Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

Mark J. Dorenkemper
SUBSIDIARY PRINCIPLES OF MARIOLOGY

The contemplation, explanation, and defense of the fundamental and vital principle of Mariology are beyond doubt the most excellent operations of the theology of the Marian mystery. We know this to be true also in regard to the consideration of the fundamental principle of the whole of theology. No more excellent operation of the human mind is possible than that whose object is God one in nature and triune in personality. Still, necessary and central as are these fundamental principles, we are able to come to only a very imperfect understanding of the Marian and divine mysteries from them alone. We know well this is due not to any deficiency in these principles but to the imperfection of the human mind considering these truths. "The higher an intelligence is, the fewer ideas it needs to know things. Divine intelligence knows all things in one intelligible form, the divine essence; inferior intelligences know things in many forms." ¹ So long as our intellect is illuminated by the imperfect light of faith, with its consequent expression of mysteries in human concepts and propositions, we must have other truths particularizing and delineating the central truth of Mariology.

There are many such truths familiar to all of us, which form a part of every consideration of Mary. The Mariologists of recent decades who courageously set themselves to the task of presenting the Marian truths in a systematic whole—something that had not been done prior to this—were faced at the outset with the problem of organization. None have purported to give the final solution to this problem. These Mariologists, the leaders in the field, acknowledge that their endeavors have fallen short of that most to be sought for: an organic, unified whole of Marian truths, a Marian Summa in the best scholastic sense of that term. The very great positive contribution these

¹ St. Thomas, De anima, art. 15.
Mariologists have made to Marian theology is well known to all. Moreover, if we take all their works together, one further negative contribution is made, that at the present stage of development a *Summa* of Mariology is beyond the realm of possibility.

The different organization manifested in the totally different divisions of these Mariological tracts certainly confirms the fact that we are still in the process of forming a *Summa Mariologica*. The division is material and not formal, that is, the division is founded on the material object rather than on the formal object. Valuable as this division is for pedagogical reasons, the theologian will not rest content until he has discovered the inner, formal unity existing in Mariology. The other articles in these *Proceedings* are proof of that. They deal with the subject foremost in the minds of Mariologists today: What is the fundamental and unifying principle of Mariology? Though less frequently mentioned, still very much implicit in all this discussion and likewise essential to a unified Mariology is the order existing among the other truths of Mariology.

That such an order exists is beyond question for the Catholic theologian. God made all things in an order which proceeds from the creative knowledge of God. In regard to supernatural realities, such as divine maternity, this divinely constituted order is made known through revelation which is nothing but a certain communication to us of the divine-ordering knowledge. In this participated divine knowledge of the Marian mystery certain truths are found to be the founda-

---

tion of other truths. It is true that by faith we hold to all these truths immediately on the authority of God. This does not, however, prevent the Mariologist from seeking to discover the real relations existing among these revealed truths. It is then that these truths begin to present themselves in an order of intelligibility in which some express secondary and derived realities, joined to the primary and principal reality of the divine maternity as conclusions to their principle, as effects to their cause, as properties to their essence.

It is to these secondary, subordinated and derived truths that we direct our attention. Moreover, it is our purpose to discover the order among these truths and center our attention principally on those truths which are immediately subordinated to the divine maternity. These truths in their turn are principles of other truths in the Marian mystery, and are therefore called secondary or subordinated principles of Mariology. After a brief introduction on the nature of subsidiary principles in general, our consideration will be divided into three main parts. In part one, we shall examine the validity of the principles of transcendence and appropriateness. In part two, two other principles will be proposed and an attempt will be

---

3 Throughout this discussion of the secondary principles, we suppose the divine maternity to be the fundamental principle of Mariology. In so doing we have no intention of condemning, by ignoring them, the views of eminent Mariologists to the contrary. This greatly discussed question is treated ex professo in the other articles of these Proceedings. Moreover, sufficient for our purpose here is that tenet on which all Catholic Mariologists agree, namely, that in some way the divine maternity is a fundamental reality in the Marian mystery.

4 Cf. M. J. Congar, art. Théologie, in DTC 15, 450, 460, which treats primary and secondary truths of faith in general.

5 The most extensive treatment of the subsidiary principles of Mariology is contained in Roschini’s Mariologia, 1, 338-379. A partial bibliography is found on p. 338 of this work. Philipon, op. cit. 6-8, 134-136, published after Roschini’s Mariology, carries a clear and concise consideration of these principles.
made to establish these as the only two immediately subsidiary principles of Mariology. In part three, the role of these two principles in doctrinal development will be examined.

A discussion of the subsidiary principles of Mariology supposes agreement on the nature of subsidiary principles in general. There may well be a divergence of viewpoints on just what is necessary for such principles. We shall only lay down the conditions for these principles as we shall consider them in this article. Three conditions appear to be necessary: (1) they must be revealed, (2) they must be immediate, (3) they must be productive. Though I believe the pertinency of these three conditions would be readily admitted by everyone, a brief explanation of their meaning may not be out of place. Beginning with the last condition first as the most apparent, I state that the secondary principles must be productive. By productiveness I mean simply that these principles must be propositions from which other truths proceed, for not every proposition is a principle.

The second condition is that the principles must be immediate, that is, they must be immediately founded in the divine maternity. Though everything we consider in Mariology must in some way be founded on the divine maternity as the first principle of the science of Mariology, yet it does not follow that all Mariological truths are immediately related to the divine maternity. Some of these subsidiary truths are more proximately related to the divine maternity than others. The

---

6 Roschini indicates this and the subsequent condition in his introduction to the consideration of the secondary principles: "... dantur in Mariologia, sicut et in quilibet alia scientia, imo sicut in aliis partibus scientiae Theologiae, quaedam alia principia in ipso supremo principio fundata, secundaria at magis explicita, ex quibus aliae veritates seu conclusiones rite deduci possunt." He does not explicitly mention the first condition, revelation, but it is certainly evident from his method that he considers this to be a condition of secondary principles of Mariology. He goes to great lengths to show that these principles are founded in Scripture and Tradition.
latter realize their reference to the divine maternity only through a more proximate subsidiary principle. The more remote secondary truths are, first of all, conclusions and then principles in Mariology. The immediate subsidiary principles, on the other hand, are not strict conclusions from the divine maternity. There is no intermediary truths or middle term by which we can deduce them from the divine maternity. In this respect they are somewhat analogous to the first principles of reason which flow from and are immediately subordinated to the absolutely first principle. Of course, they differ in this, that we do not see the immediacy of these truths in the divine maternity as in the case of the first principles.

This brings us to the first condition of the subsidiary principles, that they must be revealed. We know that the principles of theology in general are the articles of faith. However, this is especially necessary in regard to the fundamental principles of theology and those principles immediately flowing from them. Human reason is absolutely incapable of knowing these truths without revelation. Thus it is not possible for human reason ever to arrive at the divine maternity without revelation. It is equally impossible for natural reason ever to arrive at these principles distinct from the divine maternity but immediately flowing therefrom because of a free, divine ordination. Reason enlightened by faith may indeed be able to deduce other truths from these principles, but the principles themselves can be known by revelation only. By the light of faith we hold these truths in a manner analogous to our holding the fundamental truths of natural knowledge, namely, by the very light of reason without demonstration.

If these three conditions can be taken as established be-

---

7 *Sum. Theol.*, 1-2, 1, 7: "Ita se habent in doctrina fidelis articuli fidelis sicut principia per se nota in doctrina quae per rationem naturalem habetur. In quibus principiis ordo quidam invenitur. . . ."

8 Cf. *Sum Theol.*, 1, 1, 2.
yond doubt, it will be possible for us to define the subsidiary principles of Mariology: They are those revealed truths immediately founded in the divine maternity, from which all other Mariological truths proceed. By this definition we are restricting our consideration to those subsidiary principles which are immediately founded in the divine maternity. Father Rochini’s treatment of the subsidiary principles includes both those principles immediately and mediately founded on the divine maternity. Thus he enumerates seven subsidiary principles. Only the first two, transcendence and appropriateness, have their foundation immediately on the divine maternity. In part one, therefore, only these two principles will come under consideration.

PART ONE

THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSCENDENCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

A. The Principle of Transcendence

Mary so transcends all other creatures as to be in an order of her own in which altogether singular prerogatives and laws apply. Such is the principle of transcendence. Rochini is well aware that in introducing this principle, he is adding to the list of subsidiary principles ordinarily mentioned by theologians. He nevertheless considers it the first of the subsidiary principles, “principium post primum principium et ante omnia

9 Roschini divides his seven subsidiary principles into two general groups: Principia universalia of which there are four (transcendence, appropriateness, eminence and analogy) and Principia particularia of which there are three (antinomy or antithetic parallelism, association and solidarity). Of the universal principles, only the first two are “deductiva, a priori, magis absoluta et comprehensiva;” the other two are “experimentalia et a posteriori, magis, forsans, directa, sed minoris comprehensionis;” cf. p. 339.

10 Roschini, op. cit. 339.
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology 127

alia principia secundaria ponendum." It must be admitted that he has no difficulty showing that this principle is founded in Sacred Scripture, was at least implicitly enunciated by the Fathers and theologians, and was frequently employed by them with most fruitful results. Finally, his arguments to show that the principle of transcendence is immediately founded on the divine maternity are conclusive beyond a doubt.

It is, however, precisely this relation to the divine maternity that raises a difficulty in regard to the principle of transcendence as a secondary principle. Is the principle of transcendence a principle distinct from the divine maternity itself? If the transcendence of Mary is contained in her very being the Mother of God, then we cannot speak of transcendence as a true subsidiary principle of Mariology.

Some theologians explain the divine maternity in such a way that a transcendence of Mary over every other creature—save the human nature of Christ—does not belong to her divine maternity as such. However, I am inclined to believe that this is due to an imperfect understanding of the nature of that relationship to her Divine Son which constitutes her divine maternity. The great emphasis some authors have placed on the distinction between the divine maternity in the abstract and the divine maternity in the concrete seems only to have confused the real issue. Thus some authors maintain that the divine maternity in the abstract is less excellent than the other supernatural graces, but that the divine maternity in the concrete, inasmuch as it includes the fullness of sanctifying grace and the highest glory, is more excellent.11 The

11 Merkelbach, defending the excellence of the divine maternity considered in itself over the other supernatural privileges and gifts of Mary, continues: "Ita dicimus contra plures modernos: Suárez, Vázquez, Salmanticenses, Mannens, Pesch, Van Noort, Terrien, qui maternitatem divinam, in abstracto seu nude et secundum se spectatam, minoris pretii habent, quamvis in concreto, cum privilegiis et diversis gratiis connexis eam malorem dicant, quia tunc
same in-the-abstract and in-the-concrete distinction has led some writers to say that "the divine maternity in the abstract is easy to define: it is merely the formal notes of human maternity in general (adequate and physical-moral) applied to the unique case of Mary." 12

I submit that this is not a definition of the divine maternity in any sense, for the reason that it does not express the formal nature of the mother-son relation that is proper to the Mother of God. This new distinction in Catholic theology, robbing, as it does, mysteries of their supernatural character and making it not only possible but easy for us to define them, is inadmissible.

When the divine maternity in the abstract is so understood, then indeed the notion of transcendence does not belong to the divine maternity as such. If it is permissible to consider the divine maternity in this wise, then certainly transcendence can and must be numbered among the subsidiary principles. But I believe that the divine maternity, so considered, involves a double error: the one philosophical and the other theological.

The philosophical error is an unwarranted abstraction. In laying down the norms of a legitimate abstraction St. Thomas points out that "we cannot abstract a whole from just any parts whatsoever. For there are some parts on which the nature of the whole depends, that is, when to be such a whole is to be composed of such parts." 13 Now whereas it is possible to abstract maternity from the maternity of Rosemary, Alice, and Jane, it is not possible to abstract maternity from the divine maternity of the Blessed Virgin. In the former cases the child generated is accidental to the maternity, for there is

"includit gratiam et gloriám in gradu excellentissimo." Mariologia (Paris, 1939) 64.


13 Comm. in Boethius De Trin., q. 5, art. 3.
always question of a human maternity, but in the latter case the Child generated is essential to the notion of Mary’s maternity. It is not true to say that Mary’s maternity is the same as Alice’s maternity with the accidental differences in the child generated.

The theological error in this distinction of the divine maternity in the abstract and in the concrete concerns the manner of our predication of natural concepts and words to supernatural realities. This is never done in a univocal sense but always analogically. Hence in speaking of divine maternity, we are using the term *maternity* in an analogical sense. As a consequence, it can never be easy but always impossible—so long as we must use human concepts and words to express supernatural realities—to define the divine maternity. The most we can do is seek some imperfect analogical understanding of it.

This does not mean, however, that we cannot speak of the divine maternity in an abstract sense. Most certainly the fundamental principle of Mariology must be an abstract notion of the divine maternity which prescinds from the particularizing aspects of Mary’s divine motherhood. If we understand by the divine maternity in the concrete all the supernatural graces and prerogatives of Mary, we do not have here the principle of a science. Nothing can proceed from such a notion of the divine maternity, as everything that can be said about Mary is already included in the very notion of the divine maternity. The principle of any science must be abstract. This is especially true of the fundamental principle which forms the definition of the object of that science. The definition is always abstract because it must express only the essence of the thing.

This brings us back to our main question: Does the essence of the divine maternity, the fundamental principle of Mariology, contain in itself the transcendence of Mary? If it does,
then transcendence cannot be a subsidiary principle, for it is contained in the primary principle.

Merkelbach sets it down as certain that "in itself the excellence and dignity of the Mother of God is most eminent, entirely singular, and utterly unique among all the dignities of creatures." 14 The Angelic Doctor sets forth the theological principle on which rests the essential argumentation for Mary's transcendence: "Quanto aliquod receptivum est propinquis causae influenti, tanto magis participat de influentia ipsius." 15 In virtue of her divine maternity as such, Mary is more intimately united to God, the influencing cause of every perfection and excellence, than any other creature, save the human nature of Christ. By reason of the divine maternity in itself, therefore, Mary possesses a transcendent excellence second only to that of her Son. The explicit doctrine of St. Thomas, confirmed by several Popes, has become axiomatic in Mariology: "By reason of being the Mother of God the Blessed Virgin possesses a certain infinite dignity." 16

The inclusion of Mary's transcendence in the very notion of divine maternity is not a probable conclusion arrived at by an argument of becomingness, however forceful. Some have thought so, pointing out that God by His absolute power could have chosen to become the Son of a human mother without imparting to her any of the transcendent excellence we know to be Mary's. This view maintains that Mary's transcendence does not belong to the divine maternity as such but to the free

14 "In seipsa, excellentia et dignitas matris Dei est valde eminens, omnino peculiaris, imo unica, inter omnes creaturarum dignitates.—Est certum." op. cit. 55. E. Dublanchy, art. Marie, in DTC 9, 2365: "The dignity of the divine maternity, since it pertains to the hypostatic order, surpasses all other created dignities, even when considered in its isolation, and not excluding the dignity of divine adoption by grace and the Christian priesthood."

15 Sum. Theol., 3, 7, 1.

16 Sum. Theol., 1, 25, 6 ad 4m; Pius XI, Lux veritatis, in AAS 23 (1931) 513; Pius XII, Fulgens corona, in AAS 45 (1953) 580.
disposition of God. But does not such reasoning stem from a misunderstanding of the absolute power of God, supposing it possible for God to do something that is opposed to His wisdom and justice? 17

A non-transcendent Mother of God is impossible if we can show that the very notion of divine maternity implies transcendent excellence. We are not here concerned with the fact of Mary’s transcendent excellence, but with the nature of divine maternity as such. It is beyond the scope of our purpose to examine at length the nature of the divine maternity. But it is necessary to recall the principal conclusions formulated in recent studies of the divine maternity, inasmuch as Mary’s motherhood intrinsically contains the reason for her transcendence. 18

There is general agreement among Mariologists that the Blessed Virgin, in virtue of her divine maternity, in some way belongs to the hypostatic order. There is likewise a growing consensus that there must be in Mary an ontological, supernatural reality which is the foundation (the esse in) of the real relation (the esse ad) to her Son which is divine maternity. 19 Since the relation as such does not include the notion of


19 René Laurentin, in BT 8 (1947-53) 741: “Il en découle une troisième vérité, qui représente un certain développement par rapport à la pensée de S. Thomas: la maternité divine n’est pas une relation extrinsèque au Verbe; mais elle implique en Marie une réalité ontologique. Ou peut, semble-t-il, retenir une telle conclusion. En effet cette relation, la plus réelle de celles qui saient entre Dieu et la créature, après l’union hypostatique, implique un fondement réel, et ce fondement, qui, à un moment donné, établit la relation
perfection, it is in this ontological, supernatural, foundational perfection that we discover the sublime and transcendent excellence of the divine maternity.\textsuperscript{20}

A further question, on which there is no agreement, is whether this foundational perfection of the divine maternity formally sanctifies the soul of Mary.\textsuperscript{21} Authors rightly point out that this perfection must be a created configuration to the Father.\textsuperscript{22} There seems to be no conclusive reason, however, for saying that such a created assimilation to the Father "necessarily and formally sanctifies her soul."\textsuperscript{23} The divine maternity is not parallel to the hypostatic union in this regard. The sanctity of Christ’s human nature by reason of the hypostatic union is so proper to that union—as seen from the reason assigned for it—that it is not possible except in that union.\textsuperscript{24}

If this foundational perfection of the divine maternity

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Van Ackeren, \textit{art. cit.} 210-211.


\textsuperscript{22} Cf. J. Bittremieux, \textit{Relationes Beatissimae Virginis ad Personas SS. Trinitatis}, in \textit{DTPI} 37 (1934) 562-565. The author indicates the patristic and magisterial testimony for a likeness of the Father in the Blessed Virgin.

\textsuperscript{23} Van Ackeren, \textit{art. cit.} 227. The only reservation to our wholehearted acceptance of this truly erudite chapter concerns this point which seems to me accidental to the essential doctrine therein contained. I fail to see what can be gained from a comparison of the divine maternity to sanctifying grace (p. 224), and the greatly disputed doctrine of "created actuation by uncreated act." Such a comparison of things evidently not in the same order nor on the same plane, as Laurentin notes, can only raise a number of false problems and insuperable difficulties.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Comp. Theol.}, 214. After considering the union with God through grace and charity, St. Thomas continues: "Alia vero conjunctio est hominis ad Deum non solum per affectum aut inhabitationem, sed etiam per unitatem hypostatis seu personae. . . . Haec etiam est hominis Christi gratia singularis, quod est Deo unitus in unitate personae, . . . et gratissimum Deo facit." Cf. \textit{Sum. Theol.}, 3, 7, 3.
does not formally sanctify the soul of Mary, how are we to conceive it? Must it ever remain a singular something without comparison in the natural and supernatural worlds? The Catholic theologian will not have it so, for how then is he to fulfill the Church’s injunction “to seek some most fruitful understanding of the mysteries . . . from the connection of the mysteries among themselves?” 25 The answers to these questions are given to us with gratifying definitiveness by Professor Laurentin. His comparison of the divine maternity with the baptismal character has in my opinion all the earmarks of an outstanding and permanent contribution to Mariology. 26 By this comparison also the transcendence of Mary in virtue of her divine maternity is wonderfully brought to light. 27 Furthermore, the exalted Mother of God is not an anomaly for the theologian, but a pearl in a harmonious setting of the supernatural realities which constitute the object of his science.

The more the Mariologist comes to know the intimate nature of the divine maternity, the more he comes to realize the transcendent excellence of that relationship which sets Mary over all other created beings. “It is the most exalted relationship compatible with a created personality, the closest that can bind a divine to a human person: And it is this that makes Mary the most exalted and most complete of all mere-

25 Vatican Council, in DB 1796.

26 “To bring out the different aspects of this superiority [of the divine maternity], we might compare the divine motherhood, which is the fundamental gift made to Mary, with the baptismal character, which is the fundamental gift made to the Christian. The two terms of the comparison have strict analogies: like the divine motherhood, the baptismal character is an ineffaceable gift, it incorporates us in Christ, establishes us in a family relationship with God, and guarantees us his favor and his grace—if we place no obstacle in the way. But this is where the resemblances end and the differences, all to the advantage of Mary, begin.” Laurentin, op. cit. 95.

27 Cf. ibid. 95-98.
creatures."  

It seems, therefore, beyond doubt that once we admit such a singular excellence to be implied in the very notion of the divine maternity, we have by that very fact included Mary's transcendence in the fundamental principle and excluded it from the properly subsidiary principles of Mariology.

B. The Principle of Appropriateness

If the transcendence of Mary is so intimately joined to the divine maternity as to exclude its being a subsidiary principle, the matter seems to be altogether different in regard to the principle of appropriateness, the principium de convenientia. According to this principle, every perfection, grace, and privilege is to be attributed to Mary that belongs to her as the Mother of God and of men.  

We encounter special difficulties on taking up the consideration of this principle. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else in all Mariology, the requirements of scientific theology tend to run counter not only to the wholly irreconcilable demands of unrestrained pietistic imagination but also to the inclinations of true Christian piety. An apparent manifestation of some cleavage between theology and piety in regard to the principle of appropriateness is the fact that contemporary Mariologists almost without exception find it necessary to take a very definite stand on its role in Mariology. A second and more serious difficulty springs from the lack of agree-

28 Ibid. 95.

29 The different enunciations of this principle by Mariologists is not great, yet the point of emphasis is not always the same as we shall see later. Roschini, op. cit. 351: "Beatae Virgini illae omnes perfectiones tribuendas sunt quae dignitati Matris Creatoris et Mediatrixis Creaturarum reapse conveniunt, dummodo non sint fidei, doctrinae Ecclesiae aut rationi contrariae." Philipon, op. cit. 134: "We are to attribute to Mary all perfections and all graces and privileges she required for her double office of Mother of God and men."
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

ment on the validity of this principle. Some authors lay stress on its demonstrative force, whereas others are equally emphatic in pointing out its limitations.

Closer examination reveals that, in applying the principle of appropriateness, some base it immediately on the divine maternity; whereas others base it immediately on the divine plan for Mary, and only mediately on the divine maternity.

The traditional formulation of the principle of appropriateness frequently conceals the truly different meaning this principle has, depending on its relationship to the divine maternity. A further complication arises from the fact that in actual use of the principle, its relationship to the divine maternity is not so clear-cut as indicated above. It is usually a question of emphasis. Still, the principle's immediate or mediate relationship to the divine maternity is a cardinal point in determining its validity as a subsidiary principle of Mariology.

For those Mariologists who tend to view the transcendent divine maternity as the immediate foundation of the principle of appropriateness, the meaning of the principle can be expressed in this wise: Every perfection, grace, and privilege is to be attributed to Mary that belongs to her as the Mother of God. If we so formulate the principle of appropriateness, we can know all those things which belong to Mary by reason of her divine maternity as such from this principle in the same way as transcendence belongs to the divine maternity. The shortcoming of this view is that we do not ordinarily understand the role of the principle of appropriateness in this way. True, St. Thomas uses the expression "convenit alicui" in re-

30 Roschini includes more than the divine maternity in his formulation of the principle of appropriateness. The emphasis, however, is placed entirely on her transcendence by reason of her divine maternity. This would seem to follow also from his viewing the principle of transcendence as the first of the subsidiary principles. Philipon, on the other hand, clearly sees the immediate foundation of the principle of appropriateness to be the office assigned to Mary in the divine plan.
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

gard to those things which belong to the very nature of a being. However, these authors do not speak of the principium convenientiae in this way, since the principle has for them only a probable result, whereas the principle, if applied to those things which pertain to the very notion of divine maternity, must have a necessary result. We must conclude, therefore, that they actually employ the principle of appropriateness in regard to things not pertaining to the divine maternity as such.

In regard to those things, however, that are not contained in the very notion of divine maternity, we can know nothing about Mary from the principle of appropriateness when founded immediately on the divine maternity. The word convenientia means a “coming with,” “a coming together,” ultimately “a belonging together.” By means of appropriateness, therefore, we affirm the existence of a thing because of its objective connection with a being that is already known. A being can possess things in two ways: (1) by nature, and (2) by the will of the one determining its purpose. Hence, any knowledge we can have of Mary beyond that which belongs to her divine maternity is wholly dependent on a knowledge of the end willed by God in her regard. This does not mean that the principle of appropriateness has no value in Mariology, but it does make clear that this principle depends for its validity on the revelation of Mary’s place in the overall divine plan. It cannot, therefore, be an immediate subsidiary principle of Mariology.

Though this conclusion is sufficient for our primary pur-

81 In Epist. ad Coloss., lec. 4, fi.: “Essentialiter quidem quod convenit rei secundum proportionem suae naturae; sicut homini rationale.”

82 Laurentin’s meaningful statement is literally true in regard to such truths: “Everything can be connected with the mystery of the Blessed Virgin’s maternity; practically nothing can be deduced from it.” Le mouvement mariologique à travers le monde, in VS 86 (1952) 183.
pose—the determination of the immediate subsidiary principles—the stress contemporary Mariologists have given to the principle of appropriateness precludes ending the consideration of this principle on such a negative note. Though some authors join the principle of appropriateness to the divine maternity, they do not do so exclusively of any consideration of her divinely constituted role as known to us by revelation. Here the principle of appropriateness comes into its own as by far the most fruitful principle of all Mariology. It has a major role in the theologian’s proper activity of faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum) from a comparison of mysteries among themselves and with man’s final end and from analogies with natural things.

By comparing two mysteries or truths of revelation with each other, the divine maternity and the coredemption, for example, the Mariologist discovers a certain becomingness, a “belonging togetherness,” of these two truths. By comparing these mysteries, furthermore, with the general condition, laws, and mode of activity in the world about us the Mariologist comes to some fuller understanding of these supernatural truths in their mutual relations. Without doubt this agreement between the supernatural mysteries and things of the universe of our natural knowledge is capable of the most varied degree. At times there is only a very remote similarity between the supernatural and natural realities that affords us nothing more than a very imperfect glimpse of the supernatural truth. At other times there is such a proximate homogeneity that we seem to be dealing with the very essence of the supernatural

83 What Congar says of this principle in theology in general applies with equal force in Mariology. “Arguments de convenance forment, et de beaucoup, la part la plus importante des arguments de la théologie et comme la domaine approprié de cette science”; art. Théologie, in DTC 15, 455.

84 Cf. Vatican Council, in DB 1796.
reality and to have discovered its explanation. And yet this is never possible in the absolute sense, as the true connection of these supernatural mysteries ever remains hidden in the inscrutable plan of God. Whatever we discover by the principle of becomingness in this way must ever remain in the category of the probable, for it always remains founded on "verae similitudines, rationes verisimiles." 

In this usage of the principle of appropriateness a positive result is obtained. Albeit this result is only probable, this is not to the discredit of the principle for theology in general or Mariology in particular. In regard to those things which depend on the free will of God, this is the only result possible, demonstrative arguments being impossible. St. Thomas did not hesitate "to make known that truth which surpasses reason . . . by setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments." In the very first question of the Summa, the Angelic Doctor points out the value of the principle of appropriateness: "The least knowledge that can be had of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge of inferior things."

The principle of appropriateness, as we have considered

35 Cf. Congar, ibid.


37 "When certainty, derived from the positive founts of revelation, dogma and history, cannot be had, a solid probability can give an invaluable orientation to the mind which uses this probability with discretion and thereby derives a degree of security such as the arguments offer. The traveler who does not have before him a secure way, is contented to embark on the probable way which could be the true way." P. C. Landucci, Valore dell'argomento di convenienza dopo la proclamazione dei massimi dogmi mariani, in Vgl 17 (1957) 262-263; cf. Mahoney, art. cit. 454-455.

38 Cont. Gen., 1, 9.

39 Sum. Theol., 1, 1, 5 ad 1.
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

it thus far, deals only with what St. Thomas calls *disputatio quomodo sit*.\(^{40}\) In this way we have seen that the principle has a great value in giving us some understanding of the divine plan in regard to Mary as found in explicit revelation. Another question frequently being asked by Mariologists today is whether the principle of appropriateness does not also have a value in the *disputatio an sit*,\(^{41}\) that is, in establishing the very existence of Mariological truths.

The authors that treat this question touch on the thorny problem of distinguishing implicit formal revelation from virtual revelation or theological conclusions. The problem is not peculiar to Mariology, though the recent great development in this part of theology has forced the Mariologist to deal with this question that has not been finally settled in theology.\(^{42}\) Understandably, then, there is disagreement among Mariologists in regard to the use of the principle of appropriateness in this function of Mariology.\(^{43}\) The modest aims of this article preclude entrance into the arena of this dispute. It is important to note, however, the wholly different way in which the principle of appropriateness is being used in this establishing of Mariological truths.

If the term "principle of appropriateness" is used in referring to this function—it would seem much better not to do so at all—it must be made clear that we are not using this principle in the traditional way, that is, as a probable argument investigating the *quomodo sit* of a revealed truth.

In the *disputatio an sit* the principle of appropriateness

\(^{40}\) *Quodlib.*, 4, 18.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Manifestation of the great divergence among theologians was the controversy raised by the views of M. D. Chenu and the widespread disagreement on the legitimacy of the concept of a *fides ecclesiastica*.

\(^{43}\) Some Mariologists, e.g., Roschini, emphasize the probable character of the conclusions, whereas others, e.g., Philipon, stress the certainty resulting from the proper use of the principle.
must concern the properties of a supernatural reality known by revelation. In this way, as we saw previously, transcendence belongs to the very notion of divine maternity. It seems evident that other revealed truths concerning Mary express other supernatural realities, as does the revelation of the divine maternity itself. And just as a fuller understanding of the divine maternity enables the Mariologist to determine more precisely what all is contained therein, so a fuller understanding of these other supernatural Marian realities enables us to determine in greater detail what is contained in them. While this seems evident enough, there still remain the more perplexing questions concerning the degree and kind of certainty possible in regard to those things we deduce from revealed Mariological truths.

The degree of certainty in any reasoning process depends on the evidence we possess of the principles. But perfect evidence of our Mariological principles, essentially supernatural truths, is not possible so long as these are known in an obscure manner by the light of faith. At first one might be inclined to say that, though we can assent to these unevident Mariological truths by faith, it is not possible that they be principles from which certain conclusions can be drawn. The error, however, is failure to understand that the assent of faith is an act of the mind which begets true albeit imperfect knowledge in the believer. The formal ratio of Mariological truths held by faith is not understood, but a true and certain knowledge of this or that aspect of the essence of the supernatural reality expressed in revealed propositions is had. Nothing prevents the Mariologist, then, from deducing certain conclusions from the certain knowledge that he possesses. Thus, while we do not understand—in the sense that we do not have evidence of—the divine maternity, we do have through revelation a certain knowledge of this or that aspect of the essence of this supernatural reality. From this partial-though-certain knowl-
edge we can deduce conclusions. These latter, moreover, share in the certainty of the revealed truth itself, since to deny the conclusion implicitly denies the principle.

An all-important consequence follows from what has been said. The possibility and certainty of conclusions from truths of faith, while mediately founded in the assent of faith, are immediately founded in the understanding of the truth assented to by faith. The assent of faith concerns something unevident, \textit{de non visis}. In this way the truth of faith cannot be a principle. The certain knowledge content or understanding of the truth assented to is what enables that truth of faith to be a principle. Later we shall see the importance this understanding of the truths of faith has for doctrinal development.

Only with this distinction clearly in mind can we understand why it is that theological conclusions from truths of faith are not all of equal certainty. The truths of faith as such are all of the same certainty, founded as they are, immediately in the \textit{Veritas Prima}. The truths of faith as principles, that is, our understanding of these truths, are not all of equal certainty. Evidently, then, the conclusions are not all of the same degree of certainty. We have now no difficulty understanding the elastic character of the argument of appropriateness. Thus for us to know whether a certain prerogative, for example, Immaculate Conception, belongs to Mary or not, does not depend immediately on our assent to any truth of faith, but on our understanding of a truth of faith implicitly containing this prerogative. The truths of faith never increase, but our understanding of them may increase or decrease, and this gives rise to the two kinds of arguments of appropriateness: the argument of appropriateness generically understood or "simple appropriateness," and the argument of appropriate-
ness which gives positive certainty or "argument of necessitating appropriateness." 44

There is an essential difference between these two forms of argumentation which, if borne in mind, would, it seems, obviate much misunderstanding in regard to the principle of appropriateness. The difference does not lie in the understanding of the principle of appropriateness, as we saw previously, but in the understanding of the truth of faith to which the principle is applied.

In *simple appropriateness* our understanding of the truth of faith is such that while this prerogative or perfection seems to belong to the supernatural reality, yet the latter does not demand this prerogative in such a way that to be without it would imply a denial of the supernatural reality. 45 In this case the principle of appropriateness can only bring us to a probable conclusion. It makes no difference whether that conclusion is *de facto* already certain from faith or not, for the mere fact that God does something, as Thomas points out, does not exclude His not doing it as being absolutely inappropriate. 46 For something fitting and appropriate, even when realized by God, leaves room for other becoming dispositions that are possible to divine wisdom and power.

The situation is altogether different when there is question of *arguments of necessitating appropriateness*. In this case our understanding of the supernatural reality is such that we are able to affirm a necessary connection between the supernatural reality and a particular prerogative. The foundation of this affirmation is the unbecomingness of the contrary which

44 Cf. Landucci, *art. cit.* 262-263, to whom we are indebted for this distinction and for what follows on the next pages concerning it.

45 "That which is affirmed by simple becomingness is like a harmonious note which unites itself to the others and perfects the harmony of the one with the other in such a way that without it the harmony would still remain." *Ibid.* 263.

46 *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 25, 5 ad 2.
cannot be admitted in the works of God. As Saint Anselm notes: "In Deo ad quodlibet parvum inconveniens, sequitur impossibilitas." 47 This is not to say that the Mariologist may not err in thinging that a particular prerogative belongs to Mary by way of necessitating appropriateness whereas in reality there is only a simple appropriateness or none at all. There is no reason, however, for questioning on this account the validity of the distinction of simple and necessitating appropriateness. It merely indicates that there is room for improvement in his method. Even more, such an error serves to point out the kind of certainty that is had whenever the Mariologist uses the principle of appropriateness.

This last point raises the question of the kind of certainty that is had from the theological usage of the principle of appropriateness. We are here dealing with the distinction between the theological conclusion and implicit formal revelation. The question has been much discussed among theologians without general agreement resulting. Is it not possible that Mariology may indicate the way to a solution? The definitions of the Immaculate Conception and Assumption have clearly pointed out the inadequacy of the traditional, but always somewhat obscure, basis for the distinction between the theological conclusion and implicit formal revelation. The precise norms of the distinction varied in different authors, but the basis of the distinction was always sought in the manner in which the conclusion is contained in the premises. Perhaps we may now ask whether the distinction is to be sought here at all.

The theological conclusion is the result of theological activity. But it does not seem that theological activity employing such a principle as that of appropriateness, even the seemingly most necessary, can ever bring us to implicit formal revelation as such. The reason for this is twofold: (1) the nature of

47 Cur Deus Homo, in PL 158, 375.
theological certainty from intrinsic arguments, and (2) the proper function of theology.

Theological certainty based on intrinsic arguments does indeed share in the certainty of the revealed principle, but it does not have the infallible and irrevocable character that is proper to the certainty of the revealed principle. Implicit formal revelation is true revelation, so that its truth rests immediately on the infallible and irrevocable certainty of the *Veritas Prima*. This is not to cast doubt on theological certainty, but it does bring out that the human science and wisdom is still human and is not to claim the divine except for its principles, the truths of faith.

The second reason why theology can never arrive at implicit formal revelation as such is that such a task is not the function of theology. The foundation of implicit formal revelation as such can never be a theological argument. The theologian, therefore, never has the right to say that that which is the result of a theological argument is formal revelation, though he may very well consider it a certain theological conclusion. The only possible proximate basis for revelation, whether explicit or implicit, must be an infallible one, and this is the Magisterium of the Church. “God has given to His Church a living Teaching Authority to elucidate and explain what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and implicitly . . . not to each of the faithful, not even to the theologian.” 48

Just as the theologian has as one of his proper functions the deducing of theological conclusions, so he exercises his proper role in judging what is not in harmony with his theological principles. We see, therefore, nothing to censure in the Scholastics, as far as theological method goes, for their rejecting the Immaculate Conception which they were not able to harmonize with their theological principles. We may ask,

however, if even the Angelic Doctor did not trespass the bounds of theology in writing: "Augustinus de assumptione ipsius Virginis, rationabiliter argumentatur quod cum corpore sit assumpta in coelum, quod tamen Scriptura non tradit." 49 On the other hand, it is to the credit of Scotus that, while defending the Immaculate Conception by theological arguments, he did not maintain that it is a revealed doctrine. Such is not the function of the theologian.

This is not to say that the theologian, dependent on and subordinated to the Magisterium, does not have a role—and a very important one—in dogmatic development through the gradual unfolding of that which is implicit in revelation. However, this is by no means the exclusive right of the theologian. There are other equally important factors in doctrinal development, such as the Christian sense and the lex orandi, which have a perhaps even more direct role than the theologian in this matter. There can be no doubt that, if we can judge from the history of dogmatic development, the theologian is more often the learner than the teacher in the rolling back of the curtain covering implicit revelation. 50

As conclusion to this consideration of the principle of appropriateness, I should like to direct a question to Mariologists. We have seen that the principle of appropriateness is not an immediate subsidiary principle of Mariology. On the other hand, we noted the great importance the principle has in regard to the quomodo sit of Mariological revealed realities. And, finally, we have seen that the principle of appropriateness is not without significance in determining the an sit of Marian truths. The principle of appropriateness, however, fulfills these identical functions in all theology. We see nothing proper to Mariology in the use of the principle of appropriateness.

50 We shall have occasion later to investigate theology's role in doctrinal development from implicit to explicit faith.
ness. Why then do Mariologists continue to enumerate this as a distinct principle of Marian theology? What will be taken from this part of theology if, while continuing to use a common theological principle and method, we discontinue referring to this principle as though it had something proper to offer in Mariology? On the other hand, now that Marian theology has passed the days of its infancy and rightfully claims its place in theology along with the other special tracts, can we not also expect that it will no longer demand special treatment in the usage of theological principles? Finally, Mariology itself suffers in the estimation of the theologian in seeming to claim the principle of appropriateness in some special way its own. We have seen the very different meanings appropriateness has in theological method, and yet most frequently it refers to the probable argument of simple becomingness. Perhaps more than anything else the Mariological findings by contemporary scholars should convince the Mariologist that his is truly an integral part of theology in need of no special consideration. His principles as well as those of all theology are the truths of revelation. “In regard to the Holy Virgin, it is not at all that which in our viewpoint is the most appropriate, but that which has been willed by God in fact and in the concrete . . . for the data of revelation concerning the Mother of Jesus are of an extraordinary richness and there need be no fear of sounding their depths.”

PART TWO

COREDEMPTIVE AND PROTOTYPAL PRINCIPLES

The intimate connection between Christian piety and theology is unquestionably influencing Mariology during its present formative period. We have seen that the influence of

Christian piety can be a source of annoyance to scientific theology. Such involvement, however, promotes discussion, and Mariology will eventually be the beneficiary. One important advantage is already apparent. It is the general insistence that the Mariologist be in contact with his principles, which are the revealed data. The Christian is convinced that Mary and all that concerns her is a great manifestation of God's supreme and absolutely gratuitous benevolence. Consequently, there is a certain initial suspicion of anything that implies necessity. Not that no place is allowed for demonstrative reasoning with necessary conclusions (such a Barthian attitude would be fatal to all scientific consideration), but such reasoning will not be accepted unless it is firmly founded in revelation. This is certainly a healthy antidote in an age of rationalism. History may yet record that the Mariologist's major contribution to Catholic theology was the mending of the mutually detrimental divorce between positive and speculative theology.

The healthy state of contemporary Mariology is most in evidence in the very questions being raised. The Mariologist's primary concern is theology at its best: "to discover the order existing in God's freely designed plan." 52 Amid many divergent views, fundamentally there is only one question being asked: what is the role of Mary in the Christian mystery as a whole? 53 The response has been legion by Mariologists throughout the Catholic world. And there has resulted an avalanche of articles and books on the fundamental principle of Mariology. First-rate scholarship and intensive investigation of the sources are perhaps the most outstanding traits of this common response of Mariologists. But I wonder whether there is not in all this discussion some misunderstanding con-


53 R. Laurentin, Queen of Heaven (Dublin, 1956) 70.
cerning the notion of the fundamental principle of theology and of its integral parts.

The primary or fundamental principle of a science is "what a thing is" (quod quid est),\(^{54}\) that is, the definition of the object of a science. Now the definition of anything will include implicitly an ordination to a proportionate end. It will not include, however, an ordination to an end freely determined, since "the principle must always be necessary."\(^{55}\) Thus the principle of the science treating man implicitly includes an ordination to a proportionate end but does not include an ordination to the beatific vision. If, however, there be question of an end reasonably willed, there must be some foundation or reason in the thing for its free ordination to this end. Thus there must be some foundation or reason in man for his being ordained to the beatific vision.\(^{56}\) Since there is always wisdom even in the most free determination of God's will, there must always be this foundation or reason in the thing for whatever He wills for that thing.\(^{57}\) Now, the fundamental principle of a science expresses that which is necessary in regard to the object as well as the foundation or reason for anything freely willed in regard to that object. We can now determine the fundamental principle of theology and of one of its integral parts, Christology.

The object of theology is *Deus sub ratione deitatis*. Though it is impossible to define God as He is in Himself, revelation does give us what we can use as a definition: God is three

\(^{54}\) St. Thomas, *Cont. Gent.*, 3, 97.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) In man this is the *potentia obedientialis* which is not a positive demand but a capacity and certain becomingness for the beatific vision.

\(^{57}\) What the Angelic Doctor says of creation is universal in its application: "The fact that creatures are brought into existence, though it takes its origin from the rational character of divine goodness, nevertheless depends solely on God's will." *Ibid.*
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

...divine Persons subsisting in one divine nature. This, then, is theology's fundamental principle. This is the eternally necessary truth around which the theologian must centralize all his efforts. This principle likewise implicitly contains the ordination of God to His proportionate end, Himself alone. But another end, freely willed by God, cannot be known from this principle alone. Such an end is the external manifestation of His excellence by rewarding intellectual creatures with a vision of Himself. This free determination of God is, then, the first subsidiary principle of theology: God provides for the salvation of man. This truth has indeed its foundation and reason in the Trinity, the becomingness of divine goodness to be participated, but it is still an ordination freely willed by God.

In Christology the situation is perfectly analogous. The object is Christ. The fundamental principle is: The Person of the Word subsists in a divine and human nature. This principle is not an antecedently necessary truth, as is the Trinity, but it is hypothetically necessary if God wills Christ. Redemption cannot be included in this fundamental principle

58 Paul Mahoney maintains that the first proper principle of theology is that God is Pure Act. Cf. The Unitive Principle of Marian Theology, in Thom 18 (1955) 452. We cannot agree with this view, and believe it to be not in accord with Thomas's doctrine on the object of sacred theology in contradistinction to the object of natural theology; cf. Sum. Theol., 1, 1, 1 ad 2m and 1, 32, 1.

59 "Is it possible for us to know God as He is in Himself? Revelation alone can and did answer this question. God is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence the theologian must centralize all his efforts to explain all things in the light of the Trinitarian life. Only when he will have studied a given truth and established its link with the mystery of the Trinity may he boast of having given this truth a theological approach." R. Chabot, M.S., Mary, Mother and Bride, in Mm 18 (1956), 342.

60 Cf. Sum. Theol., 2-2, 1, 7. This subsidiary principle of theology is founded in the Trinity, the revelation of which is ordained to this end: "The knowledge of the Trinity was necessary for us . . . principally that we might rightly judge concerning the salvation of the human race." Sum. Theol., 1, 32, 1 ad 3m.
since it is not necessarily contained in the notion of Christ. As all agree, God could will Christ without the ordination to the redemption.\(^{61}\) It seems to me that all efforts to include the notion of redemption in the fundamental principle of Christology fail to distinguish between that which belongs to a fundamental principle and that which belongs to a subsidiary principle.\(^{62}\) St. Thomas' notion of a fundamental principle, as we have seen it, clearly influences his division of Christology: "prima (consideratio) est de ipso incarnationis mysterio . . .; secunda de his quae . . . per Deum incarnatum sunt acta et passa."\(^{63}\) The following analogy is inescapable: the Trinity is to theology as the Incarnation is to Christology, that is, fundamental principles of the respective sciences; and Providence is to theology as the redemption is to Christology, that is, first subsidiary principles of the respective sciences.

The determination of the notion and relation of fundamental and subsidiary principles of theology and Christology has an important bearing on contemporary Mariology. If the


\(^{62}\) St. Thomas' words on creation are applicable: "If it be granted that God wills to communicate, in so far as possible, His goodness to creatures by way of likeness, then one finds in this the reason why there are different creatures, but it does not necessarily follow that they are differentiated on the basis of this measure of perfection or according to this or that number of things." *Cont. Gent.*, 3, 97. If God wills Christ, then we have here the reason for that which pertains necessarily to the God-Man, but redemption is not such. The *de facto* incarnation as realized in the concrete, changes nothing of that which belongs necessarily to the incarnation as such. Therefore, also in the actually realized incarnation-ordained-to-redemption there is not a necessary connection (except consequently) between incarnation and redemption.

\(^{63}\) Prologue to *Pars Tertia*. The introduction to q. 27 which divides Thomas' Christology is no less clear: "Post praedicta, in quibus de unione Dei et hominis, et de his quae unionem consequuntur, tractatum est, restat considerandum de his quae Filius Dei incarnatus in natura humana sibi unita gessit vel passus est." Cf. J. Bittremieux, *De principio supremo mariologiae*, in *ETL* 8 (1931) 249-251.
previous considerations are correct, then the real question of Mariologists in attempting to locate Mary in the divine plan is not what is the fundamental but what are the subsidiary principles of Mariology. These will reveal to us the divine plan in regard to Mary just as Providence reveals the divine plan in the revelation of the Trinity and just as redemption reveals the divine plan of the Incarnation.

It is abundantly clear that if we desire to know the divine plan for Mary, we have to go where God makes known His absolutely free designs. Speculations on possible designs that God could have had for the Mother of God must ever remain fruitless. What, for instance, might have been the role of the Mother of God in a possible order in which God willed above all to manifest His supreme justice? A more futile speculation than this can hardly be imagined! *Quidquid a sola Dei voluntate dependet non cognitum nisi a Deo revelatum.* Only divine revelation can offer us an answer to our question: What is the role of Mary the Mother of God in the actual divine plan?

The revelation of God's divine plan is proposed by the Church and contained in the sources of revelation. It is not my purpose here to repeat the thorough investigation of these sources that has been done by outstanding scholars in recent years. I shall rather examine the essential results of these magisterial, scriptural, and patristic studies to see how they set forth Mary's role in the divine plan.

The central place in the Church's teaching in regard to Mary is unquestionably the divine maternity. Scripture and Tra-

---

64 In this most important question for his whole science, the Catholic Mariologist can ill afford not to heed the directive of Pius XII: "The work of research even in matters of Mariology is safer and more rewarding to the extent that everyone adverts to the truth that in matters of faith and morals the immediate standard of truth for every theologian is ... the Church's sacred teaching authority." *Address to Marian Congress in Rome*, Oct. 24, 1954, in *The Pope Speaks* 1 (1954) 344.
dition also have this as the focal point from which everything said of Mary emanates and in which everything said of Mary terminates. If we wish to discover the divine plan for Mary beyond her divine maternity, it is to the other truths about Mary that we must direct our attention in order to discover the order and relationship that exist among them.

The first Marian truth after the divine maternity that stands out in the teaching of the Church, Scripture, and Tradition is precisely that the divine plan in regard to Mary is not wholly revealed at Bethlehem but on Calvary. Mary's complete role in the divine designs is not fully revealed in the divine maternity, for she "has been chosen to be the Mother of Christ in order to become the associate in redeeming the human race." 65 The uncovering of the truth of Mary's association in the redemptive work is one of the most fruitful contributions of contemporary scriptural and patristic studies to Mariology.

As a result of these studies a more perfect knowledge of Mary's coredemptive role as presented in Scripture and Tradition is possible. The Protoevangelium, especially in the light of New Testament revelation, teaches that the "Woman," who in some sense is Mary, is closely associated with her "Seed" in the destruction of the kingdom of the devil. Mary's active co-operation in the redemption is likewise seen in her consent to the redemptive incarnation at the Annunciation. At Cana, although Mary was permitted to anticipate her active role in obtaining for mankind the blessings of heaven, she was given to understand that her part in redemption was to begin with Christ's hour, that is, the hour of His passion and glorification. On Calvary the full role which Mary has in the

65 Pius XI, Letter to Cardinal Binet, in AAS 25 (1933) 80: "Siquidem augusta Virgo, sine primaeva labe concepta, ideo Christi Mater delecta est, ut redimendi generis humani consors efficeretur; ex quo sane tantum apud Filium gratiam potentiamque adepta est, ut maiorem nec humana nec angelica natura assequi unquam possit."
eternal plan of God is revealed. "It is by divine design that [Mary] is at the side of [Christ], suffering and dying on the Cross. For... it can correctly be said that she with her Son redeemed the human race." 66

No one can fail to see the significance of Mary's coredemption for Mariology when it is viewed in relation to what we have seen concerning the incarnation and the redemption. The hypostatic union, which is the fundamental principle of Christology, does not of itself include the redemption. So also the divine maternity, which is the fundamental principle of Mariology, does not of itself include the coredemption. Even the divine maternity of Christ-the-Redeemer cannot be said to include necessarily the coredemption. 67 But just as Christ's incarnation is by the free design of God ordained to the redemption, so Mary's divine maternity is ordained to the coredemption by the most free purpose of God. This, then, I believe to be the first subsidiary principle of Mariology: Mary is the Coredempress. 68

A second truth about Mary, Mother of God and Core-

66Benedict XV, Inter sodalicia, in AAS, 10 (1918) 182.
67Cf. Bittremieux, art. cit., 249-251. In this connection, Gagnon makes a very penetrating observation. To insist on viewing the exigencies of the divine maternity in the concrete often has as its effect that we detract from the excellence of the divine maternity such as Tradition presents it and the Church defines it. Even if Mary had had no knowledge of the redemptive mission of her Son and even if she had known nothing of that which the Holy Spirit effected in her, she would still be the Mother of God, elevated to the hypostatic order and worthy of our highest veneration. Maternité et coredemption, in ASC 2 (1952) 53.
68It is evident from what follows that by coredemption is to be understood Mary's role in the objective redemption, that is, the redemption of mankind apart from any consideration of the application of the merits of this redemption to individuals. It is not necessary for our purpose to enter into the discussion of the precise nature of Mary's coredemption. Of the different explanations offered, the universal-coredemptive view of Journet seems most consonant with established theological principles; cf. L'Eglise du Verbe Incarné, 2 (Bruges, 1951) 409-418.
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

dempstress, is no less clearly taught by the Church. Here also recent scriptural and patristic investigations serve the Mariologist well in seeking to discover Mary’s place in the divine plan. If subsequent revelation has enabled us to understand Mary’s association with Christ in the Protoevangelium, it has also permitted us to see in this same passage that the “Woman” is never to be subject to the servitude of the devil through sin. Freedom from sin in the present economy implies grace in the soul. The extent of this sanctification of Mary by grace is testified to by the angel: “Hail, full of grace.” Moreover, these words are said “to a virgin.” Many of the Fathers have seen in Mary’s virginity not simply bodily integrity but a sign of absolute sinlessness and most perfect union with God through grace and charity. To the “woman clothed with the sun . . . was finally granted, as the supreme culmination of her privileges, that she should be preserved free from the corruption of the tomb.” 69 Finally, the woman who gave birth to Jesus is also to be “the mother of all those who live the life of Christ.” 70

What secret of the divine plan is revealed to us in this absolute sinlessness, fullness of grace, and spiritual maternity of Mary? In order to answer this question we must recall two other truths of revelation. The first is that all of Mary’s graces and prerogatives are an effect of Christ’s redemption. The second is that the effect of Christ’s redemption is the Church which “was born from the side of our Savior on the cross.” 71 Mary, therefore, is seen to contain in herself the most perfect realization of the Church. Indeed, her grace is such and her applying of the merits of the redemption is so

69 Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deus, trans., Doheny-Kelly, Papal Documents on Mary (Milwaukee, 1954) 237.
70 B. J. Le Frois, S.V.D., The Mary-Church Relationship in the Apocalypse, in MS 9 (1958) 105.
71 Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, NCWC trans., No. 28.
universal that there is no grace in the Church and there is no application of the merits of the Cross to souls in the Church that are not first of all realized in Mary in an eminent manner. "As such, Mary embodies in her person the mystery of the Church whose role is identical with that of the Virgin Mother in bringing forth the life divine in the hearts of regenerated mankind." 72 Is not, then, the secret of the divine plan manifest in all this? Mary is the Prototype of the Church. 73 This I believe to be the second subsidiary principle of Mariology.

In Sacred Scripture type frequently signifies a person, whose mission it is to manifest in himself the salvific will of God in regard to His people. Such is Mary's role in relation to the Church. When St. John in Apocalypse 12 describes Mary and the Church by the same traits, the reference passing imperceptibly from one to the other, he presents the collective society as personified in Mary. 74 The two terms of the comparison are not adequately distinct, for Mary is a member of the society. 75 As a personification of the society, she is

72 Le Frois, art. cit., 105.
73 The verbatim statement of this principle is found in St. Ambrose, Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam, 2, 7 (CSEL 32/4, 45). Recent extensive studies of the Mary-Church relationship in the Fathers concur in the conclusion of W. J. Burghardt, S.J.: "The fact, therefore, seems beyond dispute. In Christian tradition Mary is type of the Church. So she was destined by God; so was she in actuality." Theotokos: The Mother of God, in The Mystery of the Woman, ed. E. D. O'Connor (Notre Dame, 1956) 19.
74 G. Philips, La Mariologie de l'année jubilaire, in Mm 18 (1956) 41. Note: the author, as well as others, uses the terms type and prototype as synonymous. Though such usage is permitted, care must be taken that type is not understood in the sense of figure. The term figure implies an inferiority, something less perfect than the thing prefigured. To say Mary is the figure of the Church, would imply that she is less perfect than the Church. This cannot be said; cf. F. M. Braun, O.P., Marie et l'Eglise d'après l'Ecriture, in BSFEM 10 (1952) 13.
75 "Like ourselves, the Blessed Virgin is a member of the Church, still it
depicted as the most excellent member of the Church and one who has a beneficial role for the whole Church. The Mary-prototype-of-the-Church principle, therefore, means "that Mary is in the Church more mother than the Church, more spouse than the Church . . . more virgin than the Church. Mary is mother, spouse and virgin before the Church and for the Church; that it is especially in her and by her that the Church is mother, is spouse, is virgin."

If we admit that the coredemptive principle is formally distinct from the divine maternity, then a fortiori the prototypal principle, which is subsequent to the coredemptive principle, is formally distinct from the divine maternity. Pius XII indicates this order when he writes: "She who, according to the flesh, was mother of our Head, through the added title of pain and glory became, according to the Spirit, the mother of all His members." The controversy concerning the fundamental principle has brought forth a view which maintains a necessary connection between the divine maternity and the "spiritual motherhood." This position, however, is founded in the view which maintains the fundamental principle of Mariology to be the spiritual motherhood. Hence, this position stands on the validity of this notion of the fundamental principle of Mariology.

A separate, though related, question is whether the divine maternity as such demands grace in the soul of Mary. Mariologists are not in agreement on this point. Laurentin maintains that "the divine motherhood draws favors from God in

is no less true that she is an entirely unique member of Christ's Mystical Body." Pius XII, Address to Mariological Congress, in The Pope Speaks, 1 (1954) 346.

76 Journet, op. cit., 427.

77 Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, NCWC trans., No. 110; cf. Crisóstomo de Pamplona, O.F.M.Cap., De divina maternitate ad coredemptionem et maternitatem spiritualem relata, in ASC 2 (1952) 128-130.

78 Cf. EM 7 (1948) 145-196.
a measure beyond all comparison: it draws a fullness of grace by anticipation, and in a manner that is morally incapable of failing.78 His subsequent argumentation would seem to indicate that the divine motherhood as such demands a plen­titude of grace in Mary. There are good reasons for this position, though the matter demands further investigation before it can be adjudged theologically certain. However, the question is not entirely to the point here, for, though Mary’s plentitude of grace belongs to her as the prototype of the Church, it does not constitute that truth in its entirety. Moreover, those Mariologists who maintain that plentitude of grace necessarily belongs to the divine maternity do not on that account say that Mary’s being the prototype of the Church necessarily belongs to the divine maternity.

The coredemptive and prototypical principles, while formally distinct from the divine maternity, are intimately connected to this fundamental principle of Mariology. These three truths compenetrate and complement each other. First, the divine maternity intrinsically qualifies Mary’s role as Coredemptress and Prototype of the Church. Second, the coredemptive and prototypical roles intrinsically, though accidentally, qualify the divine maternity. Third, the coredemptive and prototypical roles are mutually interdependent.

In stating that the divine maternity intrinsically qualifies the coredemption, we mean that Mary’s is a maternal coredemption. In stating that the divine maternity intrinsically qualifies her as the Prototype of the Church, we say that Mary is a maternal Prototype of the Church. It is as the foundation of and the reason for her coredemptive and prototypical roles that Mary’s divine maternity intrinsically qualifies these offices. This statement does not mean that the divine maternity is the immediate principle of the coredemption. This is rather the plenitude of grace and charity by which she was

78 Laurentin, op. cit. 98.
able to co-offer with Christ an offering acceptable to God. However, if with Laurentin we see the divine maternity as analogous to the baptismal character, then the divine maternity truly specifies her grace and vocation.\(^{80}\)

That the coredemptive and prototypal offices of Mary qualify her divine maternity has been forcefully set forth by those Mariologists who maintain that the former in some way pertain to the fundamental principle of Marian theology. In the same act of the will by which God decrees the divine maternity, He ordains it to Mary’s being Coredempress and Prototype of the Church. It follows, therefore, that the divine maternity is in reality a coredemptive and prototypal divine maternity. It may be surmised that further investigations of the divine maternity in this perspective will enable Mariologists to determine more precisely in what manner the divine maternity is qualified by this ordination \textit{ab initio}.

The intimate relation that the offices of Coredempress and Prototype of the Church have with the divine maternity is not greater than the manner in which these two are related to each other. For there is a true interdependent causality between the coredemptive and prototypal roles. From one aspect the prototypal principle has its foundation in and flows from the coredemption. This is seen from the nature of redemption and Mary’s association with it. It is a central teaching of St. Paul that Christ’s redemption is a restoration of that which Adam has destroyed. However, by his sin Adam not only lost grace for human nature (“objective sin”), but also by generation actually transmits sin to his posterity (“subjective sin”). Therefore by His passion and death Christ not only redeems human nature (objective redemption), but also by the grace of faith and the sacraments actually redeems individuals (subjective redemption). Since revelation assures us that Mary is intimately associated with her Son in this

\(^{80}\textit{Ibid. 97, 103.}\)
Subsidiary Principles of Mariology

restoration, we must conclude that she also in some way has a role in objective and subjective redemption.

Inasmuch as Christ redeems mankind on the Cross, He is the Redeemer. Inasmuch as Christ transmits the grace of the Cross to individuals, He is the Head of the Mystical Body incorporating members to Himself.\(^{81}\) So Mary also in her role of coredeeming the human race is the Coredemptress. In her role of transmitting grace to individuals she is the Mother of the Mystical Body or the Dispensatrix of graces.\(^{82}\) In this latter role, however, Mary is the prototype of the Church. For the Church is also a mother and dispenser of graces.\(^{83}\) It is seen, therefore, that from this aspect Mary’s prototypal office flows from her coredemption.

From another aspect Mary’s coredemptive role supposes and is founded in her being Prototype of the Church. This is seen from the nature of the coredemption. “Every co-redeemer must be first of all a redeemed, and the greater the grace of his redemption the more does he become a co-redeemer.”\(^{84}\) Thus Mary’s coredemption supposes her own

\(^{81}\) Joumet \((op. cit. 398)\) points out the difference between these two kinds of mediation. The first is “ascendant or moral mediation” which is after the manner of satisfaction or redemption. The second is “descendent or physical mediation” in which Christ as Man is an \textit{instrument} or \textit{organ} of divinity.

\(^{82}\) Mariologists ask whether Mary with Christ (cf. prev. footnote) in descendent mediation is a physical instrumental cause. Most Mariologists lean toward a negative reply. They explain Mary’s spiritual maternity by her singular power of intercession. This much certainly must be admitted. But does this sufficiently explain \textit{Jn} 19, 27 and \textit{Ap} 12, 17 in the light of the teaching of the Church and of the conviction of Christian piety? Can Mary truly be called our mother if she in no wise causes the supernatural life in us, but only obtains it from Another by her intercession? In agreement with Braun, I believe Mary’s spiritual maternity demands more than that; cf. \textit{art. cit.}, 12.

\(^{83}\) Mary is indeed more mother and more dispensatrix for she dispenses graces that she in union with and in dependence on Christ merited in the objective redemption. The Church is mother and dispenser of graces that she (viewed apart from Mary) in no way merited in the objective redemption.

\(^{84}\) Joumet, \textit{op. cit.} 410.
redemption and plenitude of grace. Mary's coredemptive consent at the Annunciation "stems from her faith for which she is declared blessed: 'Blessed art thou that hast believed,' and is the effect of grace." 85 Mary's co-offering on Calvary has salutary value because it proceeds from a soul filled with charity. "It is charity," as Father Gagnon succinctly puts it, "which makes Mary a Coredemptress." 86 Since, however, by her preventive redemption and fullness of grace Mary is the prototype of the Church, from this aspect Mary's coredemption supposes that plenitude of grace which constitutes her the Prototype of the Church.

This order existing between Mary's grace and her association in the objective redemption has a parallel within her role of Prototype. We have seen that Mary is the Prototype of the Church in two ways: as most perfectly redeemed and as spiritual mother or Dispensatrix of graces. There exists, moreover, an order between these two aspects of Mary's prototypical office. Mary's plenitude of grace which constitutes her the one most perfectly redeemed is the foundation of her spiritual maternity. For, as St. Thomas already taught, Mary received such a plentitude of grace that she was able to diffuse grace to all men. 87 In this way Mary's plentitude of grace, by which her soul was sanctified becomes what we might call "maternal" grace.

The inter-relation of Mary's being the Mother of God,

85 Vollert, op. cit. 83.
87 A. Ciappi, O.P., De cooperatione B. V. Mariae in mysterio humanae salutis iuxta doctrinam S. Thomae et commentatorum ex Ordine Praedicatorum, in ASC 2 (1952) 65-70, 132. According in this author, it is significant that St. Thomas, while not coming to the Immaculate Conception, explicitly defends the truths contained in our subsidiary principles of coredemption and prototype of the Church.
Coredemptress and Prototype of the Church has an analogous inter-relation in Christology and ecclesiology. This can be brought out by the following diagram.

On coming to the conclusion of this second part in which we have attempted to establish Mary's coredemptive and prototypical offices as the two immediate subsidiary principles of Mariology, several corollaries seem called for. First, these two truths, while truly subsidiary principles in that they are founded in the divine maternity, may be spoken of as "first principles" of Mariology. We have a somewhat analogous situation in the first principles of reason. From our philosophy we know that there are certain principles, e.g., causality, and
finality, that are immediately founded in the absolutely first principle of non-contradiction. Yet they cannot be demonstrated by way of strict deduction from this absolutely first principle, there being no middle term. Hence these truths, immediately related to non-contradiction, are likewise immediately known by the light of reason and are consequently also called "first principles." So in a similar way the truths of Mary's being Coredempress and Prototype of the Church are immediately founded in the divine maternity. Still, it is not possible to deduce these truths from the divine maternity since they are dependent on the free will of God. They can be known only immediately by revelation and faith.

Second, the other subsidiary principles of Mariology traditionally mentioned (analogy, eminence, antinomy, solidarity) are properly secondary principles. They depend on and have validity only to the extent that they are implicitly contained in the fundamental principle of divine maternity and the subsidiary principles of coredemption and Mary as Prototype of the Church. From what has preceded, the principle of eminence is an evident particular application of the prototypal principle. The principles of analogy, antinomy, and solidarity are not strictly principles, but general a posteriori

89 The analogy is restricted to the particular points of comparison indicated. In many other ways there is no valid comparison.
90 "All privileges possessed by any of the saints are possessed by Mary either formally or eminently." Cf. Roschini, op. cit. 358-363.
91 "The privileges of the humanity of Christ have corresponding analogous privileges in Mary according to the measure and mode of each." Cf. ibid. 363-369.
92 "In the divine plan the redemption of mankind takes place by antithetic parallelism with the fall of mankind." Cf. ibid. 370-375.
93 "In virtue of her solidarity with Adam and mankind which she communicated to Christ, Mary made it possible for there to be a redemption in strict justice." Cf. ibid. 375-379.
conclusions, arrived at by repeated applications of the core-
demptive and prototypal principles. These four secondary
principles indeed serve a purpose in Mariology, apparently, however, more as directive norms than as strict principles.94

Third, in setting forth Mary's coredemptive and prototy-
pal offices as the subsidiary principles of Mariology, it
seems a way is found to harmonize the Christological and
ecclesiological viewpoints so prominent in contemporary Mari-
ology.95 There is likewise here a basis for a more essential
division of Marian theology than was had heretofore. Not
the least of all, by the coredemptive and prototypal principles, Mariology finds its proper relationship to Christology and
ecclesiology.

Finally, the coredemptive and prototypal principles together
with their foundation in the divine maternity do in a most
wonderful, albeit obscure and imperfect way give us a glimpse
of the divine plan for Mary. The Mother of God, indeed, has
a role in the manifestation of divine goodness, as do the ex-
alted cherubim and seraphim, as do Adam and Eve in their
primordial innocence. She, however, with her Son by the
eternal selection of God manifests divine goodness in the
most excellent way conceivable, in the form of mercy. For
she, coredeeming in dependence on her Son, merits the name
Mater Misericordiae.

94 J. M. Bover, S.J., has already pointed out the directive character of
certain of these principles. Cf. Los principios mariológicos, in EM 3 (1944)
11-33.

95 The fundamental-principle controversy, which divides the participants
according to the Christological and ecclesiological viewpoints, has served to
bring the three truths of the divine maternity, coredemption and prototype
of the Church very much to the fore in Mariology. There can no longer be
any doubt: these are truly central truths in Marian theology. We believe
there is a certain external confirmation in this that the coredemption and
prototype of the Church are truly the subsidiary principles of Mariology.
The discussion of the secondary principles of Mariology has an important bearing on the theological explanation of doctrinal development, one of the most difficult and pressing tasks confronting the theologian today. There is no denying that theology found itself not a little embarrassed by the dogmatic definitions of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption. Theology did not have the principles by which it could explain and justify this development. Yet the Church did not on that account hesitate to define these truths as divinely revealed. As a consequence, the theologian was unable to fulfill adequately his proper role of explaining and defending the divine revelation as authoritatively and infallibly proposed by the Church.

The Catholic theologian became acutely aware of the inadequacy of his admittedly most excellent science to explain that which had taken place in the faith of the Church. It became very evident that the vital lifeline of theology to its life-bearing source, the faith of the Church, was not functioning properly. One of the reasons for this was clearly set forth by Pius XII, namely “the neglect of and even contempt for the Teaching Authority of the Church” among some theologians. A second reason for theology’s imperfect contact with its source is coming to the fore in recent years. It is the separation of theology from the Christian life.

Mariological studies have been the occasion for this discovery. The discussions on the prerogatives of Mary have become more and more scientific, more and more theological.

And yet this development has not meant that these theological discussions are losing contact with Christian piety. The very contrary is true. The theologian is beginning to realize that the separation of theology and Christian piety, beginning during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with its acknowledged detrimental effects on the Christian life in the forms of quietism and even Protestantism, also had very harmful effects on theology as well.

It is not my purpose to discuss here the important role the Christian sense, the sensus fidei, has in doctrinal development. 97 I wish rather to investigate the significance of the coredemptive and prototypal principles for a theological explanation of Marian doctrinal development. In order that our theological investigation maintain contact with its source, it will consist primarily in relating these Mariological principles to the Magisterium and the Christian sense: (1) by defending and explaining this doctrinal development through these principles; and (2) by examining the role of these two principles in this doctrinal development.

A. Theological Explanation of Doctrinal Development by the Coredemptive and Prototypal Principles

A cursory study of the gradual evolution of the doctrines of the Immaculate Conception and Assumption indicates the major influence the coredemptive and prototypal principles exerted in this doctrinal development. Though a first-hand study of the sources is not possible here, still our purpose, it

97 Cf. C. Dillenschneider, Le sens de la foi et le progrès dogmatique du mystère marial (Rome, 1954). I am in full agreement with Msgr. Charles Davis' estimation of this book: "It can be acclaimed without fear of contradiction one of the most significant books on Mariology that recent years have given us." Cf. also C. Journet, Esquisse du développement du dogme marial (Paris, 1954); C. Vollert, Doctrinal Development: A Basic Theory, in PCTSA 9 (1958) 45-74.
would seem, can safely be attained by relying on the summarized results of the thorough investigations done prior to the solemn definitions as contained in *Ineffabilis Deus* and *Munificentissimus Deus*.

Genesis 3, 15 is the principal scriptural foundation according to Pius IX for the Immaculate Conception. His interpretation of this text is perfectly in accord with the coredemptive and prototypal principles.

The most holy virgin united with Him by a most intimate and indissoluble bond [divine maternity] was with Him and through Him, eternally at enmity with the evil Serpent [Prototype], and most completely triumphed over him, and thus crushed his head with her immaculate foot [Coredemptress].

The Fathers' interpretation of the angelic salutation is approvingly cited by the Holy Father. According to this interpretation, the revelation of the Immaculate Conception is implicitly contained in the words "full of grace" (by which Mary is Prototype of the Church). The Pope's additional explanation contains expressions referring to Mary such as "seat of divine graces," "adorned with all the gifts of the Holy Spirit," "an almost infinite treasury," "an inexhaustible abyss of these gifts," which we most frequently associate with the Church. In Mary they have the effect of being "never subject to the curse." Throughout we can see Mary as Prototype of the Church as the supposed principle. Mary possesses the sinlessness and plenitude of graces found in the Church but in an eminent manner so that she was from conception free of any taint of sin.

The testimony of the Fathers that Pius IX refers to like-

---

98 Throughout this section I shall put in brackets the particular Mariological principle that seems to be supposed as the foundation for what is said.

99 All citations from *Ineffabilis Deus* are taken from Doheny-Kelly, *Papal Documents on Mary* (Milwaukee, 1954) 9-27.
wise supposes our two subsidiary principles. Thus the Fathers and writers of the Church wonderfully attest to "the Virgin’s supreme sanctity, dignity, and immunity from all stain of sin [divine maternity and prototype of the Church], and her renowned victory over the foulest enemy of the human race [Coredempress]." The Fathers compared Mary to Eve in innocence "to demonstrate [her] original innocence and sanctity . . . but they also exalted her above Eve." The comparison of the Church to both Eve and Mary is frequently met in the writings of the Fathers. Since Mary is, moreover, exalted above Eve, we must suppose the principle of Mary as Prototype of the Church as the foundation of these comparisons. The principle of Coredempress is also implicit in the Fathers when they single out the great antinomy: whereas Eve "fell from original innocence . . . , by divinely given power [Mary] utterly destroyed the force and dominion of the Evil One."

The indications of the coreemptive and prototypal principles in Munificentissimus Deus are so frequent that we shall have to select a few that are representative of the underlying thought which pervades the entire document. It is of singular importance to note that the principal reason given for the Assumption is not directly the divine maternity but the Immaculate Conception.100 "She, by an entirely unique privilege, completely overcame sin by her Immaculate Conception and as a result she was not subject to the law of remaining in the corruption of the grave."101 The significance of the

100 This relationship between the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption is likewise seen in the position of these invocations in the Litany of Loretto, cf. AAS 42 (1950) 795; and in the Divine Praises after Benediction, cf. AAS 45 (1953) 194, 251.

The same intimate relationship is found in the addition of a reference to Mary’s Immaculate Conception in the oration of the new Mass of the Assumption. Cf. T. Mullaney, The Nexus between the Immaculate Conception and Mary’s other Prerogatives, in MS 5 (1954) 203-205.

101 All citations from Munificentissimus Deus are taken from Doheny-Kelly, op. cit. 220-239.
Immaculate Conception-Assumption relationship is twofold. First, we have seen that Mary's Immaculate Conception flows from both the coredemptive and prototypal principles, and hence the Assumption also mediately flows from these principles. Second, since the Immaculate Conception refers to Mary's absolute sinlessness and plenitude of grace, in virtue of which she is Prototype of the Church, it follows that her Assumption flows likewise directly from this principle.

The Holy Father assures us, moreover, that the faithful saw the Assumption as a consequence also of the coredemption. The Virgin Mary throughout the course of her earthly pilgrimage led a life troubled by cares, hardships and sorrows and ... that a terribly sharp sword pierced her heart as she stood under the cross of her divine Son.

The Fathers also in their comparison of Mary to Eve arrived at Mary's Assumption from her coredemption.

The Virgin Mary has been designated by the holy Fathers as the new Eve, who, although always subject to the new Adam, is most intimately associated with Him in that struggle against the infernal foe which ... finally resulted in that most complete victory over sin and death ... by the glorification of her virginal body.

Several times Pius XII presents the Assumption as flowing from the divine maternity, but not as such. It is the divine maternity "with the other privileges" in general or more frequently "with her virginity." Here also the importance of the subsidiary principles is apparent. The virginity of Mary in all Catholic tradition is not only bodily integrity but also a sign of absolute sinlessness and plenitude of grace. There is, therefore, an implicit reference to the prototypal principle.

A few times the argumentation for the Assumption is founded directly on the principle of analogy.
[Saint Anthony of Padua] declares that, just as Jesus Christ has risen from death over which He triumphed and has ascended to the right hand of the Father, so likewise the ark of His sanctification [Prototype] has risen up, since on this day the Virgin Mother has been taken up to her heavenly dwelling.

Though there is reference here to the prototypal principle as indicated, still the main argument is founded in the principle of analogy. This principle, however, as we have seen, is implicit in and derived from the coredemptive and prototypal principles. Hence the main argument of St. Anthony is likewise indirectly founded in these immediate subsidiary principles.

One of the most forceful proofs that the Assumption flows from the coredemptive and prototypal principles is "the harmony that exists between what is termed theological demonstration and the Catholic faith." The scholastic theologians did not fail to point out that the Assumption, which they derived from these principles, is in wonderful accord with those divine truths given us in Holy Scripture.

[The scholastic theologians] insist upon the fact that out of filial love for His mother, Jesus Christ has willed that she be assumed into heaven. They base the strength of their proofs on the incomparable dignity of her divine motherhood [divine maternity] and all those prerogatives which follow from it. These include her exalted holiness, entirely surpassing the sanctity of all men and the angels [Prototype], the intimate union of Mary with her Son [Coredemptress] and the affection of pre-eminent love which the Son has for His most worthy mother.

We have cited this passage in full because it contains the three "first" principles of Mariology: the divine maternity as the absolutely first and fundamental principle, the coredemption
and Mary as Prototype of the Church as the immediate subsidiary principles.

It might be objected that the coredemption is not referred to in the quite general phrase of the previous citation. However, another passage in *Munificentissimus Deus*, with which we shall end our consideration of this important document, leaves no room for doubt on this matter.

Hence, the revered Mother of God, from all eternity joined in a hidden way with Jesus Christ in one and the same decree of predestination, immaculate in her conception, a most perfect virgin in her divine motherhood [Prototype], the noble associate of the divine Redeemer who has won a complete triumph over sin and its consequences [Coredemptress] was finally granted, as the supreme culmination of her privileges, that she should be preserved free from the corruption of the tomb.

In these words, near the end of the Apostolic Constitution, the Holy Father gives the conclusion and summation of all the theological arguments for the Assumption. With reason, then, do we attach special importance to this passage as evidence of the role which the coredemptive and prototypal principles have in the doctrinal development of the dogma of the Assumption.

In terminating the investigation of the doctrinal development as indicated in *Ineffabilis Deus* and *Munificentissimus Deus*, I state the following. I have not discovered in either of these two documents a single theological reason for the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption that is not based in the coredemptive and prototypal principles. By these two principles, therefore, the theologian can explain and defend this development in Marian doctrine, by showing that the singular privileges of Mary's Immaculate Conception and Assumption are in perfect accord with Sacred Scripture.

A further question arises from the foregoing: What force
have these arguments, founded in the coredemptive and prototypical principles, for the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption? In the first place, it must be noted that the mere fact that these arguments are included in *Ineffabilis Deus* and *Munificentissimus Deus* does not bestow on them a new formal demonstrative value that they do not have in themselves. Their inclusion in these documents does, indeed, assure us that these reasonings are in perfect accord with the living faith of the Church.¹⁰² Still, this leaves their intrinsic validity and force an entirely theological question.

Before answering this question, however, I should like to recall two points which have been central in this entire study. The first is the proper place of this question. It is in theology. We are not here dealing with a question pertaining to the infallible and irrevocable order of divine faith. We are not, therefore, to look for infallible demonstration and certainty from these arguments. The second equally important point is the foundation of these arguments. It is not the divine maternity as such. It is the divine maternity as it fits into the divine plan made known to us in the revelation of Mary's being Co-redemptress and Prototype of the Church.¹⁰³ Having determined the question in this manner, I firmly believe that the coredemptive and prototypical principles are capable of furnish-

¹⁰² “La Bulle *Ineffabilis* n'a pas conféré à ces arguments une rigueur formelle qu'ils ne pouvaient pas avoir; mais elle a mis hors de conteste ce fait qu'ils traduisent exactement la foi vivante de l'Église en la sainteté originelle de Marie. Il en est de même de la Constitution apostolique *Munificentissimus* en ce qui concerne les arguments théologiques qu'on fait valoir communément en faveur de l'Assomption glorieuse de Marie.” Dillenschneider, *op. cit.* 366-367.

¹⁰³ We wonder whether Father Vollert would have been so insistent on the inconclusive nature of theological arguments for the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption if he had viewed these arguments as founded in the coredemptive-prototypical principles rather than immediately in the divine maternity; cf. *art. cit.* 58, 66.
ing a conclusive theological demonstration of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption.\textsuperscript{104}

B. The Role of the Coredeemptive and Prototypal Principles in Doctrinal Development

A final question in regard to the subsidiary principles of Mariology is their role in the development of Marian doctrine. There cannot be the slightest doubt but that Mary’s intimate association with Christ in our redemption as well as her being prototype of the Church have had a major role in the Christian consciousness arriving at the conviction of Mary’s Immaculate Conception and Assumption. However, it is not under this aspect that I wish to consider these truths here. I am rather concerned with the role these truths, as strictly theological principles, have in doctrinal development.

The question touches on the role theology in general has in doctrinal development. In two places \textit{Munificentissimus Deus} clearly sets forth what is and what is not the role of theology in this matter. One of these we have already referred to in the last citation above. Having arrived at the truth of the Assumption from theological arguments, the Pope at once affirms the belief of the universal Church in this prerogative of Mary. But it is important to note that here the reason for the certainty of the truth of Mary’s Assumption is not the conclusiveness of the theological arguments, but “the Spirit of Truth who infallibly directs [the universal Church] toward an ever

\textsuperscript{104} The manner in which these arguments are presented in \textit{Ineffabilis Deus} and \textit{Munificentissimus Deus} indicates a conviction that they beget a certainty, though indeed of a kind inferior to that which is derived from the universal belief of the Church. Likewise, there cannot be the slightest doubt but that St. Thomas, as \textit{Munificentissimus Deus} assures us, “always held together with the Catholic Church that Mary’s body had been assumed into heaven along with her soul.” Yet, since he did not consider this truth to be contained in Sacred Scripture, his conviction must rest on theological arguments as he also indicates in \textit{Sum. Theol.}, 3, 27, 1.
more perfect knowledge of the revealed truths.” It is evident that the Pope considers this as the final, culminating, and sole-sufficient reason for the proclamation of the dogma.

A few paragraphs prior to this the Pope even more explicitly indicates the role of theology in doctrinal development.

There were many teachers who instead of dealing with theological reasonings that show why it is fitting and right to believe the bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary into heaven, chose to focus their mind and attention on the faith of the Church itself. . . . Relying on this common faith, they considered the teaching opposed to the doctrine of our Lady’s Assumption as temerarious if not heretical.

Here also the Holy Father clearly contrasts the role of theology and that of the universal belief of the Church. From this passage a negative and an affirmative conclusion in regard to our subsidiary principles in doctrinal development seem sufficiently evident.

First, negatively, these theological principles do not bring the theologian to implicit revelation as such. Even though his principles are certainly revealed truths and his argumentation seems to be the most conclusive, the theologian can never by his proper theological activity arrive at truths immediately definable.

It would be a mistake if, in pointing out the limits of theological principles, we should so depreciate theology as to overlook its very significant and positive contribution in doctrinal development. One of the reasons Pius XII gave for believing the time was ripe for the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption was that this truth “is completely in harmony with other revealed truths and has been expounded and explained magnificently in the work, the science and the wisdom of the theologians.” Clearly, one cannot doubt that theology has a role in doctrinal development. To determine more pre-
cisely this role, we must examine theology's relation to the Christian sense, which, we have seen from *Munificentissimus Deus*, is all important in doctrinal development.\textsuperscript{105}

Evidently, when we speak of the Christian sense and of theology, we are dealing with two kinds of wisdom. Moreover, we believe that St. Thomas has clearly set forth the nature of these two kinds of Christian wisdom. Since we can discover relations existing between things only after we know something about the nature of those things in themselves, we shall first cite the Angelic Doctor's description of the two kinds of Christian wisdom.

Since judgment pertains to wisdom, in accord with a twofold manner of judging there is a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what is virtuous by his very inclination toward it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, a man may judge by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is numbered as a gift of the Holy Spirit. . . . The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine, inasmuch as it is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.\textsuperscript{106}

One does not read Dillenschneider's monumental work long before realizing that his description of the Christian sense is in basic agreement with what St. Thomas says here of the gift

\textsuperscript{105} On the Christian sense and the universal living faith of the Church, cf. Dillenschneider, op. cit. 333-341; 353-360, and Vollert, art. cit., 56-61. We are in full agreement with these authors in regard to the role of the Christian sense in doctrinal development and the relation it has to the Magisterium, all of which is supposed here.

\textsuperscript{106} *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 1, 6 ad 3m.
of wisdom. The only difference perhaps is that Dillenschneider is more directly concerned with what we may call the fruit of the gift rather than the gift itself. However, this does not alter the particular aspect of the Christian sense we are concerned with.

Notable as are the differences between these two kinds of wisdom, these very differences reveal an intimate relationship of the one to the other. We can readily understand how infused wisdom, which is the more perfect, will have much to offer theological wisdom. By the activity of infused wisdom the truths of faith are more perfectly penetrated, and there are uncovered hidden implications and relations. Certainly, that science which has these same truths of faith as its principles must greatly profit from this more perfect understanding of its principles.

We are primarily concerned, however, with theology's contribution to the activity of the Christian sense. It is a fundamental truth that the Holy Spirit in dispensing His gratuitous gifts does not ordinarily dispense with the necessity of a preparation and disposition in the recipient. It is here that theology has its greatest excellence and its end. In many ways theology prepares and disposes for the more perfect activity of infused wisdom both in the individual and in the Church. It does this by providing a more perfect understanding of the revealed mysteries, by disposing for an increase of humility and charity, and by removing false and deceptive imaginations. In all

107 Cf. Dillenschneider, op. cit. esp. 317-327.


109 What is said here is in perfect agreement with Dillenschneider's insistence that theology must ever maintain contact with the Christian sense; cf. op. cit. 363.
of these ways theology, the less perfect wisdom, is a preparation and a disposition for infused wisdom.\textsuperscript{110}

Moreover, theology, proceeding in a manner more in accord with our rational nature, is better able to avoid the errors and deceptions that can readily arise in a contemplation that is essentially affective. Not indeed that infused wisdom errs, but there is danger of mistaking the activity of our own natural affections and imaginations for that of infused wisdom. Hence, theological wisdom, though less perfect than infused wisdom, has a guiding and corrective role in the Christian life of faith.\textsuperscript{111}

Theology and theological principles, therefore, while never immediately causing a doctrinal development, still have an important and, in the present economy, a truly indispensable role in this development. It is in this way, then, that the subsidiary principles of Mariology, Mary as Coredemptrix and Prototype of the Church, divinely revealed truths, have played a major role in the development of Marian doctrine. They have been most fruitful principles in Marian theology, as we have seen from our study of \textit{Ineffabilis Deus} and \textit{Munificentissimus Deus}. They have exercised a dispositive causality for the dogmatization of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption.

The problem confronting the theologian because of these two definitions is not that he has any difficulty harmonizing his theology with these truths of faith. Theology had for a long time maintained these truths prior to their dogmatic definition. The theologian’s problem was rather that the theological principles by which he arrived at these truths had not been clearly set forth. Consequently, the theologian was not able satisfactorily to explain and defend the newly-defined

\textsuperscript{110} Dillenschneider, \textit{ibid.} 361, acknowledges that theology acts as a stimulant to the Christian sense.

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. \textit{ibid.} 360.
dogmas. It has been my purpose throughout to show that the coredemptive and prototypal principles are the principles by which the theologian can explain and defend this doctrinal development.

It follows of necessity that the more perfectly we understand the full meaning of these principles together with their foundation in the divine maternity, the more will the science of Mariology advance. And the more perfect our Mariology, the greater will be its dispositive causality for an ever greater development of Marian doctrine as revealed in Sacred Scripture.

Rev. Mark J. Dorenkemper, C.P.P.S.,
Carthage, Ohio.
St. Charles Seminary,