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ABSTRACT

Previous research finds that presidential tickets perform particularly well in a vice presidential candidate’s home state when that state is relatively low in population. In this article, we argue that selecting a vice presidential candidate from a small state is not sufficient to produce a large vice presidential home state advantage; rather, state population should matter only insofar as the vice presidential candidate has extensive experience within that state’s political system. Our analysis of presidential election returns from 1884 through 2008 demonstrates the statistically significant interactive effect of home state population and political experience on the size of a vice presidential home state advantage, and our models perform much better than models not accounting for this interactive effect.
Do vice presidential candidates influence voting in presidential elections? Certainly, many in the media and the public think so, as indicated by the extensive media coverage of, and speculation about, possible vice presidential selections and their strategic implications for presidential elections. Political scientists, however, have questioned the theoretical and empirical bases for expecting vice presidential candidates to significantly influence presidential voting. A particular area of scholarly interest, addressed in this article, is the vice presidential home state advantage.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, scholars typically find that presidential tickets do not fare significantly better than otherwise would be expected in a vice presidential candidate’s home state. However, studies also indicate that vice presidential home state advantages are significantly more likely to occur under certain conditions, most notably when vice presidential candidates come from relatively less-populous states where voters are more likely to be familiar with their political views and achievements.

While previous studies have found state population to be a significant predictor of the vice presidential home state advantage, we argue that such findings are based on an incomplete application of the home state advantage literature’s theoretical foundation: Key’s (1949) “friends and neighbors” hypothesis. A more rigorous application of this theory suggests that selecting a candidate from a relatively less-populous state is not sufficient to produce a large vice presidential home state advantage. Rather, selecting a candidate from a small state should provide a significant electoral advantage only when the candidate has extensive experience serving the voters of that state as an elected representative. To evaluate this hypothesis, we test the interactive effects of state
population and state political experience using an updated dataset comprising presidential
election returns from 1884-2008.

Before exploring this topic further, it is important to consider whether the vice
presidential home state advantage is relevant today. Many people would argue that,
whereas geographic considerations were crucial in previous eras characterized by salient
intra-party sectional cleavages, home state considerations have played no significant role
in determining vice presidential candidate selections in recent years. Indeed, most recent
vice presidential candidates have come from states that were not expected to be
competitive in that year’s election, including Delaware’s Joe Biden in 2008 and

However, perceptions of a vice presidential home state advantage still seem to
influence vice presidential selections, and presidential campaign strategies more broadly,
in important ways. In 2008, four of the ten vice presidential finalists, as identified by
Baumgartner (2008), represented prominent swing states in that election, and two other
finalists were born in, and retained close ties to, swing states.1 Also, we saw in 2008 a
strong indication that presidential campaigns still believe in the likelihood of a vice
presidential home state advantage. Prior to Sarah Palin’s selection as John McCain’s
running mate, the Barack Obama campaign had engaged in an unprecedented and highly
publicized effort to win traditionally-Republican Alaska, even coming within four points
of McCain in a July poll of Alaskans (Wohlforth 2008). However, within three weeks of
Palin’s selection, the Obama campaign pulled all of its television advertisements in
Alaska (Harnden 2008), cut spending in the state dramatically, consolidated its two state
offices into one, and canceled the scheduled opening of another state office (Quinn
2008). Apparently, the Obama campaign believed, as many media commentators did,² that it could not win Alaska with Palin on the Republican ticket. An additional indication that presidential candidates give credence to the possibility of a vice presidential home state advantage came in 2004, when John Kerry selected North Carolina Senator John Edwards as his running mate. Kerry’s selection of Edwards seems to have been motivated, at least in part, by his hopes of winning North Carolina; in fact, the day after announcing this selection, the Kerry campaign launched its first advertisements in Edwards’ home state (Kornblut 2004).

Thus, while home state considerations do not determine vice presidential candidate selection and, quite likely, they influence selections less than in previous years, presidential campaigns still seem to believe that vice presidential candidates can provide a home state electoral advantage. To the extent that a perceived home state advantage influences vice presidential selection, and campaign strategy more broadly, it is important to provide an improved empirical assessment of the vice presidential home state advantage and the conditions under which it is most likely to occur.

**Literature**

Despite the widespread belief that party tickets enjoy extraordinary success in a vice presidential candidate’s home state, evidence of a home state advantage is minimal. Research indicates that presidential tickets win the vice presidential candidate’s home state one-half to two-thirds of the time, depending on the timeframe used for analysis (Baumgartner 2008; Dudley and Rapoport 1989; Tubbesing 1973). Additionally, party tickets outperform their recent party predecessors in the vice presidential candidate’s home state less than 60% of the time (Dudley and Rapoport 1989; Tubbesing 1973).
What is more, vice presidential home state advantages rarely affect the outcome of a presidential election. Adkison (1982) finds that a change in one state’s vote would have changed the national election outcome in only 30% of elections between 1900 and 1980, and in only 29% of those elections would winning a larger vice presidential home state have changed the national outcome.

Previous studies find no statistically significant evidence that presidential tickets gain an electoral advantage in the vice presidential candidate’s home state (Dudley and Rapoport 1989; Garand 1988; Holbrook 1991; Rosenstone 1983). However, estimates of the average vice presidential home state advantage vary considerably; Garand (1988) and Rosenstone (1983) estimate the electoral advantage gained in a vice presidential candidate’s home state to be, on average, 3.0% and 2.5%, respectively, while Dudley and Rapoport (1989) estimate it to be only 0.3%.

Findings also vary with regard to what factors determine the size of a vice presidential home state advantage. Garand (1988) and Dudley and Rapoport (1989) argue that Democrats should enjoy a greater electoral advantage in the vice presidential candidate’s home state than Republicans, because the number of inconsistent voters likely to be mobilized by a home state candidate is greater for Democrats than for Republicans. However, the vice presidential candidate’s party is not a statistically significant predictor of home state advantage in Garand’s study, and it is only marginally significant in Dudley and Rapoport’s study. Garand also argues that vice presidential candidates from the South and West should enjoy greater home state advantages than candidates from other regions, but he finds little evidence to support this hypothesis.
The strongest empirical predictor of the vice presidential home state advantage is home state population. Dudley and Rapoport (1989) find statistically significant evidence that vice presidential candidates from relatively small, less-populous states tend to enjoy greater home state advantages than do candidates from larger, more populous states. Several studies of the presidential home state advantage reach the same conclusion about presidential candidates, including Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983), Mixon and Tyrone (2004), and, among Democratic presidential candidates only, Garand (1988). However, Disarro et al. (2007) find no support for a home state population effect at the presidential or vice presidential level.

Dudley and Rapoport’s finding that state population is negatively related to the size of a vice presidential candidate’s home state advantage is particularly attractive because it is consistent with the logic of the “friends and neighbors” hypothesis from which the home state advantage literature draws its inspiration. Key (1949) first proposed this hypothesis, which states that candidates perform best within and near the locale in which they reside. Key and other scholars studying the home state advantage explain the friends and neighbors effect in terms of several cognitive and affective factors: (1) local voters are most familiar with local candidates, thereby reducing their information costs; (2) local candidates are perceived to be knowledgeable about local concerns, and more likely to direct government resources toward addressing those concerns when in office; (3) local voters are most likely to have engaged in interpersonal contact with a local candidate and individuals closely associated with the candidate; and (4) local voters tend to identify more strongly with local candidates, often viewing those
candidates as “one of our own” (Disarro et al. 2007; Key 1949; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983).

Key (1949) finds empirical support for the friends and neighbors hypothesis in his study of Southern Democratic gubernatorial primaries. Black and Black (1973), Tatalovich (1975), Kjar and Laband (2002), and Mixon and Tyrone (2004) find additional support for Key’s hypothesis in varied geographical and electoral contexts, using diverse methodological approaches.

Whether the friends and neighbors hypothesis applies to presidential elections is a matter of scholarly dispute. Key argued that the nationalization of politics by the mid-twentieth century rendered the friends and neighbors hypothesis irrelevant to presidential elections. He explained:

In recent decades the issues and forces of national politics have tended to wear down sectional groupings. The new issues push people, wherever they live, towards divisions different from the traditional sectional cleavages and the states gradually have become more alike in the manner of their presidential voting (Key 1956, 26-27).

Given the consistent evidence of a statistically significant presidential home state advantage, other scholars clearly would dispute Key’s argument. However, vice presidential home state advantages, on average, are not statistically significant, perhaps suggesting that the friends and neighbors hypothesis has limited applicability to presidential elections.

Considering Dudley and Rapoport’s findings, it might be the case that the friends and neighbors hypothesis applies to vice presidential candidacies only when the
candidate hails from a relatively small, less-populous state. Indeed, the arguments used to justify the friends and neighbors hypothesis seem particularly relevant to presidential elections in relatively small states. First, voters are more likely in small states than in large states to be familiar with the personality and public record of a home state vice presidential candidate. We would expect this to be the case because the candidate would have faced less competition for public attention throughout his or her career in a small state with relatively few elected officials. Also, the candidate’s current and past constituents should comprise a greater proportion of the population in a small state than in a large state. Second, candidates from small states are more likely to be knowledgeable about, and direct government resources toward, state voters’ concerns because state voters’ interests are relatively homogeneous and a greater proportion of them stand to benefit from a localized distribution of government resources. Third, interpersonal contact between candidates and state voters is more likely to occur because candidates have to travel less broadly to reach their constituents and there is a smaller pool of voters with which candidates must interact. Finally, voters in small states are more likely to identify with local candidates because small state identities tend to be relatively homogeneous, as compared with large states that often have multiple regional identities.

Analyzing the relationship between home state population and the vice presidential home state advantage also is important because presidential candidates, historically speaking, tend to select running mates from relatively large states, with the hope of maximizing the number of electoral votes derived from winning a running mate’s home state. Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997) find that home state population was one of
only three statistically significant predictors of vice presidential selections between 1940 and 1992; presidential candidates during that period were more likely to select running mates from large states than small states. However, it should be noted that Sigelman and Wahlbeck’s period of analysis is quite limited, particularly in comparison to other studies of vice presidential selection and home state population, such as Dudley and Rapoport’s. Also, Baumgartner did not find home state population to be a significant predictor of vice presidential candidate selection in his analysis of the 1960–2008 period.

Hiller and Kriner (2008) also find state size to be a statistically significant predictor of vice presidential selection prior to 1972, but they find that it has not been a statistically significant predictor in elections since that time. Hiller and Kriner attribute this change in vice presidential selection strategy to the shift away from party leaders’ domination of the presidential and vice presidential nomination process following the 1972 McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms, which reduced the need for presidential candidates to mollify large state or regional intra-party factions by selecting a member of that faction for vice president in order to be nominated. Still, the historical tendency toward selecting vice presidential candidates from relatively large, populous states makes evidence of a negative relationship between vice presidential home state population and home state advantage a particularly interesting and relevant matter of empirical study, for political scientists and politicians, alike.

Given home state population’s theoretical and practical relevance to the study of vice presidential selection and the vice presidential home state advantage, it should be troubling that its effects have been conceptually underdeveloped and subjected to limited empirical analysis. In this article, we argue that a relatively small vice presidential home
state, in and of itself, is not sufficient to give presidential tickets a significant electoral advantage in that state; a significant advantage should be likely only when the vice presidential candidate has extensive political experience in a relatively small home state.

To understand this study’s conceptual critique, recall the factors cited by Key and other scholars to justify the friends and neighbors hypothesis: local voters’ greater familiarity with a local candidate; a local candidate’s greater knowledge of local voters’ concerns; increased likelihood of interpersonal contact between local voters and a local candidate; and local voters’ perception of a local candidate as “one of us.” Simply coming from a relatively small state does not ensure access to these benefits as a vice presidential candidate. Candidates who have spent little, or even no, time representing the state as an elected official have had little opportunity to gain the advantages just described. Conversely, elected officials from relatively small states with a great deal of experience in state politics are particularly likely to enjoy these electoral advantages. They have had more time to become familiar to voters, both publicly and through personal interaction; their lengthy service has provided extensive opportunities to learn about, and direct government resources toward, the concerns of state voters; and repeated election likely indicates that voters perceive the candidate to be “one of us.”

Given home state political experience’s clear theoretical relevance to the vice presidential home state advantage, a study accounting for experience’s effects stands to provide an important contribution to the literature on this topic. Therefore, in this article, we test the interactive effects of home state population and political experience. Specifically, we hypothesize that vice presidential candidates from relatively small states, with an extensive record of experience in elected office within that state, enjoy a home
state advantage significantly greater than that obtained by relatively inexperienced candidates or candidates from large states.4

**Methodology**

To test the hypothesized interactive effects of home state population and political experience, this article modifies the vice presidential home state advantage model used by Dudley and Rapoport (1989). For several reasons, the Dudley and Rapoport model is the most appropriate starting point for this article’s analysis. First, Dudley and Rapoport’s study of the vice presidential home state advantage provides our primary empirical motivation for studying the hypothesized effects of state population and state political experience. As such, their model provides the most appropriate framework for modifying their findings. Second, the Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) model, upon which Dudley and Rapoport base their analysis, is the standard model for studying home state advantages at the presidential and vice presidential levels, although often modified to some degree (see Disarro et al. 2008; Garand 1988). Third, the model’s conceptualization of a home state advantage as the home state’s deviation from previous voting patterns, relative to national deviation from previous voting patterns, is more intuitive and conceptually sound than other models used in the home state advantage literature.

Dudley and Rapoport’s operationalization of the home state advantage is nearly identical to that of Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983). Lewis-Beck and Rice conceptualize a candidate’s home state advantage as the difference between the home state electorate’s deviation in a given election from its typical partisan voting pattern and the national
electorate’s deviation in that election from its typical partisan voting pattern. Formally, the dependent variable is calculated as,

\[ H = (S_a - S_e) - (N_a - N_e) \]

where \( H \) is the vice presidential candidate’s estimated home state advantage in a given election; \( S_a \) is the vote percentage won by the vice presidential candidate’s ticket in his or her home state, in a given election; \( S_e \) is the average vote percentage won by the vice presidential candidate’s party in his or her home state, over the five most recent presidential elections; \( N_a \) is the vote percentage won by the vice presidential candidate’s ticket nationally, in a given election; \( N_e \) is the average vote percentage won by the vice presidential candidate’s party nationally, over the five most recent elections.

Whereas Lewis-Beck and Rice had used raw vote percentages to calculate the home state advantage, Dudley and Rapoport used two-party vote shares only. Dudley and Rapoport modified the home state advantage measure in this way because they recognized that third-party candidacies sometimes substantially reduce the vote percentage earned by a presidential ticket, thereby distorting direct comparisons of past and present party performance. In this article, we also use two-party vote shares only.

To properly evaluate previous conclusions about population’s effect on the size of the vice presidential home state advantage, our empirical model contains each of Dudley and Rapoport’s five independent variables, while adding state political experience and its interaction with state population.

The five independent variables used in Dudley and Rapoport’s model include: vice presidential candidate party identification (Republicans are coded 1, and Democrats are coded 0), presidential incumbency (incumbents are coded 1, and non-incumbents are
coded 0), vice presidential incumbency (incumbents are coded 1, and non-incumbents are coded 0), previous political positions held by the vice presidential candidate (current or past senators or governors are coded 1, and all other candidates are coded 0), and state population. We operationalize state population as the proportion of the national population represented by the vice presidential candidate’s home state.5

To Dudley and Rapoport’s model we add home state political experience and its interaction with home state population. Political experience is operationalized in two ways, as years of experience at any level of elected office within the state and years of experience in statewide elected office only.6 The first political experience measure is calculated as the number of years in which the vice presidential candidate held elected office in his or her home state, at any level of government, including municipal, county, state, and representation in the U.S. Congress. The second political experience measure is calculated as the number of years in which the vice presidential candidate held an elected office representing the entire state population. By this definition, statewide political offices include senator, governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. representative-at-large, and any elected office within the state executive branch.7

We include these two distinct measures of home state political experience in our analyses because each is relevant to the vice presidential home state advantage in a different way. Holding elected statewide office seems likeliest to yield a large home state advantage, because it affords the officeholder the opportunity to become familiar to, interact with, and serve the interests of, all state residents, as opposed to a subset of state residents. However, operationalizing state political experience only as the number of years in elected statewide office would fail to capture other forms of political experience.
likely to provide vice presidential candidates with electoral benefits among a significant subset of state voters, if not all state voters.

For example, Franklin Roosevelt’s 1932 and 1936 running mate, John Nance Garner, served Texas’ 15th District as its U.S. Representative from 1903-1933, during which time he also served as House Minority Leader and House Speaker. Garner’s long and distinguished service in the U.S. House makes it highly probable that he would have enjoyed the electoral benefits likely to yield a large home state advantage. However, operationalizing state political experience only as the number of years spent serving in elected statewide office would fail entirely to capture the effects of Garner’s home state political experience, because he never served in statewide office. A similar case could be made for many other vice presidential candidates included in our data.

While there are good reasons to believe either experience measure is more directly relevant to the vice presidential home state advantage, when interacted with home state population the measure of experience at any level of state government is more likely to be a statistically significant predictor. The reason for this expectation is simple. Statewide officeholders are visible and familiar to all voters in small states and large states, alike. Theoretically, then, the effects of statewide political experience on the size of a vice presidential home state advantage are not likely to vary between large and small states enough for this interaction to be statistically significant. On the other hand, elected officials serving below the statewide level typically are visible and familiar to a state subpopulation of their constituents only. In relatively less-populous states, these constituencies tend to represent a larger proportion of the state population than in relatively populous states. Therefore, the effects of experience at any level of state
government should vary between large and small states enough for this interaction to be statistically significant, with its effects being greater in small states than in large states.

To test the hypothesized interactive effects of state population and state political experience, we created two interaction terms, each multiplying the candidate’s years of home state political experience, at the statewide level or at any level of state government, by the percentage of the national population represented by his or her home state.8

**Data**

We test this article’s hypothesis using presidential election returns from 1884 through 2008,9 each of which were obtained from the online CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection.10 These data include 32 presidential elections and 64 vice presidential candidacies. After excluding cases in which the vice presidential candidate came from the same state as another major party presidential or vice presidential candidate, 56 vice presidential candidacies remain available for empirical analysis.11

Table 1 presents the estimated home state advantages for all 56 vice presidential candidacies included in our data, along with the candidates’ home state proportion of the national population, the number of years the candidate served in statewide elected office, and the number of years the candidate served in elected office at any level of state government. On average, the vice presidential home state advantage is not statistically significant (p = 0.316).12 The 0.69% mean home state advantage that we find is slightly higher than Dudley and Rapoport’s (1989) estimate of 0.3%, and quite a bit lower than Rosenstone’s (1983) 2.5% and Garand’s (1988) 3.0%.13

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
In light of this study’s hypothesis, it is worth noting that the nine largest home state advantages have occurred in relatively small states (as determined by a median split of the population data). Also, the ten candidates earning the largest home state advantages averaged 19.2 years of experience as elected officials in their states and 12.4 years of experience as elected statewide officeholders, compared with sample means of 14.0 and 7.0 years, respectively. These findings provide initial support for the hypothesized effects of home state population and home state political experience, but more direct testing is needed to draw firm conclusions.

Before directly testing this article’s hypothesis, it is useful to replicate Dudley and Rapoport’s model with the addition of all vice presidential candidacies occurring since the time of their study. Our objective in doing so is to demonstrate that this article’s empirical critique of Dudley and Rapoport’s substantive conclusions does not hinge on the addition of new vice presidential candidacies to our dataset. Indeed, there are no substantive differences between Dudley and Rapoport’s original findings and those obtained by testing their model in our updated dataset. As shown in Table 2’s first column, the population variable is statistically significant and negatively signed (p = 0.004), just as Dudley and Rapoport find. Party identification is the only other variable to reach statistical significance (p = 0.044), with Republican vice presidential candidates earning larger home state advantages than Democratic candidates.

We use two models to predict the size of the vice presidential home state advantage. Table 2’s second column provides the results of a model including each of Dudley and Rapoport’s independent variables, plus a variable representing the vice
presidential candidate’s years of experience in elected statewide office and that variable’s interaction with home state population. Table 2’s third column provides the results of the same model, but this time using a measure of the vice presidential candidate’s years of experience in elected office at any level of government within his or her home state to capture political experience. For reasons discussed in the previous section, it is more likely that the interaction term would be a statistically significant predictor of the vice presidential home state advantage when measuring experience as years in office at any level of state government.

The results presented in Table 2’s second and third columns support our hypothesis. Whereas the interaction of home state population and statewide political experience is not statistically significant in the Statewide Political Experience Model, the interaction of home state population and experience at any level of state government is statistically significant in the Total Political Experience Model (p = 0.013). The negatively signed coefficient associated with the latter model’s interaction term indicates, as expected, that the vice presidential home state advantage increases as home state population decreases and years of experience at any level of state government increases. Further attesting to the value of interacting population and political experience is the fact that the Total Political Experience Model yields an adjusted $R^2$ value of 0.152, which is nearly double the Dudley and Rapoport Model’s 0.085 adjusted $R^2$ value.

The statistical significance and direction of the Total Political Experience Model’s interaction term supports our contention, contra Dudley and Rapoport, that selecting a vice presidential candidate from a relatively small state is not sufficient to produce a large home state advantage. Rather, coming from a small state increases a vice presidential
candidate’s home state advantage only insofar as the candidate has extensive experience representing that state as an elected official. Indeed, the population variable is not statistically significant once accounting for the interactive effects of home state population and political experience in the Total Political Experience Model. However, interpreting this or any other lower-order interaction term based solely on raw regression coefficients is ill-advised. As Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and Braumoeller (2004) note, the statistical significance of a lower-order interaction term cannot be interpreted directly from a model’s raw coefficients and standard errors. Instead, a graphical representation is most appropriate for evaluating the interaction term’s marginal effects. We present political experience’s marginal effects on the vice presidential home state advantage in Figure 1, using the results of the Total Political Experience Model.\footnote{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE}

Figure 1 confirms the hypothesized interactive effects of state population and political experience. As state population increases, the marginal effect of political experience on a vice presidential candidate’s home state advantage decreases. However, judging by Figure 1’s confidence intervals, the effect of experience is statistically insignificant in relatively populous states.\footnote{For candidates from less-populous states, experience has a larger effect and it is statistically significant. The vertical line in Figure 1 represents the median state population value for all states from 1884 through 2008. As this figure illustrates, presidential tickets can expect to earn a statistically significant vice presidential home state advantage when they select a running mate who has extensive elected political experience within one of the 25 least populous states.}
Discussion

Our findings indicate that scholars should reevaluate their understanding of what factors shape vice presidential home state advantages. Whereas Dudley and Rapoport (1989) conclude that vice presidential candidates from relatively small, less-populous states provide their party’s presidential ticket with a significant electoral boost in that state, our findings indicate that selecting a vice presidential candidate from a relatively small state benefits a presidential ticket only insofar as the vice presidential candidate has extensive political experience within that state. Moreover, the interaction of state population and political experience significantly predicts the vice presidential home state advantage only when measuring the latter in terms of years of experience at any level of state government.

This article’s findings are consistent with Key’s (1949) and other scholars’ theoretical justification for expecting candidates to poll best among local voters. Vice presidential candidates are more consequential for voters’ electoral decisions when their home states are relatively small and less-populous, because candidates from these states should be more familiar to state voters, more likely to have engaged in interpersonal contact with a large proportion of state voters, more likely to understand and respond to state voters’ concerns, and more likely to be viewed by state voters as “one of us.” Vice presidential candidates with limited, or even no, political experience in their home states have little opportunity to capitalize on these electoral advantages, while candidates with extensive home state political experience have ample opportunity to do so.

Additionally, this article contributes to scholars’ broader understanding of the relevance of political experience in the vice presidential selection process.
Baumgartner’s (2008) study of vice presidential selections since 1960 finds years of political experience to be a statistically significant predictor of vice presidential selection. While presidential candidates’ motivation for selecting experienced vice presidential candidates certainly goes beyond the desire to win a running mate’s home state, this article’s findings suggest that selecting an experienced running mate might serve a presidential ticket well at the state level, as well as at the national level.

In light of this article’s findings, future research into the determinants of the vice presidential home state advantage should account for candidates’ experience in elected office within their home state, particularly with regard to experience in relatively small home states. Presidential candidates also would be wise to heed these findings when evaluating the likely electoral advantage to be gained by selecting a vice presidential candidate from a given state, although these findings indicate that gaining a significant advantage is likely only within small states that offer few electoral votes. In that sense, selecting a vice presidential candidate in hopes of winning his or her home state seems ill-advised, unless the state is relatively small and highly competitive, the prospective vice presidential candidate has extensive elected experience within that state’s political system, and the national election is expected to be so competitive that the vice presidential candidate’s home state quite plausibly could determine its outcome.
References


Notes

1 Vice presidential finalists representing swing states included Tim Kaine (Virginia) and Evan Bayh (Indiana) on the Democratic side, and Tom Ridge (Pennsylvania) and Tim Pawlenty (Minnesota) on the Republican side. Additionally, Joe Biden, of Delaware, was born in Pennsylvania and heavily emphasized his roots in that state while campaigning as a vice presidential candidate, while Mitt Romney, of Massachusetts, was born in Michigan, where his father also served as Governor.

2 For example, one reporter said Palin’s selection “has taken Alaska away from Mr Obama” (Harnden 2008), while another declared it “a blow to Obama’s slim hopes of capturing Alaska” (Quinn 2008).

3 Because their analysis focuses on the strategic considerations of presidential candidates selecting vice presidential running mates, Sigelman and Wahlbeck exclude from their analysis the two candidates chosen by convention delegates between 1940 and 1992, Charles McNary (1940, Republican) and Estes Kefauver (1956, Democrat).

4 We recognize the distinct possibility that our hypothesis applies well to the presidential home state advantage, as well as the vice presidential home state advantage. However, in this article we focus on the latter only, for two primary reasons. First, previous research consistently finds that the presidential home state advantage is statistically significant, in the aggregate. Our analysis of the presidential home state advantage, not reported in the text of this article, confirms these findings; between 1884 and 2008, presidential candidates, on average, earned a statistically significant home state advantage of 3.51% (p = 0.000). In contrast, studies of the vice presidential home state advantage, including
this article, consistently find it to be, on average, small and not statistically significant. However, these studies also find that large vice presidential home state advantages are likely to occur under certain conditions. Given the distinctively conditional nature of the vice presidential home state advantage, we find it particularly important to conduct an improved analysis of the conditions under which large vice presidential home state advantages occur, in contrast to the normal pattern of null results. Second, vice presidential selections traditionally have been viewed more as matters of campaign strategy than as matters of shaping future government policy, due to the limited constitutional role granted to the vice presidency and the far more visible role played by presidential candidates in presidential elections. Whereas presidential candidates are likely to be selected primarily on the basis of their policies and their appeal to the nation as a whole, instead of their appeal to a specific geographic constituency, vice presidential candidates are more likely to be selected on the basis of targeted considerations including, but not limited to, the need to win a particular state in which the presidential candidate’s chances of victory are uncertain. Thus, the determination of whether, and under what conditions, large vice presidential home state advantages are likely to occur is more central to evaluating the criteria relevant to selecting vice presidential candidates than the criteria relevant to selecting presidential candidates.

5 State and national population figures were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, as published by the U.S. Census Bureau. This is the same resource used by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983). We utilize U.S. Census Bureau population projections for elections occurring between decennial census reports. When population projections
were not available, particularly for elections before 1930, we estimated population figures in relation to the preceding and successive census reports.

6 To determine which years, and in which offices, the vice presidential candidates served, we relied principally upon two sources: the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (http://bioguide.congress.gov) and the National Governors Association website (www.nga.org). Accessed September 21, 2009.

7 We calculated the number of years in elected office by subtracting the first year the candidate served in an elected office from the last year he or she served in that office. For example, we coded John Edwards, whose only experience in elected office was serving as North Carolina’s Senator from 1999-2005, as having five years of state political experience when he was selected as John Kerry’s running mate in 2004 (2004–1999 = 5).

8 Because our hypothesis predicts that a vice presidential candidate’s home state advantage increases as state political experience increases and state population decreases, we considered that the interaction term might best be constructed so that its maximum values would represent extensive elected experience in a very small state. To that end, we tried operationalizing state population as the state population’s percentage of the national population, subtracted from 100, and interacted that measure with state political experience. However, operationalizing state population in this way does not change any substantive conclusions drawn from analyses using the raw state population percentage of the national population. In order to make our analyses more readily interpretable, then, we use the raw population percentage and its interaction with state political experience for all calculations presented in this article.
We begin our analysis with the 1884 election because, as Lewis-Beck and Rice also explain, the elections immediately preceding 1884 occurred too soon after the Civil War and Reconstruction to permit meaningful comparisons of present and recent national voting trends, since many Southern states were unable to vote during those periods. Also, fundamental changes in the two-party system – including the Republican Party’s emergence and the Whig Party disappearance in the 1850s, the Whig Party’s emergence in the 1830s, and the Democratic-Republican Party’s dominance in the 1820s – make direct comparisons of present and past two-party presidential votes impossible for many of the elections prior to 1884. Nonetheless, to assess the possible limitations of our data, we replicated all analyses presented in this article using an expanded dataset comprising presidential election results from 1848-2008. The substantive conclusions drawn from our analysis of the 1848-2008 data are no different than those drawn from our analysis of the 1884-2008 data. Therefore, the conclusions presented in this article should not be regarded as the product of a limited dataset. In fact, we believe that the 1884-2008 dataset represents a more accurate measure of the vice presidential home state advantage, given the measurement problems in the pre-1884 data just described, and that is why we use it in all of this article’s analyses.


Excluded candidacies include those of Levi Morton (1888), Whitelaw Reid (1892), James Sherman (1912), Thomas Marshall (1916), Charles Fairbanks (1916), Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1960), Sargent Shriver (1972), and Lloyd Bentsen (1988). We exclude
Sherman (1912) because the Progressive Party ticket headed by Theodore Roosevelt, a fellow New Yorker, earned more electoral votes than the Republican Party in that state, thus warranting our treatment of it as a major party.

12 We conducted a one-sample mean comparison test to determine whether the average home state advantage was distinguishable from zero.

13 Rosenstone and Garand’s reliance upon more limited timeframes and methodologies almost certainly is responsible for their findings of a much larger vice presidential home state advantage.

14 The ten candidates earning the smallest home state advantages averaged 15.6 years as elected officials in their states and 4.0 years in elected statewide office, and only four hailed from large states.

15 In response to an anonymous reviewer’s suggestion, we conducted additional analyses including a dummy variable representing whether vice presidential candidates were selected by convention delegates (pre-1940) or presidential candidates (1940-2008, excluding McNary 1940 and Kefauver 1956). This variable was not statistically significant in any of the models we tested, nor did it change the statistical significance of other variables in those models. Also, when testing our models exclusively among convention- or presidential candidate-selected running mates, we found no important substantive differences between these results and the results presented in Table 2.

16 To provide an additional basis for evaluating the relative merits of our Total Political Experience Model and the Dudley and Rapoport Model, we used the coefficients from both models (excluding the 2008 observations) to predict Joe Biden and Sarah Palin’s 2008 home state advantages and then compared these predictions to the candidates’
actual home state advantages. Our model came within just 1.63% of predicting Biden’s actual home state advantage, and within just 1.65% of predicting Palin’s. The Dudley and Rapoport Model, on the other hand, underestimated Biden’s home state advantage by 4.05% and underestimated Palin’s by 2.60%.

17 We employ the GRINTER command in STATA to graph the marginal effects of state political experience on vice presidential home state advantage.

18 We report a 90% confidence interval in Figure 1 because we employ one-tailed tests in our statistical models. One-tailed hypothesis tests are appropriate because we posit a directional hypothesis.
## Table 1. The Vice Presidential Home State Advantage, 1884-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Year</th>
<th>Home State Advantage</th>
<th>State Population as % of National Population</th>
<th>Statewide Political Experience</th>
<th>Total State Political Experience</th>
<th>Party/Year</th>
<th>Home State Advantage</th>
<th>State Population as % of National Population</th>
<th>Statewide Political Experience</th>
<th>Total State Political Experience</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R2008</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R1944</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>D2008</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>D1944</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2004</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R1940</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2004</td>
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<td>2.91</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>D2000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>R1932</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>D1996</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>D1932</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1992</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>R1928</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>D1988</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>D1980</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.82</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>3.03</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>R1904</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>D1972</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>1.32</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1968</td>
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<td>1.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>1.17</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1964</td>
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<td>9.21</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>R1896</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1964</td>
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<td>1.85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>R1960</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>-0.56</td>
<td>6.12</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>R1952</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>D1952</td>
<td>-7.16*</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>D1884</td>
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<td>D1948</td>
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<td>35</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Like Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) and Dudley and Rapoport (1989), we calculate home state advantages using state and national data from the five preceding elections, except for 1888 and 1884, when we use the four preceding elections and three preceding elections, respectively.

* Harry Truman did not receive any votes for President in Alabama in 1948, because the state’s ballot listed Strom Thurmond as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate. Therefore, when calculating Alabama Senator John Sparkman’s 1952 home state advantage, we treat all votes for Thurmond in 1948 as votes for the Democratic Party presidential candidate.
### TABLE 2. MODELS OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOME STATE ADVANTAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Dudley and Rapoport Model</th>
<th>Statewide Experience Model</th>
<th>Total Political Experience Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>2.37* (1.36)</td>
<td>2.53* (1.34)</td>
<td>2.43* (1.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent VP</td>
<td>0.58 (2.34)</td>
<td>0.50 (2.31)</td>
<td>0.79 (2.26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent President</td>
<td>-1.57 (1.82)</td>
<td>-1.47 (1.80)</td>
<td>-1.95 (1.76)</td>
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<td>Senator or Governor</td>
<td>-1.12 (1.51)</td>
<td>-1.76 (1.83)</td>
<td>-1.75 (1.50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.74** (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.41* (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statewide Political Experience</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>0.27* (0.13)</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population x Statewide Experience</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Experience</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>0.24* (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population x Political Experience</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>— (—)</td>
<td>-0.06* (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.43* (1.83)</td>
<td>1.34 (2.07)</td>
<td>0.59 (2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; One-tailed test.
Figure 1. The Marginal Effect of Experience on Home State Advantage

Median state population size

Marginal Effect of Total State Experience

Percentage of U.S. Population Living in State

Marginal Effect  90% Confidence Interval