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SOME REFLECTIONS
ON THE
CHRISTOLOGY OF APOLLINARIS OF LAODICEA.

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INTRODUCTION

It is with great pleasure that I share in this tribute to the Rev. Théodore Koehler, S.M. It was Father Koehler who enabled this liberal Protestant to understand and appreciate the richness of Mary, the mother of Jesus, in the Christian tradition. Coming, as I did, from a rather austere Reformed tradition, I had little or no sense for this tradition so meaningful to so many Roman Catholics. While I may yet have theological reservations, a new openness was made possible for me by means of my listening to the insights of Father Koehler and by my participation in a number of mariological seminars sponsored by the International Marian Research Institute. My personal and theological lives have been enhanced by these and many other experiences which have been my privilege while being a professor at the University of Dayton. Father Koehler, the Marianist Order, and the University of Dayton have all made inestimable contributions to the lives of many human beings and in so doing have indeed fulfilled the commandment of our Lord to love and to serve.

What I offer here in tribute is a modest preliminary reflection on the Christology of Apollinaris of Laodicea. Apollinaris, who was a substantial colleague of St. Athanasius during the Arian crisis and one who made substantial contributions toward the development of trinitarian theology, is also the person who issued in the most fundamental of all christological issues: the issue of the relationship of the divinity and humanity of Jesus the Christ. With rigorous logic and deep piety, Apollinaris pursued the necessity of a real, total union without which our redemption would have been imperiled. In a preliminary way, I have tried to show how these concerns are presented by the Laodicean. Unfortunately, Apollinaris' penchant for logical consis-
tency erupts into a truncated humanity in the Christ which is totally unacceptable. The Church understood this and rejected his point of view. What is often overlooked, however, is that other so-called orthodox writers, e.g., Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria, are equally guilty of Apollinaris' error. As the church historian Adolf von Harnack stated in his massive History of Dogma, a pious Apollinarian monk, and probably Apollinaris himself, reflecting on the revisions of his *mia physis* doctrine by Cyril of Alexandria and Leontius of Byzantium, would have said that they would totally agree with the positions offered by these two eminent theologians, except that the Apollinarians would have stated the position in somewhat more intelligible words. Apollinaris' conclusions were in error. However, he clearly demonstrated by his work what would essentially be the position of the Orthodox Fathers, i.e., that God, and God in Christ, can only be addressed and not expressed. The classical Orthodox position truly preserves the beauty and the mystery of God and the God-man.

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One may say that in contrast to the Orthodox Fathers who started with the belief that the flesh which the Logos became or the body which was prepared for it was a complete man, a flesh or body endowed with an irrational and a rational soul, Apollinaris started with the basic presupposition that this flesh or this body was *not a complete man*. In Jesus, the Logos took the place of the rational soul of the ordinary man. In consequence, Apollinaris could not say, as did the Orthodox Fathers, that Jesus had two natures, a divine nature and a human nature; for, to have a human nature by their understanding meant to possess a rational soul, inasmuch as man was, by definition, a rational animal. It is because of the denial of the rational soul in Jesus that Apollinaris rejected not only the existence of two persons, but also denied the existence of two natures,¹ maintaining that in Christ there was only one nature² or one *ousia*.³ Apollinaris' view finds clear expression in his letter to Jovian in which he writes:

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It will become clear that this phrase “one nature of God incarnate” is absolutely central to the position of Apollinaris of Laodicea.

Although it was not always recognized, it is clear that in formulating his position, Apollinaris was directing his thoughts and energies against the Christology of the Antiochenes. This is easily seen in his numerous references to Paul of Samosata and his successors. In this particular matter, Apollinaris is a partner of Athanasius (and perhaps a more substantial partner than is generally acknowledged) and represents one side of the universal paradox, God and Man, just as surely as Diodore and the Antiochenes represent the other.

The criticisms hurled by Apollinaris at Diodore and the Antiochenes are everywhere the same. For example, the Laodicean writes:

\[\text{Deeply influenced by soteriological motives, Apollinaris was convinced that if the divine is separated from the human in the Savior our redemption would be imperiled. For considered merely as man, Christ had no saving life to bestow.} \]

\[\text{He could not save us from our sins; he could not revitalize us or raise us from the dead.} \]

\[\text{The great fear that Apollinaris had with respect to this Antiochene duality may be seen in a few passages from the} \text{Anakephalaiosis} \text{appended to his book against Diodore.} \]

4 πτός 'Ἰοβιανὸν, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, pp. 250-251.
5 πτός Διονυσίου, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, pp. 256-257.
7 Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, 1, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 242.
8 Ibid., pp. 242 ff.
Furthermore:

"Ἀνθρώπος ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐνεργοῦμενος ὁ θεός, σῶμα δὲ συναφθὲν θεῷ θεός. θεός δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς ὁμώ ᾧ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐνεργοῦμενος ἀνθρώπος, ἄλλα σῶμα πρὸς θεὸν συνεθὲν."³

And also from the *Apodeixis*:

εἴ ἐκ δύο (φησὶ) τελεῖον, οὔτε ἐν ὧθες ἐστὶν, ἐν τούτῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν ὧθ ἀνθρώπος, ἐν τούτῳ θεός."⁴

The Antiochene School, in the eyes of Apollinaris, destroyed the fundamental tenet of Christianity, i.e., the union of God and man in Jesus Christ. No matter how close the juxtaposition of the two, no matter how complete their harmony, to him nothing short of perfect union is sufficient. If any vestige of separation remains, the value of Christ’s redemptive work is either debased or destroyed. Again we may refer to the *Apodeixis* for support:

ἀνθρώπου θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον."¹¹

The claim of the Church can only be valid if her Lord is not a God-inspired man but God himself incarnate. At the very best then, the Antiochene position was merely ethical, with Christ viewed as an inspiration and example: the union in him being one of will and purpose rather than one of substance, and, as such, it had to be rejected by Apollinaris.

Some Christological Observations

Having given an indication of the direction of the thought of Apollinaris, let us now indicate, very briefly, some aspects of his own christological formulation by viewing the implications of his basic contention that Jesus was the “one nature of the Word of God incarnate,” i.e., that the pre-existent Christ in his incarnation retained his divine *ousia* or nature and did not take on a complete body or humanity. And, furthermore, that while the body and the Logos form one nature by reason of the lack of a rational soul, the body with its irrational soul is still something quite distinct from the Logos.

(1) Apollinaris maintains that by their union neither the Logos nor the body with irrational soul is destroyed. He writes:

This reflects, to some extent, the influence of Stoic thinking on him, with its notion of mixture and its characteristic feature that the result of mixture is an imperceptible juxtaposition of its constituent parts none of which is destroyed. By employing this notion, Apollinaris tries to prove that in the union of the incarnation neither the Logos nor the body is destroyed. He attempts to bolster this further in a subsequent passage in which he states:

el ἀνθρωπος καὶ ψυχὴ ἔχει καὶ σώμα, καὶ μένει ταῦτα ἐν ἑνώτητι ὑπότα πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὁ Χριστὸς θεότητα ἔχων μετὰ σώματος ἔχει ἐκάτερα διαμένοντα καὶ μὴ συγκεχομένα. ¹³

(2) While the body is not destroyed in its union with the Logos, neither is it completely changed into the Logos. For concerning the Logos and the body in Jesus, Apollinaris argues that:

ἐν γὰρ καὶ ταύτῳ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὁ θεός, οὐ τὸ σῶμα, οὐ μεταβληθευσάς τῆς σαρκὸς εἰς τὸ ἁμάρτιον, ἀλλ’ ἐχούσας καὶ τὸ ίδιον τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑκ παρθένου γέννησιν καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον [σύγκρασιν ἔτοι] ἐγονὼν. ¹⁴

Thus Apollinaris maintains that this becoming flesh has not been brought about by any change in the divine ousia of the Logos. Indeed, he expressly anathematizes any who would say that the Logos has been changed into flesh and quotes against them the text “I am the Lord, I change not.” ¹⁵ The Logos, he teaches, still maintains his cosmic relations even if he has become flesh, at once permeating all things and in particular being conmingled with flesh. Clearly, it is Apollinaris’ position that the Logos, while remaining what he was, has in addition become incarnate: remaining ἀνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος and ἀνθρωπος in his eternal being, he has become σώματος and ἃσματος in the incarnation. ¹⁶ We may note here the Apollinarian conception of unity and distinction in the Person of Jesus Christ. We already know that for Apollinaris the body and the Logos are one nature in Jesus. We may now see that what difference may be

¹² Fragment 127, πρὸς Διόδωρον, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 238.
¹³ Fragment 129, πρὸς Διόδωρον, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 239. We should note that here, too, the constituent elements remain and are unconfused which implies that the union is constructed on the analogy of the Stoic conception of mixture. Cf. Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 437.
¹⁴ De Fide et Incarnatione, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 199.
¹⁵ πρὸς Ἰοβισσάν, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, pp. 252-253.
present as a result of his contention that the flesh has not been changed into that which is incorporeal may be possibly described as a property, although only in a special sense.\(^{17}\)

(3) In his insistence on the one nature, Apollinaris meant to deny not only a rationally animated bodily nature but also an irrationally animated bodily nature, but for different reasons. Professor Harry Wolfson put it this way:

His [Apollinaris’] denial in Jesus of a rationally animated bodily nature is due to his denial in Jesus of a rational soul: his denial in him of an irrationally animated nature is due to his particular conception of what becomes of the weaker element in a union of “predominance.”\(^{18}\)

For the Laodicean there are three basic elements always present in any particular body: (a) a nature, in the sense of its belonging to a particular species; (b) a person, in the sense of its being an individual thing; and (c) a property, in the sense of its being a body possessing accidents. When this body is connected to a body of greater power of activity, it is Apollinaris’ contention that the weaker element ceases to be a nature and survives only as a property. Thus the union of the body with the Logos necessarily makes the body a property rather than a person or a nature. In the light of this analysis, we may now say that, as in Origen and Athanasius, there is a recognition, i.e., a definite realization, of the difference of natures according to their properties. In the commingling, the Laodicean says, there are uncreated and created:\(^{19}\):

\[ \text{εὐνοῦται ἃ γὰρ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ σώματος, δημιουργὸς προσκυνητῷ σοφίᾳ καὶ δύναμις ὑπάρχουν αἰώνιος. ἀπὸ θεότητος ταῦτα, νῦν Δαρίας ἐν' ἑαυτῶν χρῶν τεθεῖς προσκυνών θεὸν σοφίᾳ προκόπτων δυνάμει κραταιόμενος: ταῦτα ἀπὸ σώματος.}\(^{20}\)

Similarly, in his exegesis, Apollinaris distinguishes between what is proper to the Lord’s Godhead and what is proper to his humanity. However, Apollinaris is careful to point out that everything which is recorded concerning Jesus Christ in Scripture is to be referred to the one Person, the Logos incarnate. In taking the text from the Gospel of John (17:19), “For their sakes I sanctify myself,” he states that therein is preserved the one \textit{prosopon} and the indivisibility of the one living being, but, perceiving what is demanded by an accurate discernment of what goes to make up that one Person, he proceeds to make a distinction between that which sanctifies, which is divine, and that which is sanctified, which is human nature – for one is Creator and

\(^{17}\) For a full discussion, see Wolfson, \textit{Philosophy of Church Fathers I}, pp. 441 ff.

\(^{18}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 441. Useful as Wolfson’s analysis is, he has basically misunderstood the fundamental motive of Apollinaris’ employment of the concept of mixture.

\(^{19}\) \textit{De Unione} 5, in Lietzmann, \textit{Apollinaris}, p. 187.

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the other is creature. We also refer to his interpretation of Paul’s passage in Philippians (2:9). Here he maintains that the Apostle is speaking of the “whole” as having been exalted, but, he continues, properly speaking, it is only the flesh which is exalted, since Godhead ever remains in its immutability.21

In this connection it may be seen that Apollinaris is maintaining a position already established and which will be continued in Cyril of Alexandria, in the traditional teaching of the Alexandrine School.

Some Soteriological Considerations

Like Athanasius, Apollinaris had a very strong sense of sin; and this appears not only from his insistence that redemption cannot be secured unless Christ is very God, but also supplies him with a reason for denying to Christ a human mind. Mind, according to Apollinaris, if it is truly a human mind, is sinful. To him the essence of mind is its power of self-determination or freedom of will:

φθορά δὲ τοῦ αὐτεξοσιόν ζώου τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτεξοσιόν.22

This conception made it impossible for Apollinaris to believe that two minds could co-exist in a single person.

αὐτóν γὰρ δύο νοεῖ καὶ θελητικὰ ἐν τῷ ἄμα κατοικεῖ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ ἔτερον κατὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου αντιστρατεύῃ διὰ τῆς οἰκείας θελήσεως καὶ ἐνεργείας.23

And furthermore:

εἰ γὰρ πᾶς νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ ἵδικῷ θελήματι κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενος, αὐτόν ἔστιν ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ δύο τοὺς τάνατα θέλοντας ἄλληλος συνυπάρχειν ἐκατέρω τὸ θεληθὲν ἐαυτῷ καθ᾽ ὁμὴν αὐτοκίνητον ἐνεργοῦντος.24

If, as Charles Raven has suggested,25 this is impossible in the abstract, it is still less possible to have happened in the case of Jesus Christ. “Those,” says Apollinaris, “who speak of two minds in Christ,” and according to him this was the fatal element in any duality,

οὔδε τούτῳ συνιδεῖν ἑδυνηθήσαν καίτοι πάσιν ἰν καταφανεῖς, ὡς ὃ μὲν θεῖος νοῦς αὐτοκίνητος ἐστὶ καὶ ταυτοκινήτος, ἄτερπτος γὰρ, ὃ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος αὐτοκινήτος μὲν, οὗ ταυτοκίνητος δὲ, τρεπτός γὰρ, καὶ δύοπερ ἄτερπτον νῦν τρεπτὸς οὗ μὴν ταύτης νοῦς εἰς ἐνὸς ὑποκειμένου σύντισαν. στασιασθῇσαι γὰρ τοῖς τῶν ἕν ὡς ἐστὶ διελκόμενος ἐναντίος θελήματι.26

21 Cf. De Unione 17, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 192.
22 Fragment 87, Ἀπάδεας, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 226.
23 πειρ ἐνώσεως, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 204.
24 Fragment 150, προς Ἰουλιανόν, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 247.
26 Fragment 151, προς Ἰουλιανόν, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 247 f.
So he sees that his main principle, i.e., “the one incarnate nature of God the Logos,” will be set beyond all question if he says that in Christ the heavenly takes the place of the human mind. Christ can still be called man, and there will be no doubt concerning the oneness of his person; for, under such a constitution, there can be in him but one will, one activity, one operative motion, the Logos himself being the “mover” and the flesh being the “moved.” It is in this light that he states in his letter to the exiled bishops:

"Hmēiōs ὁμολογοῦμεν οὖν εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἄγνον ἐπιδεδημηκέναι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἐπερ ἢν ἐν προφήταις, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον σάκρα γεγεννηθαι μη ἀνειληφῶτα νοῦν ἄνθρωπινον, νοῦν ἑπεράμενον καὶ αἰχμαλωτιζόμενον λογισμοῖς ἄπαροίς, ἀλλʼ θεῖον ὑνα νοῦν, ἑτεροτον ὀφθάλμων."  

Here again Apollinaris appeals to one of his major concerns, i.e., soteriology, for justification:

εἰ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ (φησι) νοῦν ὑπὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπινον ἢν ἐν Χριστῷ νοῦς – οὖν ἄρα ἐπιτελεῖται εἰν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς σαρκόςας ἔχον"  

It is his insistence on the sinlessness of the Savior and his belief that such sinlessness is incompatible with the possession of a human mind that drives Apollinaris to reject the belief in the perfect humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. The Lord exists:

οὖν ἐν δόν ωθείας ἀλλʼ ἐν μιᾷ;  

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He attempts to support his position further by appealing to Scripture in the De Fide et Incarnatione and asserting that,

..., καὶ ωθείαμα διαίρεσις τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκός αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς θείαις προφέρεται γραφαίς, ἀλλʼ ἐστι μία φύσις, μία ὑπόστασις, μία ἐνέργεια, ἐν πρόσωπον, ὄλος θεός, ὄλος ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός."

Again, as we have previously noted, he asserts that Jesus is “one incarnate nature of the Logos.”

The way in which Apollinaris described the union, i.e., that the divine and bodily properties are united in Christ; that he is eternally Creator, object of worship, Wisdom and Power: these derive from his Godhead. Son of Mary, born in this last time, a worshiper of God, progressing in wisdom, growing stronger in power: these he

27 πρὸς τοὺς ἐν διοικασαρείᾳ ἐπισκόπους, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 256.  
28 Fragment 74, Ἀπόδειξες, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 222.  
29 Fragment 158, διάλογοι, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 249.  
31 De Fide et Incarnatione 6, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, pp. 198-199.
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derives from his body. Furthermore, Apollinaris maintains both of these – that the whole is from heaven because of the Godhead, and the whole is from a woman because of the flesh. He recognizes no distinction in the one Person; neither does he divide the earthly from the heavenly nor the heavenly from the earthly: such a division is, according to Apollinaris, "impious." This position very likely caused his opponents to declare that he was teaching either the consubstantiality of the Godhead with the flesh or that the body was from heaven. Perhaps the most striking accusation is to be found in the letter of Gregory of Nazianzus to Nectarius of Constantinople, in which Gregory declares that a pamphlet had fallen into his hands which declared that

... the flesh was not acquired by the only-begotten Son for the purpose of his sojourn on earth or assumed in order to change the rudiments of our nature, but from the beginning this flesh-like nature existed in the Son.

Gregory continues:

Further, he puts forward a phrase in the gospel perverting it so as to make it testify to this folly: the words are "no one ascended into heaven except He Who came down from heaven, the Son of Man" (John 3:13), and He descended bringing with Him the flesh which He always had in heaven pre-existent and united with Him.

The possibility of a translation such as this can be seen in parallel passages in the Apodeixis, for example:

καὶ προθάρχει (φησιν) ὁ ἀνθρωπός Χριστός οὖν ὃς ἐτέρθην ἄντος παρ' αὐτὸν τοῦ πνεύματος, τοιέστω τοῦ θεοῦ,

and,

ὠς τὴν ἄρχην ἐκ τῆς παρθένου ἐσχεν, ἀλλὰ . . . πρὸ πάσης κτίσεως ἤν, τοιαύτη πάντως ἢν οία τοῖς.

Taken by themselves, without consideration of Apollinaris' repeated denials of a belief in a "heavenly flesh," these arguments appear to be quite devastating. However, when his vehement denials are considered in connection with his attack upon the position of the Antiochene dualism, it is quite plausible to maintain that he

32 Fragment 125, πρὸς Διόδωρον, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 238.
33 πρὸς Διονύσου, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 259.
34 Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle CCII, in Migne, Patrologia Graeca 37, cols. 329-334 (author's translation).
35 Ἀποδείκτης, Fragment 32, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 211.
36 Ἀποδείκτης, Fragment 34, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, p. 212.
37 See the anathemas appended to πρὸς Ἰοβιανόν, in Lietzmann, Apollinaris, pp. 253 ff.
was grossly misunderstood, that the union taking place in the womb of the Virgin Mother, was, in fact, "the fulfillment in history of an eternal yearning for men, a yearning characteristic of the divine essence."³⁸ In no sense is Apollinaris to be construed as maintaining that the Logos brought his body with him from heaven as Gregory had assumed. The body rather may share in the properties of the Logos, so that it can be called a "divine body," and the Logos may share in the properties of the body, but they remain, according to nature, body and Logos. Furthermore, it should not be thought that Apollinaris' use of such expressions as "commingling" and "mixture" necessitates any different judgment. As R. V. Sellers has pointed out, Apollinaris uses them in order to enforce the thought of the inseparability of the divine and the human elements in their union in the person of the Logos. It may be said that to employ such terminology may be rather injudicious, but, certainly, we should not say that because Apollinaris does use them his doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ is a doctrine of "confusion."³⁹

Concerning the thought of the 19th-century philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Barth once remarked that if anyone was really interested in "doing theology" that person would have to "go through" the "brook of fire," i.e., Feuer-Bach. I would suggest, along the same lines, that if anyone really wants to wrestle with the problem of Christology, then that person will have to "go through," or at least come to grips with, the issues and questions raised by Apollinaris of Laodicea!

³⁸ Raven, Apollinarianism, p. 216.
³⁹ Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies, pp. 58-59.