Philosophy Faculty Publications
Document Type
Conference Paper
Publication Date
2012
Publication Source
Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
Abstract
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006).
Inclusive pages
481-488
Document Version
Published Version
Copyright
Copyright © 2012, Viorel Pâslaru
Publisher
Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
Volume
217
Place of Publication
Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Peer Reviewed
yes
eCommons Citation
Pâslaru, Viorel, "Conceptions of Mechanisms and Insensitivity of Causation" (2012). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 17.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/17
Comments
This document is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license. Any form of reproduction, distribution, public communication or transformation of this work not included under the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license can only be carried out with the express authorization of the proprietors, save where otherwise provided by the law.
Permission documentation is on file.