Abstract
This article draws upon a range of empirical and theoretical literature to advance a theoretical argument that an international treaty is needed to establish international inspectors who would be empowered to conduct independent investigations into allegations of corruption. This type of treaty could serve to deter and reduce the level of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, thereby promoting the rule of law, good governance, and economic growth in this region. In this view, a change in international law is needed to deter corruption and lay a foundation for good governance that would permit Western assistance to be effective. In contrast, the IMF and World Bank have implemented structural adjustment programs predicated on the assumption that Western assistance, in the form of aid, loans and conditions attached to loans, can be effective when it is channeled through the same dysfunctional domestic institutions that are the source of corruption, poor governance, and poor economic performance. Evidence suggests that IMF and World Bank programs have negative impacts on economic growth rates, implying that suspension of these policies, together with the implementation of an international treaty establishing international inspectors, could have positive effects on economic growth.
Recommended Citation
Yeh, Stuart S.
(2012)
"Anti-Corruption Inspections: A Missing Element of the IMF/World Bank Agenda?,"
Journal of African Policy Studies: Vol. 18:
No.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/joaps/vol18/iss1/2