Abstract
In this paper I shall argue that the two schemes and the respective theories in which they are imbedded are not equivalent in any important sense. Rather they are complementary schemes which, though individually insufficient to explain the problem of change as Aristotle recognized it, are jointly sufficient. I shall maintain that (I) hylomorphism is prior to actuality as an explanatory scheme, but (II) it fails to explain important data concerning change which actuality theory accounts for; finally (III) I shall briefly indicate how this account of the structural relations between hylomorphism and actuality theory meets certain objections and accords with certain facts about the historical development of Aristotle's theories.
Recommended Citation
Graham, Daniel W.
(1988)
"Potentiality-Actuality and Matter-Form,"
University of Dayton Review: Vol. 19:
No.
3, Article 10.
Available at:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol19/iss3/10
