The effect of the norm of group interest in response to leader dissent

Date of Award

2019

Degree Name

M.A. in Psychology

Department

Department of Psychology

Advisor/Chair

Advisor: R. Matthew Montoya

Abstract

I examined how group members evaluated a leader following an intergroup relations task. Specifically, how a leader's decision to conform to or dissent from the group's voted preference and the resulting payout affected group member evaluation of their group leaders following a Prisoner's Dilemma Game between two groups. False feedback created a cooperative group decision and then group members were informed of the leader's decision to agree with or dissent from the group's decision. This decision was paired with a high payout or low payout for the group. Group members then evaluated the leader to assess how the decision and its payout influenced the evaluation. Although the results were not significant, means trended in such a way that leaders who countered their group's preference, resulting in a high payout, were more supported. Leaders who dissented, regardless of payout, were viewed as marginally more stereotypical leaders. These means were not in the directions predicted by norm of group interest (NGI), social identity theory (SIT), or realistic group conflict theory (RGCT). Rather, these trending means may demonstrate, in line with role congruity theory, that these leaders were viewed by group members to be more agentic and "leader-like."

Keywords

Psychology, Social Psychology, norm of group interest, dissent, intergroup relations

Rights Statement

Copyright © 2019, author

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