Title
Take the Money and Run: Political Turnover, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2010
Publication Source
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Abstract
We find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and U.S. state economic growth. Although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict Olson's (1982a) famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability, such constitutional political changes were not primarily what Olson had in mind. We argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent-seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest (redistributive) policies vs. general (growth enhancing) ones are greater for less durable regimes. Therefore, we interpret our evidence as supportive of Olson's broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent-seeking behavior on growth.
Inclusive pages
406–412
ISBN/ISSN
0167-2681
Copyright
Copyright © 2010, Elsevier
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
76
Peer Reviewed
yes
Issue
2
eCommons Citation
Caporale, Tony and Leirer, Jonathan, "Take the Money and Run: Political Turnover, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth" (2010). Economics and Finance Faculty Publications. 61.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/eco_fac_pub/61
COinS
Comments
Permission documentation is on file.