Rational Bargaining Strategies
Presenter(s)
Chloe Lynne Beckett
Files
Description
Ariel Rubinstein proved a perfect equilibrium partition exists in a bargaining model. His results come from a game in which two players must agree on a contract that states how to partition a pie of size one. Several statements regarding the players’ preferences are assumed. To begin, one player makes an offer and the other player accepts the offer or rejects the offer with another proposal. The Perfect Equilibrium Partitions (PEP) are described in all the models satisfying the assumptions. Solutions to the above scenario using fixed bargaining cost and then fixed discounting factors will be displayed during the presentation.
Publication Date
4-24-2019
Project Designation
Capstone Project
Primary Advisor
Jonathan H. Brown
Primary Advisor's Department
Mathematics
Keywords
Stander Symposium project
Recommended Citation
"Rational Bargaining Strategies" (2019). Stander Symposium Projects. 1473.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/stander_posters/1473
