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Investigating the Relationship Between Identity Salience and Attitudes about Groups



Honors Thesis Grazia DiPierro Department: Psychology Advisor: Erin Kunz, Ph.D. May 2022

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Abstract

A person's political views are largely dependent on who they are, meaning a person's identities may inform their political attitudes. The extent to which a person is made aware of an identity may influence how they view certain issues. For example, a white woman may view the same issue in two different ways depending on whether her racial or gender identity is activated. It is hypothesized that when participants are made aware of their racial identity, White participants will hold more conservative views, while non-white participants will hold more liberal views. Additionally, when made aware of a gender identity, white women may view issues the same way as non-white women (i.e., more liberally). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions to make a racial, gender, or neutral identity salient. The participants completed the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to measure their self-esteem in a social group they belong to. This was followed by questions relating to political attitudes and measures of internalized sexism. Internalized sexism is being examined to determine the role it may play in political attitudes, specifically when activated with a gender identity.



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Investigating the Relationship Between Identity Salience and Attitudes About

Groups

Political attitudes are flexible representations of a person's opinion regarding political topics. These attitudes can change over time and, given the differences observed in national elections, are influenced by one's social identities, such as race and gender. Further, the relative social power in society (i.e., majority, minority) associated with each social identity may also impact political attitudes. In general, men have more power than women and white people have more power than people of color. Women and people of color tend to be liberal and vote for Democrats, while men and white people tend to be conservative and vote for Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2015; 2020). This suggests that people who have a minority social identity may vote in the best interest of their minority identity by supporting policies or people with the most potential to elevate their status. However, in the 2016 Presidential election, more white women voted for Donald Trump (47%) than Hillary Clinton (45%; Pew Research Center, 2018¹). This pattern seems to have been consistent for the 2020 Presidential election as well. A political poll conducted in the summer of 2019 for the Democratic Primary race found that white women showed a pattern of voting more similar to white men than women of color (Quinnipiac University, 2019), and exit polls for the 2020 election report that 55% of white women voted for Donald Trump while only 9% of Black women, 30% of Latina women, and 40% of Asian women voted for Donald Trump (CNN, 2020).

¹ It is often reported that 52% of white women voted for Donald Trump in 2016, but this number was based on exit poll data, which is often skewed, whereas the 47% reported by the Pew Research Center is a more representative sample of verified voters' votes in the 2016 election.

Based on data from the 2016 and 2020 elections, white women were *not* voting in a way that further subordinates their minority identity as women. Interestingly, election data from the 2016 and 2020 election show that Black men and Hispanic men, each of whom also have a majority (gender) and minority (race) social identity, were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate (Pew Research Center, 2018; CNN, 2020); in other words, they voted in the best interest of their minority identity. White women seem to be an outlier among groups with majority-minority social identities; but why? The proposed project seeks to examine internalized sexism as another potential explanation for why white women's political attitudes reflect the prioritization of their race over gender.

The Role of Sexism in Politics

When Donald Trump ran for president in 2016, he used his Twitter platform to communicate with the public. Trump's account also served as a manifestation of his sexist attitudes toward women. In an analysis of Trump's tweets during his campaign, Scotto di Carlo found that Trump posted numerous tweets during his campaigns that perpetuated sexism and patriarchy (2020). These tweets consisted of various strategies Trump used to denigrate women, including valuing women's physical appearance rather than their intelligence, portraying women as dependent, weak, incapable, and so on (Scotto di Carlo, 2020). Despite Trump's repeated denigration of women, white women still supported him more than any other group of women in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections (Pew Research Center, 2018; CNN, 2020).

In the 2016 Presidential election, sexism stood out as a strong predictor of support for Donald Trump among both men and women. Ratliff and colleagues (2019) examined whether hostile and benevolent sexism influenced attitudes towards female candidates. Hostile sexism reinforces misogynistic ideals and dislikes feminism, whereas benevolent sexism refers to the idea that women need to be taken care of by men. Participants with greater hostile sexism scores had more positive attitudes for Trump and more negative views of Clinton. These results were consistent across political ideology, gender, and attitudes toward other racial/social groups (Ratliff et al., 2019). Similar results were found by Bock and colleagues, who concluded that participants who held more traditional views of women and had individual differences in hostile sexism were more likely to vote for Trump (Bock et al., 2017). Additionally, male and female Trump supporters indicated that they did not think gender discrimination was still a problem in the United States, and they also had higher levels of hostile sexism compared to male and female Clinton supporters (Monteith & Hildebrand, 2020).

Focusing on the dual identities of women is important in understanding why white women vote in ways that further subordinate their gender identity. One potential explanation is that white women may have higher levels of internalized sexism that prompts them to vote in the interest of their racial identity over their gender identity. Internalized sexism refers to the idea that women have and maintain sexist attitudes (Bearman et al, 2009) and is a form of internalized oppression in that women use the methods of the oppressing group, in this case men, against themselves to be more like the members of the oppressing group. Accordingly, System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) provides a framework for understanding why people may not always stand up for their minority identities. SJT theorizes that people may be motivated to rationalize social, economic, and political institutions that they rely on, even when they are not benefitting from them, and is a psychological inclination to view current social systems as fair and just (Jost et al., 2004). People want to maintain positive images of themselves as well as the groups they belong to, which can influence how people rationalize issues like sexism and inequality. Believing that institutions are legitimate makes people feel more secure because they provide structure, whereas social change implies chaos. Due to this perceived insecurity, a person may be more unwilling to support social change (Jost et al., 2004). Regarding voting behavior in the 2016 Presidential election, conservative voters were more likely to justify the legitimacy of inequalities between the rich and poor; men and women; and the American system in general compared to more liberal voters (Azevedo et al., 2017).

Political divisions among white and non-white women were clear in the 2016 Presidential election. Cassese and Barnes (2018) attempted to explain why women are attracted to Republican candidates and found that many white women endorsed sexist beliefs that influenced their voting choices in 2016. It was suspected that Trump's attacks on women combined with Clinton's status as the first female Presidential nominee would be enough to persuade Republican women to vote for Clinton, but this was not the case. Women who held sexist beliefs were more likely to tolerate Trump's sexism and vote for him (Cassese & Barnes, 2018). It is argued that white women endorse more traditional and sexist views to maintain the advantages and privileges associated with whiteness, which corroborates SJT since women want to maintain their status by putting distance between themselves and the disadvantages associated with their gender.

The proposed study seeks to examine the role of social identity salience on internalized sexism and political attitudes among voters. Previous research following a sample of women in the U.S. found that women who voted for Clinton in the 2016 Presidential election reported lower levels of internalized misogyny compared to participants who voted for Trump (Dehlin & Galliher, 2019). However, Dehlin and Galliher's study did not examine differences in internalized misogyny among women based on their race. Further, it is unclear which social identity, either race or gender, was most salient (i.e., which one the participant was most aware of) when they completed the study and when they voted. As a result, it is unclear how identity salience influences political attitudes and voting habits. Perhaps white women are more often aware of being white due to the privileges and benefits associated with their race but being made aware of their identity as women may shift their attitudes.

Feelings Toward Political Groups

Over the last few decades, gender gaps in party affiliations have continued to shift. As of 2019, a majority (56%) of registered female voters identified as Democrats or leaned toward the Democratic Party, while 38% identified as Republicans or leaned toward the GOP (Pew Research Center, 2018; 2020). For men, 50% of registered male voters identified as Republican, while 42% identified as Democrats. This suggests that women are more likely than men to identify as Democrats. Recent polls from 2021 found that there was a partisan divide over the performance of Trump during his presidency (Pew Research Center, 2021). Nearly three-quarters of Democrats (72%) said Trump was a terrible president, with 17% of Democrats saying he was a poor president and 4% of Democrats saying he was good or great. Conversely, Republicans gave Trump the most positive ratings with 37% saying he was a great president, 36% saying he was a good president, and only 10% saying he was a poor or terrible president (Pew Research Center, 2021). Additionally, women were generally less likely than men to positively evaluate the job performance of Republican presidents, and more likely than men to favorably evaluate the job performance of Democratic presidents (CAWP, 2022). These trends are interesting because a large portion of those who identify as Democrats (typically more women than men, as indicated above) gave Trump a low rating on his performance, but Trump still won the election and won over many voters, including a large number of white women. There seem to be contradictions in how Trump was evaluated by voters and how people actually voted in elections, which leads to further questions regarding why white women voted for Trump despite his overt sexist attitudes and more negative evaluations by women overall.

Influence of Identity Salience

In a study focusing on identity salience, Transue (2007) found that a participant's attachment to a shared identity helped surpass group boundaries when forming opinions on policy. Participants were willing to have tax increases when made aware of their American identity and less supportive for the tax increase when primed with the minority identity. White participants were more supportive of the broader goal of increasing the tax for public schools rather than the narrower goal of improving educational opportunities for minorities (Transue, 2007). When the relationship between whites and minorities is a shared identity, the attachment to one's own group lost influence on the way white people perceived programs that only benefited minorities. In other words, when white people perceived a shared identity, they were more likely to support programs that they might not benefit from. This suggests that political habits can be influenced when participants are made aware of various identities.

These findings are further supported by research on self-categorization and its influence on attitudes toward outgroups done by Ray and colleagues (2008). For example, when participants self-categorized as Americans, they felt more anger in reaction to Muslims than when they self-categorized as students (Ray et al., 2008). The results of this study suggest that perceptions of a social group differ depending on the way a person self-categorizes themselves and that recategorizing oneself can change emotional reactions to the same social groups. This study illuminates the present research in that we also attempt to discover whether being aware of a certain social identity will impact attitudes about groups or political issues.

Overview of Present Research

These past research designs help inform the current study because they demonstrate how being aware of different identities can change how people perceive politics and groups. The present research further investigates how identity salience and sexism impact attitudes about groups. Specifically, these studies aim to test whether the activation of a majority identity (white or male) or a minority identity (Black or female) impact how people evaluated political groups, as well as their political identity and internalized misogyny. In testing these predictions, participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses in exchange for course credit (Study 1) and from an online data collection source (Study 2). In both studies, participants first were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: the racial identity condition, gender identity condition, or the control condition. The first two conditions aimed to activate awareness of that identity, making that identity more salient to the participant. The control condition made a neutral identity salient. In this case, the control condition

primed a generational identity. In each condition, identity was made salient by having participants answer a set of questions evaluating one's self-esteem toward the relevant group (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

As a result of past findings, we designed two experimental studies in which it is hypothesized that the social identity that is most salient to participants is the one that will most strongly influence their level of sexism and political attitudes. More specifically, when race is made salient, white participants will report higher levels of sexism and more conservative political attitudes than Black participants (Study 2) and participants for whom their gender identity or no specific identity is made salient (Study 1, 2). When gender is made salient, women will report lower levels of sexism and more liberal political attitudes than men, and women for whom their racial identity or no specific identity is made salient (Study 1, 2). Activating an identity in the realm of politics is important when it comes to which platform voters are likely to support. If identity awareness is an important part of how people express a political opinion, candidates could use that information to make a certain group more amenable to support them. *Study 1*

Method

Participants

The participants from this study were undergraduate college students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Dayton. Participants were compensated for their time with research credit that applied toward their grade in their psychology course. The study took participants no more than an hour to complete. A total of 363 students participated in the study. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 22. There were 234 participants that identified as women (66.29%) and 117 (33.14%) that identified as men. There was one participant who identified as non-binary, while one participant preferred to not indicate their gender, and 10 participants who left this question blank.

In terms of ethnicity, 36 participants (10.2%) identified as Latino/a, Hispanic, or Spanish, with 317 (89.8%) participants identifying as non-Latino/a, Hispanic, or Spanish, and 10 leaving the question blank. There were 293 white participants, 46 Black, two American Indian/Alaska Native, 17 Asian, two Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 13 participants who indicated that they were a race that was not listed.

Participants who did not identify as a white man or white woman were excluded from analyses for this study because there were too few participants from each other racial group to make between-race comparisons. Therefore, the total usable sample for this study included 262 participants that identified as a white man (n = 73) or white woman (n = 183) who were not, Latino/a, Hispanic, or Spanish. Participants were randomly divided into three conditions including gender identity (n = 91), racial identity (n = 88), and a neutral identity (n = 83) condition where participants were asked to think about one of these social identities.

Procedure

This experiment is a 2 (gender: male, female) x 3 (condition: race, gender, control) between-subjects design conducted to determine the impact of identity awareness on attitudes about groups. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, each one attempting to make a different identity salient by asking about one's collective self-esteem for their gender, racial, or generational (i.e., generation Z) identity. Next, participants were asked to complete measures relating to political identity, internalized sexism, and feelings toward different groups. At the end of the study, participants completed demographic information before being presented with the debriefing. Participants received research credit for their time.

Measures

Identity Awareness. Participants were asked to fill out information related to a specific social identity. In order to activate an identity, participants completed the 16-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale developed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992). This scale is designed to evaluate group identification and one's self-esteem toward a group they belong to. Participants answered questions using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions to make a gender, racial, or generational (i.e., gen Z, control condition) identity salient. Each question was adjusted based on the condition participants were assigned to by replacing the word "group" in each question with the prompt for the race, gender, or generational condition. For example, if participants were in the race condition, the word 'group' was changed to 'race' for each question. The Collective Self-Esteem scale was used to measure participants' self-esteem toward a relevant social group in an attempt to activate that specific identity. The control condition for this study used a generational identity (gen Z) as the control condition or neutral identity. Since this study was completed by college-age students, the control condition asked participants about an identity that college-aged participants could identify with, such as being members of Generation Z. Generation Z covers people born during the years 1997-2012, so participants had to be between 18 and 24 years old to complete this study.

Internalized Sexism. The internalized sexism scale in (Piggott, 2004) will assess the level of sexism, which for women reflects internalized oppression and includes items from the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory's hostile sexism subscale (Rollero et al., 2014), Internalized Misogyny Scale (Piggott, 2004), and the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995). Participants used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) to indicate their level of agreement with various statements relating to internalized sexism. Higher scores indicated higher levels of internalized sexism for women and higher sexism for men, Cronbach's alpha = .86.

Feeling Thermometer. The feelings thermometer scale was created for the purposes of this study and intended to measure how positively or negatively participants felt toward different groups. Participants were presented with 16 different groups including white people, Hispanic people, Black people, men, women, non-binary people, police officers, firefighters, conservatives, liberals, famous people, professional athletes, poor people, wealthy people, scientists, and politicians. Ratings ranged between 0 (*negative feelings*) and 100 (*positive feelings*).

Political Identity. Participants ranked their political identity using a scale from 1 (*strongly liberal*) to 7 (*strongly conservative*) (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).

Demographics. Participants provided information about their gender, race, age, religion, and a brief family education history.

Results

Study 1

Political identity. When participants were made aware of a social identity, political identity did not vary, F(2, 248) = 0.41, p = 0.667. There was also no interaction

between gender and identity salience, F(2, 248) = 0.11, p = 0.896. However, there were differences in political identity across gender, F(1, 248) = 9.54, p = 0.002. Specifically, men were more conservative (M = 4.37, SD = 1.34) than women (M = 3.7, SD = 1.48).

Internalized sexism. The results of the internalized sexism scale indicate that identity salience did not influence levels of sexism; similar to political identity, internalized sexism was not significantly affected by identity awareness, F(2, 256) = 0.97, p = 0.38. There was also no interaction between identity salience and gender, F(2, 256) = 0.21, p = 0.813. However, there was a gender difference in misogyny between men and women, F(1, 256) = 36.66, p < .0001, where men scored higher in sexism, (M = 2.5, SD = 0.72) than women (M = 1.92, SD = 0.66).

Feeling thermometer: conservatives. There was no main effect of identity salience, F(2, 250) = 0.45, p = 0.635, or gender, F(1, 250) = 0.45, p = 0.502 on attitudes toward conservatives, but there is an interaction between condition and gender, F(2, 250) = 4.70, p = 0.01. This suggests that feelings toward conservatives varied based on the participant's gender and which identity was salient.

We conducted follow-up tests by analyzing the identity salience effect separately for men and women. Men evaluated conservatives the same way across conditions, F(2, 250) = 2.27, p = 0.106. This indicates that identity salience had no influence on how men rated conservatives. Conversely, women evaluated conservatives differently based on the condition they were in, F(2, 250) = 3.43, p = 0.034. When comparing the control and gender conditions for women, the analyses showed that women evaluated conservatives more negatively when their gender identity was salient, F(1, 250) = 6.85, p = 0.009. When the control and race conditions were compared, there were no differences in how women evaluated conservatives, F(1, 250) = 1.47, p = 0.226.

Feeling thermometer: liberals. Interestingly, there was no effect of identity salience on the rating of liberals, F(2, 247) = 2.00, p = 0.137, nor was there an interaction between condition and gender, F(2, 247) = 0.37, p = 0.691. However, there were gender differences for feelings toward liberals, F(1, 247) = 21.05, p < .0001. Specifically, women rated liberals more positively (M = 70.77, SD = 23.17) than men (M = 55.73, SD = 25.71) regardless of the identity made salient to them.

Feeling thermometer: conservatives and liberals. To further clarify the relationship between identity salience and feelings about groups, we conducted a repeated measures analysis treating political party as a within-subjects factor to compare whether there was a difference in how participants felt toward conservatives and liberals based on gender and salient identity. The way that participants felt about conservatives and liberals did vary by their gender and condition, F(2, 245) = 4.62, p = 0.011, suggesting that both gender and identity salience played a role in the rating of these groups.

In the control condition, there was no significant difference in how men and women felt towards conservatives and liberals, F(1, 245) = 0.03, p = 0.872. However, there was a gender difference in feelings such that women rated both conservatives (M =66.77, SD = 27.1) and liberals (M = 69.97, SD = 24.95) more positively than men, who rated conservatives (M = 52.05, SD = 28.65) and liberals slightly differently (M = 56.76, SD = 21.2).

In the gender condition, feelings toward liberals and conservatives did vary by participant gender, F(1, 245) = 20.36, p < .0001. Both men and women evaluated these

groups differently when their gender was salient. Men evaluated conservatives (M = 68.85, SD = 24.55) more positively than liberals (M = 49.52, SD = 28.98), F(1, 245) = 8.72, p = .004, while women exhibited the opposite pattern by rating conservatives (M = 52.85, SD = 29.24) more negatively than liberals (M = 68.92, SD = 23.72) when gender was salient, F(1, 245) = 13.82, p = .0002.

In the race condition, feelings toward liberals and conservatives did vary by participant gender, F(1, 245) = 7.93, p = .005. Men had similar feelings toward liberals (M = 66.69, SD = 27.87) and conservatives (M = 60.27, SD = 24.66) when their race was salient, F(1, 245) = 1.18, p = .279. On the other hand, women's evaluations did vary when their race was salient, F(1, 245) = 9.64, p = .002. Women rated liberals more positively (M = 73.87, SD = 19.95) than conservatives (M = 58.63, SD = 29.89) when their race.

Discussion

Study 1 results did not show support for the hypotheses that identity salience would impact political identity or levels of internalized sexism. There were gender differences for both variables, where men were more conservative and had higher levels of sexism than women. However, the results found differences in feelings toward political groups when a social identity is salient. We predicted that white women would be more liberal when their gender was salient, and we found that white women felt more positively about liberals than conservatives when both gender and race were salient. This suggests that when white women were made aware of being white or being a woman, they were more inclined to view liberals positively due to the salient social identity. We observed a main effect for the evaluation of conservatives and liberals. Men felt the same about conservatives across conditions, but women felt more negatively about conservatives when thinking about their gender. When rating feelings toward liberals there were only gender differences, where women felt more positive than men toward liberals. Comparing feelings about the two groups showed that women felt more negatively about conservatives than liberals in both the gender and race conditions. Men felt more positively about conservatives than liberals when thinking about their gender only and did not show any effects when thinking about their race.

The results of this study support past research by Transue (2007) that awareness of certain identities can sway participants' perspectives. The results from Study 1 show that white women feel more positively about liberals when both their racial and gender identity were salient, which supports that identity awareness may sway feelings toward groups. These findings expand on past research because two identities are used (race and gender) when past research has not looked at both together.

Study 2

Method

Participants

A second study was conducted that consisted of 1093 participants recruited from Prolific.co. The study took about 7 minutes to complete and participants were paid ~\$1.28 for their time. The ages of participants ranged from 18 to 80 (M = 39.42, SD =14.64). The sample consisted of 392 participants identifying as men, 652 identifying as women, 17 participants who identified themselves as non-binary, and one participant who did not indicate their gender. A total of 31 participants chose not to answer this question. The sample also had 19 participants identified as Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish. There were 1043 non-Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish participants, with 31 participants leaving this question blank. The sample contained 566 white participants, 507 Black participants, 14 American Indian/Alaska Native participants, three Asian participants, two Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander participants, and four participants who identified as a race that was not listed. Additionally, there were 25 participants who indicated that they were white and non-white biracial.

Similar to the first study, participants were excluded from analyses if they identified as something other than male or female. They were also excluded if they identified as a biracial white person due to the fact that it would be unclear whether they were thinking of their majority (white) or minority (non-white) identity if randomly assigned to the race condition. Those who were biracial with two non-white identities remained in the analyses since there was no conflict between a majority and minority identity. Participants were also excluded if they indicated that they identified as a race that was not listed (e.g., one person identified as "American" with no information about their race or ethnicity). We also excluded participants from analysis if they did not vote for Trump or Biden in the 2020 election (n = 263) since the research is motivated by the 2016 and 2020 elections, as well as people who did not correctly answer the manipulation check (n = 37) and who did not respond to the attention check (n = 124).

Thus, the final sample used for analysis contained 709 participants, with 253 men and 447 women. Of these, four identified as Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish and 696 identified as non-Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish. The breakdown by race consisted of 387 white participants, 313 Black participants, two American Indian/Alaska Native participants, one Asian participant, and two Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander participants. The average participant age was 39.71 (SD = 14.51), ranging from 18 to 80. **Procedure**

The study was a 2 (race: white, Black) x 2 (gender: male, female) x 3 (condition: race, gender, control) between-subjects design. Participants completed an abbreviated version of the first study; they completed the same Collective Self-Esteem Scale for the manipulation (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), however, participants in the control condition were asked about their generational identity based on their age (i.e., gen Z, millennial, boomer, etc.). Participants then completed shortened versions of the same measures included in Study 1, asking questions about political identity (1 item), internalized misogyny (6 items; Cronbach's alpha = .40), and feelings toward conservatives and liberals (1 item each). Participants then received payment for their participation.

Results

Political identity. Participants did not show any differences in political identity when made aware of a specific social identity (i.e., identity salience), F(2, 688) = 0.14, p = 0.873. However, there was an effect of participant gender on political identity, F(1, 688) = 6.88, p = 0.008. Specifically, men (M = 3.27, SD = 1.79) were more conservative than women (M = 2.87, SD = 1.67). The race of participants also influenced their political identity such that non-white participants were more liberal (M = 2.73, SD = 1.38) than white participants (M = 3.24, SD = 1.93), F(1, 688) = 10.22, p = 0.001. The interactions were not significant, all F's < 1.90, all p's > .15.

Internalized misogyny. Identity salience had no effect on levels of internalized misogyny for participants, F(2, 688) = 1.34, p = 0.261. However, there was an interaction between condition and race for internalized misogyny, F(2, 688) = 3.14, p = 0.044. For white participants, there was a significant condition effect, F(2, 688) = 3.69, p = 0.025. White participants in the control condition had lower levels of internalized misogyny (M = 2.49, SD = 1.10) than those in the gender condition (M = 2.76, SD = 0.97), F(1, 688) = 5.41, p = 0.02, as well as the race condition (M = 2.76, SD = 1.01), F(1, 688) = 5.82, p = 0.016. Non-white participants did not show any difference in internalized misogyny across conditions, F(2, 688) = 1.13, p = 0.323.

There was also an interaction between gender and race for internalized misogyny, F(1, 688) = 7.88, p = 0.005. For men, there was a race effect, F(1, 688) = 7.49, p = 0.006, such that non-white men (M = 2.95, SD = 0.95) reported higher levels of misogyny than white men (M = 2.63, SD = 1.11). For women, there was no difference between white (M = 2.69, SD = 0.95) and non-white (M = 2.60, SD = 0.89) women in internalized misogyny, F(1, 688) = 1.02, p = 0.312. All other effects were not statistically significant, all F's < 2.96, all p's > .08.

Feeling thermometer: conservatives. There were no main effects for identity salience and feelings toward conservatives, F(1, 611) = 0.33, p = 0.717. There was a main effect for race, such that white participants (M = 42.97, SD = 34.27) reported more positive feelings towards conservatives than non-white participants (M = 35.12, SD = 28.27), F(1, 611) = 7.24, p = 0.007. This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant condition by race interaction, F(2, 611) = 3.32, p = 0.036.

Follow-up testing showed that, in the control condition, non-white participants (M = 40.20, SD = 28.80) did not differ from white participants (M = 39.26, SD = 34.85), F(1, 611) = 0.30, p = 0.586. In the gender condition, there were differences in how white and non-white participants evaluated conservatives, F(1, 611) = 5.72, p = 0.017. Non-white participants evaluated conservatives more negatively (M = 31.56, SD = 27.03) than white participants (M = 43.45, SD = 33.28). The race condition showed significant differences for the evaluation of conservatives, F(1, 611) = 8.30, p = 0.004. Non-white participants rated conservatives more negatively (M = 33.79, SD = 28.57) than white participants (M = 46.46, SD = 34.56).

Because white vs. non-white women's attitudes is of particular interest, whether there was a race effect within each condition was also examined among women, only. When white (M = 39.70, SD = 34.39) and non-white women (M = 38.17, SD = 28.04) were made aware of a neutral identity, it did not influence their feelings toward conservatives, F(1, 611) = 0.08, p = 0.776. Women in the gender condition did evaluate conservatives differently when thinking about their gender, F(1, 611) = 5.53, p = 0.019, where white women felt more positive toward conservatives (M = 43.25, SD = 32.38) than non-white women (M = 30.29, SD = 25.41). In the race condition, white women (M = 44.03, SD = 34.62) did not evaluate conservatives differently than non-white women (M = 34.39, SD = 28.56), F(1, 611) = 2.88, p = 0.090, but these results were trending toward significance.

Feeling thermometer: liberals. Similar to the first study, there were no effects of identity salience on feelings toward liberals. Regardless of condition and gender, there were no significant effects, all F's < 2.52, all p's > .09.

Feeling thermometer: conservatives and liberals. Participants showed significant differences in evaluations of political parties, F(1, 611) = 132.87, p < .0001. However, it is qualified by a political party by race interaction, F(1, 611) = 7.77, p = 0.005. White participants evaluated conservatives (M = 42.97, SD = 34.27) more negatively than liberals (M = 60.74, SD = 31.63), F(1, 611) = 45.66, p < .0001. Non-white participants also evaluated conservatives (M = 35.12, SD = 28.27) more negatively than liberals (M = 66.05, SD = 25.16), F(1, 611) = 88.04, p < .0001. Further, there was no difference in how white and non-white participants felt towards liberals, F(1, 611) = 2.51, p < .114, but white participants evaluated conservatives more positively (M = 60.74, SD = 31.63) than non-white participants (M = 66.05, SD = 25.16), F(1, 611) = 7.24, p < .007. All other interactions were not statistically significant, all F's < 2.66, all p's > .07.

Discussion

The results from Study 2 showed that there were no differences in political identity or misogyny when made aware of one's race or gender identity. Similar to Study 1, we observed gender differences where men were more conservative than women. In Study 2, the race of participants also influenced political identity, meaning that non-white participants were more liberal than white participants.

However, Study 2 found a pattern of results for internalized misogyny that was not consistent with Study 1. White participants had lower levels of internalized misogyny in the control condition compared to the gender and race condition, while non-white participants showed no differences in internalized misogyny. Interestingly, the interaction between gender and race showed that non-white men had higher levels of misogyny than white men, which was not expected. There were no differences in internalized misogyny between white and non-white women.

When rating feelings toward groups, white participants felt more positive toward conservatives than non-white participants. Non-white participants felt more negative about conservatives than white participants in the gender and race conditions. White women felt more positive than non-white women toward conservatives only in the gender condition.

There were no significant effects for the way participants rated liberals, which was also unexpected. In Study 1 there were gender differences, but here all participants rated feelings toward liberals in generally the same way.

Comparing the two groups showed that white and non-white participants felt more negatively toward conservatives than liberals. While there was no difference between how white and non-white participants felt toward liberals, white participants felt more positive toward conservatives than non-white participants, who rated conservatives lower comparatively.

One potential reason that the results from Study 1 were not replicated could be due to the sample in Study 2 leaning more toward liberal/Democrat than the sample in Study 1. Perhaps this sample was not as representative of the larger population in terms of political leanings, which could have had an impact on the results.

The age differences and demographics of Study 1 also could have contributed to the lack of replicated results. The age of participants in Study 1 ranged from 18-22, which is a much smaller range than Study 2 (18-80). This smaller age range in Study 1 could account for differences in political views between Study 1 and Study 2. It is possible that the results were not replicated between studies due to the fact that political identity and levels of sexism may be fixed attitudes that cannot be easily swayed by the awareness of an identity.

Limitations

These studies are limited in a few ways. First, the sample in Study 1 is limited to a small number of undergraduate students at a private, mostly white institution. This may have affected the results since these students are not representative of the larger US population, especially in terms of race. Study 1 focused on a small sample of white participants, so the results are not generalizable to a larger group.

Second, the manipulation used to make an identity salient may not have made the relevant identity salient *enough*. That is, the manipulation may not have worked effectively. A possible solution would be to redesign how to make participants aware of their identities, possibly using images to activate their racial or gender identity. Additionally, the study may not be able to indicate whether the results were due to actual attitude preferences or if the results were obtained due to individual differences in the sampled populations. It could be beneficial to design a new study using a within-subjects design to measure participant's attitudes before and after an identity is made salient to see the implications of identity among the same participants.

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