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Kenneth P. Wilcox

*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

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# On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and Philosophical Idealism

Kenneth P. Wilcox

Now that the most recent era of American "Germanistik" — i.e., that of the almost exclusive commitment to the tenets of New Criticism — has reached its climax and begun to subside, its practitioners have begun to reopen themselves to pursuits the goals of which do not necessarily lie within the realm of the aesthetic. Only twenty years ago Rene Wellek condemned the extension of the literary scholar's horizon to include the investigation of national images as they express themselves in literature as being causative of a dissolution "of literary scholarship into social psychology."<sup>1</sup> Recently, however, the profession has become more receptive to claims for the need of this very type of expansion. In a paper delivered at the Amherst Colloquium on Modern German Literature in 1975, "Die sechste Schwierigkeit beim Schreiben der Wahrheit: Zum Gruppendenken in Leben und Literatur," Egon Schwarz spoke to the need for a study of stereotypes in literature. Literature and literary history (or, more accurately, its representation in "secondary" literature), said Schwarz, play an important role in the creation and propagation of stereotypes.<sup>2</sup> The benefit to be derived from such study would be — by implication — intellectual emancipation: Schwarz began his paper by expressing his opinion, "dass unser gesamtes emotionales und intellektuelles Leben in Mythen und Illusionen befangen ist, von denen wir uns trotz redlicher Bemühung nie ganz befreien können."<sup>3</sup>

In the same year Peter Boerner published an article in *Monatshefte*, "National Images and their Place in Literary Research: Germany as seen by Eighteenth-century French and English Reading Audiences," in which he too — albeit more cautiously — pleaded the need of such study. It is true: Boerner was more concerned with national images in general than with stereotypes in particular. He did, however, point to the fact that a definite line cannot always be drawn between them, for which reason, he implied, they too would be the legitimate object of such literary research. Boerner's reasoning was similar to that of Schwartz:

Although literary elements obviously play only a partial role in the development of national images, there is sound reason for literary scholarship to direct its special attention to them. It is the literary members of any society who, consciously or not, synthesize relevant observations about other societies and verbalize images of them."<sup>4</sup>

Boerner anticipated from the study of national images — and, by implication, stereotypes — in literature a wide range of benefits, ranging from its "hermeneutic usefulness when we attempt to understand the emotional and intellectual relations between the people of various nations"<sup>5</sup> to its ability to "help us reinstate some of the ties between scholars of literature and their colleagues in neighboring disciplines, ties which have become rather loose during the last two decades or so."<sup>6</sup>

Despite the expressed need for such study, little has been done. A consultation of the pertinent bibliographies and standard reference works produced for Germanists reveals that only scant attention has been paid to the concept of the stereotype by literary historians. Gero von Wilpert's *Sachwörterbuch der Literatur* (5th edition, 1969) doesn't even list the term, and Johannes Hansel's *Bücherkunde für Germanisten* (6th edition, 1972) offers no help whatsoever. The *Bibliographie der deutschen Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft* (i.e., "Eppelsheimer-Köttelwesch") contains (as of 1977) only two entries under the heading "stereotype": a book by Uta Quasthoff entitled *Soziales Vorurteil und Kommunikation. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse des Stereotyps*<sup>7</sup> and an article by Hans Bayer entitled "Kommunikation, Abstraktion und soziales Vorurteil. Zur Theorie des sprachlichen Stereotypes."<sup>8</sup>

Quasthoff begins her book with an overview of the various attempts at defining the stereotype, beginning with the first mention of the word itself in a scientific sense by Walter Lippmann in his book, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), and ending with the following definition (intended more as a summary of others' contributions than as original of her own):

Ein Stereotyp ist der verbale Ausdruck einer auf soziale Gruppen oder einzelne Personen als deren Mitglieder gerichteten Überzeugung. Es hat die logische Form eines Urteils, das in ungerechtfertigt vereinfachender und generalisierender Weise, mit emotional-wertender Tendenz, eine Klasse von Personen bestimmte Eigenschaften oder Verhaltensweisen zu- oder abspricht. Linguistisch ist es als Satz beschreibbar.<sup>9</sup>

This definition contains very little that was not already known. The only real addition is the use of the word "Überzeugung" (as opposed to "Einstellung"—and the condition that the stereotype have the grammatical form of the sentence (as opposed to that of a single word). According to these distinctions the word "nigger" stated emphatically and in isolation could represent either an "Einstellung" ("I don't like Blacks and am negatively predisposed toward them") or the abbreviated form of an "Überzeugung" (namely the sentence: "Blacks are bad").

Quasthoff then proceeds to her own attempt at an original contribution: the first "linguistically" oriented definition of a stereotype. Quasthoff's description employs logical categories and is, I believe, the first to do so systematically. The following sentence is an example of the "Grundform"<sup>10</sup> of the stereotype:

a) Der Deutsche ist fleissig.

It has the following form:

$\forall (x) [D(x) \rightarrow F(x)]$

which means:

Für alle x gilt, wenn x ein Deutscher ist,  
dann gehört x zu der Klasse der Fleissigen.

In terms of a description in logical categories, the stereotype does not differentiate itself from scientifically valid statements of the kind of which the following is an example:



This sentence can be represented by the same formula:

$$\forall (x) [M(x) \longrightarrow L(x)]$$

which means:

Für alle x gilt, wenn x ein Mensch ist,  
dann gehört x zu der Klasse der Lebewesen.

It is evident that a description in logical categories is inadequate, in that it does not differentiate between statements of type "a" and type "b".

The difference between the two lies on another level altogether. The statement "der Mensch ist ein Lebewesen" was arrived at inductively, whereas the statement "der Deutsche ist fleissig" is either based on hear-say, or it is the product of sheer speculation. In addition, the person who made the latter statement, if shown a German who is not industrious, will respond that the German in question is "kein richtiger Deutscher." The statement itself takes on the character of a "Wesenseinsicht"<sup>11</sup> and is as such no longer subject to empirical verification. This then is Quasthoff's main contribution to a definition of the stereotype: The stereotype pretends to be an a posteriori synthetic statement, but it is really an a priori analytic one.<sup>12</sup>

Quasthoff devotes the other half of her book to the question of the origin of the stereotype. Before presenting her own theory, she reviews those already in currency. They are three: 1) the authoritarian personality syndrome theory, 2) the scape-goat theory, and 3) the general semanticists' theory. The authoritarian personality syndrome theory was developed by Theodor Adorno and his associates in Berkeley in the late 1940's.<sup>13</sup> One characteristic of the authoritarian personality is that it suffers from an "Ich-Schwäche," for which it seeks compensation in xenophobia, one manifestation of which is the tendency to engage in stereotypic thinking:

Als Begründung für die Existenz solcher Bedürfnisse im intrapsychischen Haushalt und deren Befriedigung durch Vorurteile wird eine Ich-Schwäche des Individuums genannt, die der Kompensation bedarf und durch überstarke Identifikation mit der Wir-Gruppe und deren Führerpersönlichkeiten Stärkung sucht. So führt die Schwäche des eigenen Ichs, die Unsicherheit und die daraus resultierende übertriebene Bindung an die Wir-Gruppe zu einer "Bedrohungsorientierung"<sup>14</sup> gegen alles Fremde, Aussenstehende.<sup>15</sup>

The scapegoat theory (which, incidentally, does not necessarily contradict, but rather complements the authoritarian personality syndrome theory) has been propagated by so many authors and is so self-explanatory that it need not be elucidated.

The third, and perhaps least familiar, of the theories discussed by Quasthoff is that of the General Semanticists.<sup>16</sup> They concern themselves primarily with the relationship between language and reality, whereby all of their thinking is derived from three major premises:

- 1) A word is not the same as the thing to which it refers. The relationship between the two can be compared to that between a map and the territory to which it refers.



- 2) The map is necessarily incomplete.
- 3) Language is self-reflexive, i.e., words can be used in reference to other words (as opposed to things).

Another way of stating this would be: All language involves abstraction; abstraction necessarily involves distortion; using words in reference to words (as opposed to things) intensifies the level of abstraction and, hence, or distortion. Frequently we react to the language used in reference to objects, rather than to the objects themselves. The further removed from the objects to which it refers this language is, the more distorted the picture of them it presents, the less appropriate our behavior to the objects to which we are supposedly reacting.

This, then, is essentially what happens in the case of the stereotype. Mr. Smith is introduced to Mr. Jones. The person making the introduction says: "Mr. Jones is a Jew." Instead of reacting to Mr. Jones, Mr. Smith reacts to the word "Jew" and thus imputes to Mr. Jones all the characteristics associated with the stereotype "Jew." Mr. Smith is reacting to language rather than to the object to which the language in question refers. In this case, however, the language in question (the word "Jew") does not even refer directly to the object in question (Mr. Jones), but rather to other words (stingy, materialistic, etc.; i.e., all of those words associated with "the Jew"), which in turn refer to something that doesn't even exist ("the Jew" is an abstraction without a correlative in empirical reality). Because of the high level of abstraction involved here the distortion is necessarily great and Mr. Smith's behavior all the more likely to display a relatively high degree of inappropriateness.

The theory of General Semantics suggests a remedy: the avoidance of unnecessary abstraction, i.e. the use of language that refers directly to the object in question, rather than to other words which may (and then only directly) or may not refer back to it.

Quasthoff finds the first two of those three theories insufficient. The third she finds ludicrous. The very vehemence with which she attacks it suggests to the reader that it is perhaps not so much the argument itself, but rather the discrepancy between it and a set of beliefs to which she subscribes that she finds so objectionable. A closer look at her critique seems to confirm this suspicion. It consists of a) two arguments, both based on misunderstandings of the theory and b) a series of statements of belief that are lined up against their correlates allegedly underlying the theory of the General Semanticists like football players on a scrimmage line.

First of all, Quasthoff accuses the General Semanticists of confusing the word with the thing to which it refers:

Es gäbe Leute . . . , die beim Hören des Wortes "Klapperschlange" bleich werden. Das mag stimmen, jedoch gilt die Angst des betreffenden Menschen dann nicht dem Wort, sondern dem mit dem Wort bezeichneten Ding, mit dem er vermutlich sehr konkrete und reale Erfahrungen gemacht hat. Die beschriebene Reaktion auf das Wort, ohne dass eine Bedrohung durch eine tatsächlich vorhandene Klapperschlange gegeben wäre, ist dann im Sinne einer Konditionierung zu verstehen.<sup>17</sup>

It is questionable whether the people referred to here have, in fact, had any experience with rattlesnakes. But even if they have, Quasthoff has obviously misunderstood the essence of the argument itself. The fear they experience at the sound of the word "rattlesnake" is of course, just as she says, a result of conditioning. The crux of the issue is, however, that they have been conditioned to respond to the word "rattlesnake" with fear, and not just to the rattlesnake itself.

Secondly, Quasthoff accuses the General Semanticists of confusing word and concept:

Jemand, der unter einem durch einen schweren Verkehrsunfall ausgelösten Schock gelitten hat, wird nicht nur bei der Nennung des Wortes "Verkehrsunfall" erschreckt reagieren, sondern ebenso bei Wörtern wie "Unfall," "Autounfall," ja sogar besonders stark beim Hören der Sirene eines Unfallwagens. Der Wortkörper als Bezeichnung ist also keinesfalls das angstausslösende Moment.<sup>18</sup>

Quasthoff has introduced here an irrelevant distinction. The "concept," and not the word, is the abstraction to which the General Semanticists are objecting.

Quasthoff's other objections are nothing other than statements of belief. While conceding that the General Semantics, too, accept the necessity of abstraction, without which there could be no "scientific method," she accuses them of being "abstraktionsfeindlich."<sup>19</sup> In this connection she draws her readers' attention to the following sentence from Hayakawa's book, *Language in Thought and Action*: "Der Abstraktionsvorgang des Auslassens von Merkmalen ist ein unerlässliches Verfahren."<sup>20</sup> Using this sentence as a point of departure, she clarifies her critique:

In diesem letzten Zitat offenbart sich deutlich der Punkt, an dem eine Kritik auszusetzen hat: Nicht allein um den Vorwurf der Abstraktionsfeindlichkeit kann es gehen, sondern der Abstraktionsbegriff selbst muss einer Differenzierung unterzogen werden. Unter Abstraktion versteht die Allgemeine Semantik tatsächlich *nur* ein Weglassen, so dass die Repräsentation des Gegenstandes mit steigender Abstraktionshöhe immer unvollständiger wird. Es wird übersehen, dass der Abstraktionsprozess nicht einfach eine lineare Reduktion von Merkmalen beinhaltet, sondern dass die generelle Trennung von Akzidentiellem und Essentiellem sein Wesen ausmacht.<sup>21</sup>

Abstraction is always, whether one is a positivist or an idealist, a process of "Weglassen." The distinction between "Akzidentiellem und Essentiellem," however valid, is a subjective one. But for Quasthoff this distinction is an objective one, and the essence that she hopes to distill out through abstraction belongs to the realm of noumena, not to that of phenomena. For Quasthoff there is a kind of truth that is not dependent on empirical verification, as is evident from her claim to the effect that the General Semanticists' cure for stereotypitis is fallacious because it is predicated on "einem positivistischen Wahrheitsbegriff, der sich ausschliesslich auf die empirische Wahrheitsbegriffe gründet."<sup>22</sup> In fact, Quasthoff does not really object to the use of stereotypes, as long as they are an outgrowth of the "right" ideology:



eines neuen methodischen Vorgehens in der Vorurteilsforschung impliziert, folgendermassen zu formulieren: Die Frage nach der Funktion von sozialen Vorurteilen kann man nicht wertfrei beantworten. Man muss vielmehr bei der Analyse von den oben gestellten Fragen nach dem Zusammenhang dieser Vorurteile mit ihrer Interessengebundenheit ausgehen. Dabei kann man nicht mehr von dem sozialen Vorurteil als genereller Erscheinung sprechen, sondern muss die Funktion einzelner Vorurteile oder einzelner Klassen von Vorurteilen in ihren konkreten Zusammenhängen betrachten. Die Kategorie "soziales Vorurteil" ist dann nur noch eine Abstraktion, die die dialektik der Funktionen in sich vereint. Nur so lässt sich das Dilemma der Polarität von positiver und negativer Funktion auflösen und das Verhältnis von sozialem Vorurteil und Ideologie konkret begreifen. Bewertet wird dann weniger das einzelne soziale Vorurteil sondern die Ideologie, deren Ausdruck es ist.<sup>23</sup>

The "right" ideology is one that calls for an "Änderung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse." Quasthoff's ultimate objection to the theory of the General Semanticists is not that it is incorrect, but rather that it doesn't call for such an "Änderung":

Wenn man sich weiterhin der dargestellten Schwierigkeiten und Grenzen bei den Versuchen zum Abbau von Vorurteilen innerhalb der gegenwärtigen amerikanischen Gesellschaftsstruktur erinnert und dagegen hält, dass die Allgemeine Semantik durch Indizierung erreichbares "bewusstes Abstrahieren"<sup>24</sup> als Heilmittel gegen Rassismus empfiehlt, so tritt auch die Stossrichtung dieser Ideologie zutage: Eine Änderung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, ein Infragestellen des kapitalistischen Systems — Konsequenzen, zu denen das Faktum des Rassenhasses führen müsste — wird durch das Studium der Semantik überflüssig.<sup>15</sup>

Not only does Quasthoff approve of the use of stereotypes that are an outgrowth of the ideology to which she herself subscribes, she also employs this ideology in her explanation of the origin of the stereotype. She differentiates between the "Disposition" (predisposition) for trafficking in stereotypes and the "Äusserungsform" (actual expression) of them. The former is psychologically determined, the latter socio-economically. Thus, the three theories mentioned are of limited value. At best, they can offer insight into the question of "Disposition;" however, they are worthless as regards the question of "Äusserungsform." Moreover, because even psychological factors are ultimately determined by socio-economic ones, these three theories are incapable of providing us with final insights into the question of "Disposition" as well.<sup>26</sup>

The ideology to which Quasthoff subscribes is a relatively simplified Marxism, in accordance with which her own answer to the question of the origin of the stereotype is as follows:

Rassistische Vorurteile sind auch im Marxschen Sinn Ideologie. Sie sind jedoch Teil einer spezifischen Form von Ideologie, die dann auf-



Wilcox: On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and tritt, wenn der Widerspruch zwischen Produktionsverhältnissen und Produktkräften offensichtlich zu werden beginnt und eine neue revolutionäre Klasse sich herausbildet. Sie dient der Machtstabilisierung einer bedrohten Klasse bzw. dem Versuch der Wiedergewinnung der Macht einer untergehenden Klasse und wird z.T. bewusst als Herrschaftsmittel eingesetzt.<sup>27</sup>

Quasthoff admits: "Die Überprüfung dieser Hypothese hätte eine Analyse der sozialen und ökonomischen Situation in verschiedenen Ländern und verschiedenen Epochen zu leisten und sie in Beziehung zu setzen zu rassistischen oder fremdenfeindlichen Ideologien."<sup>28</sup> It is, however, characteristic of Quasthoff's approach that the formulation of the hypothesis precedes all consideration of empirical data.

Hans Bayer's aforementioned article, "Kommunikation, Abstraktion und soziales Vorurteil," is really nothing more than an abridged version of Quasthoff's book.<sup>29</sup> Like Quasthoff, Bayer is vehemently opposed to the theory of the General Semanticists and their suggestion that the stereotype could be eliminated if people were to be taught not to engage in unnecessary or illegitimate abstraction. He, too, sees the stereotype as an outgrowth of ideology; and, he, too, views ideology favorably, providing the ideology in question is the "right" one. He devotes a good deal of ink to defending it, extolling its "reale sozialpolitische Orientierungsfunktion."<sup>30</sup> In extolling the virtues of ideology Bayer is consciously attacking empiricism<sup>31</sup> and advocating a subjective interpretation of reality.<sup>32</sup> With Quasthoff, Bayer admits that stereotypes can be used to evil ends; but, like Quasthoff, he feels that they can also be employed -- by groups motivated by the "right" ideology -- to good ends, namely "zur Veränderung bestehender Verhältnisse."<sup>33</sup>

A critical evaluation of the Marxist answer given by both Quasthoff and Bayer to the question of the origin of the stereotype would go beyond the scope of this paper. Whether "Disposition" or "Äusserungsform," psychological or socio-economic factors, "Geist" or "Materie" is more important in the creation of a stereotype is a question that cannot be answered with any real certainty. Their tendency to seek an ultimate cause in the socio-economic sphere smacks of an unnecessarily vulgar Marxism. Even if it were possible to determine that socio-economic factors precede and perhaps even determine psychological ones, it would be necessary to accept and deal with an ultimately reciprocal relationship between the two.

Their studies do, however, provide guidelines for further investigations. Quasthoff's (and Bayer's) conclusion that stereotypes are a priori analytic statements pretending to be a posteriori synthetic ones coupled with her speculatively arrived at answer to the question of the origin of the stereotype and her subsequent defense of the use of the stereotype in the service of the "right" ideology suggests the following question: What is the relationship between the stereotype and idealistic philosophy? In order to answer this question, I propose to examine the construction and use of stereotypes in the novels of Arthur Dinter.

According to one of the most prominent historians of recent years, Arthur Dinter was the first writer to "put racist ideas in the forefront of a novel."<sup>34</sup> Dinter was the leading *voelkisch* publicist of the five years between the beginning of 1918 and the end of 1922. In these five years he published his then famous anti-semitic trilogy, *Die drei Sünden der Zeit*.<sup>35</sup> The first of the three novels of which the trilogy was composed, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, sold over 260,000 copies between 1918 and 1936;<sup>36</sup> it has been estimated that it was read by well over 1.5 million people.<sup>37</sup> With this kind of circulation, it certainly must have done more to help spread the doctrine of racial anti-Semitism than any other work written with the possible exception of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.<sup>38</sup> In the years following its initial appearance, Dinter was seen by the *C.V. Zeitung*, the organ of the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith, as its public enemy number one.<sup>39</sup> His novel inspired so many imitations that Stefan Grossman, editor of the influential democratic weekly, *Das Tageblatt*, began talking about an epidemic of "Dinteritis."<sup>40</sup> The importance of this novel can be seen by comparing its publication record with that of other works with which we are more familiar. Thomas Mann's *Tod in Venedig*, for example, sold only about 80,000 copies in the same time period, 1918-1936, and his *Tonio Kröger* only about 99,000;<sup>41</sup> Dinter's novel outsold either of these two by a margin of about 3 to 1. It was, in fact, either the fourth or fifth bestselling work of fiction in the decade between 1920 and 1930.<sup>42</sup>

After his success as a novelist Dinter entered into practical politics and was, among other things, the Nazi "Gauleiter" of Thuringia in the years 1924-1927. Thuringia was the strongest of all Nazi strongholds in the years prior to the takeover in 1933, and Dinter was the man who built up the entire political network for the party there.<sup>43</sup>

He was, however, forced to resign from his position as "Gauleiter" in 1927 and then expelled from the party in 1928. This break was due to three factors: first of all, his cantankerousness (in party correspondence from the mid-twenties can be found numerous references to "Dinterkrach");<sup>44</sup> secondly, his tendency to challenge Hitler's role as the sole decision-maker within the party;<sup>45</sup> and thirdly, his increasing interest in Germanic religion and preoccupation with the possibility of a spiritual revolution, as opposed to a political one.<sup>46</sup> Already prior to his expulsion from the party he had founded his own church, the "Deutsche Volkskirche." It was finally banned by the Nazis in 1937, at which point it had over 300,000 "Anhänger."<sup>47</sup> There are still small enclaves of this church in existence today.<sup>48</sup>

*Die Sünde wider das Blut* is the story of Hermann Kämpfer, a blue-eyed, blond-haired "Privatdozent" at a German university who, like Dinter himself, holds a doctorate in chemistry and is licensed to teach all of the natural sciences at the "Gymnasium" level. The novel begins as Hermann falls in love with a beautiful, blue-eyed, blonde girl, his seeming counterpart. Their courtship, while intense, is a purely spiritual one. They spend most of it reading Kant, Plato, and the Bible, Hermann functioning as teacher and Elisabeth, his fiancée, as pupil. Hermann is mildly troubled with Elisabeth's parentage: her father is Jewish. But it seems to have had no mitigating effect on either her spiritual or



physical nobility. Later, however, we learn that it was only the good influence of Hermann and the spiritual pursuits in which he engaged her that made it possible for the noble blood of her mother to repress the animalistic blood of her father in her veins.

But all this changes after the marriage takes place. The sensual experience of sexual intercourse reawakens in her her Jewish blood, which, having been given a mode of expression, can now assert itself. Now all that Elisabeth wants to do is to go to parties and to make love; she discontinues her study of Kant, Plato, and the Bible altogether; Hermann suffers immeasurably; and then, and here we reach the nadir of German literature, she bears her first child:

Ein dunkelhäutiges, mit pechschwarzem, krausem Kopfhaar bedecktes, menschenunähnliches Etwas schrie ihm [Hermann] entgegen. Tiefdunkle Augen, die einen blaulichen Schimmer zu haben schienen, blinzelten ihn unter langen schwarzen Wimpern aus einem uralten Gesicht an. Eine plattgedrückte Nase gab dem Kopfe etwas affenähnliches.<sup>49</sup>

Hermann, flabbergasted, runs to the library and checks out all the books on race and genetics he can find. He discovers that race is the spiritual and physical individuality of the "Volk." Germans are noble, creative, idealistic, and beautiful. Jews are their antipodes. They are base, parasitic, materialistic, and ugly. Assimilation offers no solution to the racial problem. The progeny of mixed marriages is invariably dominated by its Jewish blood. What we have is a case of racial atavism, the recurrence of the racial characteristics of a grandparent. Racial assimilation is, from the German point of view, tantamount to racial pollution. The novel goes on and on and on in the same vein, with ever more episodes in the life of Hermann Kämpfer, all demonstrating, however, essentially the same points. I will, therefore, forgo a further rendering of the plotline.

Important to my line of thought here is only the characterization of Germans and Jews, the former in exclusively positive, the latter in exclusively negative terms. Dinter is, of course, trafficking in stereotypes. He even went so far as to invent a cosmology which - to his way of thinking, at least - justified this kind of stereotypic thinking. Dinter's religion, which he called "Geistchristentum," had at its foundation the following dogma.<sup>50</sup> In the beginning there was God, and all was one with God. And then - through sin - certain spirits fell away from God. Their task, since this initial fall, has been to return to oneness with God. This they do, in the course of repeated incarnations, through self-improvement or "Bildung." In the course of every life one is presented with a new set of moral obstacles. If one performs well on this moral obstacle course, one's spirit will be closer to God at the completion of one's life. One continues to be reincarnated until one has been confronted with and has overcome all conceivable moral obstacles, at which point one returns to oneness with God.

At any given point in the history of the universe some spirits will, necessarily, be closer to God and others further away. Those that are further away from God choose (and not only choose, but - to be precise - actually "form") Jewish bodies in which to incarnate themselves. And those that are closer to God choose, i.e., "form" Aryan ones. They make these choices as a matter of effi-



ciency: Jewish bodies are more appropriate to the execution of evil deeds, Aryan bodies more appropriate to the execution of good ones. Thus there is - according to the cosmology - no such thing as a good Jew, and no such thing as a bad German, by definition. If a Jew is good, he's not really a Jew, he's a German; and if a German is bad, he's not really a German, he's a Jew. Like Göring,<sup>51</sup> a person of Dinter's ilk could determine for himself who was a Jew and who wasn't.

What is interesting about Dinter's philosophy is not so much its import, but rather the fact that he claimed to have gotten it from the classical idealists: "Meine Philosophie gründet sich auf die Philosophie Platos, Kants und Goethes, der ich als Zögling des philosophischen Seminars der Universität Strassburg seit meiner Studentenzeit inbrünstig ergeben bin."<sup>52</sup> At other points in his literary work he would include Schiller and Kleist in his list of spiritual mentors.<sup>53</sup> All of these thinkers, he would insist, had contributed in a direct way to his world view; he was, in fact, one of their few true spiritual heirs.<sup>54</sup> That Dinter aspired to a place for himself in their ranks is evidenced by his repeated attempts to publish his works with the Cotta Verlag,<sup>55</sup> and that he even went so far as to imitate their works, both stylistically and thematically.<sup>56</sup>

It is, of course, true that Dinter's thinking represents both a perversion and a subsequent misuse of the tenets of those whose spiritual heir he imagined himself to be. One must, however, be cautioned against dismissing an investigation into the relationship between Dinter's view and his supposed models as superfluous. Dinter was highly educated<sup>57</sup> and utterly sincere; he was extremely influential, perhaps so much so that the claim that he helped to prepare the way for the "Endlösung" is not too far-fetched.<sup>58</sup>

His ideas were shared by, and in some cases borrowed from, some of the most influential (albeit qualitatively questionable) opinion-makers of the era, including both Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Friedrich Lienhard. Dinter had begun to read Chamberlain's works, including *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*,<sup>59</sup> *Goethe*,<sup>60</sup> *Kant*,<sup>61</sup> and *Die Worte Christi*,<sup>62</sup> sometime in the first half of 1914, the effect of which was that he underwent a spiritual revolution:

Wie ein Magnet plötzlich Richtung und System in einen Haufen Eisenfeilicht bringt, so ordneten sich unter dem Eindruck des Buches [*Die Grundlagen*] meine Empfindungen und Erfahrungen, Gedanken und Vermutungen zur geschlossenen Kette. Sofort schaffte ich mir Chamberlains übrige Werke an. Sein "Kant" war mir eine Offenbarung, sein "Goethe" wirkte auf mich wie eine kopernikanische Tat, sein "Worte Christi" wurden mein ständiger Begleiter. Es vollzog sich in mir eine vollkommene geistige Wiedergeburt.<sup>63</sup>

The works of Friedrich Lienhard had much the same effect on him. By 1915 he had definitely read Lienhard's *Wege nach Weimar*,<sup>64</sup> which he referred to in an article he had written to eulogize Lienhard in *Bühne und Welt* as an "Evangelium."<sup>65</sup>

I would like to proceed by identifying some of the motifs that Dinter claimed to have gotten from the classical idealists and then to try to establish the extent

Wilcox: On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and to which he perverted them, or to which they had already been perverted for him by his mentors, Chamberlain and Lienhard.

To begin with, Dinter's entire cosmology was based on the Neoplatonian "Emanationstheorie" to which Goethe subscribed. It is, in fact, at least in form, and if one subtracts the racial elements, in content as well, nothing more than an arbitrarily appropriated and somewhat capriciously reworked version of the cosmology Goethe describes at the end of the Eighth Book of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*.<sup>66</sup> In a yet unpublished work, Dinter credits Goethe's cosmology as his source.<sup>67</sup>

Intrinsic to Dinter's cosmology is the idea that there is a correspondence between outer appearance and inner character. This idea was common to many eighteenth-century thinkers, both in its general formulation, that form reflects content, and in its more specific formulation — and here I am referring to the idea of "Kalokagathie," i.e., moral beauty. It was Schiller, however, who first provided the theoretical foundation for the concept of "Kalokagathie," both in his six letters to Körner "Über die Schönheit"<sup>68</sup> and in his famous treatise of 1793, "Über Anmut und Würde."<sup>69</sup> His argument ran as follows: If a person is such that his natural side is in harmony with his rational, or moral, side, he will exhibit a certain grace in his movements or actions. And if these movements or actions are repeated often enough, they will solidify themselves in the form of physical beauty.<sup>70</sup> The argument found its most memorable expression in that pithy verse from *Wallenstein* known to every German with a "Gymnasium" education since the mid-nineteenth century: "Es ist der Geist, der sich den Körper baut."<sup>71</sup> At the same time that Dinter was developing the idea of the "Kalokagathie," Franz Joseph Gall was laying the ground work for what was to become the science of the determination of character through the study of the shape of a person's skull.<sup>72</sup> Gall's work owed much to that of Johann Caspar Lavater,<sup>73</sup> whose *Physiognomische Fragmente*<sup>74</sup> had attracted a great deal of attention thirty years before. Knowing that Goethe had collaborated with Lavater on this work,<sup>75</sup> it is not surprising to find that he responded favorably to Gall's lectures.<sup>76</sup>

This entire thought complex was appropriated by both Lienhard and Chamberlain. Lienhard's *Wege nach Weimar* are imbued with it; occasionally, they even appeal to it directly: "Wie sich der Geist von innen heraus den Körper bildet. . ."<sup>77</sup> And Chamberlain's *Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* are really nothing more than an elaboration of the same theme. It finds its best expression in his much quoted lines:

O Mittelalter! Wann wird deine Macht von uns weichen?  
Wann werden die Menschen es begreifen,  
dass Gestalt nicht ein gleichgültiger Zufall ist,  
sondern ein Ausdruck des innersten Wesens?<sup>78</sup>

Among those who quoted this passage from Chamberlain was the portrait painter, Robert Burger-Villingen.<sup>79</sup> Although now forgotten, Burger-Villingen played an important role in the popularization of the application of phrenology to the so-called "Jewish question." Among other things, he invented the "plastometer," a device that was to enable its user to measure the human skull and



through the measurements thus obtained determine the racial origin and thus character of its owner. It was, in fact, the plastometer that was used in the 1930's to determine whether or not an applicant for the SS should be accepted.<sup>80</sup> That Burger-Villingen saw himself and his followers saw him also as the spiritual heir to Lavater, Goethe, and Gall is evident from articles that appeared in *Die menschlichen Formgesetze*, the organ of their organization, the "Bund zur Förderung der Menschenkenntnis." For example:

"Menschenkenntnis nach Formgesetzen" lautet das Thema, das der bekannte Forscher Robert Burger-Villingen seinem morgigen Vortrag im "Prälaten" gegeben hat. Schon seit Urzeiten haben sich hervorragende Persönlichkeiten wie Theophrast, Plinius, Gall und Lavater mit dem Problem beschäftigt, den Charakter der Menschen aus der Schädel- und Gesichtsform zu erkennen. Der Vortrag behandelt also ein Geheiß, das von jeher starke Anziehung auf die hervorragendsten Geister - auch Goethe beschäftigte sich eine Zeit lang ernsthaft mit Lavaters Lehre - ausgeübt hat.<sup>81</sup>

Dinter spent the summer of 1920 with Burger-Villingen at the estate of the family Kleist-Retzow in Pomerania.<sup>82</sup> The friendship which ensued was an important factor in the development of Dinter's cosmology and its claim that good spirits choose, and in fact "form," Aryan bodies, and that evil spirits choose, and in fact "form," Jewish ones.

And it was, of course, this claim, a claim which was tantamount to the equation of Jewry with evil, that lay at the heart of Dinter's particular brand of stereotypic thinking. But "Kalokagathie" was only one of three classical concepts to which Dinter appealed. The other two were those of the "Ding an sich" and teleology. From the first Dinter was indebted to Kant; after that he borrowed from Schiller. In both cases, however, his perception of the concept in question was colored by the way in which he had found it portrayed in the writings of his mentors, Lienhard and Chamberlain.

Dinter was convinced that there is something inside each one of us that corresponds to a Platonic form or a Kantian "Ding an sich." He found confirmation of this notion in the *Wege nach Weimar*. Here Lienhard had devoted a lot of time to talking about things like the "göttlichen Mittelpunkt in unserer eigenen Brust," which idea he attributes to Plato, Kant and Schiller: "Es ist auch ein Kerngedanke Schillers und Kants; er geht auch durch den ganzen Platonismus," and then later to Goethe.<sup>83</sup> In fairness to Lienhard, however, it must be said that he explicitly warned against the moral dangers involved in viewing this "Mittelpunkt in unserer eigenen Brust" in racial terms.<sup>84</sup>

Chamberlain, however, did precisely that, as is evidenced by the following passage from the *Grundlagen*:

Man braucht nicht die authentische Hethiternase zu besitzen, um Jude zu sein, viel mehr bezeichnet dieses Wort, vor allem eine besondere Art zu fühlen und zu denken; ein Mensch kann sehr schnell, ohne Israelit zu sein, Jude werden; mancher braucht nur fleissig bei Juden zu verkehren, jüdische Zeitungen zu lesen und sich an jüdische Lebensauffassung, Literatur und Kunst zu gewöhnen.



Wilcox: On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and Andererseits ist es sinnlos, einen Israeliten echterer Abstammung, dem es gelungen ist, die Fesseln Esras und Nehemias abzuwerfen, in dessen Kopf das Gesetz Mose und in dessen Herzen die Verachtung anderer keine Stätte mehr findet, einen "Juden zu nennen."<sup>85</sup>

These lines were triple-underlined in Dinter's copy.<sup>86</sup>

It was probably this passage, in combination with that from Lienhard cited above, that led Dinter to the conclusion that the "Rassenfrage" "sich zwanglos in die Gedankengänge Kants über das Ding an sich und den intelligibeln und empirischen Charakter fügt."<sup>87</sup> The thought process is a simple one, indeed: one begins by establishing the concept of a soul and then identifying it with the "Ding an sich."<sup>88</sup> Next one says that Jewishness is a spiritual, and not a physical, quality. Finally, one equates Jewishness with evil; and the conclusion is inescapable: "Das jüdische Wesen" ist eine seelisch-sittliche, auf Eigensucht und Stoffsucht (Egoismus und Materialismus) gründende Haltung, die sich ebenso bei Juden wie bei Nichtjuden findet. Diesen 'Juden' in uns und um uns niederzuzwingen, das ist die eigentliche Aufgabe eines wahren Christentums."<sup>89</sup>

For Kant, of course, the "Ding an sich" was unknowable, and, as such, not a valid object of scientific investigation.<sup>90</sup> According to Kant, knowledge of the "Ding an sich" would require an "intellektuelle Anschauungsart, die aber nicht die unsrige ist."<sup>91</sup> Dinter, however, alleged that he was in possession of such an "intellektuelle Anschauungsart" himself.

The same kind of presumption is evidenced in Dinter's application of the idea of teleology to the so-called "Rassenfrage." There can be little doubt that he was influenced in his thinking by Chamberlain, in whose *Grundlagen* the entire history of the world is viewed as a struggle between good and evil, "das Germanische" and "das Ungermanische," the ultimate outcome of which is - or at least should be - clear.<sup>92</sup> That Chamberlain was in turn influenced in his thinking by Kant, goes without saying. Ostensibly, both Dinter and Chamberlain were unerring disciples of Kant. Both, however, took Kant too literally. According to Kant, the idea of "teleology" (like all the other ideas of pure reason) has an only regulative function. That is, it "may suggest avenues of investigation which would have remained unknown to us on a strictly mechanical approach,"<sup>93</sup> or "may aid us in attempting to systematize our knowledge."<sup>94</sup> The idea of "teleology" (like all the other ideas of pure reason) may be employed, however, only "for the sake of physical explanation,"<sup>95</sup> and may only "assist us in looking for mechanical explanations, not for substitute or concurrent explanations of a different kind."<sup>96</sup> Dinter, and to a lesser extent Chamberlain as well, attempted to exact a metaphysical explanation of that which is only physical through an unqualified application of an "Idee" to the world of phenomena.

Of even greater importance than the concepts of "Kalokagathie," the "Ding an sich," or teleology is yet another link through which the *voelkish* thinkers sought to associate themselves with the tradition of philosophical idealism and thus lend an air of respectability to their endeavors: the idea that speculative thinking is superior to empirical investigation. Revealing in this regard is a passage from the beginning of the *Sünde wider das Blut*. Kämpfer, the hero of

the book, is working in the chemistry lab, trying to synthesize protein. He has just failed again, after several other attempts. He seeks now consolation for his failure in the words of Goethe, as taken from *Faust I*:

Und was Natur nicht offenbaren will,

Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.<sup>97</sup>

It is, of course, not Goethe who is speaking here, but rather Faust. Only Dinter doesn't know that. More characteristic of Goethe's opinion on this matter is his statement in the *Annalen*, "dass die Natur kein Geheimnis habe, was sie nicht irgendwo dem aufmerksamen Beobachter vor die Augen stellt."<sup>98</sup> Kämpfer, however, decides to throw out empiricism because it cannot provide us with knowledge of the "Dinge an sich" that stand behind the things in the world of empirical reality:

Selbst wenn sie [die Wissenschaft] as fertig brächte, das letzte Steinchen und Hälmdchen und Käferchen in seine letzten Atome zu zerlegen und aus ihnen wieder zusammenzusetzen. . . , der starren Fessel der Materie, die uns umengt, hätten wir uns dadurch doch nicht entwunden und dem, was hinter den Dingen steht, wären wir auch nicht um Haaresbreite nähergerückt.<sup>99</sup>

Kämpfer comes to the conclusion that actual knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality is a prerequisite to all scientific endeavor: "Ohne die Voraussetzungen Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit war hier keine Lösung zu finden."<sup>100</sup> Because empiricism cannot provide us with answers to the essential metaphysical questions (i.e., cannot provide us with any knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality), it should be abandoned in favor of metaphysics.

With this mention of God, freedom, and immortality Dinter was, of course, alluding to Kant. His conclusions are based, however, on a rather slanted reading of the first *Kritik*. God, freedom, and immortality are, within the context of the Kantian system, postulates of pure reason. They are not meant to be objects of scientific investigation, but rather to function as guidelines, which can help to give direction to our empirical investigation of the subject matter of the natural sciences. They are not things about which we can have knowledge, nor should we care to. Kant introduced them in the first of his three *Kritiken*, that of "reine Vernunft," which was designed to do nothing other than show that natural science is indeed possible; that is, "that nature is organized in such a way that we will be able to discover and systematize empirical laws."<sup>101</sup>

But Dinter, due to his -- and Chamberlain's and Lienhard's -- inaccurate reading of Kant, turned the first *Kritik* into an apology of metaphysics. For all three of them -- Dinter, Chamberlain, and Lienhard -- the alleged superiority of speculative thinking over empirical investigation is central to Kant's thinking.

This attitude expresses itself in two ways: first of all, in the claim that the "ideal" world is more authentic than the "real" one; and secondly, in the claim that knowledge of the ideal can be obtained more efficiently through speculation or intuition than empirical investigation. Chamberlain, for example, writes:

Aus der allerunmittelbarsten Erfahrung meines eigenen Lebens



Wilcox: On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and erkenne ich - aus der mechanischen Natur - das Dasein einer unmechanischen Natur. Diese kann man vielleicht der Deutlichkeit halber die ideale Welt nennen, im Gegensatz zur realen; nicht etwa, dass sie weniger real, d.h. wirklich sei, im Gegenteil, sie ist offenbar das Allersicherste, was wir besitzen, das einzige unmittelbar Gegebene, und es sollte insofern vielmehr die äussere Welt die 'ideale' genannt werden; doch nennt man jene die ideale, weil sie in Ideen, nicht in Gegenständen sich verkörpert.<sup>102</sup>

Dinter may have been influenced by Chamberlain through this passage; in any case, he was in agreement with him here: next to these lines in Dinter's copy of the *Grundlagen* stands the word "Wunderbar!" in his handwriting.<sup>103</sup>

Equally impressive to Dinter was Chamberlain's contention that intuition is superior to empirical investigation. The following passage, for example, has been triple-underlined in Dinter's copy:<sup>104</sup>

Überhaupt ist die Wissenschaft eine zwar herrliche, doch nicht ungefährliche Freundin; sie ist eine grosse Gauklerin und verführt den Geist leicht zu toller Schwärmerei; Wissenschaft und Kunst sind wie die Rosse an Platos Seelenwagen; der "gesunde Menschenverstand". . . bewährt sich nicht zum wenigsten darin, dass er die Zügel straff spannt und diesen edlen Tieren nicht gestattet, mit seinem natürlichen, gesunden Urteil durchzugehen. Einfach vermöge unserer Eigenschaft als lebendige Wesen steckt in uns eine unendlich reiche und sichere Fähigkeit, dort, wo es Not tut, auch ohne Gelehrsamkeit das Richtige zu treffen. Wer unbefangen und mit lauterem Sinn die Natur befragt. . . kann sicher sein, eine Antwort zu erhalten, wie sie eine Mutter ihrem Sohne gibt, nicht immer logisch untadelhaft, doch wesentlich richtig, verständlich und auf das Beste des Sohnes mit sicherem Instinkte gerichtet.<sup>105</sup>

In the very next sentence (also triple-underlined in Dinter's copy) Chamberlain then applies this principle to the racial question: "So auch in der Frage, was Rasse zu bedeuten habe: eine der wichtigsten, vielleicht die allerwichtigste Lebensfrage, die an den Menschen herantreten kann."<sup>106</sup>

In Lienhard's writings Dinter saw and praised these same tendencies. This is evidenced in his eulogy of Lienhard:

Lienhards Weltanschauung wurzelt in der tiefinnerlichen Gewissheit, dass unser wahres Wesen einer geistigen Welt entstammt, in die es durch den Tod zurückkehrt. Unsere Zugehörigkeit zu einer übersinnlichen Welt ist nicht empirisch zu beweisen, sondern muss innerlich erlebt werden. Die innere, nicht sinnliche Erfahrung beansprucht aber dieselbe Realität wie die sinnliche.<sup>107</sup>

Dinter's assessment of Lienhard's writings was not inaccurate. Just like Chamberlain's *Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Lienhard's *Wege nach Weimar* treats of "Regionen des Geistes,"<sup>108</sup> die uns durch keine Schaufel und kein Mikroskop erklärt werden."<sup>109</sup> These "Regionen des Geistes" can be explained only through intuition: "Der Weg zum Erschauen des Ganzen und des Feinsten geht durch die intuitive Kraft des Innern."<sup>110</sup> And this holds true



for our inquiries into the "Rassenfrage" as well: the nature of the Aryan or "heroic" soul cannot be explained materially, it is "einem logischen Beweis unzugänglich."<sup>111</sup>

These two tendencies -- to assign greater authenticity to the ideal than to the real and to attribute greater validity to intuition than to empirical investigation -- are potentially dangerous when applied to the so-called "Rassenfrage." But, even more fundamental than this error in application, is the error -- on the part of all three: Lienhard, Chamberlain, and Dinter -- in derivation. It is simply incorrect to ascribe these tendencies to Kant, and to do so is to pervert him.

Dinter's perception of Schiller, however, was somewhat less perverted; that is, when Dinter ascribes these tendencies to Schiller he does so with some justification. His words in the *Sünde wider die Liebe* "So paradox es klingt, so wahr ist es: das reine Wissen ist um so vollkommener, je gereinigter es ist von empirischen (durch Erfahrung gewonnen) Bestandteilen"<sup>112</sup> bear some similarity to Schiller's in the tenth of the "Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung der Menschheit":

Zwar wird uns dieser transcendente Weg eine Zeitlang aus dem traulichen Kreis der Erfahrung und aus der lebendigen Gegenwart der Dinge entfernen und auf dem nackten Gefild abgezogener Begriffe verweilen, aber wir streben ja nach einem festen Grund der Erkenntnis, den nichts mehr erschüttern soll, und wer sich über die Wirklichkeit nie hinauswagt, der wird nie die Wahrheit erobern.<sup>113</sup>

And there is a certain obvious parallel between the process intrinsic to Schiller's method of speculation and that intrinsic to Dinter's way of producing stereotypes. Both processes are essentially anti-empirical in nature. That is, both encourage the making of a priori analytic statements. Schiller, for example, prides himself on having arrived at a generalization concerning the nature of beauty (namely, that all beauty is "Freiheit in der Erscheinung"), from which all empirical manifestations of beauty could be deduced, without having examined a single instance of beauty itself. And, as if that weren't enough, it was not in need of verification.<sup>114</sup>

Dinter did much the same thing. Having arrived, through speculation, at the generalization that all Jews are evil, he then proceeded to deduce from his generalization specific, empirical manifestations of Jewishness. By dint of this process Hermann Sudermann, who turned against Dinter after the latter's conversion to anti-Semitism, became a "Gesinnungsjude."<sup>115</sup> And by the early 1920's Dinter had come to the conclusion that Jews who had grown sufficiently in spirit and morality could become Aryans.<sup>116</sup>

It has not been my intent to blame the creators of German philosophical idealism for the tendency to traffic in stereotypes that one finds among writers like Dinter. But I would like to suggest the following: There are certain characteristics inherent in metaphysical thinking that encourage its practitioners to think in stereotypic terms. I am referring to its tendency to circumvent empirical reality. Instead of arriving at generalizations through observation followed by induction, it tends to do so through speculation. The generalizations at which it thus arrives have a greater truth value than do those arrived at through

Wilcox: On the Construction of Stereotypes, the Problem of Induction, and observation and induction, because their validity is not dependent upon anything so transient as the empirical world. It can then take these generalizations and from them deduce a kind of a substitute for empirical reality. This is what Dinter did, and he might have not found it so easy to do so had he come of age in a culture with a more empirical orientation.

To what extent the ideas presented in this paper contradict, complement, or perhaps even connect the various theories concerning the origin of stereotypes mentioned in Quasthoff is a matter that invites further inquiry. What this paper has revealed, however, is the hidden connection between writers like Quasthoff, on the one hand, and Dinter on the other. Both Quasthoff and Dinter are idealistic thinkers in the sense that both subscribe to an ideology that seems to color their perception of empirical reality. Both recognize the stereotype for what it is: an apriori analytic statement, the only essential difference being that Dinter does not question the validity of such statements. Both exhibit a decidedly speculative bent, Dinter in the process through which he arrives at his stereotypes, Quasthoff in the process through which she arrives at her theory of the origin of stereotypes. Finally, both defend the use of stereotypes in the service of the "right" ideology.

University of North Carolina  
Chapel Hill



NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>René Wellek, "The Crisis of Comparative Literature," *Proceedings of the Second Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association*, ed. Werner P. Friederich, I (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 151.
- <sup>2</sup>Egon Schwartz, "Die sechste Schwierigkeit beim Schreiben der Wahrheit: Zum Gruppendenken in Leben und Literatur," *Die USA und Deutschland*, ed. Wolfgang Paulsen (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1976), p. 23.
- <sup>3</sup>Schwartz, p. 11.
- <sup>4</sup>Peter Boerner, "National Images and their Place in Literary Research: Germany as seen by Eighteenth-Century French and English Reading Audiences," *Monatshefte* 67 (1975), p. 366.
- <sup>5</sup>Boerner, p. 367.
- <sup>6</sup>Boerner, p. 368.
- <sup>7</sup>Uta Quasthoff, *Soziales Vorurteil und Kommunikation. Eine sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse des Stereotyps* (Frankfurt: Athenäum Verlag, 1973).
- <sup>8</sup>Hans Bayer, "Kommunikation, Abstraktion und soziales Vorurteil. Zur Theorie des sprachlichen Stereotyps," *Wirkendes Wort* 26 (1976), pp. 76-97.
- <sup>9</sup>Quasthoff, p. 28.
- <sup>10</sup>The following is all taken from Quasthoff, pp. 239-244.
- <sup>11</sup>Willy Strzelewicz, "Das Vorurteil als Bildungsbarriere in der industriellen Gesellschaft,-- in *Das Vorurteil als Bildungsbarriere*, ed. Willy Strzelewicz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), p. 32, as quoted in Quasthoff, p. 242.
- <sup>12</sup>See Immanuel Kant, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Die Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), III, 34: "Erfahrungsurtheile als solche sind insgesamt synthetisch. Denn es wäre ungereimt, ein analytisches Urtheil auf Erfahrung zu gründen, weil ich aus meinem Begriff gar nicht hinausgehen darf, um das Urtheil abzufassen, und also kein Zeugniß der Erfahrung dazu nöthig habe."
- <sup>13</sup>First described in: Theodor Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).
- <sup>14</sup>Gordon Allport, *Die Natur des Vorurteils* (Köln: 1971), p. 399. This is a translation of the original: *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Addison Wesley Pub. Co., 1954).
- <sup>15</sup>Quasthoff, p. 106.
- <sup>16</sup>A school of thought founded by Alfred Korzybski in his book, *Science and Sanity* (Lancaster: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Pub. Co., 1933).
- <sup>17</sup>Quasthoff, p. 177.
- <sup>18</sup>Quasthoff, p. 177.
- <sup>19</sup>Quasthoff, p. 172.
- <sup>20</sup>S.I. Hayakawa, *Semantik, Sprache im Denken und Handeln* (Darmstadt: Darmstädter Blätter, 1967), p. 188. This is the German translation of: *Language in Thought and Action* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949).

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<sup>21</sup>Quasthoff, pp. 172-173.

<sup>22</sup>Quasthoff, p. 175.

<sup>23</sup>Quasthoff, p. 148.

<sup>24</sup>Hayakawa, p. 215.

<sup>25</sup>Quasthoff, p. 178.

<sup>26</sup>Quasthoff, p. 105.

<sup>27</sup>Quasthoff, p. 141.

<sup>28</sup>Quasthoff, p. 141.

<sup>29</sup>Even his examples are, for the most part, taken directly from Quasthoff's book, in some cases without acknowledgement, as for example the reference to the "Krawattenmuffel," p. 82 (see Quasthoff, p. 145).

<sup>30</sup>Bayer, p. 87.

<sup>31</sup>That Bayer is consciously attacking empiricism is evident from the following passage: "Grundsätzlich kann der erkennende Mensch gegenüber der objektiven Realität zwei Grundhaltungen einnehmen. Während er in der theoretischen, d.h. empirisch gesicherten und nachprüfbaren rationalen Aussage als Betrachter eine distanziert-sachliche Haltung einnimmt, wird die ideologische Aussage von einem ausgeprägten Vitalverhältnis bestimmt, d.h. der Mensch fasst — wie schon Bacon beobachtete — die Dinge nicht nach ihrer, sondern nach seiner Natur auf." (p. 94).

<sup>32</sup>In "Ideologiekritik" Bayer sees "die Verabsolutierung des materiellen, d.h. der eigennützigen Interessen" (p. 94), and he carries this reasoning so far as to indulge in an apology of the stereotype itself: "Nicht bloss intellektuelle Redlichkeit und Wahrheitssiebe motivieren also die Skepsis gegenüber dem ideologischen Stereotyp, sondern auch elementare eigennützige Faktoren" (p. 94).

<sup>33</sup>Bayer, p. 89.

<sup>34</sup>George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap), p. 164.

<sup>35</sup>Arthur Dinter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut* (Leipzig: Verlag Matthew und Thost, 1918), *Die Sünde wider den Geist* (Leipzig: Verlag Matthew und Thost, 1921), and *Die Sünde wider die Liebe* (Leipzig: Verlag Matthew und Thost, 1922).

<sup>36</sup>Donald Ray Richards, *The German Bestseller in the 20th Century. A Complete Bibliography and Analysis. 1915-1940* (Berne: Herbert Lang & Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 58.

<sup>37</sup>See Baldur von Schirach, *Ich glaubte an Hitler* (Hamburg: Mosaik Verlag, 1967), p. 38, and Werner Jochmann, "Die Ausbreitung des Antisemitismus," in *Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution. 1916-1928: Ein Sammelband*, ed. Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1971), p. 460, as quoted in Rodler F. Morris, "German Nationalistic Fiction and the Jewish Question: 1918-1933," Diss. University of North Carolina 1979, p. 295.

<sup>38</sup>Morris, p. 187.

<sup>39</sup>See Leo Kamnitzer, "Mein Prozess mit Dr. Dinter," *CV-Zeitung*, 5 April 1923, p. 111, and "Aus der Presse," *CV-Zeitung*, 5 April 1923, p. 151 as quoted in Morris, p. 198.

<sup>40</sup>Stefan Grossmann in *Das Tageblatt*, 3 Dec. 21, p. 1461, as quoted in Morris, p. 298.

<sup>41</sup>Richards, p. 182.

<sup>42</sup>See Richards, "Table B," pp. 100-253.

<sup>43</sup>See Morris, pp. 380-427.



- 44"Dr. Dinter macht mobil," *Kleine Erwerbungen NSDAP*, NS 20/123, 136479, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, as quoted in Morris, p. 392.
- 45Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), pp. 96, 135-36, 143.
- 46Gregor Strasser, Letter to "werte Parteigenossen," 8 Oct. 1928, Akte Dinter, Berlin Document Center.
- 47Interview with Siegfried Dinter, Dinter's second son, 24 July 1978. It had about 3000 actual members. Interview with Emil Straubing, leader of the "Ortsgruppe Dresden" of the "deutsche Volkskirche," 30 May 1979.
- 48Interview with Emil Straubing. Also, see correspondence of Elisabeth Dinter, Dinter's wife, for the years 1948-1978 in Dinternachlass, Waldacker/Rödermark.
- 49Dinter, *Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed. (Leipzig: Matthes und those, 1920), p. 238.
- 50See Dinter, *Sünde wider den Geist*, pp. 43-44, 60, 86-89, 104-108, 110-113, 115.
- 51See Mosse, p. 304.
- 52Dinter, "Nachwort" to *Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 237.
- 53See, for example, Dinter, "Nachwort" to *Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed., p. 430: Mit neuen Augen und neuen Ohren durchwanderte ich. . . in jahrelangen, folgerichtigen Studien ein Gebiet, das von den altindischen Heldengeschichten über Hesiod und Homer bis zur Edda und dem Nibelungenliede reicht, von den indischen Veden über Demokrit und Plato bis zu Goethe und Kant, von Aeschylos und Euripides bis zu Shakespeare und Kleist, Schiller und Richard Wagner, von den altindischen und assyrisch-babylonischen Urkunden über Herodot und Tacitus bis zu Mommsen, Treitschke und Gobineau. Und das war das Ergebnis: Rasse ist alles!
- 54Dinter constantly alleges that the classical idealists have been consistently misinterpreted, usually by Jewish scholars, who dominate the German academic establishment. For example, see *Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 45.
- 55See, for example, Dinter, Letter to J.J. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 14 Sept. 1906, Cottaarchiv, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach/Neckar.
- 56See, for example, Dinter, *Jugenddrängen. Roman eines Junglings* (Leipzig: Matthew und Thost, 1921). This book comes awfully close to being a plagiarization of Goethe's *Werther*. Its plotline is identical to that of *Werther*, it treats of the same themes, and it contains entire passages that -- apart from minor variations -- are identical to passages in *Werther*.
- 57He had, for example, a doctorate from Strassburg in chemistry, physics, and geology. See *Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 236.
- 58See, for example, Heinrich Falb, "Arthur Dinter als Politiker und Ideologe: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Weltanschauung der national-sozialistischen Bewegung," Zulassungsarbeit zum Staatsexamen an der Albert-Ludwig Universität Freiburg im Breisgau 1967, pp. 138-142. Even after the Nazis had assumed power and had begun to forbid the publication of Dinter's other works, the *Sünde wider das Blut* was still being widely circulated. As late as 1939 it was still recommended reading for "Gymnasiasten" studying the "Judenfrage." See Fritz Fink, *Die Judenfrage im Unterricht* (Nürnberg: Der Stürmer-Abteilung Buchverlag, 1937), p. 43.
- 59Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., 1899).

- <sup>60</sup>Chamberlain, *Goethe* (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., 1912).
- <sup>61</sup>Chamberlain, *Kant* (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., 1905).
- <sup>62</sup>Chamberlain, *Die Worte Christi* (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., 1901).
- <sup>63</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed., p. 430. Dinter makes the same claim in a personal letter to Houston Stewart Chamberlain; see Arthur Dinter, Letter to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 10 Oct. 1916, Chamberlainnachlass, Wagner-Gedenkstätte, Bayreuth.
- <sup>64</sup>Friedrich Lienhard, *Wege nach Weimar* (Stuttgart: Verlagsanstalt Greiner & Preiffer, 1905-1908).
- <sup>65</sup>See Dinter, "Friedrich Lienhard, die Deutschen und der Weltkrieg," *Bühne und Welt*, 17 (1915), 482.
- <sup>66</sup>Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche*, ed. Ernst Beutler (Zurich: Artemis-Verlag, 1948), x, 385-88.
- <sup>67</sup>Dinter, *Das Evangelium*, Erläuterungen I., p. 26, Dinternachlass, Waldacker-Rödermark.
- <sup>68</sup>Often referred to as the "Kalliasbriefe," these include the following: 25 Jan. 1793, 8 Feb. 1793, 18 Feb. 1793, 19 Feb. 1793, 23 Feb. 1793, and 28 Feb. 1793. See Johann Friedrich Schiller, *Schillers Briefe*, ed. Fritz Jonas (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1892-1896), III.
- <sup>69</sup>Schiller, *Schillers Werke. Nationalausgabe*, ed. Lieselotte Blumenthal and Benno von Wiese (Weimer: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1943 ff.), xx, 251-308.
- <sup>70</sup>This often neglected aspect of Schiller's argument is articulated in the essay "Über Anmut und Würde," p. 264.
- <sup>71</sup>This is to be found in *Wallensteins Tod*, III, 13. Dinter quotes it in his "Die Rasse- und Judenfrage im Lichte des Geistchristentums," in *Der Jude ist schuld -- ? Diskussionsbuch über die Juden Frage*, n. ed. (Basel: Zinnen-Verlag, 1932), p. 96.
- <sup>72</sup>Gall began actually lecturing on phrenology at the University of Vienna in the late 1790's. His first published work on the subject, however, did not appear until 1809: *Recherches sur le système nerveux en général, et sur celui du cerveau en particulier; mémoire présenté à l'Institut de France, le 14 mars 1808; suivi d'observations sur le rapport qui en a été fait à cette compagnie par ses commissaires par F.J. Gall et G. Spurzheim* (Paris: F. Schoell & H. Nicolle, 1809).
- <sup>73</sup>See John D. Davies, *Phrenology. Fad and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 7.
- <sup>74</sup>Johann Caspar Lavater, *Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe* (Leipzig, 1775-78; rpt. Zürich Orell Füssli Verlag, 1968). In particular, see "Schadel, was sich aus der blossen Form, Härte und derselben schliessen lässt," II, 149-152.
- <sup>75</sup>See Fritz Martini, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte*, 15th ed., (Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag, 1968), p. 243.
- <sup>76</sup>See, for example, "To Johann Jakob Willemer," 24 Jan. 1803, Letter 779, *Goethes Briefe*, ed. Karl R. Mankelkow (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1964), II, 439.
- <sup>77</sup>Lienhard, 10th ed. (1923), I, 8.



- <sup>78</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 12th ed. (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., p. 255. That Chamberlain sees his thinking as in keeping with that of Lavater is evident from the statements he makes in his Goethe book. Goethe's thinking is described there as unqualifiedly correct; and he attributes (no source given) Goethe with having said: "Er [Lavater] ist der beste, grösste, weiseste, innigste aller sterblichen und unsterblichen Menschen, die ich kenne." See Chamberlain, *Goethe*, pp. 121-22.
- <sup>79</sup>See Robert Burger Villingen, *Das Geheimnis der Menschenform* (Bernau bei Berlin: E. Gruner, 1921), p. 30. Also, see Dinter, *Die Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 243.
- <sup>80</sup>Interview with Ernst Liebe, applicant to the SS (who was refused), 20 July, 1977.
- <sup>81</sup>From the *Forster Tageblatt* (author, title, date unknown) as quoted in *Die menschlichen Formgesetze*, 10 (1930), p. 53.
- <sup>82</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider den Geist*, pp. 241-242.
- <sup>83</sup>Lienhard, 10th ed. (1923), I, 37.
- <sup>84</sup>Lienhard, 10th ed. (1923), I 41-42.
- <sup>85</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 12th ed. (1918), pp. 544-45.
- <sup>86</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 8th ed. (München: F. Bruckmann A.G., 1907), pp. 544-45, Dinternachlass, Waldacker/Rödermark.
- <sup>87</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 243.
- <sup>88</sup>See Dinter, *Die Sünde wider die Liebe*, p. 282.
- <sup>89</sup>Dinter, "Die Rassen- und Judenfrage," p. 96.
- <sup>90</sup>See Immanuel Kant, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Die königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), III, 333.
- <sup>91</sup>Kant, III, 307.
- <sup>92</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 12th ed., pp. 630-31.
- <sup>93</sup>J.D. McFarland, *Kant's Concept of Teleology* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), pp. 35-36.
- <sup>94</sup>McFarland, p. 37.
- <sup>95</sup>McFarland, p. 31.
- <sup>96</sup>McFarland, p. 33.
- <sup>97</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed., p. 16 (from *Faust. Erster Teil*, lines 674-675).
- <sup>98</sup>Goethe, "Annalen," *Goethes Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Eduard von der Hellen (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1932), xxx, 11.
- <sup>99</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed., p. 17.
- <sup>100</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, 12th ed., p. 18.
- <sup>101</sup>McFarland, p. 23. Also, see his entire first chapter, "The Justification of Natural Science."
- <sup>102</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 12th ed., p. 1112.
- <sup>103</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 8th ed., p. 1112, Dinternachlass, Waldacker/Rödermark.
- <sup>104</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 8th ed., p. 319, Dinternachlass, Waldacker/Rödermark.
- <sup>105</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 12th ed., p. 319.
- <sup>106</sup>Chamberlain, *Grundlagen*, 8th ed., p. 319, Dinternachlass, Waldacker/Rödermark.

<sup>107</sup>Dinter, "Friedrich Lienhard und die Deutschen," p. 481.

<sup>108</sup>Lienhard, *Wege nach Weimar*, I, 39.

<sup>109</sup>Lienhard, *Wege nach Weimar*, I, 39.

<sup>110</sup>Lienhard, *Wege nach Weimar*, III, 45.

<sup>111</sup>Lienhard, *Wege nach Weimar*, I, 39.

<sup>112</sup>Dinter, *Die Sünde wider die Liebe*, p. 173.

<sup>113</sup>Schiller, *Nationalausgabe*, xx, 341.

<sup>114</sup>See Schiller, *Briefe*, III, 237.

<sup>115</sup>Dinter, Letter to Paul Ernst, 6 April 1917, Nachlass Paul Ernst, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marchbach, Neckar.

<sup>116</sup>See Dinter, *Die Sünde wider den Geist*, p. 115; "Die Rassen- und Judenfrage," pp. 102-103.



