2001

Catholicism and Human Rights

Mary Ann Glendon

Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/uscc_marianist_award

Recommended Citation

http://ecommons.udayton.edu/uscc_marianist_award/7

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Catholic Special Collection at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marianist Award Lectures by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
Mary Ann Glendon

Marianist Award Lecture/2001

Catholicism and Human Rights
CATHOLICISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

by MARY ANN GLENDON

Marianist Award Lecture
2001

THE UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON
MARY ANN GLENDON is the Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard University. In 1994, she was appointed by Pope John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Social science and also serves as a member of the Pontifical Council for the Laity. In 1995, she was named to the Holy See's Central Committee for the Great Jubilee 2000.

She has taught at Boston Law School and has been a visiting professor at the University of Chicago Law School and the Gregorian University in Rome. She received her bachelor of arts, juris doctor and master of comparative law degrees from the University of Chicago. Professor Glendon studied at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and was a legal intern with the European Economic Community.

Professor Glendon's publications include:

_A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights_

_Argestation and Divorce in Western Law_

_The Transformation of Family Law_

_A Nation Under Lawyers_

_Seedbeds of Virtue_

_Rights Talk_

_The New Family and the New Poverty_

In addition to these publications, Professor Glendon has authored several articles and has lectured widely in this country and in Europe. She has received honorary doctorates from numerous universities.
The following lecture was given at the University of Dayton on the occasion of the presentation of the Marianist Award to Mary Ann Glendon, February 22, 2001.
I am deeply honored to have been chosen for this year's Marianist Award. And I was delighted when Father Heft told me I could give this lecture on any aspect of my work, so long as I included a discussion of how my faith has affected my scholarship and how my scholarship has affected my faith. At the time, that sounded like an easy assignment, since it was the experience of representing the Holy See at a U.N. conference that led to the book I have just completed—a history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR), combined with a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt for the years when she presided over the drafting of that document. The more I thought about Father Heft's request to say something about how my faith has affected my scholarship and vice versa, however, the more I realized that it is not at all simple to trace those connections.

So I decided that I should probably begin with a few words about what led me into international studies in the first place. As I look back, it seems to me that the much-maligned Latin liturgy of my youth had a lot to do with it. Perhaps only someone who happened to grow up in a small town can understand me when I say that for me, in rural western Massachusetts of the 1950s, the pre-Vatican II Church was a brightly colored window opening out to the great world of people, places, events, and ideas that lay beyond Berkshire County. The Sunday missal, with Latin on one page and the English translation facing it, not only got me interested in languages, but gave me a sense of being linked to people all over the earth—people who were reading the same words in the same language as I was, but who lived in places where it never snowed, or in great cities like Rome, Dublin, and New York, or countries behind the mysterious “iron curtain.”
I have to trace my inclination for comparative studies back to those days, too, because even though my home town only had 5000 people, it contained two very different cultures: the world of my Irish Catholic father and his relatives and the Yankee Congregationalist world of my mother's family. As a result of their rather daring mixed marriage, my brother and sister and I were more or less forced to become little theologians. We tried to figure out the answers to such perplexing questions as whether our mother and father could both go to Heaven, and, if so, whether that would be the same Heaven.

In my teenage years, I began to encounter even more questions that I could not answer on the basis of what I had learned in Sunday School. Like many people, I began to put religion in one mental compartment and high learning into another. I am sure that I do not have to tell anyone here that the transition from one's childhood faith to a more mature spirituality is a road filled with potholes. And I fell into my share of them.

But what prevented me from locking religion into a sealed cranial chamber forever were three circumstances that also had a good deal of influence on my scholarship later on. The first was that, as a high school student, quite by chance, I came across an essay in our local newspaper by Father Theodore Hesburgh, then the President of Notre Dame. One sentence jumped out at me. It was like a message in a bottle that washed up on the seashore just when I needed it. It was this: "When you encounter a conflict between science and religion, you're either dealing with a bad scientist or a bad theologian." It's no exaggeration to say that sentence had an enormous effect on my life by stimulating me to think critically about the natural and human sciences alike.

I am glad that I had the opportunity, many years later, to meet Father Ted and tell him how much that sentence of his had meant to me. By that time, his words had been reinforced by the work of the late Bernard Lonergan who did so much to help Catholics to remain in dialogue with the natural and human sciences. Lonergan
encourages us to follow the example of Thomas Aquinas who, utterly unafraid of where his God-given intellect would lead him, did not hesitate to engage the thought of great pagan philosophers.

The second factor that kept me from building a mental firewall between faith and reason was that I happened to attend the University of Chicago at a time when its leading intellectual lights held Catholic thought in exceptionally high esteem. The curriculum had been designed by Robert Maynard Hutchins, who often said how much he admired the Church for having the longest intellectual tradition of any institution in the world. He and Mortimer Adler drew heavily from that tradition when they constructed Chicago's famous "great books" program. So heavily in fact, that Chicago was often described as the place where atheist professors taught Thomas Aquinas to Marxist students.

My Chicago education in Catholic philosophy, however, did not extend to Catholic social thought. In fact, I managed to get all the way through college without the slightest awareness that there was such a thing, though I had read and been deeply impressed by the autobiography of Dorothy Day. What changed that was a third circumstance: the Second Vatican Council. It would be impossible to exaggerate the electrifying effect that John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council had on me and other young Catholics who were just beginning to make our way in the world in the early 1960s.

So, all in all, it is perhaps not surprising that I gravitated, as a lawyer, to international and comparative studies, to human rights, and to areas of law that correspond to major topics of Catholic social thought. And that brings me to the main subject I'd like to discuss with you today: the interesting reciprocal relationship between Catholic social thought and the post-World-War II human rights project that I discovered in the course of digging into the origins of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
Catholic Influences on the Human Rights Project

If you are like most Americans, and like me before I got interested in the Universal Declaration, you probably do not stay up nights thinking about the United Nations and its various pronouncements. So let me begin with a little background on the Universal Declaration, and why it seemed to me to be worth studying. During World War II, the idea began to percolate that there should be some kind of international bill of rights—a common standard to which all nations could aspire—and by which they could measure their own and each others’ progress.

One of the first suggestions came from Pope Pius XII, who called in a June 1941 radio address for an international bill recognizing the rights that flowed from the dignity of the person. Another came from the British writer H.G. Wells in a little pamphlet subtitled, “What Are We Fighting For?” But in practical terms, the most consequential support came from several Latin American countries, who comprised 21 of the original 55 member nations of the U.N. when it was founded in 1945.

It was largely due to the insistence of the Latin Americans, joined by other small nations, that the U.N. established a Human Rights Commission, composed of members from 18 different countries. It was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, who was just then making a new life for herself after the death of her husband. (The title of my book, “A World Made New,” is taken from a prayer that Mrs. Roosevelt used to carry in her purse, and I chose it to evoke not only the aspirations of the framers of the Declaration in the post-war period, but also the changes that were taking place in her own life.)

When the Human Rights Commission set to work in early 1947, its first major task was to draft a “bill of rights” to which persons of all nations and cultures could subscribe. But that assignment rested upon a couple of problematic assumptions: no one really knew whether there were any such common principles, or what they might be. So The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) asked a group of philosophers—some
well-known in the West like Jacques Maritain and others from Confucian, Hindu and Muslim countries—to examine the question. These philosophers sent a questionnaire to still more leading thinkers all over the world, from Mahatma Gandhi to Teilhard de Chardin, and in due course they reported that, somewhat to their surprise, they had found that there were a few common standards of decency that were widely shared, though not always formulated in the language of rights. Their conclusion was that this practical consensus was enough to enable the project to go forward.

The judgment of the philosophers was borne out by the experience of the delegates on the Human Rights Commission. This group, too, was highly diverse, but they had few disagreements over the content of the Declaration. Their disputes were chiefly political, and chiefly involved the Soviet Union and the United States hurling accusations of hypocrisy against each other.

On December 10, 1948, the document was adopted by the UN General Assembly as a "common standard of achievement." There were no dissenting votes, although the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa recorded abstentions. The Declaration quickly became the principal inspiration of the postwar international human rights movement; the model for the majority of rights instruments in the world over 90 in all; and it serves today as the single most important reference point for discussions of human rights in international settings.

But the more the human rights idea caught on, the fiercer became the contests over the meanings of the provisions of the Declaration. So, after returning from the Beijing Women's conference, I decided to read up a bit on the original understanding of the Declaration. I expected to just go to the library and check out a book or two. But to my surprise, there were no histories of the framing at that time, apart from three doctoral theses, all done at European universities. So I began to read the primary sources myself.

It did not take long to realize that the framers of the UDHR, like legal drafters everywhere, had done a good deal of copying. They
drew many provisions from existing constitutions and rights instruments that the staff of the U.N. Human Rights Division had collected from all over the world. They relied most heavily of all on two draft proposals for international bills that were themselves based on extensive cross-national research. One of these proposals was prepared under the auspices of the American Law Institute, and the other was a Latin American document that became the 1948 Bogota Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

The final draft produced by Mrs. Roosevelt’s Commission was a synthesis drawn from many sources—and thus a document that differed in many ways from our familiar Anglo-American rights instruments—most noticeably in its inclusion of social and economic rights, and in its express acknowledgment that rights are subject to duties and limitations. It also differed from socialist charters, notably with its strong emphasis on political and civil liberties.

Several features of the Declaration set it apart from both Anglo-American and Soviet-bloc documents. Consider the following: its pervasive emphasis on the “inherent dignity” and “worth of the human person”; the affirmation that the human person is “endowed with reason and conscience”; the right to form trade unions; the worker’s right to just remuneration for himself and his family; the recognition of the family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society” entitled as such to “protection by society and the state”; the prior right of parents to choose the education of their children; and a provision that motherhood and childhood are entitled to “special care and assistance.”

Where did those ideas come from? The immediate source was the twentieth-century constitutions of many Latin American and continental European countries. But where did the Latin Americans and continental Europeans get them? The proximate answer to that question is: mainly from the programs of political parties, parties of a type that did not exist in the United States, Britain or the Soviet bloc, namely, Christian Democratic and Christian Social parties.

But where did the politicians get their ideas about the family,
work, civil society, and the dignity of the person? The answer to that is: mainly from the social encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931). And where did the Church get them? The short answer is that those encyclicals were part of the process through which the Church had begun to reflect on the Enlightenment, the eighteenth-century revolutions, socialism, and the labor question in the light of Scripture, tradition, and her own experience as an “expert in humanity.”

The most articulate advocate of this whole complex of ideas on the Human Rights Commission was a Lebanese Arab of the Greek Orthodox faith, Charles Malik. In reading the old U.N. transcripts, I was struck by Malik’s frequent use of terms like the “intermediate associations” of civil society, and by his emphatic preference for the term “person” rather than “individuál.” When I had the opportunity to meet Charles Malik’s son, Dr. Habib Malik, I asked Dr. Malik if he knew where his father had acquired that vocabulary. The answer was: from the heavily underlined copies of *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno* which Malik kept among the books he most frequently consulted. Charles Malik thus seems to have been one of the first of an impressive line of non-Catholic intellectuals who found a treasure trove of ideas in Catholic social teaching.

The most zealous promoters of social and economic rights, contrary to what is now widely supposed, were not the Soviet bloc representatives, but delegates from the Latin American countries. Except for the Mexican delegates, most of these people were inspired, not by Marx and Engels, but by Leo XIII and Pius XI. Their focus was not on the exploitation of man by man, but on the dignity of work and the preferential option for the poor.

The Latin American influence continued when the Human Rights Commissioners submitted their draft Declaration for final review by a large UN committee composed of representatives from all the member nations. In 1948, the Latin Americans were still the largest single group in the UN. And they used their clout. They offered so many amendments that they incurred the wrath of the Canadian
lawyer who was then serving as the Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights.

In a memoir published many years later, John Humphrey referred to the Latin American efforts to bring in still more ideas from their own 1948 draft Declaration as "the Bogota Menace." Of the group's Cuban spokesman, he said, "Highly intelligent, Guy Perez Cisneros used every procedural device to reach his end. His speeches were laced with Roman Catholic social philosophy, and it seemed at times that the chief protagonists in the conference room were the Roman Catholics and the communists, with the latter a poor second." In his private diaries, published after his death, Humphreys was less circumspect in recounting his reactions. There, he described Cisneros as a man who "combines demagogy with Roman Catholic social philosophy," and said that Cisneros "should burn in hell" for holding up the proceedings with his calls for amendments.

I think I have said enough to show that the contributions of Catholic social thought to the Universal Declaration were far from insignificant. But to avoid any misunderstanding, let me emphasize again that this was just one of many sources of influence on that impressively multicultural document.

Now I would like to turn to a consideration of some of the ways in which that influence was reciprocated.

The Influence of the Universal Human Rights Idea on Catholicism

Here the trail is harder to follow, but I believe it begins in Paris in 1948 when the Human Rights Commissioners were trying to round up support from as many nations as possible for the final vote on the Declaration in the U.N. General Assembly. A key figure in that lobbying process was the French member of the Commission, René Cassin. Cassin was a distinguished French lawyer who described himself as a secular Jew. He had lost 29 relatives in concentration camps, and was later to win the Nobel Peace Prize for his human
rights activities. There is an intriguing sentence in Cassin's memoirs where he says that in the fall of 1948 he was aided on several occasions by the "discreet personal encouragements" of the Papal Nuncio in Paris. That Nuncio was none other than Angelo Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII.

Roncalli's subsequent actions suggest that events in the U.N. that fall must have made a great impression on him. It also seems clear that he must have agreed with Maritain and other Catholic thinkers that there was value in discussing certain human goods as rights, even though the biblical tradition uses the language of obligation. In *Pacem in Terris*, John XXIII referred to the Universal Declaration by name and called it "an act of the highest importance.""10

Many Catholics were surprised, and some were even shocked, at the extent to which the documents of Vatican II, and John XXIII's encyclicals *Pacem in Terris* and *Mater et Magistra* seemed to reflect a shift from natural law to human rights. Some writers regard this shift as mainly rhetorical, an effort on the part of the Church to make her teachings intelligible to "all men and women of good will."12

But I believe it was more than that. I would say it was also part of the Church's shift from nature to history, as well as her increasing openness to learning from other traditions. The Church has always taught, with St. Paul, that our knowledge of truth in this life is imperfect; that "now we see only as in a mirror dimly." But she has not always been so forceful as John Paul II was in *Centesimus Annus* when he insisted that Christian believers are obliged to remain open to discover "every fragment of truth...in the life experience and in the culture of individuals and nations."13 A hallmark of the thought of John Paul II has been his sense of being in partnership with all of humanity in a shared quest for a better apprehension of truth.

With hindsight, we can see that Vatican II only marked the beginning of the Church's appropriation of modern rights discourse.14 As one of the younger Council Fathers, Bishop Karol Wojtyla from
Krakow shared John XXIII's appreciation of the postwar human rights project. John Paul II has repeatedly praised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, calling it "one of the highest expressions of the human conscience of our time" and "a real milestone on the path of the moral progress of humanity."\(^{15}\)

Needless to say, the Church's adoption of rights language entailed the need to be very clear about the fact that she does not always use that terminology in the same way it is used in secular circles. Those who think the Church should never have gone down that road at all often fail to notice two important facts about the Church's use of rights language. First, the rights tradition into which the Church has tapped is the biblically informed, continental, dignitarian tradition which she herself had already done so much to shape. "The Catholic doctrine of human rights," Avery Dulles points out, "is not based on Lockean empiricism or individualism. It has a more ancient and distinguished pedigree."\(^{16}\)

Second, the Church did not even uncritically adopt the dignitarian vision. In *Gaudium et Spes*, the Council Fathers say that the movement to respect human rights "must be imbued with the spirit of the Gospel and be protected from all appearance of mistaken autonomy. We are tempted to consider our personal rights as fully protected only when we are free from every norm of divine law; but following this road leads to the destruction rather than to the maintenance of the dignity of the human person."\(^{17}\) In the same vein, John XXIII noted in *Pacem in Terris* that everything the Church says about human rights is conditioned by their foundation in the dignity that attaches to the person made in the image and likeness of God, and everything is oriented to the end of the common good (74). And when John Paul II sent his good wishes to the UN on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Declaration in 1998, he challenged the assembly with these words: "Inspired by the example of all those who have taken the *risk of freedom*, can we not recommit ourselves also to taking the *risk of solidarity*—and thus the *risk of peace*?"\(^{18}\)
Some of the most striking interactions between Catholic social thought and human rights have occurred in the field of international advocacy. With over 300,000 educational, health care and relief agencies serving mainly the world's poorest inhabitants, the Church has become an outspoken advocate of social justice in international settings. But it is a hard sell. Challenging passages like this one from the 1998 World Day of Peace message do not sit particularly well with affluent nations and First World interest groups:

Living out [the] demanding commitment [to solidarity] requires a total reversal of the alleged values which make people seek only their own good: power, pleasure, the unscrupulous accumulation of wealth...A society of genuine solidarity can be built only if the well-off in helping the poor, do not stop at giving from what they do not need. Those living in poverty can wait no longer: They need help now and so have a right to receive immediately what they need (emphasis supplied).

At first glance, words like "a right to receive what one needs" sound uncomfortably like simplistic, secular social advocacy. But the Church's use of rights language in this context cannot be equated with crude mandates for state-run, social-engineering programs. For one thing, the Church has always refrained from proposing specific models: her gift to political science has been, rather, the principle of subsidiarity—which is steadily attracting interest in the secular world.

Moreover, the Church teaches solidarity not as a policy, but as a virtue—a virtue which inclines us to overcome sources of division within ourselves and within society. Like any other virtue, solidarity requires constant practice; it is inseparable from personal reform.

The Church's advocacy for the preferential option for the poor has led her to become a staunch defender of the Universal Declaration as an integrated whole. While most nations take a selective approach to human rights, the Holy See consistently lifts up the original vision of the Declaration—a vision in which political and civil rights are indispensable for social and economic justice, and vice versa. At a time when affluent nations seem increasingly to be
washing their hands of poor countries and peoples, it is often the Holy See, and only the Holy See, that keeps striving to bring together the two halves of the divided soul of the human rights project—its resounding affirmation of freedom and its insistence on one human family for which all bear a common responsibility.

As for the future, I believe the dialogue between Catholicism and the human rights tradition will continue, and that it will be beneficial to both. One may even imagine that the resources of the Catholic tradition may be helpful in resolving several thorny dilemmas that have bedeviled the human rights project from its outset, especially the dilemmas arising from challenges to its universality and its truth claims. A fuller exposition of that point would require another lecture, but let me briefly sketch some ways in which Catholic thinkers might be helpful with regard to these problems.

Take for example the dilemma of how there can be universal rights in view of the diversity among cultures, which has recently resurfaced with a vengeance. A number of Asian and Islamic leaders (unlike the Asian and Islamic representatives on the original Human Rights Commission) take the position that all rights are culturally relative. They claim that so-called universal rights are really just instruments of Western cultural imperialism.

The long Catholic experience in the dialectic between the core teachings of the faith and the various cultural settings in which the faith has been received helps us to see that to accept universal principles does not mean accepting that they must be brought to life in the same way everywhere. The experience of Catholicism with the inculturation of its basic teachings shows that universality need not entail homogeneity. In fact the whole Church has been enriched by the variety of ways in which the faith has been expressed around the world.

The framers of the UDHR had similar expectations for the relatively short list of rights that they deemed fundamental. Their writings reveal that they contemplated a legitimate pluralism in forms of freedom, a variety of means of protecting basic rights, and differ-
ent ways of resolving the tensions among rights, provided that no rights were completely subordinated to others. As Jacques Maritain put it, there can be many different kinds of music played on the Declaration’s thirty strings.

It seems unfortunate that this pluralist understanding has been almost completely forgotten, even by friends of the human rights project. For the more that Western groups promote a top-down, homogenizing vision of human rights, the more credibility they add to the charge of Western cultural imperialism.

Another dilemma for the human rights project is the challenge of historicism and relativism. If there are no common truths to which all men and women can appeal, then there are no human rights, and there is little hope that reason and choice can prevail over force and accident in the realm of human affairs. It is one thing to acknowledge that the human mind can glimpse truth only as through a glass darkly; and quite another to deny the existence of truth altogether. Hannah Arendt has warned that, “The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction...and the distinction between true and false...no longer exist.”

At a time when much of the post-modern secular academy seems to have given up on reason and the search for truth, it is heartening to read the spirited defense of reason in the encyclical *Fides et Ratio*. The “reason” that the Church defends is not the calculating reason of Hobbes—in the service of the passions—nor is it narrow scientific rationalism. It is the dynamic, recurrent, and potentially self-correcting process of experiencing, understanding and judging that has animated her best theologians from Thomas Aquinas to Bernard Lonergan.

I trust that my enthusiasm for Catholic social thought and philosophy will not be understood as unbridled boosterism. I am well aware that much of what our tradition has to offer was learned painfully after mistakes and sad experience.
On the other hand, there is such a thing as exaggerated self-criticism. At a time, and in a culture, where the Church is under siege from many directions, I believe that Catholic intellectuals do a great disservice when they contribute to the myth that the history of Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular is a history of patriarchy, worldliness, persecution, or exclusion of people or ideas. When I hear these rants against the Church, I always find it helpful to ask: Compared to what?

My own consciousness on that subject was raised by my Jewish husband who, like my teachers at the University of Chicago, has a great admiration for Catholicism. He often tells me he just can't understand why so many Catholics just roll over when their Church is unfairly attacked, or why they do not take pride in her great accomplishments.

However that may be, it is good to know that there are still many institutions of higher learning where the Catholic intellectual tradition remains in lively dialogue with the natural and human sciences and with other faiths. From all that I have heard, the University of Dayton is one of the places where that great conversation continues. I am profoundly grateful to have been asked to be a part of that conversation on this occasion where you celebrate and renew the Marianist tradition.


5. UDHR, Preamble and Articles 1, 16, 22, 25 and 26.


13. Centesimus Annus, 46.


17. Gaudium et Spes, 41.


THE MARIANIST AWARD

Each year the University of Dayton presents the Marianist Award to a Roman Catholic distinguished for achievement in scholarship and the intellectual life.

Established in 1950, the award was originally presented to individuals who made outstanding contributions to Mariology. In 1967, the concept for the award was broadened to honor those people who had made outstanding contributions to humanity. The award, as currently given, was reactivated in 1986.

The Marianist Award is named for the founding religious order of the University of Dayton, the Society of Mary (Marianists). The award carries with it a stipend of $5,000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Juniper Carol, O.F.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Daniel A. Lord, S.J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Patrick Peyton C.S.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Roger Briëñ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Emil Neubert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Joseph A. Skelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Frank Duff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>John McShain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eugene F. Kennedy, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Winifred A. Feely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Bishop John F. Noll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Eamon R. Carroll, O. Carm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Coley Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>René Laurentin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Philip C. Hoelle, S.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Cyril O. Vollert, S.J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Eduardo Frei-Montalva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>John Tracy Ellis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Rosemary Haughton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Timothy O'Meara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Walter J. Ong, S.J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Sidney Callahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>LouisDupré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Monika Hellwig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Philip Gleason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>J. Bryan Hehir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Charles Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Gustavo Gutiérrez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>David W. Tracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Jill Ker Conway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Marcia L. Colish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Mary Ann Glendon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>