Document Type
Article
Abstract
The president holds both a veto power and enforcement power by nature of his position. Traditionally, the veto power has been understood as temporally limited—the president gets one shot to use it with respect to a particular bill. On the flip side, the enforcement power is a continuing one—the president has ongoing discretion to enforce the law in the way he believes to be necessary. Far from being distinct powers, however, the enforcement power can be transformed into a “continuing veto power” wherein the president can use his enforcement discretion to nullify particular statutes or applications of statutes that he disfavors. This Article explores that phenomenon. By temporally extending the veto power, the enforcement power has important effects on our law. It enhances the power of the presidency, potentially undermines fair notice and democratic accountability, and presents risks of opportunism and gamesmanship. Importantly, mechanisms for meaningfully constraining the continuing veto do not currently exist. Although our system has closed off many of the avenues to constraining the continuing veto, its dangers warrant thinking seriously about its effects on our political system.
Recommended Citation
Craighead, M. Burke
(2026)
"The Enforcement Power as a Continuing Veto Power,"
University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 51:
No.
2, Article 4.
Available at:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol51/iss2/4
Publication Date
4-1-2026
Comments
M. Burke Craighead is a law clerk to the Hon. Chad Readler, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Baylor University.