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Science and practice in conflict: incommensurability between academicians and practitioners in the American Psychological Association

Zachary Curtis Rash
University of Dayton

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SCIENCE AND PRACTICE IN CONFLICT: INCOMMENSURABILITY BETWEEN
ACADEMICIANS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION

Thesis

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by


Zachary Curtis Rash

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

Dayton, Ohio

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APPROVED BY:



Wardle, Elizabeth
Faculty Advisor



Wilhoit, Stephen
Faculty Reader



Slade, Andrew
Faculty Reader



Hughes, Sheila--Department Head

ABSTRACT

This study extends the existing literature which analyzes rhetoric and incommensurability among scientists and other groups by examining the rhetorical strategies that exacerbate incommensurability between scientists and practitioners within psychology in a dispute over the American Psychological Association's organizational structure. Unlike previous analyses on science, rhetoric, and incommensurability, this study uses both narrative and neo-Aristotelian analysis to reveal the rhetorical strategies perpetuating incommensurability. Chapter 1 offers a literature review and discusses gaps in the extant research. Chapter 2 discusses the contributions this study makes to the literature, discusses the research questions, details the paper's organization, and describes the methods and artifacts used. Chapter 3 includes discussion of the historical context of the conflict. In Chapter 4, neo-Aristotelian analysis demonstrates how academicians and practitioners increase incommensurability by attacking each others' methodologies, knowledge, and credibility. Chapter 5 uses narrative analysis to show how the two groups give incommensurable accounts of the conflict, compelling members of each group to dismiss the other's legitimacy. Rhetors' also glorify members of their own group and dehumanize their opponents. Chapter 6 answers this study's research questions, concluding that scientists and practitioners perpetuate incommensurability through ad hominem attacks and their dramatic stories instead of discussing the key issues that cause incommensurability.

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INTRODUCTION

Scientists discuss their findings and theories with the public. They also work with other scientists within their own field and in other fields to find solutions to shared problems. However, they struggle to communicate effectively with other groups, even scientists within the same discipline, due to fundamental differences in discourse conventions, values, beliefs, or perceptions of the world. Philosophers of science Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend label this phenomenon “incommensurability” (Harris 18). Contemporary rhetorical studies reveal numerous rhetorical strategies that exacerbate incommensurability between scientists and other parties, making productive communication even more difficult than their differences require. Studies show scientists in conflict attack the logos their opponents’ privilege (Bazerman and De los Santos; Fahnestock, “The Bering Crossover”; Lyne and Howe; Prelli, “Stasis and the Problem”; Prelli, “The Rhetorical Construction”) and assert their own privileged logos is superior to the opponents’ across situations (Ceccarelli; Fahnestock, “Cell and Membrane”; Miller 480). They also attack their opponents’ ethos as scientists (Bazerman and De los Santos; Miller; Prelli, “The Rhetorical Construction”), and they bolster their own ethos by claiming they are scientific revolutionaries (Fahnestock, “Cell and Membrane”; Fahnestock, “The Bering Crossover”; Lynne and Howe; Prelli, “The Rhetorical Construction”) and by presenting history in a manner supporting their credibility (Fahnestock, “Cell and Membrane”; Good).

The following analysis will extend the previous research by examining the rhetorical strategies that exacerbate incommensurability between scientists and practitioners within psychology during and after a dispute in the late 1980s over the American Psychological Association's organizational structure. This study will support the findings of previous studies: it will show that the two parties in the APA conflict utilize rhetoric promoting incommensurability similar to the rhetoric explored in previous research. They experience two types of incommensurability, value and pragmatic incommensurability, and they attack each other's logos and ethos in response to these perceived differences. Such attacks solidify these incommensurabilities in scientists and practitioners' minds and further polarize the groups. This study will also show narrative analysis' value for examining the relationship between science, incommensurability, and rhetoric. Through their dramatic stories about the conflict, scientists and practitioners employ the metaphor of Good versus Evil found in pro-war rhetoric (Hines and Windt 141): they portray themselves as noble and civil and their opponents as evil and subhuman. Rhetors use the setting and plot to gain the sympathy and respect of members of their own party. Their stories also ask listeners from the rhetors' group to join the fight against the opponent.

In Chapter 1, I will explain what incommensurability is, indicate why it is problematic, discuss the existing research on science, rhetoric, and incommensurability, and note gaps in the current body of literature. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the present study, identify how it extends previous research, state my research questions, discuss the organization and methods I use in each chapter, and describe the artifacts for analysis. In Chapter 3, I will give the history of the conflict, since understanding the rhetorical

situation is crucial for understanding the analysis. Then I will begin the rhetorical analysis. In Chapter 4, I will discuss two types of incommensurability, value and pragmatic, that the groups experience, and I will use neo-Aristotelian analysis to demonstrate how their rhetoric both reflects these incommensurabilities and perpetuates them. In Chapter 5, I will use narrative analysis to examine how each group's account of APA's history and the reorganization conflict compel each side to shun communication. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will discuss how the analysis answers this study's research questions and extends previous research.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE ON INCOMMENSURABILITY, RHETORIC, AND SCIENCE

Incommensurability is “the lack of a common standard for taking the measure of two systems with respect to each other” (Harris 3) within science, be it the grounds, warrants, discourse conventions, or values privileged by disparate parties. This disconnect results in misunderstanding, isolation, or even conflict between scientists and the public or between different groups of scientists. Incommensurability makes effective communication difficult because once the two parties accept incommensurability, they consider cooperation unproductive: “The rhetorical message is, ‘Why bother?’ If we can’t agree, or even decide on criteria by which it is conceivable to agree, we might continue talking *at* each other for our own expressive needs, but there would be no point in talking *with* each other” (Harris 20). The rhetoric groups use can exacerbate incommensurability. They may share a common problem, but their rhetoric discourages each group from recognizing the contributions the other group makes towards solving the issue. Each camp employs rhetoric utilizing the group’s own privileged values and assumptions to argue its side’s position is irrefutably correct and the other’s group’s position is certainly wrong. This rhetoric could be effective depending on the rhetors’ purposes, such as promoting “moral, professional, and personal motives” (Prelli, “Stasis and the Problem” 322). However, as Lawrence Prelli asserts, “...any advantages are purchased at the cost of foreclosing prospects for *commensurate deliberation* about

divisive issues” (Prelli, “Stasis and the Problem” 326).¹ Rhetors engaged in such rhetoric work at cross-purposes, avoiding productive dialogue about points of contention between groups; they also discourage members of each group from considering how the other group can help answer questions both groups have in different but valuable ways. Rhetoric promoting incommensurability, thus, discourages cooperation and collaboration between groups that have good reasons to work together.

Randy Allen Harris asserts that numerous types of incommensurability exist between groups, such as value incommensurability and pragmatic incommensurability, all of which help illuminate the trouble scientists have in communicating with the public, members of other disciplines, and other members of the same discipline.

Value Incommensurability

Value incommensurability occurs when different groups privilege incompatible ethical, moral, or political values in a pluralistic society (Harris 63-74). While two values may appear attractive, both cannot be realized completely at the same time. Isaiah Berlin suggests, for example, that liberty and equality are incommensurable in their purest forms:

Liberty [...] is an eternal human ideal, whether individual or social. So is equality. But perfect liberty (as it must be in the perfect world) is not compatible with perfect equality. If man is free to do anything he chooses, then the strong will crush the weak, the wolves will eat the sheep, and this puts an end to equality. If perfect equality is to be attained, then men must be prevented from outdistancing each other, whether in material or

intellectual or spiritual achievement, otherwise inequalities will result.

(qtd. in Harris 70)

Two values can coexist, Harris argues, but people ultimately must value one over the other in particular situations: “The values push in opposite directions in some tightly coupled way—more of one means less of the other....they cannot both be *fully* realized at the same moment” (71).²

A great body of research reveals how incommensurate values between groups competing in the public forum influence the rhetoric common to debates regarding topics including, but not limited to, genetics research (Condit, *The Meaning of the Gene*), abortion (Railsback, “The Contemporary American Abortion Controversy”), gay rights (Brummett) and political correctness (Bello); of particular interest to this discussion, however, is how scientists and other groups encounter value incommensurability. The infamous Scopes Monkey trial demonstrates a difference in values between scientists and much of the public. In this case, scientists and lawyers defending evolution privilege science as the only legitimate test of truth, and any question about science must come only from within science itself, regardless of any plausible philosophical or ethical concerns of a nonscientific nature raised by those in the public sphere (Weaver 109).

Scientists’ goals as researchers are often incompatible with other groups’ values. Although it would be absurd to generalize that scientists do not care about helping people, their primary goal in research is to expand the knowledge base of their own specialized communities. In those communities, scientists value skepticism and a cautious examination of the research before accepting a belief of practical consequence as true. Their skepticism conflicts with the public’s desire for science to produce results

with direct application to people's everyday lives as quickly as possible (Calsamiglia 140). Unlike scientists, the public longs for quick, decisive answers to political or ethical concerns. One example is in debates over allegedly innate differences between the sexes in math skills. When a study's results suggested boys may be better than girls at math, the media assigned to the results and subsequent discussion more decisiveness and certainty than many scientists, including the study's own researchers, were readily admitting (Fahnestock, "Accommodating Science" 338-345). This value incommensurability between scientists and the public sphere also surfaces when politicians and other public figures interpret and utilize scientists' reported findings in ways conducive to their own agenda but conflicting with scientists' goals. For example, groups may applaud or denounce modern genetics research because of its racial implications, despite insistence from researchers that science has no political agenda (Condit, "Rhetorical Formations" 15), and creationists may use scientists' reservations about certain tenets of evolutionary theory to argue for creationism without addressing these same scientists' overarching support of Darwin (Lyne and Howe 78-81).

Pragmatic Incommensurability

Value incommensurability reveals how miscommunication operates between scientists and other groups. A relative of value incommensurability, pragmatic incommensurability, elucidates specifically the disagreements and explicit conflicts in the scientific community between and even within scientific disciplines. Pragmatic incommensurability "concerns the (non-referential, non lexical) components of a program (theory, paradigm) that lead proponents on either side of a communicative divide to resist and misunderstand each other" (Harris 56). Pragmatic incommensurability manifests

itself in various ways, such as differences about “what values one can base an argument on..., what authorities one can invoke, [and] what sorts of solutions to what sorts of problems count as support for one side of the debate or another” (Harris 56). These beliefs derive from disciplinary conventions, such as “what sorts of data feeds one side, what sort compromises the other, what events count as data, how do you get it, with what conceptual or mechanical instruments?” (Harris 56). Philosopher of science William Bechtel agrees with Harris and proposes that boundaries form between different scientific disciplines based on how each defines science: what phenomena scientists should study, what concerns deserve attention, what theories should drive research, what methods scientists should use for investigation, and how scientists should show their results (Good 240).

A great deal of extant research demonstrates pragmatic incommensurability between and within disciplines in times of conflict. Pragmatic incommensurability surfaces in many rhetorical forms. One way it appears is when quarreling groups criticize their opponents’ logos: they attack the other party’s methods, data, and so forth and assert their own party’s scientific procedures trump those of the opponent. Other rhetorical strategies related to pragmatic incommensurability involve ethos. Rhetors attack the other party’s ethos by calling the opponent unscientific. Rhetors also counter attacks on their ethos by labeling themselves Kuhnian revolutionaries, and they reaffirm their credibility by rhetorically constructing history in ways supportive of their position.

Rhetors attack the other group’s logos by labeling the other group’s research data, methodologies, interpretations of data, and/or conclusions insufficient or unreliable. Lawrence J. Prelli shows this rhetorical strategy in his examination of an argument

between researcher Murray Straus and clinical psychologists, social workers, and other researchers about the validity of research suggesting woman-on-man violence occurs just as frequently as man-on-woman violence. Disparate groups “[portray] the other as lacking legitimate data, terminology, value commitments and methods. In overall effect, the adversary’s perspective is denied any legitimacy as a mode of inquiry into social problems” (“Stasis and the Problem” 325). Similar rhetoric surfaces in the debate over Francine Patterson’s research suggesting gorillas can understand and use sign language. One vocal critic, anthropologist Thomas A. Sebeok, questions “the reliability of both [Patterson’s] data and her interpretations of the data,” asserting she does not utilize scientific skepticism when performing her research and her emotional involvement with her test subject biases her results (“The Rhetorical Construction” 95).

Questions over appropriate methodology also arise in the rhetoric between toxicology and ecotoxicology. Ecotoxicologists leave the field of toxicology because they feel its strict quantitative laboratory experiments cannot sufficiently address environmental concerns. Instead, they claim field work involving qualitative analysis of real populations and ecosystems is necessary (Bazerman and De los Santos 437-439). In response, toxicologists declare ecotoxicology’s object of study and research methods “too multi-causal and situationally complex to draw conclusions from” (Bazerman and De los Santos 443).

Another example of rhetoric promoting methodological incommensurability occurs when Stephen J. Gould applies the methods of paleontology to evolutionary theory: biologists chastise him for believing he can bring paleontology into a discussion of biology (Lyne and Howe 78). In examining the rhetoric of archeologists debating

when humans first arrived in North America, Fahnestock shows that, in order to refute the other side, different groups establish criteria for evidence to which the other side does not adhere or they set up their own experiments whose results serve as counterarguments to the other's position (Fahnestock, "The Bering Crossover" 59). Another study shows conflict between two groups within sociology—psychological social psychologists and sociological social psychologists—concerning the proper object of study and the type of methodology appropriate for research (Good 246).

In times of pragmatic incommensurability, scientists may even argue their field's data and methodology supersede the opponent's data and methodology across all situations. In the discussion between physicists and biologists about nonionizing radiation's effects on humans, physicists insist "physics-trumps-biology": all science reduces to physics, while physics owes no comparable debt to biology (Miller 480). Biology is also inferior to physics, physicists suggest, because its results only reveal correlation, not causation (477-479). Cell physiologists supporting Associate Induction Theory exclaim similar sentiments on the relationship between physics and biology, claiming the physics supporting their position overrides any findings of their opponents in biology (Fahnestock, "Cell and Membrane" 413-414). Similarly, sociobiology proponent E.O. Wilson calls sociological criticisms of his research irrelevant because biology trumps sociology (Ceccarelli 287-289). In each case, these scientists claim their scientific discipline is superior to that of the opponent because their research is at the core of all of the opponents' findings.

In addition to criticizing their opponents' logos and championing their own, scientists in conflict also attack their opponents' ethos and assert their own credibility in

various ways. Scientists frequently attack opposing scientists' credibility by declaring that their opponents are not scientists. For example, in the debate over sign language use in gorillas, Sebeok "implies that Patterson and her co-author are not 'real' scientists: they are scientific 'outsiders'" (Prelli, "The Rhetorical Construction" 92). Sebeok insists Patterson is not a legitimate member of the scientific community: Patterson and her colleague lack the endorsement of a serious institution, she cannot secure financial backing for her research, she submits her work to the press instead of to scientists for critical review, and she personally vests herself in her research (94). Another example of scientists attacking their opponent's ethos occurs when a leading toxicologist praises toxicologists as "true" scientists while questioning the "*unscientific* political, social, and psychological motives" of ecotoxicologists (Bazerman and De los Santos 444, emphasis added); this toxicologist adds they are "lunatics" (442). Miller's study shows physicists questioning the competence and motives of biologists (490-491) and declaring biological research methods and conclusions unscientific (487).

When accused of scientific inferiority, many scientific rhetors attempt to reestablish their ethos by invoking Thomas Kuhn and his concept of scientific revolutions; they counter that they are not untrustworthy scientists, but instead are misunderstood scientific revolutionaries reacting against a rigid scientific orthodoxy. For instance, responding to Sebeok and other critics, Patterson exclaims that she is a Kuhnian revolutionary working against the dogmatic tenets of her field (Prelli, "The Rhetorical Construction" 96). Gould reacts similarly to biologists' criticisms, claiming the current establishment in biology is a dogmatic, rigid, and reductive orthodoxy needing a scientific revolutionary such as himself (Lynne and Howe 76). Associate Induction

Theory's proponent Gilbert Ling considers himself a Kuhnian revolutionary and likens himself to revolutionary scientists like Galileo (Fahnestock, "Cell and Membrane" 96). Each camp of archeologists debating the Bering Strait controversy claims its group members are minorities revolutionizing the field and propose that the other side is not up to date on current research (Fahnestock, "The Bering Crossover" 54-56).

Groups also boost their credibility by constructing history in ways favorable for their group. Good explains camps selectively choose "points of inflection," or historical events in the development of their field which they interpret as leading scientific research and consensus towards the position they currently hold (248). Scientists highlight the events which serve them favorably and interpret these events in a manner supporting their side. Proponents of Associate Induction Theory, for instance, highlight experiments in cell physiology which best support their position while downplaying the vast body of other research conflicting with their side over the past fifty years (Fahnestock, "Cell and Membrane" 406).

Commensurability

Much discussion reveals how scientists' rhetoric perpetuates incommensurability. Scientific rhetors, however, can reach commensurability through effort and extended dialogue (Campbell 336). As Fahnestock explains, shunning discussion and compromise perpetuates incommensurability: "When one buys into incommensurability, one declines negotiation" ("Cell and Membrane" 392). Through civility and compromise, not abrasiveness and stubbornness, scientists can overcome incommensurability. At the very least, they can discover the issues causing incommensurability, discuss their differences relating to these issues, and find common ground (Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem" 325).

They can respect the “different but compatible” answers each provides to similar questions (Prelli, “Stasis and the Problem” 295) and or find a new viewpoint from two original positions (Campbell 380; Ceccarelli 275). Many examples demonstrate how scientists in conflict use rhetoric to successfully promote commensurability. The conflict between toxicologists and environmental toxicologists (formerly known as ecotoxicologists) over methodology and object of study has waned as each group applauds the other’s research and works with the other at appropriate junctures (Bazerman and De los Santos 430): “The new field never stops accepting the findings, measurements, or methods of the old, although placing them within a new framework, and the old gradually comes to recognize the findings, work, and methods of the new” (427). Darwin successively promotes evolution by addressing the concerns raised by the seemingly incommensurate actualist geology of Charles Lyell (334). The history of scientific conflict, then, reflects both successes and failures in the fight to overcome pragmatic incommensurability.

Gaps in the Previous Research

The body of research on value and pragmatic incommensurability between scientists and other groups and between different scientific groups is relatively small. More research into the communication between such groups in conflict could support or refute the conclusions drawn from these few but promising studies. It could also reveal more rhetorical strategies which perpetuate incommensurability within science. Furthermore, critics performing this research often use methods drawn from classical rhetoric, such as Cicero’s model for civil debate (Ceccarelli), stasis theory (Prelli, “Stasis and the Problem”) and elements of neo-Aristotelian analysis (Prelli, “The Rhetorical

Construction”); however, no critic has employed narrative analysis to examine how the stories scientists tell reinforce incommensurability. Narrative analysis could provide another useful lens for understanding how scientists in conflict construct history in ways favorable to their own position.

CHAPTER 2: THE PRESENT STUDY

This thesis will extend the literature examining the rhetorical strategies members of scientific communities employ related to value and pragmatic incommensurability. Unlike previous studies, this study will also demonstrate that narrative analysis is useful for studying how scientists and other groups perpetuate incommensurability. To accomplish these goals, I will examine the rhetoric of incommensurability between two divergent parties within the American Psychological Association (APA): scientists (or academicians) and practitioners. In the late 1980s, building tension between academicians and practitioners in psychology led to an infamous conflict within APA. Many academicians within APA's membership voiced concern that clinicians, once a minority within APA, had gained too much influence within the organization; consequently, they felt the organization was moving away from its roots in rigorous scientific research, resulting in reduced funding for scientific projects and an undervaluing of science's essential role in psychology. Conversely, many clinicians felt their influence within the organization was necessary in order to protect the concerns of practicing psychologists and to garner the respect they did not receive from academicians throughout APA's history. They also insisted, contrary to scientists' claims, that science was receiving adequate attention in APA. A great deal of debate at APA meetings ensued, but a plan to reorganize APA's political structure and satisfy all parties failed.

Subsequently, a number of disenfranchised experimental psychologists left APA to form the American Psychological Society (APS) in 1988.

While signs of commensurability between the two groups exist today, as many psychologists are members of both groups, members of each group still question the goals and merit of the other group, and other signs of the conflict still linger. An examination of the rhetoric surrounding this situation could identify rhetorical strategies perpetuating the conflict. As Harris argues, investigation of the rhetoric promoting incommensurability may not provide an immediate solution to a problem (98), but it shows the rhetorical factors groups in conflict should first address. This study aims to answer two primary research questions about the rhetoric of incommensurability between scientists and practitioners:

1. What rhetorical strategies utilized by scientists and practitioners encourage incommensurability? In other words, how has rhetoric exacerbated the conflict?

2. Additionally, how do these rhetorical strategies vary at different stages of the conflict? Do these strategies vary with time?

To answer these questions, I will use several methods of analysis. In Chapter 3, I will first detail the history of APA and the reorganization conflict of 1988; the effect of a rhetorical strategy depends on the context, so I must provide a situational analysis.

I will then begin the rhetorical analysis. In Chapter 4, I will discuss how scientists and practitioners experience value and pragmatic incommensurability, and I will use neo-Aristotelian analysis to show how their rhetoric pertaining to both incommensurabilities makes productive communication more difficult. In neo-

Aristotelian analysis, critics assess how rhetors utilize the available means of persuasion to communicate to their audience. Specifically, analysis examines how various elements influence the message's effectiveness given the audience, including discussion topics, style, and organization, as well as the three persuasive appeals: appeals to reason (logos), appeals to emotion (pathos), and appeals to credibility or trustworthiness (ethos) (Hill 64-71).

In chapter 5, I will employ narrative analysis to explore how practitioners and scientists tell different stories about APA's history to perpetuate incommensurability. Narratives serve as effective tools for showing audiences how they should view the world; people appreciate interesting stories, and through an engaging story a speaker can influence audience members' beliefs about a situation or strengthen beliefs they already have (Rowland 131-132; 136). Narratives operate as arguments implicitly, utilizing the elements of good storytelling to convey a message to listeners. Also, contemporary speakers often utilize Master Narratives, conventional stories popular with current audiences; framing a conventional story for a new situation could increase its rhetorical effectiveness (Hillbruner, cited in Hart and Daughton 91). Critics have used a myriad of approaches for examining the rhetorical effects of narratives, such as Kenneth Burke's dramatisitic theory. I will use Fisher's narrative paradigm (Rowland 141-142), identifying the formal elements of the narrative (such as the protagonists, antagonists, supporting characters, setting, and plot) and explaining how they operate rhetorically.

Finally, in chapter 6 I will return to the research questions presented in this chapter and answer them in light of the results of the analysis. I will also discuss this study's

implications for research on the relationship between science, rhetoric, and incommensurability.

This particular study looks at a diverse set of artifacts for analysis. Materials dating from the initial stages of the conflict to the present should show how the rhetoric of both sides has evolved. One type of artifact for study will be trade publications put out by each organization, APA's *APA Monitor* and APS's *APS Observer*. Around the time of APS's formation, these periodicals published numerous articles detailing the success of their own group and the troubles plaguing the other. Each publication still runs articles about the state of the conflict. In these publications, many prominent scientists and practitioners, including the organizations' presidents, explain their positions through editorials. I will also examine book chapters written by practitioners who were key figures in the conflict. Of particular importance is an edited book by two practitioners, Rogers Wright and Nicholas Cummings, who spearheaded clinicians' rise to power within APA; numerous practitioners integral to the conflict contribute chapters relevant to the struggle between scientists and practitioners. Finally, I will use personal interviews with key scientists and practitioners involved in the conflict, such as Milton Hakel, Marilyn Brewer, and Raymond Fowler. They still comment on the situation in ways interesting for rhetorical analysis twenty years later.

CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

The following historical account of the conflict between scientists and practitioners in psychology is integral for understanding the effect of rhetorical strategies each party utilizes when discussing APA and discussing the party's opponent. I will italicize terms and people's names throughout this discussion that are particularly important for understanding the analysis.

APA's Beginning and Evolution

Psychologists formed the American Psychological Association in the late 1890s to garner more support for the scientific study of behavior and to distinguish psychology from its parent discipline, philosophy (Sokal). While the criteria for membership were vague at first, membership required not only a doctorate in psychology but training in and a commitment to publishing scientific research because APA's founders, all academicians, defined psychology as a science (Evans 76-78). The requirement of a PhD was not a concern for most psychologists: most applied psychologists earned PhDs, and doctoral work always included studying and performing research. Applied psychologists were what was and is still known as *scientist-practitioners*. The requirement for ongoing publication, however, initially excluded many applied psychologists, but by the early 1920s, APA relaxed this criterion to include those working as practitioners (Evans 79).

APA's membership always had a wide array of interests. Conventions began grouping their presentation sessions according to different foci by 1910, and several smaller groups developed from these specialized interests (Fowler 267). However, practitioners in particular felt that their needs were not met by an APA dominated by academicians (Wright x-xi), and they formed the *American Association for Applied Psychology (AAAP)* to promote clinicians' concerns in the 1930s. This organization grew quickly in numbers, and by 1945 APA merged with AAAP and APA created a system of divisions to accommodate the concerns of all psychologists. There were 19 divisions initially, with seven representing the groups newly acclimated to APA: five divisions represented the former AAAP, and two divisions represented other outside organizations, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) and the Psychometric Society (Fowler 267). Soon thereafter a division representing state psychological associations, comprised mostly of clinicians, also formed (Wright 13). More divisions formed as interests proliferated in psychology.

Practitioners now had several divisions representing them in APA. However, scientists still controlled APA and psychology as a discipline. The *Council of Representatives*, a group elected by APA membership, governed the organization, but it met infrequently and had less influence than the *Board of Directors*, a 12-member group elected by the Council of Representatives. Technically, clinicians could vote to elect Council representatives from state associations, and clinical divisions, in turn, could influence the composition of the Board. However, academic or scientific divisions' Council members' votes counted for 2 ½ more votes than the votes of state divisions' Council members. State divisions represented a unified voice for clinicians throughout

APA's history and so clinicians gave most of their votes to such divisions. Since their vote meant much less in APA's organization, clinicians had little influence and struggled to get their concerns met sufficiently. For instance, they wanted to focus on issues with clinical licensure and insurance coverage, but academics allowed little discussion for these issues in APA (Hakel, interview). Many practitioners also felt constrained by the scientist/practitioner education required for clinical students. In 1949, David Shakow led the *Boulder Conference on Graduate Education in Psychology*, which resulted in reinforcing scientific training as a crucial part of even clinical students' education (Wright xi). The emphasis on scientific research was troublesome to practitioners because they rarely did any research upon completing their doctoral studies. Many felt the time spent on research was irrelevant to their practice, and some new graduates set-up additional training time and supervision because they did not feel ready to practice (Fox 105). In the 1960s, a group of disenfranchised practitioners formed a pact to gain power for clinicians in APA (Martin). Many vocal and already politically active practitioners comprised this self-proclaimed *Dirty Dozen*, including *Richard Wright, Raymond Fowler, Nicholas Cummings, Melvin Gravitz, Max Siegel, Theodore Blau, and Francis Young*, among others (Wright 2).

The *State and Provincial Psychological Associations*, as well as other new divisions, were a main vehicle clinicians used to gain power. These organizations became more associated with applied psychologists, even though there were academician members, because such organizations were concerned with psychologists' interactions with the public and government, especially within a state (Fowler 271). They were independent of APA, but they could elect members to the Council of Representatives as

long as they had 10 APA members in their group. As clinicians increased in number and became more organized, state associations became an effective route through which clinicians could increase their influence in the Council (Fowler 270). Academicians soon became worried about the power of state associations, and in response George Albee formed the Council Commission in 1966 ("Division Elections"). Initially committee members suggested cutting off all direct influence of state associations on the Council; the unofficial State Association Coordinating Committee, headed by Wright, Young, and others, rallied against this plan, and it did not pass. Additionally, the Dirty Dozen members garnered support for two initiatives: state associations to have their own division within APA and a new voting system whereby each member gave 10 votes to any division or state division he/she chose. The new state association division gave practice-centered divisions and state associations a medium through which to discuss their concerns and coordinate political campaigning (Wright 12-13), and Schultz, Rosencranz, Wright, and Young led the efforts to increase practitioner influence through the division (22). Clinicians also created numerous other divisions to attract psychologists of various interests to increase the number of votes practitioners received (Fox 113).

Practitioners led by the Dirty Dozen spearheaded other changes. They pleaded for a new trade publication: they did not feel the existing one, *The American Psychologist*, was a sufficient vehicle for discussing practitioners' concerns. Their efforts led the *APA Monitor*, a monthly newsletter addressing matters concerning all members of psychology (Wright 26). Additionally, they campaigned for more insurance support. In the 1960s, the APA formed the American Psychological Association Insurance Trust (APAIT) to

oversee national insurance programs for those in psychology. Clinicians pressed this institution for more money devoted to practitioners' coverage through a group called the "Ad Hoc Committee on Insurance and Related Social Developments" (AHCIRSD) (Wright 19). The committee, headed by Wright, Gravitz, and Cummings, pressed APA and its Board of Professional Affairs (BPA) for insurance money and practitioner training (24-25). While they did receive money for training, the battle for more insurance money continued. A high point of the conflict occurred when APAIT proposed a "health contract that excluded psychologists as reimbursable providers of mental health services" (31); AHCIRSD disbanded and formed the Committee on Health Insurance—headed by Cummings, with Gravitz, Shapiro, and Wiggins as members—to further push the matter.

Clinicians also worked to increase psychology's presence in public policy. Through AHCIRSD, they pressed for an APA-funded group for advocacy but were initially unsuccessful (Wright 25). However, Cummings, Lawrence, and Wright formed an independent public policy group, the *Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions and Science (CAPPS)*. Among other activities with the state and federal government, CAPPS funded political candidates (Fowler 276). Academicians within APA became concerned about the goals and rising power of CAPPS and created the Committee on Relations between APA and CAPPS to investigate CAPPS. Eventually, the committee decided the best course of action was for APA to form its own public-policy group, which became the *Association for the Advancement of Psychology (AAP)*. This organization merged with CAPPS with Wright as the Executive Director (Wright 47; Fowler 276). The new AAP, like CAPPS, had autonomy from APA, but the

increasing interest in public policy paved way for other public advocacy divisions within APA.

Practitioners also challenged the educational requirements for clinical graduate students. In 1964, Cummings created the first independent professional schools of psychology in Los Angeles and San Francisco, schools which dropped the scientist-practitioner model of graduate education and instead emphasized more training for private practice (Wright 27-28). Similar programs soon emerged, despite academicians' criticism of the quality of these schools' pedagogy. Dirty Dozen members proclaimed these schools, though they were not APA-accredited, were just as good if not better than APA's approved programs because they developed training practices considered more applicable to work with patients (Fox 106). These programs awarded students with a new degree, a PsyD.

Contributing to these changes in APA and psychology as a discipline was the influx of undergraduates interested in clinical psychology (Fowler 280), the demand for practitioners on the job market, and dwindling job opportunities for scientists. The changing demographics were particularly noticeable by the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, by 1984 over 50% of psychology doctorates awarded were for students entering the mental-health profession; this percentage does not include the number of graduates who received PsyDs (Fox 112). On the other hand, the number of doctorates awarded to research psychologists had declined between the 1970s and 1980s by over 40% (Fowler 280).

The rising power and influence of practitioners in psychology led to the election of a string of clinicians to the APA presidency—such as Dirty Dozen members Blau,

Cummings, and Siegel—in the late 1970s and early 1980s. And by 1985 practitioners successfully proposed a plan for more funding for “state advocacy, hiring experienced professional advocates, and developing a grass roots network” (Fowler 277). Scientists, who had once controlled APA, now felt they were a minority; they thought APA had lost touch with them and no longer valued science (Fox 110). Their concerns were numerous. For one, they felt there were too many divisions. By 1986, 42 divisions and 52 state and provincial divisions comprised APA, and academicians worried the great number of divisions fractionalized APA. Also, scientists were concerned that most of these divisions, particularly the state and provincial divisions, attracted mostly practitioners, limiting scientists’ voting power (Fowler 268-269). They objected to rising dues and claimed APA devoted too much time and money to practitioners’ interests instead of scientists’ needs (271, 276). They wanted more control over their money, especially when APA suffered a significant financial loss after purchasing the magazine *Psychology Today*. They wanted to know they would still be financially secure if this failed business venture bankrupted APA (Hakel, interview). Unhappy with the direction they perceived APA was heading, scientists took drastic efforts to regain an equal footing.

Reorganization

Scientists felt decentralizing APA’s governmental body by reducing the number of divisions—but giving more autonomy to significantly larger divisions that take their place— would give scientists more incentive to stay in APA and would balance APA’s power structure. Scientists first suggested *reorganization* as early as 1946 but became more persistent when their concerns peaked in the 1970s and 1980s (Hakel, interview).

Several committees proposed plans for reorganization with little success, such as the Committee on APA Reorganization headed by James Deese in 1974 and the Blue Ribbon Commission led by Kenneth Clarke and Dorothy Eichorn in 1979. In 1984, the Board of Directors created a Task Force on the Structure of APA, headed by academician Jack Bardon ("A Short History"; Hakel, interview). This committee's plan—to divide APA into two divisions, a science and practice division—was rejected by the Council of Representatives and two other plans from the Board of Directors were rejected as well (Fowler 281-282).

In 1987, Dirty Dozen members Wright and Fowler, as well as then APA president and academician *Bonnie Strickland*, assembled the *Group on Restructuring (GOR)*, a collection of prominent scientists, such as *Milton Hakel*, *Sandra Scarr*, and *Marilyn Brewer*, and practitioners such as Stanley Graham and other Dirty Dozen members, to work on a reorganization plan, though Wright resigned from the committee early in its operation ("A Short History"; Hakel, interview). Like the Task Force on the Structure of APA, GOR also proposed restructuring APA into a science and a practice division. However, numerous psychologists involved in public policy and state organizations, as well as scientist-practitioners, wanted more representation in the proposed structure. After many compromises, a new plan for a five-division system—science, practice, public interest, scientist-practitioners, and state associations—formed and GOR presented the revised plan to the Council of Representatives (Fowler 282). Unlike previous reorganization plans, the GOR plan passed and the Council recommended its approval to APA voters ("A Short History").

Bitter exchanges and political campaigning led up the vote on the GOR plan and the next APA president in 1988. Many campaigned heavily within the state associations to get the proposal defeated. Opponents of the plan also gained a powerful ally when practitioner Graham, a GOR member and APA presidential candidate, notably reversed his support of the plan in March 1988, making him the only one of the six candidates explicitly opposed to the plan. Defeating the GOR plan became part of his platform and his position not only won support for his campaign but also for reorganization's defeat (Hakel, interview). Scientists were vocal as well. Hakel, Scarr, Strickland, former APA president *Janet T. Spence*, and other prominent academicians in the Assembly of Scientific and Applied Psychologists (ASAP), formed in 1987 ("A Short History"), began campaigning for reorganization in May of 1988. They also developed a plan whereby if reorganization failed, they would leave APA and become the *American Psychological Society (APS)* (Hakel, interview). (Note: APS changed its name from the American Psychological Society to the Association for Psychological Science in 2007) with Spence as APS's first president. This possible defection of scientists from APA, coupled with the news of APA's financial crisis from the *Psychology Today* deal, heightened the tension leading to the vote in August.

The vote received a record turn-out, but reorganization failed. Only 42.8% voted in favor of it, and a two-thirds majority was required for the proposal to pass (Fowler 285). In response, the ASAP followed its plan to form APS. Spence continued her role as president, and several other prominent scientists or scientist-practitioners joined APS, including former APA president *Logan Wright* and former APA Science Directorate Alan Kraut. APS members were initially concerned about their organization's survival, but

within a year they already had 4000 members and felt comfortable it would last (Hakel, interview).

APS's formation did not significantly harm APA's enrollment, as some APS members retained their membership in both organizations. However, members of each group distrusted and disliked the other group in the beginning. While APS insisted from its inception that it was not trying to compete with APA (Spence, "American Psychological Society: Off and Running"), the APA Board of Directors labeled APS a competing organization in 1988. Furthermore, APS members were allowed to attend the next APA convention but were not allowed a booth for enlisting more psychologists to APS, and a vote to bar APS members from positions of power within APA came close to passing in 1988 (Fowler 285). On the other hand, APS allowed APA members to attend its first summit meeting but did not let APA have any official representation (Hakel, interview).

Today, both groups thrive independently but coexist peacefully by most accounts, and many psychologists are members of both groups. APA is still the largest psychological organization in the world with 148,000 members as of 2008 ("About the American"), while APS is considerably smaller with 18,000 members ("About APS"); APS's existence, in other words, has not significantly harmed APA membership. Despite the conflict, APA still considers itself a professional and a scientific organization ("About the American"). While bitterness between the groups has deteriorated, representatives from each organization have competed with one another in the public sphere from time to time (Hakel, interview), and many psychologists are still reluctant to discuss their feelings about the other group publicly (Breckler).

Conclusion

The context of the conflict between scientists and practitioners is important for understanding the rhetorical analysis that will follow. I will show that many of the key players in the history of the conflict make statements perpetuating incommensurability between academicians and clinicians. During and after the reorganization conflict, scientists and practitioners still debate the proper training in psychology for students and the proper role of science in psychology and in APA; these debates reveal the two groups' value and pragmatic incommensurability, the topic of Chapter 4. They use these topics as grounds from which to verbally attack each other, increasing incommensurability. Also, while they seem to agree about the details of APA's history I have outlined above, they describe the events in ways favorable to their positions, like other groups in conflict ("Cell and Membrane" 406; Good 248); their stories are the subject of Chapter 5. Scientists and practitioners tell different stories about the history of the relationship between science and practice within APA, as well as the political activity of each party before and during the reorganization conflict.

CHAPTER 4: VALUE AND PRAGMATIC INCOMMENSURABILITY: VEHICLES FOR PERPETUATING THE CONFLICT

The concepts of value and pragmatic incommensurability, coupled with neo-Aristotelian analysis, demonstrate why some bitterness between the groups persists twenty years after the GOR plan's failure. In this chapter, I will show that scientists and practitioners experience value incommensurability: the groups have different goals that cannot both be realized fully at the same time. They also experience pragmatic incommensurability, as each side privileges different types of knowledge. I will use neo-Aristotelian analysis to demonstrate how practitioners and scientists make incommensurability even stronger, further polarizing the two sides. Fowler uses value incommensurability as an area through which to attack the ethos of scientists. Scientists and practitioners also expand the chasm between each other with their comments relating to pragmatic incommensurability. Each group values a different type of logos, or support for an argument. In many cases, members increase the schism between the groups by attacking the other group's privileged logos, perpetuating pragmatic incommensurability. Rhetors' comments render the logos their own group privileges incommensurable with the logos valued by the other group. Pragmatic incommensurability leads rhetors to attacking the other group's ethos as well. Members of the same group as the rhetors receive such remarks well, but the comments discourage this group from taking the other

seriously, increasing incommensurability. Rhetors' comments will frustrate and anger the other group, perpetuating the conflict further.

Value Incommensurability

The comments of Raymond Fowler—Dirty Dozen member and president of APA during the failed reorganization vote in 1988—suggest value incommensurability between scientists and practitioners, similar to the one found between scientists and the general public (Calsamiglia 140): practitioners, like the public, value research with clear, practical consequences, while scientists primarily want to expand their discipline's knowledge base. His comments suggest that practitioners are only interested in helping people, while scientists are only interested in furthering their field and their careers. Unlike researchers in other fields, researchers in psychology do not direct their attention towards improving practice. In the medical field, he asserts, a great deal of the research is directed toward application, so it useful to read recent publications; in psychology, however, "We don't have a whole battery of researchers who are trying to find better techniques. The clinicians say, 'What in the world is in that journal that would be useful to me?'" (interview). According to Fowler, scientists are not concerned with helping clinicians, who help the public. He supports his claim by discussing a recent issue of *Health Psychology*, a well-respected journal, in which there "is very little a clinician could possibly use to do a better job tomorrow than he is doing today" (interview). He adds that scientists are not tailoring their research toward the needs of those practicing:

Nobody who wrote those articles sat down and said, "What is the biggest problem clinicians have and what kind of research can I do that would help them do a better job of what they are doing?" Instead, they say,

“How can I build on the last study I did and carry out additional ramifications of it?” or “How can I get off in a direction that nobody is thinking and try to find some new information?” It’s a big, big, institutional split and philosophical split between the two groups.
(interview)

Fowler emphasizes what he sees as a key difference between scientists and practitioners: scientists work to expand psychology’s knowledge base for knowledge’s sake, while practitioners work to help others. Since scientists do not produce research meaningful for practicing clinicians, clinicians do not need to read and understand recent work in academic psychology. The point of psychology to academicians, he asserts, is to search for truth: if an inquiry produces results with clear practical application, they are pleased, but “[if] not, you still added one brick to the edifice of truth in science. That’s part of being a scientist. You don’t sit down and say, ‘What can I do today in research that would *help people*?’ You say, ‘What can I do to scratch this itch I have about why does so and so happen?’” (interview, italics added). Moreover, academicians criticize practitioners for using unproven therapeutic methods to treat patients, but Fowler insists that clinicians often have no choice but to rely on their practical training in the absence of research: “Am I going to try to find something in the literature that might possibly help me, or am I going to bring to it the best I know from my training on what to do *to help someone who is hurting*?” (interview, italics added).

Fowler’s comments perpetuate incommensurability between scientists and practitioners. He assigns to each group a particular value, and each group’s value cannot be realized simultaneously—they are incommensurable. Scientists only want to advance

knowledge of human behavior, while practitioners only want to help people. Like liberty and equality, which, as Berlin argues, are values many hold dear yet cannot be realized completely simultaneously (qtd. in Harris 70), knowledge and helping others cannot both be realized fully at the same time.

Fowler chastises scientists for not tailoring their research towards direct practical application and implicitly attacks the ethos of scientists, perpetuating incommensurability for both practitioners and scientists. Practitioners, he suggests, are selfless, only concerned with helping people, while scientists are selfish, caring only about furthering their careers. His portrayal of the two groups is favorable for practitioners and will be received well by them. It encourages them to see themselves as better people than scientists, elevating them above scientists. Also, his comments encourage practitioners to view scientists' work as impractical; it expands a knowledge base that has no relevancy to the real world. On the other hand, his statements would likely frustrate scientists and hurt his credibility in their view. They may feel slighted; Brewer, for instance, states scientific journals exist which provide useful information for practicing psychologists (interview). Later analysis will show that many other academicians feel their research *does* have practical application, and practitioners ignore it. His comments, then, would only confirm in their minds that practitioners *are* ignorant of research; if someone like Fowler paid more attention to the extant research, he would know plenty of research has direct application. Fowler's implication that scientists, not practitioners, are self-interested would also insult academicians, who, as later analysis will show, feel practitioners are greedy and completely self-interested.

Pragmatic Incommensurability

The two groups disagree about the proper moral values that should underlie psychology; they also disagree about the evidence psychologists should privilege, a form of pragmatic incommensurability. Their disagreement leads them to attacking each others' logos and ethos, further perpetuating the conflict. Each group claims the logos privileged by the other—scientists' privileging of research and practitioners' privileging of practical, hands-on experience—are insufficient or unreliable bases for claims about behavior. Scientists even claim scientific data trumps the practical experience touted by practitioners. Because they feel their opponents privilege unreliable logos, rhetors also attack their opponents' ethos. Dirty Dozen members value practical knowledge and skills over knowledge from science, and they attack the credibility of scientists who comment on clinical practice without possessing this practical knowledge. Academicians, on the other hand, attack the ethos of practitioners, asserting psychologists uninterested in science are poor, untrustworthy psychologists or are not psychologists at all.

Practitioners Attacking Academicians' Logos and Ethos

Practitioners attack the ethos of scientists because of the logos scientists value. Specifically, practitioners deride academicians for privileging scientific knowledge over practical knowledge: they claim a clinician's practical knowledge and skills are just as credible, if not more credible, than knowledge gained from science. For instance, Fowler asserts that the belief that "unless you publish, you perish. Unless you publish, you are not respected" is too "in-grained" in academicians' minds (interview). He uses several analogies to argue instead that clinicians have practical knowledge that is just as important if not more important than an academic's scientific expertise. Fowler

compares practitioners to college professors who publish little but excel at teaching: he suggests they are unfairly undervalued compared to professors who publish frequently. According to him, teaching, a more practical skill, is just as valuable as research. He also likens the relationship between scientists and practitioners to young doctors and the nurses working for them: "How much respect do physicians show to nurses? A physician who has been out of school a year shows very little respect for a nurse who has been in practice for 35 years and knows ten times as much as he or she does" (interview). Important here is what the nurse knows ten times as much about: practical knowledge for medical practice, not research or the science related to medical practice. Fowler considers the doctor less knowledgeable than the nurse because her extensive practical knowledge is more valuable than his knowledge of science and medicine. When it comes to practical situations, Fowler suggests, knowledge gained through experience is actually worth more than the knowledge learned from academic training.

Other Dirty Dozen members attack the ethos of academicians in *The Practice of Psychology: The Battle for Professionalism*, a book, edited by Wright and Cummings, designed to educate practitioners on the history of clinical practice. They suggest to their clinician readers that academicians, even if they are experts on the research surrounding clinical practice, are not credible instructors for clinical students, and academicians' opinions on the proper instruction of clinical students are not credible because academicians lack practical experience. For clinicians, first-hand experience trumps knowledge from science. They criticize the scientist/practitioner model privileged by academicians because it requires clinical students to devote a portion of their graduate studies to research. Practitioners object to the research requirement because the

academicians who designed it are not themselves clinicians and do not have to do clinical work. According to Wright, those leading the Boulder conference proposed a model for clinical students' education that:

continued to give preeminence to science and, in effect, 'tacked on' training in applied areas...the Boulder compromise (scientist/practitioner) found broad acceptance in the scientific/academic community (*few of whom had any real knowledge of, or experience in providing, free-standing, professional, psychological service*). (xi-xii, emphasis added)

Wright suggests academicians have little experience as practicing clinicians, rendering their opinion on clinical training unreliable; only practicing clinicians are qualified to discuss clinical training. The clinical training model prized by academicians was not "relevant" (4) to clinical students' needs and did not prepare students for "the delivery of *quality* psychological services" (xii), according to Wright. Cummings also discredits the expertise of the faculty members teaching these courses because they did not have clinical experience (71). In this view, instructors who do not practice are not credible teachers of clinical psychology because experience, not research-based knowledge, is what matters. Wright and Cummings both convey to practitioners that academicians are not credible authorities on clinical student education.

Dirty Dozen members emphasize that the independent professional schools were more credible because their instructors had clinical experience, resulting in training more relevant and practical than that delivered by academicians. The first programs, Wright asserts, had "the unique input and participation of professional psychologists; input incorporating the clinical knowledge gained from '*real life*' experience in the

independent delivery of a broad range of psychological services” (28, emphasis added). Fox asserts these schools received harsh and unfounded criticism because they devalued scientific training and APA accreditation, but Dirty Dozen members knew better:

Derogatory and unsubstantiated charges regarding poor quality were leveled at the new programs....It was often assumed that existing programs that were accredited by the APA [scientist/practitioner programs] were of high quality.... [Nevertheless,] Dirty Dozen members were skeptical of such claims and supported attempts to develop *training that was more relevant* to psychological practice. (106, emphasis added)

Again, they emphasize that the scientist/practitioner model was inappropriate for clinical training because it devalued “real life” or practical application. Their rhetoric suggests that scientific training is only relevant and useful in the academy; it does not have a practical application. Thus, only practitioners with extensive clinical experience can deliver effective training to clinical students.

Finally, Wright attacks the academicians’ credibility as speakers on other issues regarding clinical practice for similar reasons: scientists, he emphasizes, lack practical knowledge and experience in clinical work. He notes that when academicians still controlled APA before the 1970s, the academic members who worked on concerns of interest to practitioners knew little if anything about the real, practical concerns of clinicians. He notes that up until the 1960s all members of the Board of Professional Affairs “were academic psychologists, most of whom had little ‘hands on’ experience in independent service delivery” (6). Furthermore, Wright claims it was nearly impossible for practitioners to have a voice on the Board of Directors until clinicians took control

because they had to speak through academic psychologists “who were (1) only marginally identified with applied psychology and (2) had little, if any, ‘hands-on’ experience in the direct provision of psychological services” (48). In discussions of health care and insurance coverage for practitioners, Wright asserts, academics clearly knew little about the real concerns of practitioners. The academic members of AHCIRSD, for instance, “had little knowledge, or interest in, third party coverage of mental health...” (19). The APA Executive Directors of the time were equally ignorant of clinicians practical concerns: “...about the kindest thing that can be said about those CEOs, from the standpoint of professional psychology, is that they lacked insight into and an understanding of the issues besetting that discipline” (23). Yet academicians weighed in on all of these issues. Without first-hand experience as practitioners, however, Wright suggests to fellow clinicians that academicians’ opinions are not to be taken seriously.

Throughout the conflict, many practitioners claim they view science as an important part of psychology. However, practitioners, particularly Dirty Dozen members, imply through some of their comments that the form of logos they privilege is more valuable than that of the scientists. They suggest practical, experience-based knowledge is more valuable than knowledge gained from science. They go even further and attack the ethos of scientists directly: since academicians do not possess this practical knowledge, in practitioners’ view, academicians are not qualified to talk on matters relevant to clinical psychology. They suggest academicians are merely scientists who are not credible psychologists.

Academics Attacking Practitioners' Logos and Ethos

Practitioners' comments, however, are incommensurable with the stated positions of many academics around the time of APS's formation; they insist a commitment to science is what makes a psychologist credible, not practical experience, and some even suggest this commitment is a prerequisite to being a psychologist. The logos academics privilege is science, not experience. Like the practitioners, they attack the ethos of the other group for valuing a different logos, further perpetuating incommensurability. They assert clinicians are untrustworthy not for failing to publish research, as Fowler suggests, but for failing to value science, the core of psychology to academics. According to Logan Wright—a clinician who joined APS after being an APA president and a champion of practitioner rights—"Independent practitioners have turned their backs on those influences which have given credibility to the practice of psychology, namely, a close tie to science and a good public interest record" (qtd. in "The APS Logistics Office" 13). According to academics, science is the basis for psychology as a discipline, and while a practitioner does not have to actively publish research articles to be a psychologist, he or she must actively promote science in his or her professional practice. In the pages of the APS's trade publication, *The APS Observer*, scientists exacerbate their bitterness towards practitioners by attacking practitioners' ethos as psychologists, similar to how scientists in other disciplines accuse their adversaries of not being "real" scientists (Bazerman and De los Santos; Miller; Prelli, "The Rhetorical Construction"); they also attack the logos practitioners privilege and insist science trumps professional experience in all situations (as also seen in Ceccarelli; Fahnestock, "Cell and Membrane"; Miller).

Academicians attack clinicians' ethos by claiming most clinicians are not even psychologists. This is apparent, for instance, when Lee Sechrest—APS member and former president of APA's clinical division—responds to reports that thousands of students graduate with degrees in applied psychology every year. He argues that this is false information because he does not “think that we [departments] are graduating thousands of psychologists. We are graduating thousands and thousands of practitioners who are peripherally acquainted with the discipline of psychology. Most practice seems to be grounded in all sorts of notions about behavior that have no scientific standing whatsoever....Freud, for example” (qtd. in “The Courage” 8-9). He suggests what practitioners do is related to psychology, but without an explicit connection to science, their work is not psychology. He qualifies that some clinicians are committed to science and are psychologists, but a great deal venture away from psychology, even those with good training. Robert Parks, the director of accreditation for the American Medical Association, also attacks practitioners' ethos by suggesting that what they practice is not psychology. He explains, “if you wish to practice medicine, go to medical school; if you wish to practice psychology, seek firm grounding in behavioral science” (23). Clinicians, Parks suggests, are not psychologists because they have insufficient backgrounds in science.

Academicians attack practitioners' ethos further by insisting practitioners are unscientific and let their emotions get in the way of their judgment. Fowler insists practitioners should not read academic journals because they are not useful; nevertheless, Sechrest admonishes them because “they don't subscribe to journals. How can you say your practice is scientifically based if you don't even read the journals? All the evidence

shows practitioners' big influence is workshops, [sic] and charismatic leaders" (qtd. in "The Courage" 9). They do not base their judgments on science but on practical advice, and they let their emotions influence their practice. According to Sechrest, however, a real psychologist can only invoke science to justify a particular technique or clinical assessment. Clinical psychologist Walter T. Plant shares Sechrest's view and attacks clinicians' mental competency because they make claims based on their instincts, not on research: "Many psychologists seem to be of the view that thought and its expression goes on in the pelvic region and not the brain. How many times have associates offered 'I have a gut feeling on this' as evidence?" (14). To Plant, practitioners are simply irrational because they make judgments based on intuition, not science. Hilgard also attacks practitioners' scientific credibility and their susceptibility to their emotions. He attributes the conflict between scientists and practitioners partly to greed on the side of the practitioners. Since they make more money focusing on their practice, they disregard their obligations to science. He adds that these new clinicians "[make] you ill. All these wild-eyed, feely-feely types. There is no consideration of the research at all" (qtd. in "These Problems" 6). Without privileging science, Hilgard suggest, psychology has allowed untrustworthy, overly emotional and subjective practitioners into the discipline.

Others echo these concerns that practitioners' devaluing of science has reduced the reliability and credibility of clinical psychologists. Cook notes that there were no concerns of "quackery" when scientific and applied psychology worked together (qtd. in "American Psychological" 6), but now APS must strive "to eliminate faddish and unscientific trends in private practice" (qtd. in "American Psychological" 8). Behavioral psychologist and APS member Robert Epstein comments in the *Observer* that

psychology is now “tainted” due to “the *uneven quality* of clinical practice and because of the *iron heel of pop psychology*” (“The Summit” 10, emphasis added). Clinicians, academicians suggest, have become charlatans without science and have reduced the credibility of psychology as a whole.

APS members’ at APS’S first summit meeting also express concern that practitioners rely on experiences and clinical judgment in their practice, not scientific fact. The *APS Observer* reports that they discussed several issues they deemed pertinent to the interest of the organization, one of them being how APS should promote science within practice. They agreed to discredit and remove from clinical practice all techniques proven invalid by science “regardless of the training of those engaging in these practices” (“The Summit” 10). Even if the psychologist using such practices is licensed—licensing procedures being controlled by state associations and thus clinicians—the practice should be forbidden. Scientific consensus, in other words, overrides the opinions and knowledge of practitioners. The *APS Observer* also reports that the group recommended compiling reports to be sent to parties such as insurance companies “to help reduce the promotion and use of scientifically unsound technique” (The Summit” 10). A group also agreed that “particularly blatant forms of psychological quackery (handwriting analysis was one candidate) should be debunked” (“The Summit” 10).

Some APS members assert science’s superiority to clinicians’ judgments in more detail. For example, Sechrest sees science as a lens through which to judge all clinical practices. He admonishes clinicians for declaring techniques unfounded by scientific research effective and using them in practice. Their practices are supported by “clinical judgment,” not science, and are thus insignificant. He also laments that clinicians are not

being called to task for relying on their professional judgment to make claims and clinical assessments: "Today you can make almost unbelievable claims and statements and no one will call you to task. No one is interested. No one insures that claims on behalf of practice are even reasonably established or measured (qtd. in "The Courage" 8). He adds, "Because of the notion of independent practice—that psychologists can practice based on their own beliefs and not science—we have simply allowed practitioners to do as they wish. With no one calling them to account (qtd. in "The Courage" 9). The personal experience and assessment of a practitioner, the grounds privileged by Fowler and other practitioners, are insufficient grounds to Sechrest. In situations where no scientific evidence suggests how to treat a patient, furthermore, Sechrest argues practitioners should simply do nothing: "They should have the courage to say 'we don't do that because we do not know how.'Just as some courageous physicians say 'we don't know what to do.' You don't do surgery just to be doing it" (qtd. in "The Courage" 9). In this view, clinical judgment is so untrustworthy that it should not even be used in cases where science has provided no guidance, which is clearly contrary to Fowler's position. Academicians claim that under no circumstances should practitioners use therapeutic techniques not yet supported by science.

He provides several examples of cases where clinicians act under false authority, giving professional opinions unverified by scientific research. He notes psychologists give their "expert opinion" in court cases without having a solid bank of knowledge to base their opinions. He also argues that psychologists are not yet qualified to give opinions in sex abuse cases:

There are very few scientific data on the validity of opinions that psychologists are giving. And psychologists can't just give an 'opinion.' Expert witnesses are forced to go beyond the data. Their fees depend on making these kinds of statements with a level of confidence that can't be justified given the state of our knowledge. (qtd. in "The Courage" 9)

Again, clinicians should not take action unless research clearly supports it: science provides the context through which clinicians should act. He also criticizes a state association for making claims that "psychologists are experts in biofeedback, stress management, and behavior modification. That's patently untrue. That is an exaggerated claim. Some are. Most are not. There are few psychologists who could really claim expertise in more than a few areas" (qtd. in "The Courage" 10). Clinicians must avoid claiming authority in areas outside of their particular expertise.

Like Sechrest, Robyn Dawes, a former APA Board of Directors member, attacks the credibility of practitioners, chastising them for consciously disregarding scientific findings which discredit their practice's validity. He details in his resignation letter from APA that "what the APA has failed to do—and in [his] view failed **miserably**—is to assure that the professional practice of psychology is based on available scientific knowledge" (14). He agrees with Sechrest that "clinical judgment" and experience are not valid grounds for practice. Instead, clinicians must refer to science to assess the proper course of action. He notes that a great body of research proves "experience-based inference in the absence of a sound theoretical base" is highly problematic. The issue is not when clinicians make decisions when there is no research relevant to the particular situation; it is when "there **are** research findings that imply one course of action, while

‘clinical judgment’ (and let’s face it, *egotism*) imply a contrary one” (14-15, italics added). Throughout his letter, he insists practitioners are aware of the research proving their judgment is erroneous but choose to ignore it. They disregard science because they are self-absorbed.

Dawes cites several areas in which he believes clinicians are blatantly ignoring the research which proves their practices are invalid or suspect. He opens by citing research suggesting clinical psychologists are not better therapists than others (14). They disregard research by Paul Meehl and others spanning 30 years showing that actuarial predictions—predictions, based on statistics, about how a patient, inmate, and so forth will behave (Colman)—are more accurate than the predictions clinicians make based on their assessment; they also disregard a related body of research showing clinicians need to acknowledge base rate statistics when assessing behavior. However, Dawes exclaims, “The effect of Meehl’s work on clinical practice in the mental health area can be summed up in a single word: Zilch. He was honored, elected to the presidency of APA at a very young age in 1962, recently elected to the National Academy of Sciences, and ignored” (15). He rebukes APA for disregarding research on the ineffectiveness of assessment tests: “APA is indifferent to the pleas that ‘despite the research I find this test valuable in my experience,’ which is the standard justification for administering most demonstrably invalid tests—e.g. Rorschach, sentence completion and Draw-A-Person” (15). He cites work by E.L Kelly—which “has never been successfully challenged”—that suggests the interviewing process state associations require for licensing practitioners is unreliable: “Like Meehl, Kelly was elected president of APA and ignored” (15). He also admonishes claims by Fowler and Matarazzo that clinicians’ predictions in trials are

valid, citing Matarazzo's own acknowledgment that their position "has not met 'even the most primitive scientific tests of validation'" (qtd. in Dawes 15). When clinicians do reference research, they refer to research involving methods unreliable to experimental psychologists, such as "interviews, unvalidated tests, and tests that have been shown to be invalid" (15). Finally, he concludes that the goal of the clinicians running APA is to persuade Americans that practitioners "have a special expertise and power that **simply doesn't exist**" (15). He adds, "The evidence indicates that a judge or jury with a desk calculator would do better" (15).

Dawes, unlike the other academicians discussed above, directs his comments specifically toward the opposing group, practitioners, though his letter is reprinted in the *APS Observer*. Similar to other academicians, however, his letter exacerbates incommensurability due to his ad hominem attacks on practitioners. He calls practitioners self-absorbed; he claims they know that science has proven many of their techniques invalid and their expertise as therapists to be insignificant. Instead of promoting a dialogue about these concerns, Dawes launches an insulting offensive. Furthermore, to support his argument he uses research, the grounds which he declares from the beginning to be unimportant to his opponents. He does not try to meet them on their own terms or encourage productive communication between the two parties. By choosing a rhetorical strategy that will certainly enrage practitioners, Dawes perpetuates incommensurability, encouraging them to dismiss his message. However, the academician audience of the *Observer* will receive his attacks well and his approach will only reaffirm any beliefs they hold that their opponents are selfish and unscientific.

Conclusion

Clearly, academicians and practitioners in APA experience value and pragmatic incommensurability, privileging different values and logos, and perpetuate this disconnect within their own groups by attacking the logos and ethos of the opposition. Practitioners insist experience and clinical judgment based on practical, “real-world” experience are valid grounds for supporting and utilizing a given clinical technique. They also criticize the scientist/practitioner model, arguing that its proponents do not have sufficient experience as practitioners to make decisions regarding clinical training. Plus, practitioners suggest academicians are not credible instructors for clinical students, even if the scientist’s research interests are in applied psychology, because they have little or no experience with patients. For the same reasons, scientists’ opinions on other matters related to clinicians’ affairs are also invalid. Academicians, conversely, attack practitioners’ because practitioners, they assert, do not privilege scientific research; because practitioners lack training in science, they are unreliable psychologists susceptible to “quackery” and “fads.” The only claims valid in psychology are ones supported by theory and research; academicians’ incommensurable rhetoric leaves them unable to accept any positions made by clinicians grounded on experience or clinical judgment.

While different groups often have different values and privilege different methodologies, these differences do not necessitate conflict between groups. However, the rhetorical strategies scientists and practitioners employ discourage cooperation. By attacking the other group’s logos, rhetors encourage their fellow group members to view the opponent’s logos as incommensurable with their own. The audience will see little

reason to converse with the other group if the opponent's knowledge and beliefs are useless and incompatible with their own. Also, by attacking each others' ethos, speakers encourage members of their own group to resent the other even more. Furthermore, speakers' comments would frustrate members of the opposing group. The statements of clinicians and academicians suggest incommensurability—a communicative divide existing since psychology's infancy—at least partly contributed to the bitterness between members of the two parties before and after the vote for reorganization. As neo-Aristotelian analysis demonstrates, however, the rhetorical strategies they use exacerbate incommensurability and prevent productive discussion between the groups about their differences. Instead of talking *with* each other about their different beliefs and values pertaining to psychology, and instead of working together on shared problems, they are talking *at* each other.

Scientists' and practitioners' statements deriving from value and pragmatic incommensurability are not the only vehicles through which they attack each other's credibility and bolster their own. The narratives they tell work in a similar manner rhetorically. In each group's account of the history of APA up to and during the reorganization conflict, the group attacks the trustworthiness and character of the other, describing the opponent as irrational and evil; conversely, the group describes itself as noble and even heroic. Each group also invites its listeners to continue the battle against the other, perpetuating the conflict further.

CHAPTER 5: ONE CONFLICT, TWO STORIES: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRACTITIONERS' AND ACADEMICIANS' TALES

In this chapter, I will apply narrative analysis to the stories told by both practitioners and scientists to show how their narratives perpetuate incommensurability. I will first discuss the Dirty Dozen's narrative. I will examine the narrative's formal elements, including the setting, characters, plot, and the theme, and explain the rhetorical functions these elements serve. Then I will argue that the formal and functional elements work together to create a descendent of a Master Narrative—their story is a contemporary adaptation of liberation narratives about the triumph of an oppressed minority over an irrational hegemonic power. In the Dirty Dozen's rendition of the Master Narrative, a young idealistic group of practitioners overcomes discrimination and injustices at the hands of the old academician regime, leading a revolution to change the direction of APA. Their dramatic account perpetuates incommensurability between practitioners and academicians: it encourages practitioners to view academicians as arrogant, irrational, evil enemies only interested in preserving their own power. It dehumanizes academicians: it does not allow for any rational motives behind academicians' behavior.

After examining the practitioners' narrative, I will analyze the academicians' narrative to show that their story operates in a manner rhetorically similar to that of the practitioners' narrative: it encourages incommensurability by describing the rhetors' group as noble and even heroic while describing the other group as irrational and evil. I

will discuss the formal elements of the scientists' narrative, particularly the setting, plot, and antagonists, and explain how these features operate rhetorically to win sympathy for scientists and encourage hatred for the uncivilized practitioners. I will argue scientists also dehumanize their opponents in their narrative; they suggest practitioners behave impulsively without any reasonable explanation for their actions.

Finally, I will conclude this chapter by contrasting the narratives of practitioners and scientists. I will discuss in detail how they both utilize the "Good versus Evil" metaphor found in pro-war rhetoric: each group characterizes its own members as noble and civilized but describes the other group's members as evil and savage. This encourages each group's respective audience to despise the other group and to join the fight against this enemy. I will also explain how both groups use plot in ways ideal for their side of the argument, portraying their actions in a favorable light while portraying the other's actions as questionable.

The Practitioners' Narrative: a Story of Triumph Despite the Odds

In the case of the Dirty Dozen's story about their victory against the academicians, the setting is meetings, conventions, and other gatherings of APA psychologists between 1946, when APA and AAAP merged, and 1988, when the reorganization proposal failed. The protagonists are the Dirty Dozen, the antagonists are the academicians, and the supporting characters are other practitioners and those sympathetic to the practitioners' cause. Notable plot devices are discrimination and commitment, and the themes suggest academicians are cowardly, arrogant, and unjust while practitioners are courageous, selfless, and resourceful.

Setting

The various descriptions of the setting facilitate incommensurability, transporting the audience to a distant time in which practitioners were the victims of horrible discrimination in APA at the hands of academicians. For instance, Fowler likens practitioners' situation to events with emotional resonance to all Americans—America's history of explicit discrimination against African-Americans: "The relationship of clinicians to APA was not terribly unlike the relationship of black people to the government of the state of Alabama, where I grew up. They had no power, no vote, and were really remarkably discriminated against" (interview). He extends this metaphor, characterizing voting practices within APA as apartheid with practitioners at the losing end:

In the later years, as the number of clinicians built up, there was still enormous resentment on the part of the academics who controlled the association, and unwillingness to give up any power at all. So, one of the techniques that was used several decades ago was to finally, under great pressure, to give clinicians a half vote each. Sort of a compromise from *total apartheid* to *modified apartheid*. (interview, emphasis added)

Fowler and Wright also offer personal anecdotes about academicians' discriminatory statements toward practitioners. Fowler recounts an old story of an academician colleague who would tell his students that if they went into private practice, the instructors "have just wasted years of training" (interview). Similarly, Wright claims that in his graduate school days a student had to hide his or her plans to run independent

practice; if the faculty knew of the student's plans, they would not allow him or her to pass the program (4).

Fowler makes the setting for practitioners' battle significantly more dramatic through the theme of injustice. Such an analogy encourages an audience to sympathize with the protagonists by framing their conflict in a scene of discrimination. Younger audience members with practitioner leanings may know little or nothing about the conflict between the camps within APA and the resulting reorganization debate in the late 1980s. Instructors and textbooks say little about the topic, and even key figures in the drama, such as Fowler himself, insist there really not been any conflict since shortly after APS'S formation (interview). The context Fowler provides for the practitioners' story, however, provokes their emotional involvement and wins their support for the practitioners immediately. Academicians, on the other hand, would find the portrayal insulting and would certainly take issue with comparing their behaviors to those of racist whites of the first half of the 20th century.

Protagonists and Supporting Characters

Acting within this setting are heroes and villains. Heroes in narratives are either "everyman" characters, showing that in certain situations any person can be heroic, or they are traditional heroes "who [serve] as model[s] for great action" (Rowland 133-134). The protagonists in the Dirty Dozen narrative, Dirty Dozen members themselves, are traditional heroes. Like the heroes involved in America's fight for independence, they symbolize courage and dedication to their specific cause: empowering practitioners. They are a young, courageous group committed to gaining rights for practitioners in APA against the hegemonic academicians who oppress them. In Wright's words, they are part

of a “younger, more aggressive” body of psychologists that rejected the scientist/practitioner model advocated by academicians (4). He repeatedly emphasizes that they are a “small, informal group of psychologists” committed to strengthening practitioners’ power within APA (2). Like the heroes in many popular stories, they are a group of individuals who valiantly fight against a hegemonic power.

In addition, according to Wright’s account, the Dirty Dozen are exemplars of how people should sacrifice unselfishly to achieve a shared goal. Though they may have had different backgrounds, “and although each had a private agenda, they were united in their subscription to the principle that those personal agendas had to take second place to the interests of professional psychology” (57). Their commitment is genuine and free of bureaucracy: “There were never any rules, bylaws, or procedures governing the group, or any due. Such formalities were unnecessary. You got a phone call; and if you could, you pitched in whatever the action might be” (2). Their tactics may be unsavory at times, as their moniker suggests; in fact, Wright even makes “a pact with the devil” (see Figure 1). However, they participate in “all sorts of ‘psychologically unseemly acts’” only because their enemy will do the same (Wright 2). According to Wright’s account, the Dirty Dozen are admirable models of selfless dedication to a cause: the advancement of practitioners in APA is such a noble pursuit to them that they will drop all personal ambitions and do whatever it takes to overcome the odds and win their battle.

Throughout Wright’s narrative, he frequently mentions Dirty Dozen members by name as he praises their individual achievements in the fight against the academicians. His discussion is similar in form to famous fantasy stories in which a band of heroes work independently to fight evil. One hero he describes, interestingly enough, is himself.



Rogers Wright “making his pact with the devil” (circa 1978).
This statue adorned the foyer of the Devil’s Pitchfork Restaurant in the
Gramercy Inn, Washington, DC, a favorite meeting place
of the Dirty Dozen in the years beginning with the early 1960s.

Figure 1: This photo and caption from Rogers Wright and Nick Cummings’ The Practice of Psychology: The Battle for Professionalism (Appendix II) promote incommensurability between scientists and practitioners. Dirty Dozen members insist they put personal ambitions aside, but the image above contradicts this claim: one makes a pact with the devil to fulfill such ambitions. However, by making light of their commitment to dirty political tactics, Wright and Cummings discourage other practitioners from recognizing the Dirty Dozen as corrupt and instead encourage the audience to consider such means justified given the end. This rhetorical approach keeps practitioners from calling into question the nobility of the protagonists, downplaying any equal blame they share for the conflict.

Referring to himself in third-person, he self-aggrandizes as he chronicles his own achievements, such as single-handedly persuading California’s Attorney General to change his stated position that psychoanalysis is not legitimate psychological practice by

law; the AG changing his position, Wright emphasizes, was an “unprecedented act” (14). He characterizes Cummings as a “young psychologist” (19) who made a “bold decision” to open up an independent professional school of psychology, “a historic movement” (28). He praises Kovacs and Wiggins as brains behind the operation. Wright asserts Kovacs uses his “frequently prescient view of the future” to convince the Los Angeles city and county psychological societies to create a committee on insurance issues (15). Wiggins, “who has more ideas than 10 people could possibly implement,” put together genius proposals regarding licensing and insurance (25) and came up with the clever moniker, “Freedom of Choice,” that helped win the approval of state legislators for insurance reimbursement for practitioners (34). Wright’s account of their individual achievements glorifies them in the minds of their practitioner audience; like the American heroes associated with America’s fight for independence from Britain, Dirty Dozen members are champions for the rights of practitioners.

Wright also characterizes the supporting characters that assist the protagonists as young, open-minded, and eager to increase clinicians’ voice within APA. When practitioners take control of the BPA, for instance, Wright notes that the new staff members “were somewhat naïve with respect to clinical issues... [but] they both had identification with professional psychology and were willing to learn” (25). Wright also emphasizes that ally Chuck Kiesler, an APA CEO, was young, hired younger staff members (particularly in the clinical divisions), and was “open to new ideas” (53).

Wright’s description of the practitioners and their affiliates commands the interest and respect of his practitioner audience and in turn promotes incommensurability with academicians. He characterizes the protagonists and supporting characters as talented,

dedicated individuals who work relentlessly to empower practitioners in an APA that discriminates against them. They serve as models to other practitioners; audience members are encouraged to take pride in the accomplishments of the “founding fathers” of the contemporary APA and to continue their fight. Fox exclaims “What [the Dirty Dozen] started has not been completed as of yet” (115). Practitioners are also encouraged to understand their current position of power in APA in a new light: it resulted from years of fighting against an old and rigid orthodoxy controlling APA. Wright’s account resembles the way many scientists examined in other analyses describe themselves in the face of adversity; they declare themselves to be young revolutionaries whose ideas, while perhaps unpopular now, will receive a more favorable treatment in time (see “The Bering Crossover,” “Cell and Membrane,” Lyne and Howe, and “The Rhetorical Construction”). Wright’s strategy encourages practitioners to avoid cooperating with academicians by depicting their scientist colleagues as simply an obtuse old guard whose ideas and values derive from outdated, irrelevant beliefs.

Antagonists

The Dirty Dozen reinforce this incommensurable attitude through their descriptions of the academicians. The academicians are a nameless enemy—unlike the practitioners, they have no identity and are less than human in the Dirty Dozen’s story. As a whole, academicians represent an irrational, selfish, and corrupt enemy who reinforces the status quo that keeps them in power through mindless bureaucracy. To Dirty Dozen members, academicians are “insensitive” (Wright 39), “irrational” (Wright xii and 54) and “insane” (Siegel et al.); their behaviors, which are “less than scholarly, scientific, or well-mannered,” (Wright xii), deserve “study and analysis by a competent

psychologist” (Wright 39). Dirty Dozen members emphasize the arrogance of academicians; noting scientists believe they are the only “true” psychologists (Wright 3) and that they simply think all psychologists should be academicians (Fowler). Wright, for instance, chastises the academicians running the California State Psychological Association for their “intellectual arrogance” (10). Furthermore, according to Wright, academicians employ corrupt methods to maintain their power. They utilize “convenient sophistry” when arguing their positions (42). They utilize their “faculty emoluments to control [APA],” Wright states. He also emphasizes that academicians use dirty tricks to control APA elections, such as the “‘dean’s network,’ ...an informal arrangement among the academicians whereby their departmental resources, including long-distance telephone lines, were being systematically (and successfully) used to influence the APA election process” (49). According to Dirty Dozen members, academicians, unlike the practitioners, also use bureaucracy as a weapon against their enemy, though this tactic generally fails. Academicians form numerous committees for the express purpose of keeping practitioners from power, such as the Albee Committee (12), the Blue Ribbon Committee (Siegel et. al.), and the Committee on Relations between APA and CAPPS (42). They also pass new APA bylaws specifically to keep practitioners from power. According to Wright, the APA Board of Directors passed a policy denying him from taking his newly acquired seat on the Board because he had in the past been a member of a political action group. They tried to apply the new policy to him retroactively (45).

The Dirty Dozen’s portrayal of their story’s antagonists discourages other practitioners from taking academicians seriously. They depict academicians as vile, irrational oppressors whose actions are only motivated by their desire to preserve the

status quo that gave them a monopoly over APA's politics. Other possible explanations for their actions are not allowed. Though the practitioners also engage in dirty politics for the purpose of increasing their power within APA, their metaphorical descriptions of themselves as "good" and the academicians as "evil" discourage the audience from recognizing their actions as foul play. The audience must instead view such actions as necessary means for defeating a ruthless enemy.

Plot

An effective narrative needs a captivating plot to engage the audience and involve them in the story; the Dirty Dozen's use of the interplay between dedication and corruption makes the story interesting and reinforces incommensurable beliefs about practitioners and academicians. It encourages the audience to root for the practitioners as an underdog in a fight against a powerful, tyrannical hegemony, played by the academicians. The plot moves in a continuous cycle: the Dirty Dozen make some progress, the academicians ignore practitioners' progress or actively work to undermine practitioner's efforts, the Dirty Dozen successfully counters the academicians' tactics, and so on. For instance, according to Wright, the Dirty Dozen worked diligently to increase practitioners' political power. Wright and Siegel et al. note, however, that the corrupt academicians formed numerous committees for the express purpose of threatening the power gained justly by practitioners, such as the Albee Commission, the Blue Ribbon Commission, and GOR. In each case, practitioners and the Dirty Dozen have mustered time and resources enough to defeat the academicians' attacks on their power. They remain committed to their goal despite the devious efforts of the academicians, and with each battle practitioners become stronger. The turning point

occurs when the power in APA shifts from academicians' to practitioners' hands: Wright notes that at a Council meeting in 1972, an academician openly states that the power is shifting from the academicians to the practitioners (41). Action rises as the Dirty Dozen members get themselves elected to top political positions in APA to the chagrin of academicians, with the climax being the defeat of the GOR plan in 1988.

The "reorganization drama," as Siegel et al. refer to it, is the final battle between practitioners and academicians, and after winning the battle, Dirty Dozeners suggest, the conflict ends (falling action ensues): APS and the academicians are a vanquished enemy, still alive but not much of a threat. Fowler claims academicians thought they were dealing a blow to APA when they formed APS, believing many members would desert APA, but APA's numbers stayed about the same. Wright, in his notably brief discussion of APS, carelessly dismisses them as a small "competing" organization that had "stagnated, with a membership of approximately 15,000 (*a large number of whom were students*) and a substantial portion of whom were *sub-doctoral practitioners*" (55, emphasis added). Wright's account suggests that the most formidable enemy is now weak and pathetic; it still tries to compete with the protagonist, but its efforts are laughable. Nevertheless, practitioners' fight is never over, as "future generations" must continue to battle "seemingly insurmountable challenges that are currently threatening the very survival of professional psychology" (Wright and Cummings, dedication).

The plot of the Dirty Dozen's narrative reinforces incommensurability. The academicians are an evil empire that works constantly to undermine the efforts of the practitioners to improve their lot within psychology. Practitioners had to endure forty years of battles with academicians to finally lay claim to power, but according to the

story, time has proved practitioners are superior. Academicians, once powerful and intimidating, are now insignificant. The story encourages practitioner audience members to cheer for the practitioners and to despise the academicians. It also suggests to practitioners that academicians are no longer relevant to them; their group, APS, is a farce. The story encourages pride in the causes and values of practitioners and scorn for the interests of academicians. It also encourages practitioners to continue battling the enemy they defeated; like the common villain in a series, evil forces can always rise up again and threaten the peace the protagonist has brought.

Master Narrative

The formal elements of the story—the setting, protagonists, supporting characters, antagonists, and the plot—and the rhetorical functions of these elements work together as a modern adaptation of a Master Narrative of liberation. This Master Narrative is a conventional story about an oppressed minority beating the odds to succeed despite the discriminatory practices of the dominant power. This story has a special meaning for Americans, as it derives from the story of U.S colonists' struggles against an oppressive Great Britain, considered the most powerful country in the world at the time. Stories of a similar nature come from the Civil Rights Movement, a comparison Fowler suggests himself. In the Dirty Dozen's adaptation of the Master Narrative, the underdog is the Dirty Dozen and practitioners as a whole; through over forty years of hard work and courage, they overcome "insurmountable odds" (Wright and Cummings), defeat their oppressors, and stake a claim for themselves in APA. The themes of the Master Narrative make the Dirty Dozen's story all the more convincing to their practitioner audience. It further promotes incommensurability, encouraging practitioners to view the

scientists as an oppressor who has committed unspeakable evils against them. It also encourages practitioners to see themselves, not academicians, as victims in the APA conflict, and to see the tactics used by Dirty Dozen members to take over APA as just and necessary, not unfair, despicable, or deceitful. At the same time, this Master Narrative is a brazen affront to academicians, strengthening incommensurability between the two groups. While they would concede that academicians have openly disrespected clinicians in the past (Hakel, interview, "These Problems" 4), academicians would not consider themselves evil and would not agree any past wrongs justify the practitioners' later control of APA through whatever means necessary. They would also argue the practitioners, not the academicians, are guilty of using bureaucracy to maintain power (Hakel, interview) and would argue practitioners behave dishonestly and irrationally, as the academicians' own narrative demonstrates.

The Academicians' Story: A Tragic Fall from Grace

Academicians give quite a different narrative describing APA's past and the situation prompting the push for reorganization. Their audience includes not only other scientists but practitioners as well, though their remarks are much more rhetorically effective for scientists. Like the practitioners, the scientists tell a story that promotes incommensurability between scientists and practitioners. Their narrative encourages other academicians to resent the changes wrought by the practitioners' growing influence: it suggests practitioners have rendered APA an unscientific and shameful perversion of its old self while practitioners satiate their unquenchable thirst for power. Practitioners have stolen the academicians' organization from them, and academicians must in turn fight to check the power of clinicians in APA or form a new group in the

mold of the original scientifically-based APA. Such rhetoric still persists twenty years after the incident, as personal interviews with figures such as Hakel and Brewer reveal. In the academicians' narrative, the setting, APA, changes dramatically as the story progresses. The antagonists threaten the stability of the organization and they corrupt APA. The academicians battle the practitioners fruitlessly to take back control of APA. Their story contains numerous traditional plot devices, such as tragedy, rising action, a turning point, climax, and falling action. Prevalent throughout the story are themes of corruption, intolerance, and unity.

Setting

The setting perpetuates incommensurability by taking its academician audience members to a distant time where they are the majority within APA and their values are left unchallenged. In this ideal world, science is the chief concern of psychology and practitioners are interested in science. For instance, the covers of the first few issues of the *APS Observer* invite the audience to a place where science is psychology's only focus. One issue features an image of antiquated laboratory equipment used in memory studies influenced by the first notable memory researcher, Hermann Ebbinghaus. The caption dates the instruments as late 19th century to early 20th century ("After Ebbinghaus" 1). Other covers feature pictures of notable psychological scientists from psychology's early days, such as William James ("Alice and William James" 1)—deemed in academia as the father of psychology—and famous behaviorist James B. Watson ("John B. Watson" 1). Pictures of past APA presidents, notably all academicians, appear on other *APS Observer* covers ("APA Presidents" 1; "Although Psychology" 1). This combination of images brings the audience to a scene much more

desirable to them than the one they struggle in now. In this scene, the field of psychology is a community of academicians committed to science: APA presidents are academicians, and practitioners have no voice in APA. Historical images and figures in psychology relating specifically to clinical work, such as Freud's couch, Carl Jung, and Carl Rogers, are left out of this account of psychology's history. The images suggest to the audience that psychology, from the beginning, has been about science, and a world devoid of practitioner interests is not only possible but is in fact achievable.

Articles in the *APS Observer* also transport the audience to a time where science, not practice, was at the forefront of all psychologists' interests, a comforting scene for academicians. The first two issues each include feature articles on famous psychologists in APA's history, Cook, and Hilgard, who have joined APS, and in each article the psychologist works to create this scene of an ideal, purely scientific APA. For example, Cook notes that the original APA conferences were at universities and the "atmosphere...was scholarly" (cited in "American Psychological" 6). Hilgard notes all the notable scientists he met when he went to his first APA convention in 1928, such as E.G. Boring, Robert S. Woodworth, and Edward L. Thorndike, and he also mentions meeting Ivan Pavlov in 1930 (cited in "These Problems" 4). As Cook notes, "Everybody who was anybody belonged to the APA" in the early days (cited in "American Psychological" 7). The scene was exhilarating: "'There was a mood of congeniality and excitement'... 'Psychology was on the move'" (Hilgard, qtd. in "These Problems" 4). Psychologists were excited to talk with one another about science at APA conventions, and all of the big names were there. Plus, they were interested in what others were doing, regardless of their own specialty (Cook, cited in "American Psychological" 6).

The original scene in the academician's narrative is pleasant and comforting to scientists. It is a world where what they value—a commitment to science—is privileged, and no other values compete for attention in APA. Notable historical figures in the history of psychological science attend the conferences, not necessarily famous clinicians. The spirit is lively, congenial, cooperative, and notably academic. It is a Garden of Eden for scientists, where they can work together in perfect harmony without constraint. It is an ideal scene which this narrative suggests did exist at a time, prodding scientists to long for the way things used to be. Practitioners, on the other hand, would find little flattering about academicians' portrayal of the past. They would claim that APA in this form described by practitioners is discriminatory, slighting the significance of practitioners working in early 20th century. Wright would argue, for instance, that the only reason APA conferences were chiefly academic in nature was because academicians disregarded the interests of practitioners (x).

Plot

The story plays on the emotions of the academician audience members; they are devastated when the utopia of collegiality that is APA comes crashing down because of the practitioners' corrupting influence. When AAAP merges with APA in 1946, Skinner notes, Boring prophetically warns that APA will continue to prosper only if psychologists ensure that science remains at the organization's forefront and that psychologists stay out of private practice (qtd. in "The Summit" 8). As the story unfolds, APA falters because it strays from this emphasis on science. The ideal scene of harmony deteriorates into a world of aggression and divisiveness; the world which upholds the values of the academician audience becomes corrupted by practitioner influence. APA's tragic fall

from grace begins with the APA/AAAP merger. The protagonists, the academicians, are tragic heroes who make an innocent mistake; in this story they have good intentions when they work out the plan for the merger, but they do not anticipate the dire consequences. Hilgard notes that the “the old habit of disrespect for applied psychology” left practitioners feeling like “second class citizens” (qtd. in “These Problems” 4). However, this is around World War II, and the “spirit of the times” promotes unity, not fractionalization; the situation prompted each party to put their differences aside (Hilgard, cited in “These Problems” 4-5). Academicians promote unity within psychology by meeting with the AAAP and they work fervently to create a new organization in which all psychologists can work together. To bring scientists and practitioners together into one organization, academicians agree to drop APA’s publication requirement for membership and allow AAAP to merge into APA. At the time, they have no reservations about the move because all practitioners, they erroneously believe, privilege science like they do:

“[We] felt we simply must get rid of the distinction between scientific and applied psychologists. Remember at the time that most of applied psychology—I/O, Assessment, Counseling, and so on—was closely associated with scientific psychology. The Universities were training them....No one could foresee a split between scientific and applied psychology in the sense of an applied psychology practiced without a commitment to scientific psychology. The strength of the commitment to general psychology was still very strong.” (Cook, qtd. in “American Psychological” 6)

The noble and selfless academicians even work with the clinicians to develop licensing and certification procedures for private practice because they have a moral responsibility to ensure that practitioners are properly trained (Cook, cited in "American Psychological" 7; Hilgard, cited in "These Problems" 5). The flaw of the academicians in their story is naiveness: they value what is good, science, but erroneously believe those who they take under their wing share this proper and moral value. They fail to recognize these practitioners as an enemy whose political savvy will lead to a power shift within APA.

Tragedy ensues over the next few decades as practitioners rise in number and influence within APA: the "symbolic character" (Cook, qtd. in "American Psychological" 6) of APA changes from scholarly and congenial to professional and bureaucratic as the concerns of professionals take center stage. The conventions move from *academic institutions* to *hotels* as the influx of practitioners overcomes scientists (Cook, cited in "American Psychological" 7). The meetings become too large (Hilgard, cited in "These Problems" 6) and by the 1950s, fractionalization flourishes: "you could go through an entire APA convention and attend things only in your specialty...specialization was well underway" (Cook, qtd. in "American Psychological" 7). Gone is the interest in others' scholarly achievements, the intellectual discussions that follow, and the "sense of brotherhood" felt among other psychologists (Hilgard, qtd. in "These Problems" 5). Finally, when non-academicians are elected to the APA presidency, it "[strikes at] the emotional basis of people's identification with APA" (Cook, qtd. in "American Psychological" 6). Scientists stop going to the conventions altogether (Cook, cited in "American Psychological" 8). By the 1980s, 10% of APA's membership drop out over a four year span and less than half of new PhDs "even bother to join APA" ("Milton

Hakel” 10). As Cook notes, “‘Sometime ago a colleague told me ‘I’ve given up on APA.’ I thought it was a revealing phrase. In a special sense people did not withdraw from APA, they felt APA withdrew from them’” (qtd. in “American Psychological” 8). Membership to APA is no longer something of which to be proud (“Milton Hakel” 10).

The corrosion of the setting in the academicians’ narrative is tragic and captivating for the audience. The academicians of old are similar to the heroes of Greek tragedy; they are great figures who suffer because of a tragic flaw. Like academician audience members, the protagonists are champions for science. They are also noble, recognizing that practitioners are treated poorly. Their magnanimity leads to their downfall, however, as they suffer for letting the practitioners into APA unconditionally. They do not recognize that the different values possessed by those they help will pollute and eventually destroy APA.

Recognizing their mistake even in 1946, however, the protagonists try to salvage APA before practitioners cause irreparable harm. Rising action occurs in their narrative as they toil over numerous plans for reorganizing APA’s political structure to promote unity within APA (see Figure 2). The story prods the audience to feel sympathetic with and frustrated for the fallen heroes, the academicians, as the bureaucratic practitioners undermine academicians’ tireless efforts to save APA. Scientists call for reorganization from the beginning of the merger, but their ideas always get “shot down by the bureaucratic process” (Hakel, interview). The scientists find they cannot rely on the ineffective Policy and Planning Board, a device they implement into the APA by-laws during the APA/AAAP to revise the structure of APA appropriately every five years (Hilgard, qtd. in “These Problems” 5). They have to resort to other means. Numerous




Figure 2. This timeline from the first issue of the *APS Observer* shows events scientists consider related to APA reorganization. The author(s) expands time from 1987 until the formation of APS, emphasizing the details related to the GOR reorganization conflict and creating a dramatic effect (rising action).

committees recommend restructuring APA in different ways, such as limiting the number of divisions, but the “results [are] not adopted” or they are “abandoned” (“A Short History”); the practitioners begin exerting their influence early on and disrupt any plans which may limit their power.

As in many good stories, the action picks up speed after a turning point. In their story, the turning point occurs in 1987. Reorganization seems hopeless after practitioners ignore one reorganization proposal after another. Hope seems lost when yet another plan, the Bardon plan, is rejected (“A Short History”). However, the tables seem to turn when a key enemy defects to the scientists’ side. Logan Wright, a “political genius” and close associate of the Dirty Dozen, becomes concerned for the future of the organization and helps create GOR, working with Bonnie Strickland and Fowler to enlist “credible” figures in APA, not “mouthpieces for the powers that be” (Hakel, interview): “If they say something will happen, they’ll make it happen” (Hakel, interview). Finally, progress on reorganization is happening, and key practitioners seem to be listening. GOR adopts a plan for reorganization and the APA Council gives the plan to APA’s membership ““with a recommendation for approval”” (“A Short History”).

Just when the audience’s hopes are finally high, they are crushed in the story’s climax: practitioners on GOR, despite their original approval of reorganization, betray the academicians to preserve their power (Brewer). Rogers Wright quits GOR, and Graham, the chair of the Practitioners for Reorganization, reverses his position to win the votes of practitioners in the upcoming APA presidential election (Hakel, interview; “A Short History”). Without Graham’s support, academicians fight in vain for reorganization

(Hakel, interview). Though the ending is depressing, it leaves the audience with hope; academicians leave APA but may have a bright future in their newly formed APS.

The plot devices in the academicians' narrative help engage the interest of the audience. This captivating story also perpetuates incommensurability. The plot compels listeners to feel sorry for the academicians and root for them to defeat practitioners. Continually the audience's hopes are shattered as the practitioners undermine all of the scientists' efforts. Just when the audience sees hope for their heroes—the tide finally seems to be turning—the practitioners they thought had come to their side betray them for personal gain. The antagonists in this story win. The story compels academicians to want to help their fallen brethren. Since the story leaves them with a sense of hope through APS at the end, they want to help write a happy ending to the sequel where scientists overthrow the practitioners through a rival organization. The story leaves them disliking the practitioners and wanting to exact revenge.

Antagonists

The descriptions of the practitioners throughout the story further compel the audience to despise them: they are portrayed as hostile, tyrannical dictators who work to preserve the status quo that divides APA and keeps them in power. They take power through deceitful political maneuvers; the Dirty Dozen manipulate the political process and just keep electing themselves to APA offices (Hakel, interview). However, once in power, practitioners render APA completely worthless. For instance, the Council of Representatives is "ineffective" and many regard it as "a joke" ("Milton Hakel" 11). Once they rise to power, practitioners reject any plan that could reduce their total control of the organization, regardless of the plan's merit. They are simply preserving the status

quo, taking their chance to exact revenge for the disrespect they received from some academicians in the past. As Hakel puts it, they are saying, “we don’t want to give up power, we like things the way they are...if you don’t like it, that’s too bad, because you did it to us first..... [it’s] simple payback” (interview). A vote for them in APA presidential elections, furthermore, says, “I like things the way they are. Status quo, come weal or woe!” (“Milton Hakel” 11).

Once in power, Dirty Dozen members transform APA into a “tyranny” (Krapu 43) under the “*reign* of Nick Cummings and crew” (Alperson 14, italics added). They also monopolize state licensing procedures and damage psychology’s unity “through...fractioning actions” (Krapu 43). They refuse to give any “autonomy and identity” (Scarr 18) to the scientists, a “significant minority” (“Milton Hakel” 10) in APA. The practitioners are also overtly hostile towards academicians. They are guilty of “ill-will” (Hakel, Interview). They transform APA’s Council of Representatives into a “debating society” (Hilgard, qtd. in “These Problems” 5). When preparing to vote down the GOR plan, Brian Welsch, head of the Practice Directorate, remarks to Scarr and Brewer, “We will crush you like baby seals” (Brewer). Like tyrants, practitioners running APA also try to control the thoughts of their members; as Hayes notes, the *APS Observer*, unlike APA’s *Monitor*, does not “tell people what to do or think like a *classroom monitor*” (Hayes 3, emphasis added). They even try to bar APS members from APA (Spence 10) and they label APS a competing organization (Fowler) though APS’S president insists otherwise (Spence 10).

Practitioners are not only tyrannical but also greedy. They disregard science because it does not pay well: “In private practice every time you spend an hour in the

library you lose \$100. In part, it is avarice that has caused the problem” (Hilgard, qtd. in “These Problems” 6). Their greed carries over from their careers into their political offices. In particular, they rely upon the money from APA journals to fund their excesses. The journals are “money-makers” for the powers that be, and practitioners selfishly raise subscription rates whenever APA’s budget is in trouble (“Questions and Answers” 7). They also use the money from these “cash-cow[s]” to support private practice and bureaucracy (Hakel, interview). Altogether, APA with practitioners under the helm is an “avaricious APA” (Barr 14).

In this drama, finally, practitioners are irrational, incapable of comprehending why science is important to their practice and why they should work to keep scientists within APA. For instance, they cannot understand that a vote against reorganization is a vote against keeping science within APA (Scarr, qtd. in “A New APA” 1). In regards to practitioners’ opposition to reorganization, Cook is confused: “I simply cannot put my feet in the shoes of those who opposed it....I just don’t see how they couldn’t realize that a break up would be very bad for them, and that it would be inevitable if reorganization failed” (qtd. in “American Psychological” 8). They lack the “wisdom” to see that practice needs science underpinning it (Scarr 18), leading them to “quackery” (Cook, qtd. in “American Psychological” 6) and leaving them “gullible to fads” (Cook, qtd. in “American Psychological” 8). Practice, as SPSSI President Seymour Feshback states, simply “needs the scientific base” (qtd. in “American Psychological” 8).

The character of the antagonists, practitioners, in the academicians’ narrative works to perpetuate incommensurability in several ways. By metaphorically depicting practitioners as irrational, power-hungry dictators who do not care about science,

academicians eliminate any other possible explanations for practitioners' behavior and discourage their scientist audience from taking practitioners seriously. For instance, practitioners insist that they are elected by a democratic process (Siegel et al.), not a dictatorship. In addition, Fowler insists that practitioners, contrary to the suggestions of the academicians' narrative, do not want the scientists to leave APA; they fight the GOR plan not because they disrespect scientists but because they feel the plan has too many flaws (interview). Clearly, both sides characterize similar events in completely different ways.

Comparison of the Two Narratives

Comparing the narrative analyses of both groups' stories suggests numerous reasons why incommensurability persists, as the ways each group presents the setting, protagonists, antagonists, and the plot are opposite in many respects. The role reversal for the protagonists and antagonists from one story to the other is remarkable. Each group utilizes the Good versus Evil metaphor found in pro-war rhetoric; speakers using this metaphor emphasize "an absolute division between 'good allies,' and 'evil enemies'" (Hines and Windt 141). Rhetors use positive metaphors, or "civilizing vehicles," to describe themselves and their allies (Bates 452) and to distinguish themselves from the enemy. To describe this enemy, they use negative metaphors, or "decivilizing vehicles," to portray the other side as ruthless, "less than human," (Reid 267) and unresponsive to reason. In both the academicians and the practitioners' stories, the protagonists are civilized—noble, dedicated, and good-natured—while the antagonists are savage—dishonest, irrational, tyrannical, and excessively bureaucratic. Such rhetoric polarizes the conflict for each group's fellow members, elevating this group above the other morally

and intellectually, and discourages listeners from considering reasonable explanations for the other group's actions.

The different ways each group characterize the setting are also incommensurable. Practitioners characterize APA's early days as harsh and oppressive, while academicians characterize this time as jovial and almost utopian. For academicians, the time when academicians controlled APA was peaceful, congenial, and academic, but practitioners such as Fowler and Wright suggests this is only because academicians were taking every measure to silence practitioners and rule APA. Academicians admit they disrespected clinicians to an extent at a time, but such details are only a footnote in their account of APA's past. To practitioners, however, such injustices come to the forefront of the story.

The plots of the groups' stories work at cross-purposes. The groups characterize the history of APA from the APA/AAAP merger onward in opposite ways. For practitioners, the numerous committees formed on reorganization and other related issues are obstacles created by a cruel enemy, academicians, to derail the heroes in their fight to improve APA; for academicians, these same committees are the appropriate means for challenging the power of a different cruel enemy, practitioners, to help the academicians *in their* fight to save APA. The groups even characterize the key event in the conflict, the reorganization plan of 1988, in opposite ways. Both sides seem to recognize being betrayed by someone they trust, though who this person is and the reason for the betrayal vary. Wright and Fox, for instance, see Logan Wright's defection as a betrayal and cannot see any reason why Logan Wright joined the academicians' side (Fox, qtd. in "Lone Ranger"; Wright 55). The savage metaphor ascribed to academicians, then, has become literalized in practitioners' minds; once someone joins the opposing group, their

actions become irrational. Academicians, on the other hand, do not see Wright's defection as a mystery at all, as they assert Wright believed APA could not continue fruitfully in its current organizational system. In addition, academicians declare Graham's position reversal as betrayal and believe his move cost them a successful bid for reorganization (Hakel, interview). Practitioners do not even mention Graham's reversal in their story, however, so they do not offer any explanation why he switched sides; Graham's actions are irrelevant to their story. Finally, each group enlists those on its side to continue the battle with the other group, encouraging its audience to act on the feelings of resentment the story fosters within them.

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Should APA have reorganized? Should scientists have formed APS? Today, academicians and practitioners involved in the reorganization debate believe psychology benefited from the reorganization proposal's failure; APS's formation was good in retrospect, they explain, because it has given scientists the singular voice in psychology they desire (Brewer; Fowler; Hakel, interview). In my analysis, I do not identify the legitimacy of either side's position in the debate or argue that APA could or even should have reorganized to accommodate scientists; neither do I argue which group's beliefs about what proper values and methodologies in psychology are accurate. Instead, I answer two research questions: what rhetorical strategies utilized by scientists and practitioners perpetuate incommensurability? Also, how do these rhetorical strategies vary at different stages of the conflict, or do they vary at all? In the process of answering these questions, I extend the literature on science, rhetoric, and incommensurability by confirming the results found in previous studies and demonstrating narrative analysis' usefulness for this type of research.

How Does Rhetoric Promote Incommensurability?

Scientists and practitioners use rhetoric to exacerbate incommensurability in several ways; one method is attacking each others' ethos due to value incommensurability they experience. The ultimate goals of each group—for scientists,

expanding the knowledge base of psychology, and for practitioners, providing psychological services—are not mutually exclusive (hence the existence of scientist-practitioners). However, statements by Fowler imply clinicians' goal is superior.

Rhetors also perpetuate the pragmatic incommensurability they perceive between one another by chastising each other's logos and ethos. Rhetors attack the other group's ethos because of the logos the opponent privileges: rhetors accuse the other group of basing judgments or practices on useless or worthless knowledge. In their book *The Practice of Psychology: the Battle for Professionalism*, Dirty Dozen members attack academicians' credibility when academicians teach or make judgments about clinical psychology: since academicians do not have practical, hands-on experience doing clinical work, practitioners suggest, academicians are not qualified to comment on clinical practice. Conversely, throughout the early issues of the *APS Observer*, academicians attack the credibility of practitioners because practitioners base their decisions on experience, not science; like scientists in other studies (Ceccarelli 287-289; "Cell Membrane" 413-414; Miller 477-479; 480), psychological scientists such as Sechrest and Dawes assert the logos they privilege, science, trumps the logos practitioners privilege, experience, in all situations. Because practitioners do not value science, Sechrest and Parks declare that practitioners are not even psychologists, much like how other scientists in conflict assert their opponents are not scientists (Prelli, "The Rhetorical Construction" 92 and 94). Hilgard and Plant also question their opponents' mental stability, a rhetorical strategy scientists in other situations employ (Bazerman and De los Santos 442). Hilgard, like physicists examined by Miller (490-491), accuses his opponents of incompetence and questions their motives. By deriding the opponent's knowledge and values, as well as

launching ad hominem assaults on the opponent, scientists and practitioners discourage open and thoughtful discussion about their differences and efforts to find common ground. The attacks also limit any potential for embracing the methodologies, perspectives, and insights of the other side.

In addition to attacking the ethos and logos of their opponents, scientists and practitioners exacerbate incommensurability through the stories they tell about the history of APA before and during the reorganization conflict. One way in which their narratives encourage incommensurability is by utilizing the Good versus Evil metaphor common to pro-war rhetoric (Hines and Windt 141): in their story, their own group's members, the protagonists, are noble and civil, while the other group's members, the antagonists, are savage and irrational. The story asks audience members from the rhetor's own group to view the protagonists as heroes, role models fighting for the good of psychology. The story also invites the audience to view the antagonists as vile and subhuman; listeners, these stories suggest, should not take this enemy seriously. By depicting their own group as noble and the other group as savage, rhetors encourage the audience to view all of their own group's actions as fair and rational; they also discourage the audience from considering any reasonable explanations for the other group's behavior. At the same time, these stories could insult and frustrate listeners from the other group, since from the other's perspective the protagonists and antagonists are reversed. The Good versus Evil metaphor polarizes scientists and practitioners, inhibiting the potential for productive communication between the two groups.

Other elements of a good story, such as setting and plot devices, perpetuate incommensurability by invoking sympathy for the protagonists and encouraging loyalty

to the rhetor's group. The stories suggest to listeners of the same group that the fight is not over and enlist this same audience's services in continuing the battle against this savage enemy. The story-tellers, like scientists in other conflicts ("Cell and Membrane" 406; Good 248), portray history in a manner ideal for their position. They emphasize events in the history of APA and events around the time of the reorganization vote that are favorable for them, and they interpret these events in a way that makes their position appear correct; in turn, they deemphasize or omit actions committed by their own members and other events that make their side look dishonorable or disrespectful. Audience members from the same group as the rhetors, consequently, have an incomplete picture of what led up to the vote on reorganization: they lack the historical details that tarnish their own side's innocence and that suggest the antagonists are rational, information which would encourage respect for and cooperation with the other group.

To answer the first research question in brief, rhetors increase incommensurability by attacking each other's logos and ethos, encouraging audience members from the rhetors' group to disregard the other group because of the other's values and privileged epistemology. Rhetors also enlarge incommensurability through narrative; specifically, their use of the good versus evil metaphor and their one-sided descriptions of the setting and plot encourage audience members from the rhetors' group to view their own party as honorable and the other party as despicable, downplaying any historical details that call such descriptions into question.

How Does the Rhetoric Vary Over Time?

From my research, I can answer the second research question: how do the rhetorical strategies encouraging incommensurability vary with time? Rhetorical

strategies perpetuating incommensurability appear frequently around the time of and up to a year after the reorganization vote, but their frequency subsides from the 1990s onward. Many rhetors promoted incommensurability up to and during the reorganization conflict using the above-mentioned tactics, as excerpts from the *APA Monitor*, the *APS Observer*, and the *Industrial-Organizational Psychologist* demonstrate. However, this rhetoric has decreased in frequency since 1989, the year after the reorganization vote. In 1988, The *APA Monitor* ran many articles and features associated with the pros and cons of reorganization, but little has appeared on the conflict since then. The *APS Observer* devoted many pages of its 1988 and 1989 issues to conflicts between practice and science, but these article types decreased in frequency from 1989 onward. Though rhetoric promoting incommensurability is less prevalent today, recent books and interviews demonstrate that key practitioners and scientists involved in the conflict—such as Hakel, Brewer, Wright, and Cummings—still employ rhetoric encouraging incommensurability. In addition, in a recent *APS Observer* feature commemorating the 20th anniversary of APS's formation, Dawes criticizes APA for reasons similar to those he stated back in 1988: they value “obviously unscientific procedures” and notes he wishes the break between APA and scientists was clearer than it has been (qtd. in “Charter Member”).

Conclusion

I use APA's reorganization conflict for a case study extending the literature on the relationship between science, rhetoric, and incommensurability. This study offers further evidence that analyzing the relationship between incommensurability and rhetoric illuminates how conflict between scientists and other groups—such as other scientists, or,

in the case of this analysis, practitioners in the scientists' discipline—becomes polarized. Like other studies, my analysis shows how rhetors attack each other's logos and ethos, perpetuating any incommensurability inherent in their different values and their different beliefs about valid epistemology. Such rhetoric divides scientists and practitioners and discourages them from working together to understand their differences: instead of talking *to* each other about their beliefs about psychology, they are talking *at* each other. This study also demonstrates that narrative analysis is a valuable tool for studying incommensurability within science. Narrative analysis, previously unused in this line of research, reveals how the stories each party tells exacerbate incommensurability. Narrative analysis shows how groups in conflict construct history in ways favorable to their position, and it also reveals a rhetorical strategy absent from other analyses: use of the Good versus Evil metaphor commonly used in pro-war rhetoric. Speakers' rhetoric dehumanizes their opponents, leaving listeners with no reason to take the other group seriously.

While my case study extends previous research exploring how rhetoric facilitates incommensurability, it does not contribute to research examining how rhetoric promotes commensurability. Fowler (interview), current political figures in APA (Breckler; Brehm 5; Levant, qtd. in "Dr. Ronald F. Levant"), and prominent members in APS (Read, qtd. in "Charter Member"; Klatzky) use rhetoric encouraging cooperation between practitioners and scientists and between APA and APS; 2007 APA President Sharon Stephens Brehm even offers neuroscience as one area in which scientists and practitioners, and APA and APS, can work together (Brehm 5). Further research on the conflict could explore how rhetoric can bridge the gap between science and practice and between the two major

organizations operating in psychology. Such research could also suggest how rhetoric can help scientific groups in conflict cooperate and respect one other despite their differences. The current study identifies starting points for combating incommensurability: members of APA and APS could openly discuss their different values and beliefs about psychological science and practice and show each other how their differences are complementary, not conflicting. Each group can work to find reasonable explanations for the other's behaviors in the reorganization conflict and recognize the other as a colleague, not an irrational enemy.

Analyses such the present study identify issues groups must confront in order to reach commensurability. According to Harris, critics focusing on the causes of incommensurability are like doctors "diagnosing ailments rather than prescribing cures, but that cast, much like the critical reasoning focus on fallacies, is inevitable" (98). He explains, "Remedies are rare when there is no theory of causes. The way to proceed with communicative breakdowns of this sort is to chart the misalignments, to catalogue the misunderstandings, to find the leaks so you can gum them up" (98). Before proposing solutions to the problem, that is, we must know the problem.

NOTES

¹ For further discussion of how economic factors and ideological commitments contribute to incommensurability, see Harris' discussion of factors perpetuating incommensurability in *Rhetoric and Incommensurability* (105-115). Prelli also elaborates on these issues in "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication: The Case of Spousal Violence Research," found in Harris' book.

² Berlin and Harris' explanations of value incommensurability are useful for understanding the concept's application throughout this analysis. However, this discussion may be too simplified for understanding this complex idea. Jean-Francois Lyotard gives a more thorough examination of value incommensurability when he explains what he calls the *differend*.

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