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Educational Administration and the Two Types of Connatural Knowledge: Intellectual and Affective*

Ellis A. Joseph

Each administrator, as a thinking self, is to himself not object but subject, a subject in the midst of a world of subjects which he knows only as objects; he alone is subject as subject.¹ When it is said that an administrator is to himself not object but subject, it is meant that this administrator is the only administrator in the world who is in some way aware of his “inexhaustible depth;” of his “operations;” of his “existential complexity;” of his “inner circumstances;” of his free choices, attractions, weaknesses, virtues, loves and pains; and of “that atmosphere of immanent vitality which alone lends meaning to each of his acts.”² Subjectivity as subjectivity, however, is inconceptualizable; it is “an unknowable abyss;” it is unknowable by mode of any science whatsoever.³ There is an imperfect and fragmentary knowledge of subjectivity as such, and it is a “knowledge by mode of inclination, sympathy, or connaturality, not by mode of knowledge.”⁴ Such knowledge appears principally in three distinct forms: (1) practical knowledge, which judges both prudential matters and the subject himself, by the inner inclinations of the subject; (2) “poetic knowledge, in which subjectivity and the things of this world are known together in creative intuition-emotion and are revealed and expressed together, not in a word or concept but in a created work;” (3) mystical knowledge, which is directed towards things divine and “in which God is known by union and by connaturality of love,” which “becomes the formal means of knowledge of the divine Self.”⁵ The first form is the form of particular interest to the administrator, and the role of love in this form is significant; for it is love which enables one to know another in another way besides as object.⁶ The union in love makes the thing loved another ourselves.⁷ This means that this union makes the thing loved another subjectivity that is ours, for we love, not only for ourselves but also for the beloved.⁸

To the extent an administrator loves, not only for himself but for the beloved (in his case, the personal well-being of the students, teachers, and other personnel under his care), he acquires an obscure knowledge of the thing loved, similar to that which he possesses of himself.⁹ Thus, through love the administrator, in a certain measure, knows the beloved (his work) in his very subjectivity by virtue of the experience of union.¹⁰ This is what is meant when it is said that the administrator may, in a certain way, become part of his work. The love an administrator has for his work is not a passing pleasure or emotion; it is part of the very meaning of his being alive.

An administrator’s judgment may either be based upon objective necessities and the derivation of a conclusion from premises by means of a middle term; or it may be based upon the requirements of his subjectivity which has become one in nature or connaturalized with his work which has its particular virtues, and then his affirmative judgment about a matter will follow upon the positive inclination of his will, and his negative judgment will follow upon the repugnance of his will.11

In matters pertaining to administrative virtues an administrator may judge rightly in two ways: (1) either by means of a perfect use of discursive reason;12 or (2) through a certain connaturality with those things about which judgment is to be made.13 We will consider that certain connaturality in its two main types, the intellectual and the affective.14

It may be said that the speculative intellect of man is ordered to the consideration of the true and that the practical intellect is ordered to the direction of human acts.15 When one speaks of the speculative intellect and the practical intellect, he is not speaking of two separate intellects, but of the same intellect under two different aspects.16 The speculative intellect seeks knowledge for its own sake, knowledge which wholly remains “within the mind to make it perfect.”17 Examples of such knowledge may be mathematics and metaphysics, among others. The speculative intellect has knowledge so that it “shall rest in truth and enjoy it;” it is concerned with what is; “it takes its joy in being and has eyes only for being;” and “the good or evil estate of the subject, its needs or convenience, are alike indifferent to it.”18 The practical intellect seeks knowledge in order to put that knowledge to some use, with a view to making or doing something; it is not content to rest in truth and enjoy it.19

The speculative intellect, in its function of acquiring knowledge of truth for the sake of truth, ordinarily proceeds by way of discourse, that is, logically from the knowledge of one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects.20 On the other hand, “the human intellect at times tends towards truth by a certain natural non-cognitive inclination even though it does not perceive it as having the character of truth;”21 and it is at such times that it comes to know the truth by intellectual connaturality.22

“Knowledge by intellectual connaturality is a result of the habitus proper to the speculative man.”23 Habitus means here a permanent disposition related to the nature of the subject and qualified as operative.24 A habitus may be said to be operative when it has the faculties or powers of the human soul for subject and tends by nature to action.25 Three intellectual habitus are assigned to the speculative intellect and two to the practical intellect.26 In this section the concern is with the three assigned to the speculative intellect, and they are science, wisdom, and understanding.27 Science is the habitus which enables its possessor to have a knowledge of things through proximate causes; wisdom enables one to have a knowledge of things through their ultimate causes; and understanding gives man a knowledge of the first principles of man and the universe.28
It may be said that "every habitus produces a proportion, a connaturality with with the object."29 "In the case of intellectual connaturalty, the habitus of the speculative man produces a proportion with reality as able to be conceptualized."30 This means—to use the two examples which were cited earlier—the intellect of the mathematician or metaphysician is connaturalized with the things of mathematics or metaphysics.31 It is this connaturalty which facilitates the play of knowledge only in the mode of pure knowledge.32

A mathematician may be said to possess knowledge by intellectual connaturalty when he is able to take an axiom, which is a self-evident mathematical truth, and draw a conclusion from it which to him is obvious, but it is for a beginning mathematics student only a result of logical demonstration.33 The main difference between the two conclusions is the immediacy with which they are arrived at. The experienced mathematician is able to see the conclusion immediately because the axiom has really become a part of him in his use of it over the years. The beginning student in mathematics, on the other hand, must draw his conclusion from the axiom by reasoning slowly and logically from one step to another, because very little proportion or consonance has had the opportunity to develop between him and his subject matter. Maritain points out that the experienced mathematician is inclined solely by his intellectual habitus.34 The beginning student in mathematics cannot be solely inclined by his intellectual habitus, for the intellectual virtues have not been developed so well in him as they have in the master mathematician.

Why, then, is this knowledge by intellectual connaturalty important? It is important for two reasons. First, by possessing it the speculative man—as was seen above—becomes more and more able to immediately see consequences from a principle.35 Second, knowledge by intellectual connaturalty is necessary for the perfect functioning of the human intellect.36 The human intellect in times of weakness may be dependent for its perfect functioning on the dispositions of the subject.37 These dispositions are called habits or virtues, and they create a sympathy or connaturalty between the subject and object.38 This connaturalty is purely and exclusively intellectual, with nothing extra-intellectual about it; and it belongs to the natural activity of the intellect, having no interference from action, from the moral life of the subject, or from love.39 It is due to a proportion brought about in the subject by the object acting on the intellect and on it only, in such a way that the object engrafts on the intellect an actual similarity to itself, an actual desire for the intellect to be inclined to the demands of the object.40

The contrasting type of knowledge by connaturalty is knowledge by affective connaturalty. Such knowledge is different from knowledge by intellectual connaturalty: (1) "by the fact that it is not required for the natural activity of the intellect;" and (2) "by the means which it uses, which are extra intellectual."41

It has been said that the speculative intellect has for its object the true and that it is content to rest in the truth and enjoy it once the truth is known. The practical
intellect—the intellect of the educational administrator—has for its ultimate object the end of desire, which is a good related to the work of a power other than the intellect, and which is the beginning of action.42

The administrator's practical intellect may acquire knowledge in a speculative way. It may come to know by reasoning from the principles which govern operations in administrative action. In applying these administrative principles to the singular, the practical intellect functions perfectly as practical. This means that the administrator's practical intellect performs the function proper to it as practical when it is acting in the practical situation with all its contingencies, when it is faced with a decision to make here and now which will direct the will to act. For example, an administrator, who has studied administration as a course of instruction, may be aware of certain rules which should be adhered to if successful administration is to take place. However, it is only when he is face to face with an administrative problem in a real problematic situation that his intellect must make a practical judgment concerning just which rule is to be used and how it should be used.

It may be that in a given administrative situation—because the appetite of the administrator is so ordered—he is able to make a judgment which is according to his natural inclination, which follows the inclination of his heart because "the law regulating his desire is the same as the law of virtue."43

When the administrator makes such a judgment according to his natural inclination, he is making his judgment with spontaneous reference to the universal principles of practical knowledge governing his actions. This judgment may be said to be the result of knowledge by affective connaturality.44 This knowledge is acquired by experience and not by discursive reasoning. This knowledge is perfectly practical knowledge, and it becomes, just as habitus does, "second nature" to the administrator who possesses it.45

Just as knowledge by intellectual connaturality is a result of the habitus proper to the speculative man, affective knowledge is a result of the habitus proper to the man of action. The term "affective" is in the realm of the intellectual and sensitive appetites, and these are powers of the soul which come under the direction of the practical intellect.46 The sensitive appetites are irrational by nature.47 They function under the command of reason and may be said to have habitus by their relation to the higher faculty of reason.48

The intellectual appetite, by contrast, is spiritual by nature; then, though it is determined in regard to its final ultimate end—the good, it is free to choose the particular means to reach its end.49 The administrator's will, then, needs habitus to give him the power of directing his choices in accordance with the ends he has in view.50

The habitus proper to the appetitive powers of the administrator, and that proper to the appetitive powers of all men, are the moral virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Prudence regulates human acts in accordance with right
reason; justice is the rendering of each one his due with constant and perpetual will; fortitude controls the irascible appetite by giving man the strength to follow the dictates of his reason despite fear and hardships; and temperance controls the concupiscible appetite according to reason, restraining the inordinate love for sense pleasures.\(^5^1\)

The two habitus assigned to the practical intellect are the intellectual virtues of art and prudence. The habitus of art is right reason about things to be made, and the habitus of prudence is right reason about things to be done.\(^5^2\)

Art has to do with exterior works, for it confers a certain aptitude to make things.\(^5^3\) Prudence has to do with immanent acts; it not only confers a certain aptness to do things, but it also confers the right use of that aptness.\(^5^4\) The right use of that aptness belongs to the habitus of the appetitive powers and requires a rectitude of the appetite.\(^5^5\) This is why prudence is both an intellectual and a moral habitus.\(^5^6\)

It is evident, then, that habitus plays an inseparable role in knowledge by affective connaturality. Every habitus creates a proportion, a consonance with the object. In the case of knowledge by affective connaturality, the habitus of the administrator in action creates a proportion with the object of the judgment to be formed.\(^5^7\) This means that the desire of the prudent administrator becomes connaturalized with the object “of which the intellect is to judge in conformity with the movement of desire.”\(^5^8\) This connaturality makes possible the administrator’s judgment by mode of inclination in contrast to judgment by mode of discursive reasoning.\(^5^9\)

In this knowledge through union or inclination, connaturality or congeniality, the intellect is at play not alone, but together with affective inclinations and the dispositions of the will, and is guided and directed by them. It is not rational knowledge, knowledge through the conceptual, logical and discursive exercise of Reason.\(^6^0\)

It was stated earlier that knowledge by affective connaturality is acquired through experience and not by discursive reasoning. Why, then is this knowledge so unique and so helpful to the educational administrator? Certainly all educational administrators have acquired knowledge through their long experience in their work. Such knowledge differs from other knowledge by experience in two ways. First, it becomes “second nature” to the administrator who possesses it. Second, it enables the administrator to make the requirements and demands of the administrative process a part of his subjectivity through love.

It may be regarded as unusual to consider love as a means of knowing in the realm of educational administration, but it must be recognized that there is an affective dimension which permeates the entire administrative process.\(^6^1\)

The who (particularistic) and the what (universalistic) of the administrative process are usually people or are manipulated by people.\(^6^2\) Since the individual is the reason for the existence of the administrative process, emotional, more than
functional, ties may define many of the mutual rights and obligations of the individuals in that process. The educational administrator (acting agent), in his application of love, may view it in two ways:

a) First, as it applies itself and the other powers to action. This love is restricted to the executive or efficient order. It applies the agent to act.

b) Secondly, as it applies and unites the object to itself, assimilating it through fruition and making itself thereby connatural and proportionate to the object. Love experiences its object with a sort of loving taste, according to the Psalmist (Psalm xxxiii, 9) Taste and see. In this way the one loving takes on the condition of his object, that is, through the affective experience the object is rendered more conformed, proportioned and united to the person, more suitable to him. Love, then, may become in the administrator-knower-lover a sign of the thing loved (in this case, the personal well-being of the students, teachers, and the other personnel under his care).

If the administrator has true love for the personal well-being of the students, teachers, and other personnel under his care, then they are not just objects to him, they are a part of his subjectivity. This personal well-being is in the administrator-knower-lover as another self, another subject. The appetite of the administrator-knower-lover, which is modified in the act of love to conform to the subjective state of the beloved, becomes, when the intellect reflects on it, a means of knowing the beloved in a sincere, rich, and immanent way.

Lastly, an objection might be raised to the necessity of the administrator’s having to love his work in such a way that it becomes a part of his very subjectivity. Might not an administrator be very efficient without such a love? He may be efficient indeed. However, the administrator who is interested in his work because it brings him some personal glory or better opportunities cannot say that the requirements and demands of his work are conatured in him. He may be said to be wedded only to himself and his selfishness. What permanent effects will efficiency have upon the personal well-being of those under the administrator’s care if there is no love on the administrator’s part for the good which he wills and for the persons for whom the good is willed? True efficiency is a good for those persons under the administrator’s care. It is impossible for the good administrator to wish for a condition of true efficiency in the administrative process without simultaneously loving those for whom this efficiency is willed. There is no division of love. One and the same act of love is both direct love with respect to the person and indirect love with respect to the good willed for the person; there is a division of objects loved but not of love.

... the motion of love tends into two terms, namely into the good which one wills for some one ... and into the one for whom one whom wills good. Therefore for that good which one wills for someone there is had indirect love; for that one for whom one wills good there is had direct love.
The administrator may be said to love efficiency in the administrative process insofar as that efficiency is a good which is willed for some individual or individuals. Efficiency cannot give love of its own. On the other hand, the individuals for whom the efficiency is willed may give love of their own and experience the immaterial union which exists between the lover and the loved. The administrator cannot love efficiency for efficiency's sake. He may, however, be said to have indirect love for efficiency in the administrative process (the good) and direct love for the persons in this process for whom this good is willed. This is what is meant when it is said that the administrator may become identified with his work or that his work may become a part of his subjectivity through love. The efficiency as efficiency is not a part of him; but efficiency as a good willed for the personal well-being of the students, teachers, and other personnel under his responsibility may be said to be a part of him.

What is the difference, then, between an administrator who is just efficient and one who has made his work a part of his subjectivity through love? Can the latter make better decisions if he identifies himself with his work or if his work is a part of his subjectivity through love?

The competent administrator is one who is able to understand human nature and to judge of it. Like so many others who must judge and understand human nature, the administrator may rely on knowledge by affective connaturality. Concerning this knowledge by affective connaturality Simon says:

"An example is this celebrated page of Balzac: ... 'I used to observe the mores of the suburb, its inhabitants and their personalities ... In me observation ... gave me the power of living the life of the individual on which it was exercised, and enabled me to substitute myself for him, ... While listening to these people, I was able to take over their life, I felt their rags on my back, I walked with my feet in their tattered shoes; their desires, their needs, everything passed into my soul, or my soul passed into theirs ... I became inflamed with them against the workshop bosses who tyrannized them, or against the bad customers who had them come again several times without paying them ... to assume another self was my recreation.'"

The above passage suggests that if the school administrator is to really understand those under his responsibility and if he is really going to make decisions at times by mode of affective inclination to insure their welfare, then he must "be connaturalized to the goods of the [school] community that he leads;" he must "come to exist, to live, to suffer, and to think inside the [school] community" which he leads, if not actually, then at least intentionally.

The administrator who is merely efficient may not care to love those for whom the efficiency is intended. If he does not care to love and suffer with those for whom the efficiency is intended, then his administrative actions will not be nearly as effective as they should be. If he is merely efficient—as was implied earlier—
then he is efficient for some other reason than the good of those under his care. If the school administrator is efficient for any other reason other than the good of those under his care, then the best that can be said of him is that he is an expert; he is not a leader nor is he a good man, for:

In an entirely normal state of affairs, leadership belongs to prudence, not to expertness; rather than the bearer of technical ability, a leader is supposed to be a man of virtue, a man of human experience, a man who loves them and succeeds in persuading them. Perfect order would want experts to be kept in subordinate positions under leaders who should be good men rather than good experts.\textsuperscript{73}

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NOTES


2 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 83.

3 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 77.

4 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 78.

5 \textit{Ibid.}

6 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 90.

7 \textit{Ibid.}

8 \textit{Ibid.}


10 \textit{Ibid.}


13 \textit{Summa Theol.}, II-II, 45, 2; 1, 1, 6 and 3.


15 \textit{Summa Theol.}, I, 14, 16.

16 \textit{Ibid.}, I, 79, 11.


18 \textit{Ibid.}


23 Ibid.
25 Ibid., I-II, 55, 2.
26 Ibid., I-II, 57, 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” p. 3.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” p. 3.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.; see also: Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” pp. 4-5.
41 Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” p. 5.
42 Summa Theol., I, 79, 2; see also: Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” p. 5.
44 Lambur, op. cit., p. 6.
45 Ibid.
46 Summa Theol., I-II, 50, 3; 51, 2; see also: Lambur, p. 7.
47 Ibid., I-II, 56, 4.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., I-II, 50, 5; see also: Lambur, “Connatural Knowledge,” p. 7.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., I-II, 51, 2.
52 Ibid., I-II, 57, 4.
53 Ibid., I-II, 56, 3.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
59 Summa Theol., I, 1, 6 and 3: “A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what is virtuous by his very inclination towards it . . . In
another way, a man may judge by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not virtue."


62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.


66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.; see also: Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 2, 1139a, 21.
68 Summa Theol., I-II, 26, 4.
69 Ibid., I-II, 26, 4; see also: I-II, 26, 2; I-II, 25, 2; I-II, 23, 4.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., pp. 220-222.
73 Ibid., p. 279.