Leakage Mapping: A Systematic Methodology for Assessing the Side Channel Information Leakage of Cryptographic Implementations

Author(s)

William E. Cobb, Air Force Institute of Technology
Rusty O. Baldwin, University of DaytonFollow
Eric D. Laspe, Air Force Institute of Technology

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-2013

Publication Source

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security

Abstract

We propose a generalized framework to evaluate the side-channel information leakage of symmetric block ciphers. The leakage mapping methodology enables the systematic and efficient identification and mitigation of problematic information leakages by exhaustively considering relevant leakage models. The evaluation procedure bounds the anticipated resistance of an implementation to the general class of univariate differential side-channel analysis techniques. Typical applications are demonstrated using the well-known Hamming weight and Hamming distance leakage models, with recommendations for the incorporation of more accurate models. The evaluation results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential side-channel analysis attacks on two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard.

Inclusive pages

2:1-2:29

ISBN/ISSN

1094-9224

Comments

Permission documentation on file.

Copyright

© W. E. Cobb, R. O. Baldwin, and E. D. Laspe | ACM 2013

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

Volume

16

Peer Reviewed

yes

Issue

1

eCommons Citation

Cobb, William E.; Baldwin, Rusty O.; and Laspe, Eric D., "Leakage Mapping: A Systematic Methodology for Assessing the Side Channel Information Leakage of Cryptographic Implementations" (2013). Computer Science Faculty Publications. 108.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/cps_fac_pub/108