Audit Committee Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements

Author(s)

Deborah S. Archambeault, University of DaytonFollow
F. Todd DeZoort, University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa
Dana R. Hermanson, Kennesaw State University

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Winter 2008

Publication Source

Contemporary Accounting Research

Abstract

This study investigates the association between audit committee incentive-based compensation and financial reporting failures reported in restatements. Specifi- cally, we evaluate whether short-term and long-term incentive compensation (i.e., short-term and long-term stock option grants) for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements due to error or fraud. 1 We use accounting restatements as a proxy for financial reporting failure because they are relatively objective measures of reporting failure (e.g., Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2002, 2006; Myers, Myers, Palmrose, and Scholz 2005) and because they are increasingly common and costly events that are linked to audit committee member oversight performance.

Inclusive pages

965–992

ISBN/ISSN

0823-9150

Comments

Permission documentation is on file.

Copyright

Copyright © 2008, Canadian Academic Accounting Association

Publisher

John Wiley & Sons

Volume

25

Issue

4

Peer Reviewed

yes

eCommons Citation

Archambeault, Deborah S.; DeZoort, F. Todd; and Hermanson, Dana R., "Audit Committee Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements" (2008). Accounting Faculty Publications. 44.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/acc_fac_pub/44