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The effect of the norm of group interest in response to leader dissent
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Introduction
-- I examined the influence of a leader's dissenting behavior in an intergroup task on a group member's evaluation of the leader's performance.
-- Group members participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). False feedback created a cooperative ingroup decision and then group members were informed of the leader's apparent decision to conform to or dissent from the group's decision. This decision was paired with a high or low payout.
-- I investigated predictions based on Social Identity Theory (SIT), Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT), and Norm of Group Interest (NGI).
• NGI predicted group members high in the tendency to pursue group interests should make evaluations of the leader based on payout
• RGCT predicted that intergroup relations stem from outcome. As such, all group members should be concerned with payout
• SIT predicted that only highly-identified group members should be concerned with payout. Low identified members should care about the leaders decision.

Methods
Participants:
• Undergraduate students ($n = 12$) recruited from SONA system and compensated with research credit
Procedure:
• Participants completed the NGI scale, were informed of the task, their group (Group A), and divided into roles (always group member, group leader played by confederate)
• Participants completed Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (IOS), and Social identification scale
• Participants were led to believe that the leader met with other group's leader and were informed of their group’s preference (X), the leader’s decision (X or Y), the other group’s decision (X or Y), and the resulting outcome (high or low payout)
• Participants completed Leader evaluation, ingroup identity, and performance/motivation scales

Measures:
• NGI scale (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2013) assess tendency to adhere to group norms
• IOS scale (Aron et al., 1992) a measure of closeness to group
• Social Identification (Cameron, 2004) a measure of group identification
• Leader evaluation (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001) a combined measure of leader evaluation
• Common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1996) measures understanding of their group as separate from other group
• Performance/motivation (Wolf et al., 2008; Pinter et al., 2007) measures different motivations on PDG

Results
Anticipated Results:
2 (Leader decision) x 2 (Payout) regression examined leader evaluation with social identification and NGI as moderators.
-- NGI predicted an interaction of payout and leader decision moderated by level of NGI
  • High NGI should be linked with favorable evaluations of leader when the decision results in a high payout, regardless of decision
-- SIT predicted an interaction of payout and leader decision moderated by group identification
  • High group identification should be linked with favorable evaluations of the leader when the decision results in a high payout, regardless of the decision
-- RGCT predicted an effect of payout
  • High payouts should lead to positive evaluations of the leader

Preliminary Results:

While not significant, means trended such that a dissenting leader, whose decision resulted in a high payout, was evaluated favorably.

Conclusion
Group members may have viewed a high payout dissenting leader as more "leader like."