The Effect of the Norm of Group Interest in Response to Leader Dissent
I examine the influence of a leader's dissenting behavior in an intergroup task on a group member's evaluation of the leader's performance. In the proposed study, group members will participate in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). False feedback will create a cooperative group decision and then group members will be informed of the leader's decision to conform to or dissent from the group's decision. The leader's decision will be paired with a high payout or low payout group outcome. I investigate predictions based on Social Identity Theory (SIT), Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT), and Norm of Group Interest (NGI). NGI predicts individual variations in outcome-based evaluations of the leader, RGCT predicts high payouts should be associated with high evaluations of the leader. Lastly, SIT predicts a leader's dissent should result in lower evaluations of the leader from low identifying members regardless of outcome. Results will highlight each models' fit to dissent and leadership situations within an intergroup context.
R Matthew Montoya
Primary Advisor's Department
Stander Symposium poster
"The Effect of the Norm of Group Interest in Response to Leader Dissent" (2019). Stander Symposium Posters. 1480.