, Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) found in their study of nationalism and international trade that nationalist sentiment may not actually play a role in openness to

international trade. The discrepancy in the research thus warrant further study of nationalism's affect on a unique subset of international trade--intercountry adoption.

Furthermore, nationalism has been subject to empirical studies indicating that countries with higher nationalist sentiment are less likely to act as receiving countries than countries with lower nationalist sentiment in terms of comparing the effect of transaction cost determinants of adoption on prospective adoptive parents (Leblang, et al., 2015). Additionally, in terms of the United States as a sending country, research suggests that United States nationalist sentiment causes the United States to be the number one receiving country although this has not been sufficiently studied (Roby & Ife, 2009). The lack of empirical research on nationalist sentiment in relation to the level of restrictiveness of intercountry adoption policy necessitate investigation of the variables in relation to each other.

Overall, the majority of research on intercountry adoption has examined the Hague Convention. Some scholars have concluded that the Hague Convention may not actually be as effective as intended in terms of protecting the rights of the child. For instance, adoptive parents are more inclined to adopt from non-Hague signatories to lessen the cost of intercountry adoption (Leblang et al., 2015). Also, the little research into the effect of the Hague Convention on birth parents demonstrates that the Convention does not necessarily seek to uphold birth parents' rights. Lastly, variables such as nationalist sentiment expressed, globalization, and colonial ties have been examined primarily only in relation to adoptive parent preference. Therefore, variables affecting adoption policy as well as the manifest and latent effects of the Hague Convention warrant further study.

RESEARCH DESIGN

My hypothesis is as follows: In comparing sending countries in intercountry adoption, countries expressing higher nationalist sentiment will be more likely to have more restrictive adoption policies than countries expressing lower nationalist sentiment. Thus, my experiment entails analyzing nationalist sentiment in terms of the restrictiveness of intercountry adoption policy. Given the tangential knowledge of the effect of increased nationalist sentiment on adoption flows, doing so will most likely prove a link between increased nationalist sentiment and increased adoption policy restrictiveness. Because much of intercountry adoption research is qualitative, my research will be quantitative in order to lessen the gap in empirical adoption research that currently exists as well as because the nature of my variables lend themselves better to a quantitative design.

The logic behind the hypothesis largely stems from the Leblang et al. (2015) study, which demonstrated that adoptive parents are less likely to adopt from countries expressing higher levels of nationalist sentiment. The researchers determined this not by surveying adoptive parents, but by looking at the number of intercountry adoptions from about twenty sending countries in relation to the nationalism of the executive branch. Therefore, this phenomenon may be a result of policy restrictiveness making adoptions from countries with higher nationalist sentiment harder to broker and thereby explaining lower adoption flows from more nationalistic countries. Leblang et al. (2015) also mentioned that some cultures view children as belonging to their country of birth—a nationalistic view that would reasonably translate into greater restrictiveness in intercountry adoption policy as such a view would logically lessen countries' likelihood

to act as sending countries in intercountry adoption. Additionally, other scholars have suggested that political regimes more so than citizens feel that adopting out children to foreign countries indicates the sending country's inability to care for its citizens (Varnis, 2001). Considering the policy making function of government, such a governmental nationalistic attitude would most likely be expressed in policy and thus support my hypothesis.

METHODOLOGY

Operationalizing nationalism, the independent variable, requires a multifaceted, holistic approach, as currently, no universally accepted definition of nationalism exists. However, conceptualizations of nationalism in the current literature all connect nationalism to an attitude of national superiority and desire to protect the interests of one's nation. For instance, Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) define nationalism as "an ideology where the members of a nation, or nation-state, are held to have a duty to be loyal to the nation and where the primacy of the welfare of the nation is emphasized," (432), while Smith and Kim (2004) define it as "a strong national devotion that places one's own country above all others," (128). The language of these two definitions demonstrates that the wellbeing of the nation is of prime importance in nationalistic states. The vernacular often equates nationalism and patriotism; however, according to Smith and Jarkko (1998), "feeling national pride is not equivalent to being nationalistic," (1). Although both stem from national pride, nationalism encompasses patriotism, which is "love of one's country or dedicated allegiance to same," (Smith & Kim, 2004: 127). Further reiterating that nationalism and patriotism are distinct concepts, Davidov (2009)

found that nationalism and constructive patriotism “should be modeled separately” as they “display different relations with other substantive variables,” (79).

A comparison of North Korea, a highly nationalistic state, and the United States, a highly patriotic state, makes apparent the contrast between the concepts of nationalism and patriotism. While Americans rank number one out of the thirty three countries included in the International Social Survey Programme (2003-2004) in terms of national pride, the country can be classified as highly patriotic rather than highly nationalistic due to the absence of the hallmarks of nationalism at the foundational/governmental level. For instance, the United States’ Constitution guarantees civil liberties essential to a free society including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. These freedoms arguably comprise the core of American society to the extent that the government does not have the capability to lead its citizens to believe false claims in an attempt to foster love of the regime. Contrastingly, the citizens of North Korea, without these civil liberties, are led to believe anything that the government tells them due to the regime’s complete control of the media as well as by its restrictive international travel ban and severe Internet restrictions. Therefore, in an attempt to control the citizenry and promote the North Korean state, the government has restricted civil liberties to the point of completely disillusioning its people. In its aforementioned practices, North Korea proves to be highly nationalistic, as it ascribes to its key tenet of “placing one’s own country above all others” although this necessitates the absence of civil liberties and strict governmental control of information. As the comparison of North Korea and the United States demonstrates, operationalizing nationalism for the purposes of this research requires firmly distinguishing it from patriotism while navigating through the fact that popular

conceptualizations of nationalism and patriotism may vary across cultures as asserted by Davidov (2009). In order to combat varied interpretation regarding the definition of nationalism, this study will operationalize nationalism by examining the trait at the governmental level rather than among the citizenry via survey data.

Moreover, the current literature indicates that government perpetuated nationalism is likely to have a greater effect on international adoption than does citizen expressed nationalism. Recognizing that sending countries in intercountry adoption injure their national pride by adopting out their children, Leblang et al., (2015) highlighted the important fact that “politicians in sending countries often criticize the practice of international adoption, as they seek to stir nationalist emotions and gain popularity,” (619). Thus, the study measured nationalism via data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI) which measures the level of nationalism exhibited by a state’s chief executive. Expanding upon this operationalization of nationalism, this study will not only use this same measure but also examine other state level factors associated with nationalism to produce a final judgement on the level of government-perpetuated nationalism in each country. For instance, because Davidov (2009) found nationalism “to be associated with authoritarianism,” each country in the sample will be deemed either authoritarian or democratic as measured by Polity IV data.

Additionally, the presence of state-sponsored media within each country, as measured by Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 World Press Freedom Index, is used as a measure of nationalism since state-sponsored media is a key mechanism by which nationalistic governments foster nationalism among the citizenry. With only limited or, in some cases, completely restricted access to outside information not biased towards their

country's government, citizens of that country are more likely prone to favor the current regime. This is evident in the case of North Korea, as the current regime utilizes the absence of freedom of the press to manipulate its population in its favor. As a result, the North Korean citizenry holds the regime in high esteem, albeit forced, uninformed esteem, which demonstrates the state's power to bias citizens' perceptions in favor of the regime and thereby foster nationalism.

Furthermore, I will operationalize nationalism using data from Freedom House's 2015 Freedom in the World Index which evaluates the state of political and civil rights by country. In terms of the separate categories of political rights and civil rights, the Index rates each country on a one to seven scale, with one being the most free and seven being the least free. The scores of the two categories are then averaged to produce an overall freedom score. Key to evaluating civil liberties is a country's allowance of freedom of expression, religion, assembly, speech, and education. Countries with the best score in the civil liberty category guarantee these freedoms. Because these freedoms are associated with the free exchange of ideas and personal autonomy, they guarantee that individuals are freely able to criticize their governments without fear of punishment, a civil liberty which is more likely to be absent in a nationalistic regime working to ensure that citizens respect, honor, and love the regime. The absence of or diminished expression of freedom of religion also serves as a measure of nationalism as a state-mandated religion or a regime's strong preference towards a certain faith serves to homogenize the citizenry and eliminate any threat to a nation's strength as a unified group that could result from religious differences.

Key to evaluating political rights is a country's commitment to free and fair elections with competition among political parties and an absence of corruption. Countries exhibiting these principles earn the best score in the political rights category. Lower-scored countries exhibit varying degrees of election corruption. Scoring poorly in the political rights category can speak to a regime's level of nationalism since standing political leaders of nationalistic countries are likely to prohibit or undermine candidates or political parties that threaten the status quo and threaten the citizen's devotion to the most nationalistic party. Since factors other than nationalism can motivate election corruption, this category is admittedly the weakest measure of nationalism in the data set. However, because of the importance of competitive, free and fair elections and their significance in ensuring that the voices of the citizenry rather than just those of the regime are heard renders it relevant in this study's operationalization of nationalism which emphasizes regime-perpetuated rather than citizen-expressed nationalism.

Aside from explicitly governmental indicators of nationalism, citizen survey data from the International Social Survey Program's National Identity Model 2013 as well as the World Values Survey, when available¹, is included in the holistic measure of nationalism. Specifically, my research evaluated responses to this question from the ISSP: "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think it is to have been born in [COUNTRY]." Respondents could answer with either very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all. This question measures nationalism because it seeks to uncover ethnocentric preferences within the citizenry as

¹ Countries included in analysis for which ISSP National Identity Model 2013 data is available: Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, México, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Spain


well as to measure inclusivity in the society of other nationalities. In a more nationalistic country, therefore, the citizenry will be more inclined to respond “very important” to this question. From the World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014², the holistic measure of nationalism includes a 1/0 nationalism determination based on the following question: “How much do you trust people of another nationality?” Possible responses to the question included trust completely, trust somewhat, do not trust very much, and do not trust at all. If a country had over 50% of responders combined responding with one of the do not trust categories, then that country received a 1 to equate to nationalistic. This rationale behind this coding relates back to one of the aforementioned key tenets of nationalism, viewing one’s country as superior to all others. If respondents do not trust those of other nationalities, then they are expressing nationalistic feelings of superiority.

Lastly, the holistic measure of nationalism includes economic indicators of nationalism: intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership, number of import partners, and number of import products. Firstly, using data from the CIA World Factbook, the number of IGOs that a country is a member of serves as an indicator of nationalism, with the fewer the IGOs a country is involved with, the more nationalistic. The rationale behind this logic stems from nationalistic country’s motivation to isolate themselves from global society due to perceived feelings of superiority and an unfavorable attitude towards foreign involvement in their countries. Thus, with the fewest number of IGOs any of the countries analyzed in this research are members of being 30, countries that are members of 30-45 IGOs were coded as most nationalistic. Countries

² Countries included in analysis for which World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 data is available: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Guinea, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, México, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

that are members of 46-65 IGOs were coded as moderately nationalistic, and those countries that are members of 66 or more IGOs were coded as least nationalistic.

Next, a country's number of import partners and import products serve as nationalism indicators in the holistic nationalism measure under the assumption that the fewer import partners and the fewer imported products brought into a country, the more nationalistic that country. For instance, throughout the mid-1900s, Latin American countries operated under the policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in order to assert their economic independence from Western nations whom they felt taken advantaged by and instead focused on internal development. Although the majority of these nations were forced to expand their economy and conform to the policies of neoliberalism due to having accrued large national debt, the policies of ISI demonstrate nationalistic, domestically-focused economic policies. Thus, in some cases, a country



may limit its import partners/products in order to be independent and less globalized, which can correlate to nationalistic sentiment³.

³ Number of import partners and a country's corresponding nationalism classification:

24-120= most nationalistic

121-169 = moderately nationalistic

170- 229 = least nationalistic

Number of import partners and a country's corresponding nationalism classification.

< 2,000 products: most nationalistic

2,001-4000 products: moderate

4001+: least nationalistic

For each economic indicator, Freedom in the World score, World Press Freedom Index score, and Polity IV score, specific scores corresponded to low, moderate, and high levels of nationalism. Combined with EXECNAT data, ISSP and World Values Survey Data, a final nationalism judgement for each country was determined, with the possibilities being least, moderate, or most nationalistic. The distribution of the scores is reflected in Graph 1.1.

In order to measure my dependent variable, level of adoption policy restrictiveness, among nearly one-hundred sending countries, I have developed a restrictiveness matrix with a maximum possible restrictiveness score of eighteen. This score was derived from nine categorical components affecting the restrictiveness of a state's intercountry adoption policy. This model expands upon that of Breuning & Kousser (2009), a study which categorized restrictiveness as whether or not existed in each sending country "an official residency requirement for prospective adoptive parents...and whether or not international adoption agencies or organizations were allowed to operate within the country, (Breuning & Kousser, 2009: 93)." The first component, residency requirements, can be significant barriers to foreign prospective adoptive parents and thus necessitate inclusion into a policy restrictiveness score. A residency requirement refers to a country mandating that prospective adoptive parents (PAPs) reside in the country from which they desire to adopt for a given period of time, ranging from weeks to years, and culminating with requiring that PAPs be legal citizens of the desired sending country. To reflect the variations in residency requirements, the residency requirement category is measured on a scale from 0 to 7, with the individual scores equating to the following residency parameters:

Score	Requirement
0	None
1	PAPs must travel to the country at the beginning and/or end of the adoption process.
2	PAPs must reside in country for less than one month.
3	PAPs must reside in country for one to three months.
4	PAPs must reside in country for three to six months.
5	PAPs must reside in country for six to eighteen months.
6	PAPs must reside in country for eighteen months or more.
7	PAPs must be a citizen of the sending country.

Next, whether or not a country allows foreign adoption agencies to operate in country warrants inclusion into the restrictiveness matrix because a country prohibiting adoption agencies to operate constitutes a barrier to PAPs who desire a streamlined, easy to navigate process as well as demonstrates a country's aversion to intercountry adoption in general (Leblang et al., 2015). This component was measured using a simple 1/0 measure, with countries that do not allow adoption agencies to operate in country receiving a 1 and countries that permit and accredit foreign adoption agencies to operate receiving a 0.

One of the seven additional restrictiveness measures is post-adoption reporting requirements. Like residency requirements, countries' post-adoption reporting requirements vary and thus necessitate the following scale for scoring:

Score	Requirement
0	The country does not require post-adoption reporting.
1	Only a few required reports for a period a few years post adoption. ⁴
2	Annual reports required.
3	Reports multiple times a year for a certain number of years post adoption followed by annual reports.
4	Annual reports or multiple reports a year plus periodic visits from adoption authorities in receiving country.
5	Child must return to birth country for a visit upon sending country's legal request. ⁵

According to the US Department of State, “Post-adoption reports provide assurance to the authorities of the child’s country of origin that children who are placed with permanent families in the United States are receiving appropriate care and protection,” (Post Adoption Reporting Overview). By requiring adoptive families to report on the well-being of their adoptive children, sending states seek to maintain some of the control over the adopted children that they allowed to be relinquished to foreigners. Because the reports are means of maintaining control and power and because they constitute an extra requirement for adoptive parents, post-adoption reporting requirements affect the restrictiveness level of a country’s intercountry adoption policy and thus necessitates inclusion into the restrictiveness matrix.

⁴ Belize and the Philippines each receive a score of 1.5 for unique requirements.

⁵ Only Pakistan has this requirement and receives this score.

The remaining six categories used to operationalize policy restrictiveness are religion, income, child, sexual orientation, and marriage requirements, and an “other” category. All of these are scored on a 1/0, all or nothing scale. Religion requirements refer to whether or not a country requires that PAPs be of a certain religion or of the same religion as the child they adopt. This requirement constitutes restrictiveness because it serves as a means of controlling who can adopt. Most Muslim countries, for instance, require that PAPs also practice Islam, in an effort to preserve the cultural and religious identity of the child and to ensure that he/she is raised according to the sending country’s religious values. Next, income requirements refer to whether or not a country designates a specific amount that PAPs must earn annually in order to adopt. This constitutes restrictiveness because it serves as a means of excluding PAPs that do not meet the sending country’s economic standards and the quality of life that is associated with them.

Next follow marriage, child, and sexual orientation restrictions. Many countries have a marriage requirement by which single persons cannot adopt or can only adopt older or special needs children. Countries that require PAPs to adopt as married couples receive a 1 towards their restrictiveness total because this requirement is a means by which sending countries have codified their cultural preference for a nuclear family and thus exclude/restrict single persons from adopting. Sexual orientation is not a question in countries that allow single individuals to adopt. However, sexual orientation restrictions largely pertain to those countries stipulating that only married couples can adopt by extending the restriction further to permit only heterosexual married couples to adopt. Thus, sexual orientation restrictions further serve to preserve sending countries’ cultural values and project those values onto foreign PAPs as a means of retaining cultural

autonomy despite relinquishing children via intercountry adoption. Next, some countries place restrictions on the nature of the families of PAPs, mostly regulating how many biological children a couple can have. A country received a 1 in this category if it specifies a limit on the number of children PAPs already have, if PAPs are prohibited from having biological children and/or other adopted children, if the country prohibits adoption based on the gender of PAPs pre-existing children, or if the country requires proof of sterility. All of these potential restrictions are included in this research's restrictiveness matrix because they could constitute barriers to many PAPs and again serves as a way for sending countries to engineer the "perfect" adoptive family according to their cultural standards/preferences. Finally, the "Other" category accounts for those unique restrictions not explicitly covered. For example, if a country requires that its children eligible for adoption can only be adopted by family members, or if a country stipulates that its children can only be adopted by foreign citizens as is the case in Haiti, the country received a 1 added to its restrictiveness total.


The scores of the aforementioned restrictiveness components: residency, operation of foreign adoption agencies, post-adoption reporting, religion, income, marriage, children, sexual orientation, and other were calculated for each country and added together for a maximum of eighteen points, with a score of eighteen equating to maximum intercountry adoption policy restrictiveness. In terms of the states analyzed, I utilized the list of over one-hundred sending countries studied by Breuning (2012), for it is the most comprehensive, global sample of sending countries for which adoption policy exists and can be measured. Thus, the countries analyzed by Breuning (2012) offer the most clear/available picture of sending countries involved in intercountry adoption. For

instance, her data does not include certain small states, most Arab states, and unstable or failed states, as they do not have adoption policy to be analyzed (Breuning, 2012). Of the analyzed sending countries, no country reached the maximum score on the restrictiveness matrix. Indonesia received the highest score with fifteen. However, those six countries that have banned intercountry adoption with no plans to reinstate the practice, automatically received a score of eighteen to reflect their complete prohibition of the practice. Those countries that have suspended intercountry adoption as they update their policies and/or ratify the Hague Convention were excluded from analysis. As used Breuning & Kousser (2009) and Breuning (2012), the source of the majority of restrictiveness data in this study was the US Department of State, the United States' central authority for intercountry adoption in accordance with Hague Convention regulations. If the US State Department did not have all of the necessary data, I supplemented it using intercountry adoption data from the French State Department as well as from the adoption authorities of the individual countries themselves.

In addition to the independent and dependent variables studied, the control variables of GDP (\$), poverty rate, rate of natural increase, and birth control use were accounted for in the research design in order to conduct the comparison of levels of nationalist sentiment and level of adoption policy restrictiveness in the most conclusive manner possible. According to the World Bank, the data source for GDP, "GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products." Thus, it is a measure of a country's wealth and economic success. Controlling for a country's wealth is necessary in this research because a country that can afford to

care for its children is unlikely to adopt many of them out internationally and thus is likely to have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies. Poverty rate also has the power to similarly affects a country's intercountry adoption policy independent of nationalism. If more of a country's citizens live in poverty, that country is presumably more likely to be less restrictive in its intercountry adoption policies because more of its citizens will be less likely able to care for their children. Harsh living conditions due to poverty could also render more children orphans in impoverished countries and thus result in less restrictive intercountry adoption policies although this is not likely the case in a highly nationalistic impoverished country.

The control variables of a country's rate of natural increase as well as citizen use of birth control also could impact intercountry adoption independent of nationalism and thus necessitate attention. Firstly, rate of natural increase, or the birth rate of a country minus the death rate, could affect intercountry adoption policy. Experiencing more deaths than births, countries that experience a negative rate of natural increase can be reasonably assumed to be less likely to adopt out many of its children internationally independent of nationalist sentiment. Lastly, birth control use in a country could also influence that country's intercountry adoption policies. If more sexually active citizens are using birth control, then it is reasonable to assume that more citizens are in control of the number of children that they produce and are thus much less likely give up their children for



adoption, domestically or internationally regardless of nationalist sentiment of the government.

Upon scoring each country using the discussed restrictiveness matrix, fifty-four countries were coded as having low intercountry adoption policy restrictiveness, thirty as medium restrictiveness, and nine as high restrictiveness, as Graph 1.2 indicates. An example of a country having the least restrictive intercountry adoption policies is South Africa, who sent 114 children to the U.S. to be adopted from 2010-2016. South Africa received a zero for restrictiveness as the country has no residency requirement, does not require post-adoption reporting, and allows adoption agencies to operate in country. The country also does not have formalized policy including more tedious restrictions such as those involving marital status, sexual orientation, or number of children an adoptive family has. Also in the low restrictiveness category is Haiti with a score of 4 on the restrictiveness scale. Haiti sent nearly fifteen hundred children to the U.S. for adoption between 2010 and 2016 and actually mandates that prospective adoptive parents be residents of a foreign country, as a sort of reverse residency requirement excluding Haitian citizens from adopting. In addition, Haiti's adoption policy contains sexual orientation and marriage restrictions as well as requires post-adoption reporting. Overall, comparatively speaking, South Africa and Haiti both typify the zero to slightly restrictive policies of countries placed in the low restrictiveness category.

An example typifying the medium restrictiveness category is Romania with a score of nine. From 2010-2016, only eleven children were adopted out from Romania to the United States although many children reside in Romanian orphanages in inhumane conditions. Romania's intercountry adoption policy prevents most from adopting because prospective adoptive parents must be Romanian citizens and blood relatives of the child. Additionally, the law requires post-adoption reporting every four months for two years.

However, because Romania does not have any additional restrictive requirements, the country fits into the medium restrictiveness category.

Receiving a score of fifteen, Indonesia is the only country that qualified for the highly restrictive category based on the restrictiveness matrix. The country's strict two-year residency requirement, annual post-adoption reporting requirement, and the fact that no foreign intercountry adoption agencies are permitted to operate in country renders Indonesia highly restrictive. In addition, the country bans single individuals and same-sex couples from adopting, and married prospective adoptive parents must either be medically certified as childless, have only one child of their own, prove sterility, or have previously adopted a child from Indonesia. Finally, Indonesia also requires that prospective adoptive parents practice the same religion as the child to be adopted. Because of all of the above restrictions, Indonesia possesses the most restrictive intercountry adoption policies without having banned the practice entirely. Only 16 children have been adopted by US couples from Indonesia between 2010-2016, and they correspond to the country's restrictive policies.

Finally, these seven countries, Argentina, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, and Russia, received the maximum possible restrictiveness score of eighteen by virtue of completely having banned intercountry adoption. As an Islamic country, Egypt deserves special explanation as according to O'Halloran (2009), "Islam views adoption as falsifying the identity of the individual, corrupting the integrity of bloodlines and lineage, and as undermining the natural order of society," (389). Significant social stigma surrounding full adoption prevents adoption in Islamic countries as it is practiced by Western receiving nations. Therefore, instead of practicing adoption as traditionally

conceptualized in Western societies, Islamic societies such as Egypt only allow for extended family adoption by which the child retains his or her familial name and identity but is cared for by relatives other than the biological parents. This arrangement is called *kafala* and signifies “a formal pledge to support and care for a specific orphaned or abandoned child until he or she reaches maturity,” (380). Thus, Egypt in this analysis serves to represent Islamic countries that do not recognize the institution of adoption as it is traditionally practiced throughout the rest of the world.



Of additional note out of the most restrictive countries is Russia, which for years had been one of the world’s top sending countries in intercountry adoption in terms of number of children adopted out. For instance, over 3,000 Russian children were adopted out to the United States from 2010-2013. However, in 2013, President Vladimir Putin signed the Dima Yakovlev law into force. Named after a Russian child adopted by U.S. citizens who tragically suffered an accidental death at the hands of his parents, the law effectively cut all ties with the United States in the realm of intercountry adoption. The law explicitly prohibits U.S. citizens from adopting from Russia and terminated the U.S.-Russia Adoption Agreement. Rather than arising out of a concern for child welfare, however, the Dima Yakovlev law was enacted in response to the United States’ Magnitsky Act, which leveled sanctions on Russian officials accused of human rights abuses (Siegel). Thus, at the expense of approximately half a million Russian orphans, Russia banned the world’s top receiving country from adopting its children in order to retaliate politically. Furthermore, Russia has also banned any countries that permit same-sex marriage from adopting Russian children. As a result, Italy is the only country whose citizens can adopt from Russia (Ford).

DATA ANALYSIS

In order to determine the effect of nationalism on intercountry adoption policy, I ran a linear regression accounting for the most nationalistic countries--those that received a rating of “most” on the holistic nationalism measure--against the restrictiveness total. The results proved to be statistically significant, demonstrating that the more nationalistic a country, the more restrictive the country’s intercountry adoption policies with statistical significance at .018. Thus, the results confirm my hypothesis. The graph below demonstrates that countries that received the maximum nationalism score on the holistic measure are twice as likely to have higher levels of adoption policy restrictiveness,

specifically a score of 7.5 or higher on the adoption policy restrictiveness matrix. The linear regression also included the control variables of rate of natural increase, poverty rate, birth control use, and GDP (\$). The only statistically significant variable proved to be birth control use, meaning that the

more citizens using birth control in a country, the more likely it is that that country will have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies. The model indicates that for every 10% increase in birth control use, adoption policy restrictiveness increases by eight points. The graph below demonstrates this trend; as birth control use increases, the mean



predicted probability that a country will have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies also increases.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

With approximately one hundred and forty million orphans in our world today, the institution of intercountry adoption has the potential to directly affect millions of parentless children by providing them with forever homes (Orphans 2017). With the many discussed restrictions on intercountry adoption, especially in recent years with the suspension of intercountry adoption in several countries due to corruption and given the severity of the global orphan crisis, this research is especially relevant. As the results of this research demonstrated, more nationalistic regimes, such as Putin's Russia, have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies. In Russia, a country that has banned intercountry adoption, millions of orphans are residing in orphanages rather than in the care of loving families as a result of politically-motivated adoption restrictions. The disconnect between Russia's status as a signatory to the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its current intercountry adoption policies demonstrate the ability for regimes to advance their own interests over the human rights of citizens, in this case, the human rights of orphans, some the most vulnerable children. In order to promote children's rights, signatories to the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be committed to its principles. Article 3 of the Convention states that adults, particularly policy makers, must be committed to protecting the best interest of children (Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child 2014). With the results of this research indicating that more nationalistic regimes are more restrictive in their intercountry adoption policies, more nationalistic countries, by virtue of their nationalism, demonstrate increased potential to violate Article 3 of the Convention, if intercountry adoption is in the best interest of that country's orphans. The Hague Convention on the

Protection of Children 1993 echoes this sentiment and recognizes that in some cases, intercountry adoption is in the best interest of children, especially the orphaned or abandoned with no domestic placement options.

Relating to that which is in the best interest of orphans and despite the millions of them in the world today, corruption in the realm of intercountry adoption has recently been of the utmost concern. Whereas intercountry adoption can be in the best interest of children who otherwise would not have the opportunity to grow up in the care of a loving family, unfortunately, the economic dimension of the practice in terms of supply and demand drive corruption. For instance, Guatemala suspended intercountry adoptions in 2007 in order to attempt to eradicate the corruption involved in the process. Able to falsify documents, Guatemalan attorneys were able to make children appear to be orphans on paper, when in actuality, their mothers were usually coerced or tricked into relinquishing their parental rights (Wheeler 2011). These attorneys operated this way in order to profit and fulfill the demand for adoptable children in the United States. The Hague Convention sought to address the problem of adoption corruption; however, recent reports indicate that it has not succeeded. In March 2017, the Netherlands voted on whether or not to eliminate the Convention altogether, a move that could have halted the practice of intercountry adoption worldwide (Dale-Harris 2017). Although the Netherlands maintained the Convention, the fact that its elimination was considered demonstrates the fragility of the existence of intercountry adoption amidst concerns that the practice harms more children than it helps. The results of this study seem to align with concerns that intercountry adoption as a means of political expression serve to advance state interests other than solely the protection of children.

Overall, the practice of intercountry adoption should continue when intercountry adoption is in the best interest of children, and the Hague Convention should thus be upheld. In accordance with this statement, the United States has imposed stricter requirements on adoption agencies operating in foreign countries. In acknowledgement of the prevalence of corruption, these new requirements place increased responsibility on US adoption agencies in ensuring that the adoptions the agency facilitates are legitimate. Although demonstrably necessary, these increased restrictions serve to threaten the practice of intercountry adoption all together as adoption agencies often do not have the means of overseeing every step of the adoption process within the sending countries (Wehrman 2017). Therefore, the practice of intercountry adoption is in jeopardy from all sides, as both corruption and, ironically, the restrictions meant to eradicate it threaten its ability to continue, despite its root intention of providing children with families.

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Appendix A

Sending Countries Included in Analysis and the Sources of Restrictiveness Data on Them

Algeria

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/algeria.html>

Angola

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/angola.html>

<http://adopt.com/angola/index.html>

Argentina

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/argentina.html>

http://oas.org/dil/esp/Ley_de_Adopcion_Argentina.pdf

Armenia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/armenia.html>

Austria

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/austria.html>

Bangladesh

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/austria.html>

Belize

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/belize.html>

Bhutan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/bhutan.html>

<http://www.nwc.gov.bt/en/files/publication/Child%20%20Adoption%20%20Rules%20%20and%20Regulation%20of%20Bhutan%202015.pdf>

<http://nwc.gov.bt/en/notification?tpages=12&id=107&page=11>

[http://nwc.gov.bt/en/files/publication/Child%20Adoption%20Act%20%20of%20Bhutan%202012%20\(CAA\).pdf](http://nwc.gov.bt/en/files/publication/Child%20Adoption%20Act%20%20of%20Bhutan%202012%20(CAA).pdf)

Bolivia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/bolivia.html>

Brazil

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/brazil.html>

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Lei/L12010.htm

Bulgaria

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/bulgaria.html>

<http://mo-public.mjs.bg/>

<http://www.justice.government.bg/>

Burkina Faso

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/burkina-faso.html>

Burundi

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/burundi.html>

Cambodia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/cambodia.html>

Cameroon

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/cameroon.html>

Central African Republic

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/central-african-republic.html>

<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment925.aspx?AttachmentType=1>

Chad

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/chad.html>

<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment987.aspx?AttachmentType=1>

Chile

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/chile.html>

<http://www.sename.cl/web/adopcion-internacional/>

China

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/china.html>

Colombia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/colombia.html>

<http://www.icbf.gov.co/portal/page/portal/PortalICBF/Especiales/prueba/Bienestar/Adopciones-back/Internacionales/USA-EstadosUnidos>

Congo

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/democratic-republic-of-congo.html>

Costa Rica

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/costa-rica.html>

<http://www.pani.go.cr/servicios/adopciones/adopciones-internacionales>

Cuba

<https://www.martinews.com/a/legal-obstacles-to-adoption-in-cuba/26601.html>

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/cuba.html>

Denmark

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/denmark.html>

Djibouti

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/djibouti.html>

Dominican Republic

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/dominican-republic.html>

Ecuador

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/ecuador.html>

Egypt

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/egypt.html>

El Salvador

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/el-salvador.html>

<http://www.pgr.gob.sv/ado.html#extranjera&gsc.tab=0>

Eritrea

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/eritrea.html>

Estonia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/estonia.html>

Ethiopia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/ethiopia.html>

Fiji

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/fiji.html>

Gabon

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/gabon.html>

<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment937.aspx?AttachmentType=1>

Georgia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/georgia.html>

Guinea

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/guinea.html>

Guinea Bissau

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/guinea-bissau.html>

Guyana

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/guyana.html>

Haiti

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/guyana.html>

Honduras

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/honduras.html>

<http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=f67003ad3beec841652b6a31c6916c23>

Hungary

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/hungary.html>

India

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/india.html>

Indonesia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/indonesia.html>

Iran

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/iran.html>

Israel

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/israel.html>

http://www.molsa.gov.il/Populations/Youth/Adoption/International/Pages/MT01_02_06.aspx

Jamaica

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/jamaica.html>

Japan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/japan.html>

Kazakhstan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/kazakhstan.html>

Kyrgyzstan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/kyrgyzstan.html>

Latvia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/latvia.html>

Lebanon

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/lebanon.html>

Liberia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/liberia.html>

Lithuania

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/lithuania.html>

Madagascar

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/madagascar.html>

Malawi

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/malawi.html>

Malaysia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/malaysia.html>

Mali

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/mali.html>

Mauritania

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/mauritania.html>

México

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/mexico.html>

Moldova

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/moldova.html>

Mongolia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/mongolia.html>

Morocco

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/morocco.html>

Mozambique

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/mozambique.html>

Nepal

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/nepal.html>

Netherlands

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/netherlands.html>

Nicaragua

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/netherlands.html>

Niger

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/niger.html>

Nigeria

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/nigeria.html>

Norway

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/norway.html>

Panama

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/panama.html>

Papua New Guinea

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/papua-new-guinea.html>

Paraguay

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/paraguay.html>

Peru

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/peru.html>

Philippines

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/philippines.html>

Poland

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/poland.html>

Romania

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/romania.html>

Russia

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/russia.html>

Sierra Leone

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/sierra-leone.html>

Singapore

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/singapore.html>

South Africa

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/south-africa.html>

South Korea

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/south-korea.html>

Spain

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/spain.html>

Sri Lanka

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/sri-lanka.html>

Sudan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/sudan.html>

Tanzania

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/tanzania.html>

Thailand

<http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=c7f3d62d46128bb6aed3ea6b104773a3>
<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/thailand.html>

Togo

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/togo.html>

Trinidad and Tobago

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/trinidad-and-tobago.html>
<http://www.ttparliament.org/legislations/a2000-67.pdf>

Ukraine

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/ukraine.html>

United Kingdom

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/united-kingdom.html>

Uruguay

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/uruguay.html>

Uzbekistan

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/uruguay.html>

Vietnam

<https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/vietnam.html>
<http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=8ab7cf7f9e1c3eea812e6976d1c7fb62>

Appendix B

Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent Variable: Adoption Policy Restrictiveness	Dependent Variable: Nationalism
Residency Requirement	EXECNAT 2015 Data from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
Post-Adoption Reporting Requirements	Polity IV Score, Center for Systemic Peace: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm
Ability of International Adoption Agencies to Operate in Country	World Press Freedom Index (2015): https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2015
Religion Requirements	Freedom in the World Index (2015): https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.WhJtZbT821s
Income Requirements	Citizen Survey Data from the World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 and International Social Survey Program 2013: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity/2013/
Marriage Requirements	IGO Membership, CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2107.html#ag
Sexual Orientation Restrictions	Number of Import Partners, The World Bank: https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en
Children Restrictions	Number of Import Products, The World Bank: https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en

Other	
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Appendix C

Control Variables

Variable	Source(s)
Birth Control Use (Any)	WorldPopData: http://www.worldpopdata.org/index.php/table
GDP	The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/country
Poverty Rate	The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/country CIA World Fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html#da UN Data: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=poverty&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3a581
Rate of Natural Increase	WorldPopData: http://www.worldpopdata.org/index.php/table