Paper/Proposal Title

Orchestration or Improvisation at the UN? The International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions

Presenter/Author Information

Tom Pegram, UC London (UK)

Location

River Campus - Room 2006

Start Date

10-4-2013 9:30 AM

Abstract

To bridge the gulf between international human rights law and domestic practice, the UN promoted a novel idea in the 1990s: all countries were to adopt National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Their endorsement by the UN General Assembly in 1993 has precipitated a global norm cascade with 120 NHRIs in existence in 2013. This paper applies the conceptual framework of orchestration to analyse how and why the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has ideationally and materially supported a third-party intermediary – the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs (ICC) – to achieve human rights compliance by UN Member States. Orchestration, as developed by Abbott and Snidal, provides a valuable alternative to traditional IO governance approaches which emphasize ‘hard’ regulation. A focus on indirect and soft modes of human rights governance is particularly pertinent to explaining the influence of the UN given its lack of coercive modes of governance. In analysing the UN’s enlistment of the affiliated but independent ICC to achieve human rights objectives with respect to target States the paper demonstrates that orchestration provides a powerful conceptual tool to illuminate a novel arena of human rights compliance. Drawing on significant primary fieldwork, the paper also advances a cautionary note to the empirical application of orchestration theory. It highlights the importance of individual human rights norm entrepreneurs willing and able to exploit constructive ambiguities within UN structures to advance their objectives. It further reflects on the potential for strategic setbacks as different stakeholders compete for resources and influence.

Comments

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Oct 4th, 9:30 AM

Orchestration or Improvisation at the UN? The International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions

River Campus - Room 2006

To bridge the gulf between international human rights law and domestic practice, the UN promoted a novel idea in the 1990s: all countries were to adopt National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). Their endorsement by the UN General Assembly in 1993 has precipitated a global norm cascade with 120 NHRIs in existence in 2013. This paper applies the conceptual framework of orchestration to analyse how and why the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has ideationally and materially supported a third-party intermediary – the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs (ICC) – to achieve human rights compliance by UN Member States. Orchestration, as developed by Abbott and Snidal, provides a valuable alternative to traditional IO governance approaches which emphasize ‘hard’ regulation. A focus on indirect and soft modes of human rights governance is particularly pertinent to explaining the influence of the UN given its lack of coercive modes of governance. In analysing the UN’s enlistment of the affiliated but independent ICC to achieve human rights objectives with respect to target States the paper demonstrates that orchestration provides a powerful conceptual tool to illuminate a novel arena of human rights compliance. Drawing on significant primary fieldwork, the paper also advances a cautionary note to the empirical application of orchestration theory. It highlights the importance of individual human rights norm entrepreneurs willing and able to exploit constructive ambiguities within UN structures to advance their objectives. It further reflects on the potential for strategic setbacks as different stakeholders compete for resources and influence.