Abstract
I shall argue that we need not regard Aristotle as inconsistent as a consequence of his seeming reservations about the suitability of souls as hupokeimena; nor need we accept the suggestion of those commentators who agree with Hamlyn in holding that DA 408b11-15 provides evidence that "the concept of a person or subject is generally missing from Aristotle's discussion of the problems in the philosophy of mind." But it will not be possible to avail ourselves of the solutions of those commentators who seek to deny either of the first two propositions in our prima facie inconsistent triad; and by focusing on the third proposition we can come to appreciate just how concerned Aristotle is with the questions which motivate our investigations into the nature of persons and personal identity, including especially the nature of the diachronic identity of persons.
Recommended Citation
Shields, Christopher
(1988)
"Soul as Subject in Aristotle’s De Anima,"
University of Dayton Review: Vol. 19:
No.
3, Article 14.
Available at:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol19/iss3/14
